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ABSTRACT'
Gavin J. McGrath
Puritans and the Human Will: Voluntarism within mid-
seventeenth century puritanism as seen in the works
of Richard Baxter and John Owen"
Doctor of Philosophy
University of Durham
1989
This thesis is a theological study of mid-
seventeenth century puritan piety as seen in the works
of Richard Baxter (1615-1691) and John Owen (1616-
1683). It proposes that central to the practical
divinity of Baxter and Owen was a voluntarism.
Voluntarism is defined as "the prominence, but not
dominance, of the will's response to God's sovereign
initiatives in the divine/human encounter". Based on
this definition the chapters consider the following.
Chapter 1 presents the historical and theological
context in	 which they wrote, paying 	 particular
attention to general
	
developments within Reformed
theology,	 covenant	 theology,	 Arminianism	 and
Antinomianism.
Chapter 2 argues that Baxter and Owen were within a
tradition which went back to Augustine and extended
through to Calvin. This tradition taught that man's
will was "free" only in the sense that it was free from
constraint and force. Due to sin the will could only
respond to God's call through the renovation which God
brought about through grace and the Holy Spirit.
Chapters 3 and 4 present the two sides of the
divine/human encounter. Chapter 3 considers covenant
theology as an important antecedent to Baxter and
Owen's interpretations of the divine encounter.
Chapter 4 studies human choice, and the ability to
choose, as a reflection of the Imago Dei. It is noted
that Baxter and Owen recognized faith as involving all
the	 human faculties,	 but	 especially a	 crucial .
"willingness."
Chapter 5 discusses voluntarism and justification:
the meeting of the divine initiative and human
response. Attention is given to the issues of election,
the effectual call, preparation and the work of the
Holy Spirit.
Chapters 6 and 7 depend upon the doctrinal
observations made in the earlier chapters and present
the practical side of Baxter and Owen's voluntarism.
Grace and duty, perseverance and assurance are the
principal topics. Voluntarism shaped the importance of
a willingness to fight sin, and the hope and promise of
the saints as they lived their life in Christ.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION 
1.1	 Voluntarism defined 
This thesis is a study of one aspect of mid-
seventeenth century puritan theology and practice: the
importance of the human will in the Christian life, or
voluntarism. Broadly speaking, voluntarism refers to
the choosing acts of the human will; more precisely,
however, the will's choice with particular reference to
the following points. First, the very
	 etymology of
voluntarism, derived from voluntarius and from the verb
volo (to be	 willing, to wish,	 to purpose,	 to
determine), suggests an intrinsic choosing capability
(arbitrium) or function of man. In mid-seventeenth
century puritan theology it was held that along with
his reason and affections, man's will (his choosing)
was central to his identity and activity. Mid-
seventeenth century puritans like Richard Baxter (1615-
1691) and John Owen (1616-1683) believed that man's
reason, will and affection (man's faculties)
constituted the human soul. Equally the faculties were
evidence that man was made in the image of God. This
study argues that while no one faculty was considered
more important than the others by Baxter and Owen,
nevertheless, they taught that the will played a
2prominent role in a person's Christian life. In short,
the voluntarism	 of Baxter and	 Owen assumed the
prominence but not the dominance of the will. The
first point, then, is that voluntarism refers to the
choosing of the human will yet within a context of
man's other faculties.
Secondly, it must be appreciated that voluntarism
ultimately relates to the divine will. When Baxter and
Owen considered the question of free will (liberum
arbitrium) it was in reference to God's will.
Following Augustine they argued that just as man was
not autonomous vis-a-vis his Creator, so the human will
was not independent from the Creator's will.
Thirdly, voluntarism relates to the Christian's life
and experience. Within the Augustinian tradition (to
which Owen and Baxter were indebted) the will was
important	 in	 regeneration,	 justification,
	
and
sanctification. Thus, the role of the human will was
central	 to Baxter and Owen's understanding of a
person's Christian experience.	 How did he come to
faith? How could he grow in grace? How could he fight
sin?	 How could he be sure that he would persevere to
the end? In answering these questions Baxter and
Owen's practical theology detailed the role of the will
and stressed the importance of willingness.
Voluntarism is therefore a way of describing the
will's response to the divine initiative: it is part of
the human side of	 the divine/human encounter.
Nevertheless, voluntarism necessitates a study of the
human response to God and a study of the divine
3initiative. Accordingly, it is important to show the
will's activity in relation to a number of associated
doctrines which explain the divine initiative and
activity.	 Throughout this study, then, Baxter and
Owen's	 views	 on	 election,	 predestination,
Justification, sanctification and perseverance are
presented. Their voluntarism was so closely related to
each of these doctrines, each never fully isolated from
the other, that the methodology of this thesis must
include an
	
appreciation of this 	 broad doctrinal
context.
The definition
	
of voluntarism offered in	 this
thesis, is therefore, the prominence, but not
dominance, of the will's response to God's sovereign
initiatives in the divine/human encounter. It will be
shown that this definition best expresses the views of
Baxter and Owen concerning the role of the human will
in the Christian life.
This definition goes further than what has been
presented by a number of studies on puritan theology in
recent years and to which this thesis responds and
interacts.	 On one	 hand,	 voluntarism is	 not
voluntaryism: a term which helpfully explains how some
Elizabethans stopped attending their local parish
church, or went in addition, to another another parish
church or Separatist gathering where a more "powerful"
or more "edifying" preacher was present. 1	On the
1 See the study by Patrick Collinson, °Voluntary Religion: Its Forms and Tendencies'
in The Religion of Protestants. The Church in English Society 1559-1625. The Ford lectures,
1979. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, paperback 1984), pp.242-83. See also the earlier work
by Geoffrey Nuttall, Visible Saints: The Congregational Ray 1640-1660. (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1957).
4other hand, with regard to those who have rightly
confined voluntarism to the role of the will, this
thesis particularly responds to a number of modern
scholars.
In his book, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649,
R.T. Kendall has drawn a contrast between Calvin's
definition of faith and that of later "Calvinists". 2
His main argument is that later English puritans,
notably William Perkins (1558-1602), accepted a view of
faith which was not Calvin's, but Theodore Beza's
(1519-1605). According to Kendall, Calvin understood
faith and the assurance of faith to rest principally in
a passive persuasion of the mind; faith had more to do
with knowledge through illumination rather than any
sense of voluntarism or experimental test. In
contrast, Beza promoted the idea of a limited atonement
and this, concluded Kendall, led to the implication
that assurance was not to be found in looking to
Christ's death.	 Furthermore, Beza allegedly suggested
a distinction between faith and assurance.
	 From this
distinction developed the practical syllogism
(syllogismus practicus), or what Kendall has called the
"reflex act": a person gained assurance by looking
inward to detect if certain fruits of sanctification
were evident; if they were present, and such fruits
were characteristic of the elect, then the person could
conclude he was regenerate.3 Following Beza rather
2 R.T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinis, to 1649 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1979).
3 Kendall, Calvin and English Calviniss, p.93.
5than Calvin, Perkins and his followers (Richard
Greenham, Paul Baynes, Richard Rogers, John Cotton,
Richard Sibbes and the Westminster Confession of Faith)
stressed the role of the will over knowledge. 4
According to Kendall their voluntarism was "faith as an
act of the will in contrast to a passive persuasion of
the mind." 5 From this definition he has identified an
element within English Calvinism which he has called
"experimental predestinarianism", and so argued that
faith became more than a knowledge but an involvement
of the will in response to grace and the preparatory
work of the law. 6 In this sense Kendall's conclusion
is that by the time of Baxter and Owen the theological
consensus was far different than Calvin's teaching.
Apart from a number of critical reviews of his book,
there has not yet been an adequate appraisal of
7Kendall's assumptions. 	 This thesis argues that his
definition of voluntarism is erroneous. To draw such a
sharp contrast between faith resting in a passive
persuasion of the mind and faith as an act of the will
is too neat and tidy.	 Far more importantly, a reading
4 
For Greenham see DNB, vol 23, p.77; Baynes see DNB, vol 3, p.455; Rogers see DNB,
vol 49, p.137; Cotton see Richard LAreaves and Robert Zaller eds. Biographical Dictionary of
British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century (Brighton: The Harvester Press Limited, 1982),
vol I, pp.178-79. See also Larzer Ziff, ed. John Cotton on the Churches of Hem England
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Sibbes seeDHD, vol 52, p182.
5 Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinist, p.3 and passit.
6 
Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinist, p.62.
7
Kendall has received considerable criticism: notably from W. Stanford Reid, NTJ,
43, 1980, pp.255-62; A.N.S. Lane, Thetelios, 6, 198011, pp.29-31; A. Skevington Wood, EA.,
53, April - June, 1981, pp.124-25; Dewey D. Wallace, D.H., 50 September, 1981, pp.348-49;
Paul Helm, SJT, 34, 1981, pp.179-85, later expanded in Calvin and the Calvinists (Banner of
Truth, OK) ; M. Charles Bell, SJT, 36, 1983, pp.535-40; George Harper, CTJ, 20, no.2,
November, 1985, pP.255-62.
6of Perkins and other later Puritans suggests that
Kendall has allowed his definition to blur some of the
contradictions and paradoxes of English Calvinist
theology; equally one cannot help but question his
reading of Calvin.
The fact of the matter is that Calvin considered
justifying faith and assurance to be inextricably
related. 8 In pointing to this unity Calvin argued
from his conviction that true faith was a certainty of
God's gracious promises of mercy and forgiveness in
Jesus Christ.
Therefore our mind must be otherwise
illumined and our heart strengthened,
that the Word of God may obtain full
faith among us. Now we shall possess a
right definition of faith if we call it
a firm and certain knowledge of God's
benevolence toward us, founded upon the
truth of the freely given promise in
Christ, both revealed to our minds and
sealed upon our hearts through the Holy
Spirit. '
The strength of faith rested solely in the object of
faith: Christ Jesus the Redeemer for sinners, and for
me, a particular sinner.	 Of course it is necessary
to appreciate the implications of Calvin's teaching on
"temporary faith", particularly with reference to Simon
Magus (Acts 8.13). Kendall has suggested that it was
8 
A.N.S. Lane, 'Calvin's Doctrine of Assurance', Vox Evangelica 11 (1979), p.32;
Paul Helm, SJT, 34, 1981, p.182	 argues that there are passages in Calvin's Institutes in
which "saving faith is clearly distinguished from assurance.'	 Helm refers to 111.2.11 and
111.2.12. See a criticism of Helm's view by M. Charles Bell, "Was Calvin a Calvinist?'
	 SJI,
36:4 (1963), pp.535-40.
9 Calvin, Instit. III.ii.7. OS, IV, p.G: Nunc iusta fidei definitio nobis constabit
si decamus esse divinae erga nos benevolentiae firmam certamque cognitionem, quae gratuitae
in Christo promissionis veritate fundata, per Spiritum sanctum et revelatur mentibus nostris
et cordibus obsignatur.
10 A.N.S. Lane, 'Calvin's Doctrine of Assurance', Vox Evangelica 11 (1979), p.36.
7actually Calvin's teaching on temporary faith --
because it left some questions unanswered -- which gave
rise to later voluntaristic definitions of faith and
the use of the practical syllogism. 	 as David
Foxgrover has suggested, the issue of temporary faith
in Institutes III.ii.10-11	 did not challenge the
certainty of assurance. Calvin wanted to explain the
nature of hypocrisy and warn believers only so as to
encourage them in perseverance. 12 Calvin's emphasis
was on a faith which knew, by persuasion and
illumination by the Spirit through the Word, the
trustworthiness of God's mercy and forgiveness offered
in Christ.	 Accordingly, Calvin argued faith and
assurance are united in essence. 0
Nevertheless, Calvin recognised, and was sympathetic
towards, those who doubt of their assurance. In this
sense there was a degree of paradox in Calvin's
teaching on faith and assurance.
Surely, while we teach that faith ought
to be certain and assured, we cannot
imagine any certainty that is not tinged
with doubt, or any assurance that is not
assailed by some anxiety. On the other
hand, we say that believers are in
perpetual	 conflict	 with	 their own
unbelief.	 Far, indeed, are we from
putting their consciences in any
peaceful repose, undisturbed by any
tumult at all. Yet, once again, we deny
that, in whatever way they are
afflicted, they fall away and depart
from the certain assurance received from
11 Kendall, Calvin and English Calviniss, pp.23-24.
12 
David Foxgrover, "Temporary Faith ° and the Certainty of Salvation', CTJ, 15
(1980), pp.220-32.
13
Calvin, lnstit. III.11.16.
8God's mercy. 14
Kendall has passedover this aspect of Calvin's
teaching: doubting, fearing and trembling were not
minimised by Calvin. The problem was not with the
nature of faith but with the constant struggle against
unbelief and sin. Likewise, faith could be weak and in
need of further growth. 0	 True knowledge of
assurance, however, overcame this doubt.16
How was assurance experienced? This is at the heart
of voluntarism. Calvin argued that it was gained
through the Spirit validating the Word. 17 In the
revelation of God's word one was shown the certainty of
perseverance and above all else the preserving power
18
and promise of God in Christ.
	
As the Spirit
testified to the believer of God's faithfulness to his
promises in his Word, confidence and assurance were
gained. For Calvin assurance was a special work of the
Holy Spirit. 19 What Calvin seems to have rejected was
any notion that the conscience was the basis for
detecting assurance: "if you contemplate yourself, that
is sure damnation." N Certainly Calvin suggested that
14
Calvin, Instit. III.ii.17. OS, IV, p.27.
15 George W. Harper, "Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649: A Review Article', CU,
20, no.2, 1985, p.257, is surely wrong to suggest that Calvin was unwilling to devote such
attention to the idea of true believers struggling with assurance.
16 Calvin, Instit. III.ii.15.
17 Cal y in,/nstit. III.i.1-4.
18 Calvin, Instit. III.ii.21.
19 Calvin, Instit. III.11.71.
20 Calvin, Inst it. III.ii.24.
9the conscience, if it was humble and tender,
strengthened a believer's progress in the life of
faith, but to set the conscience between faith and
assurance was dangerous. Assurance originated from the
promise of God in Christ. 	 Personal morality would
not provide infallible assurance.
But what about Calvin's comment on 2 Peter 1.10,
singled out by Kendall as a key text in experimental
predestinarianism? Again, Kendall has missed some of
Calvin's subtlety:
purity of life is rightly regarded as
the illustration and evidence of
election, whereby the faithful not only
show to others that they are the sons of
God, but also confirm themselves in this
faith, but in such a way that theyrplace
their sure foundations elsewhere. I.
This raises the question of works and assurance and,
further,	 the issue	 of the	 practical syllogism,
syllogismus practicus.	 On the whole Kendall and
others seem to be right: Calvin did not stress the
practical syllogism, at least	 as it came to be
understood by those who came after him. N
The problem, however, which should not be ignored,
is that Calvin accepted that works could strengthen and
serve as signs of one's justification. In his
exposition of the Lord's Prayer Calvin explained that
21 Calvin, Instit. 111.11.24.
22 Calvin, Coss.2 Peter 1.10, p.334.
23
This was defined above, p.4, See John S. Bray, "The Value of Works in the Theology
of Calvin and Beza°, The Sixteenth Century	 Journal, 4 (1973): 77-86 who draws attention to
this issue.
24	 .
Wilhelm Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, English trans. by Howard Knight (London:
Lutteruorth Press, 1956), pp.171 and 178; Lane, op.cit, p.46; Bell, op.cit, pp. 538-39.
10
the conditional clause, "as we forgive" (Mt. 6.12 and
parallels), while not that upon which forgiveness
rested, was nevertheless a warning "to prevent anyone
from daring to approach God to seek forgiveness without
being quite free and clear from hatred." At the same
time, however, one's forgiveness of others can serve to
"confirm our own absolution, as by the imprint of a
seal." 25	 Similarly in his exposition of the Lord's
Prayer	 in the	 1559 Institutes	 he	 referred to
forgiveness of others as a condition which could be a
"sign to assure us he has granted forgiveness of sins
to us just as surely as we are aware of having forgiven
others." N
Yet, surely the context of Calvin's argument about
works and his exposition of the Lord's Prayer was one
which insisted on the primacy of justification through
Christ's righteousness.	 Calvin, of course, wanted to
address criticism from Rome and stressed a
justification by faith which did not exclude works, but
works were subordinate signs of one's justification.
The flow of Calvin's argument in Instit. III.xiv.18-20
was that while works helped a believer in assurance
they did so only in that they referred to God's
adopting them as sons. As Lane has put it, works of
this kind were never to be, " the primary ground of our
confidence." n
25 
Calvin, a Harmony of the Gospel, Torrance edition, Vol 1, p.212; CR 45, p.201:
'et simul absolutionis nostrae fiduciam quasi impresso sigillo melius ratam facere.'
26 Calvin, Instit. III.xx.45; OS, IV, p.361: addidit enim hoc tanquam signum quo
confirmmemur tam certo nobis factum a se remissionem pectatorum...
27
Lane, op.cit, p.34.
11
The above examples of Calvin's writings suggest that
Kendall	 has not	 presented an	 entirely balanced
interpretation of Calvin. A number of conclusions can
be drawn here which will be shown in later chapters to
be relevant to understanding voluntarism in later
English puritanism. First, assurance was of the
essence of faith, and should not be separated from
faith. Second, Calvin recognised that many doubted, and
while this was not ideal, it was not a reflection on
the nature of faith but the reality of one's struggle
with the flesh.	 Third, Calvin may not have embraced
introspective reflection in order to determine
election, still he allowed, and encouraged, a person to
see the signs of sanctification and to gain assurance
that such evidence confirmed one's union with Christ
and participation in the life of the Spirit.
Kendall's interpretation of William Perkins (1558-
1602) also needs a certain amount of qualification.
Kendall has referred to Perkins as "the fountain head
of the	 experiential predestinarian	 tradition".	 28
Perkins was a committed follower of Calvin but with
modifications received from Beza and Zanchius. 29
Perkins's view of assurance, which was not
necessarily original, can be summed up in the following
way. First, Perkins claimed that there were different
degrees of faith. In Foundation of Christian Religion
he referred to the "least" measure of faith and the
28 Kendall, Calvin and English Calviniss, p.51.
29 Ian Breward, The Works of Millie, Perkins.	 The Courtenay Library of Reformation
Classics. Vol. 3. (Appleford: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970), p.85.
12
"greatest" measure of faith. Here is the
implication: there was an assurance of faith which was
the essence of faith, but there was an assurance of
faith which came after faith and over a long period of
time in the Christian life. It was the latter with
which Perkins was primarily concerned. 31 Perkins did
not fully separate faith from assurance, but because of
his experiential approach he gave greater emphasis to
the long process of assurance. 	 "You may have to wait,
but by faith it will come." 32	 It was this assurance
which became infallible.	 In Golden Chain Perkins
declared,
[the] highest degree of faith is
plerophoria, a full assurance, which is
not only a certain and true but also a
full persuasion of the heart, whereby a
Christian much more firmly taking hold
on Christ Jesus maketh full and resolute
account that God loveth him, and that he
will give to him by name Christ and all
his graces pertaining to eternal life.
Man cometh to this high degree after the
sense, observation and long experience
of God's favour and love.
A second observation about Perkins' theology of
perseverance is that he widened the gap between
certainty of God's benevolence and the experiential
apprehension of this assurance. His resolution of this
30 Breward, Perkins, p.158; cf. p.229.
31
This observation is also made by Gordon J. Keddie, "infallible Certenty of the
Pardon of Sinne and Life Everlasting", EQ, 48, p.237.
32 Perkins, 4 Treatise tending unto a Declaration in The Works of the fano and
Worthie Hinister of Christ.. .gathered into one gam, and newly corrected. John Legat:
Cambridge, 1605, p.492.
33
Keddie, ap.cit, p.243.
34 Perkins, Golden Chain Chap. XXXVI.80-81, in Breward, Perkins, pp.230-31.
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problem was found within a covenant theology. 35
According to Ian Breward, while Perkins' 0 use of the
covenant was not central to his theology, nevertheless
the covenant of grace expressed the outward means of
the decree of election. The covenant had seals or
means, which if used by the believer, could provide a
way to assurance. This point, however, led to an
increased reflection on one's sanctification and the
use of the covenant means.
Q. How may a man know that he is
justified before God? A. He need not
ascend into heaven to search the secret
counsel of God, but rather descend into
his own heart to search whether he be
sanctified or not. Rom. 8.1;	 2 John
3.9. 
Finally, Perkins advocated the practical syllogism,
not in a way which subordinated his Christocentrism but
which called for the conscience to determine the
appropriateness of the will's choice. The practical
syllogism was also only suitable for someone under the
influence of the Spirit, and in fact, Perkins in Golden
Chain inferred the practical syllogism only after he
stressed the independent testimony of the Spirit.
However, he moved on to an affirmation of the practical
syllogism.37
It is arguable that Kendall missed certain subtle
qualifications to be found in Calvin's and Perkins'
soteriology: especially the role of the Spirit and
35 
The nature of covenant theology is considered below, 1.5, pp. 54-56 and more
fully in 3.1, pp.144-75.
36 
Perkins, Foundation of Christian Religion, in Breward, Perkins, p.159.
37 Perkins, Golden Chain, Chap. 1 1/111.113-114 in Breward, pp.256-59.
3.4
38Christology.	 To be sure, there are differences
between Calvin, Perkins and later puritans; this is
hardly surprising, given that Reformed theology was
shaped not only by Calvin but by the Heidelberg
divines, Dutch theologians as well as English writers.39
Nevertheless, as shown in the previous pages, Kendall's
interpretation of Calvin and Perkins is open to
legitimate challenge. We argue that, however different
Calvin	 was from	 later	 "Calvinists" there	 were
voluntaristic themes which continued. A reading of
Calvin and Perkins actually points to far more paradox
and qualification than Kendall has acknowledged. In
the final analysis Calvin's theology did include a
voluntarism: but a voluntarism more in keeping with the
definition offered above -- the prominence, but not
dominance, of the will's response to God's sovereign
initiatives in the divine/human encounter.
William K.B. Stoever's 'A Faire and Easie Way to
Heaven'. Covenant Theology and Antinomianism in Early
Massachusetts (1978) is an indispensable study into the
nature of covenant theology and its relationship to
seventeenth century puritan theology. 0 Stoever has
made a	 number of
	
important advances
	
in modern
38 See Richard A. Muller, Christ and Decree. Christology and Predestination in
Reforsed Theology fro, Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986), p.132 who
makes a similar criticism and adds that Kendall, among others, has missed the relation
between Perkins' theology and pietism. 	 This is a fascinating observation, but regrettably
Muller never clearly explains it.
39 The developments in Reformed theology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
are presented below in 3.1 - 3.1.3, pp.144-75.
40	 •	 •
William K.B. Stoever, 'A Faire and Easie Hay to Heaven'. Covenant Theology and
Antinonianist in Early Nassachasetts (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press,
1978).
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scholarship, particularly noting the way in which
seventeenth	 century	 Reformed	 theology argued
passionately that faith was the result of God's
sovereign initiative in predestination and, yet, there
also was the importance of human choice. In many ways
Stoever's findings are conclusive, but, as the title
suggests, he has concentrated on New England
Antinomianism. The nature of Antinomianism in England
in the seventeenth century remains to be studied;
equally the voluntarism to which Stoever alludes needs
fuller exposition.
One work which is notable because of its treatment
of voluntarism is John Von Rohr's, The Covenant of
Grace in Puritan Thought (1986). It is one of the few
more recent works which has analyzed the nature of
voluntarism. 41 Unlike Kendall, he has accurately noted
that Augustine's influence led many puritans to hold a
view of faith which involved both the intellect and the
will. Von Rohr highlights voluntarism's importance in
covenant theology. The difficulty, however, is that he
never fully defined voluntarism beyond concluding that
it was one of the two paradoxical points of puritan
theology which	 enabled	 them	 to	 affirm human
42
responsibility and contingency.	 He comes closer to
the view of this thesis when he writes, "The basic
antinomy is that of divine sovereignty and human
freedom.	 If predestination affirms the ultimacy and
41	
John Von Rohr, The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought. American Academy of
Religion Studies in Religion, Number 45. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986).
42 Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace, p.1.
1.6
final efficiency of God's choice, piety urges at least
some effective free participation on the part of the
human subject." 43
The study of voluntarism in the thought of Richard
Baxter and John Owen, as representatives of mid—
seventeenth century puritanism, which will be presented
here	 inevitably	 becomes	 a	 study	 of	 puritan
spirituality. As such, it stands beside the
contributions of other modern writers. The invaluable
work in recent years by Stoever, Dewey D. Wallace, Jr.
and Charles L. Cohen has, nevertheless, been more
concerned with practical piety and an overview of a
large number of late puritans than with a close
44theological study of certain central figures.	 This
thesis, as a close study of doctrine, can also serve as
a complementary aid to Paul Seaver's insightful work,
45Wallington's World.	 Seaver has drawn on the personal
writings of Nehemiah Wallington, a London artisan whose
diaries provide a fresh insight into the puritan life;
in short Seaver has gone out into the congregation and
provided an example of a "common man". This approach
43 Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace, p.8.
44 Stoever, Faire and Easie Ray. Dewey D. Wallace, Jr., Puritans and Predestination.
Grace in English Protestant Theology 1525-1695. Studies in Religion. (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1982). Wallace provides a good survey of predestinarian
theology. His section on the seventeenth century is quite good, particularly noting the
contrast between Baxter and Owen. The major draw back is that his work, as a survey, does
not provide close theological detail. Charles Lloyd Cohen, God's Caress: The Psychology of
Puritan Religious Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) is unique in its study
of puritan spirituality. It by far surpasses the earlier works of G.S. Wakefield, Puritan
Devotion (London: Epworth Press, 1957), Owen C. Watkins, The Puritan Experience (London:
Routledge and Kegan Pau1,1972) and Irvonwy Morgan, Puritan Spirituality (London: Epworth
Press,1973). Cohen, however, accepts certain assumptions about Calvin and Calvinism which, as
we show, are open to further question.
45 Paul Seaver, Rallington's Rorld. R Puritan Rrtisan in Seventeenth-Century London
(London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1985).
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is most welcome, for it helps us get beyond the
like.personalities of notable figures -a-s- Baxter and Owen.
Yet the historical theologian cannot help but press the
issue: on what doctrinal bases did Wallington predicate
his life?
Finally, recent works on Richard Baxter and John
Owen suggest that there is need for more theological
studies.	 F. J. Powicke's biographies of Baxter are
helpful, but now quite out of date.
	 Geoffrey F.
Nuttall has presented a meticulous biography of Baxter
but provided little theological observation. 47 The
illuminating study of Baxter as a literary figure by
Neil H. Keeble is complementary to Nuttall's work, but
it too	 refrains somewhat from
	
close theological
analysis. 48 By far the fullest study of Baxter's
theology is J.I. Packer's D.Phil thesis; yet it is now
some thirty years out of date. 4'3 The most thorough
50
work on John Owen has been by Peter	 Toon.
Regrettably, his biography of Owen contains very little
theological analysis. 	 Sinclair B. Ferguson's recent
46 Frederick J. Powicke, A Life of the Reverend Richard Baxter 1615 - 1691 (London:
Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1924) and The Reverend Richard Baxter Under the Cross (London: Jonathan
Cape, Ltd., 1927).
47 Geoffrey F. Nuttall, Richard Baxter (London: Thomas Nelson, 1965).
48 N.H. Keeble, Richard Baxter. Puritan Han of Letters (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1982).
49 James I. Packer, "The Redemption and Restoration of Man in the Thought of Richard
Baxter" unpublished D.Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1954.
50 Peter Toon, The Correspondence of John Omen (1616-1683) (Cambridge and London:
James Clarke & Co., Ltd., 1970). This work is most helpful due to the small amount of extant
manuscripts of Owen. Toon, The Oxford Orations of Dr. John Omen (Linkinhorne: Gospel
Communication, Linkinhorne House, 1971). This is a collection of translated Latin orations
delivered at Oxford between 1652 and 1657. Toon, God's Statessan: The Life and Rork of John
Owen, Pastor, Educator, Theologian (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1971).
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study of John Owen is a welcome popular introduction to
Owen's theology. The deficiency of Ferguson's work,
however, is the absence of any critical evaluation of
Owen and his period. 	 because of the need for
more doctrinal studies of mid-seventeenth century
puritan theology and the desirability of further work
on Baxter and Owen this thesis was undertaken.
This thesis presents voluntarism	 as a key	 to
understanding late puritan spirituality, and explores
'Jo rie,S
this through the if.a. 4.1-ag of the leading writers Baxter
and Owen. As argued above, the present field of
secondary scholarship has room for more work not only
on Baxter and Owen but on the theological nature of
mid-seventeenth century English puritan piety. It is
desirable to	 know, from	 a theological/historical
perspective,	 what	 inspired	 and	 motivated	 the
spirituality of these Christians.
1.2 Was there a mid-seventeenth century puritanism? 
To describe Baxter and Owen 	 as mid-seventeenth
century puritans, however, is to face an apparent
contradiction: neither arrogated to	 himself the name
"puritan". While it is worth noting that Baxter's
father was labelled "puritan" by his contemporaries and
Owen's father was a clear non-Conformist, by the time
Baxter began writing in 1649 the term had a specific
51	
Sinclair Ferguson, John Omen On The Christian Life (Edinburgh/Carlisle: The
Banner of Truth Trust, 1987).	 This work is largely written for a popular audience, based in
part on his Ph.D thesis,	 The Doctrine of the Christian Life in the teaching of Dr. John Owen
(1661-1683)", unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1979.
19
implication: associated more with a term of abuse than
a compliment. 52	 So, can Baxter and Owen be called
puritan? Or is this the "vertical" hermeneutic to
which William Lamont referred in his book, Richard
Baxter and the Millennium: that is, "to discard the
seventeenth—century dross... and to extract the gold --
the piety which has moved Christians throughout the
next three hundred years" ?53
There are valid reasons for placing Baxter and Owen
within what may be called a puritan tradition. To
understand why it is necessary to consider first the
term in its Elizabethan context: the context of both
Baxter and Owen's fathers. 	 This is done immediately
below. After this (in 1.3) Baxter and Owen's
biographies are presented, particularly with an eye
towards their non—Conformity.
What did the term puritan imply for the generation
before Baxter and Owen? Patrick Collinson has
demonstrated in his work, The Elizabethan Puritan
Movement, that the expression was a term of derision.
Yet, Collinson cautions that the substance of this
derision must not be made too precise. More recently,
52	
For Baxter's father see his comments in Reliquiae Baxterianae, ed. Matthew
Sylvester (1696) pp.2-3. For Owen's father see William Orme, "Memoirs of the Life and
Writings of Dr. John Owen° in Harks of John Omen, edited by T. Russell, Vol. 1 (London:
Richard Baynes, 1826), p.5. Orme is dependent upon John Asty's, 'Memoirs of the Life of John
Owen," in A Complete Collection of the Sermons of the Reverend and Learned John Omen, D.D.
(London, 1721), p.3. 	 As for modern studies see Ferguson, John Owen p. 1 and n.2. loon,
God's Statesman, likewise assumes that Henry Owen was a puritan, p.l. (But, while we offer
this point, we must hasten to add that Owen only considered his father a non-Conformist. We
do not have specific evidence, as with Baxter's father, that Henry Owen was called 'puritan'
by his contemporaries.) Neither Ferguson nor loon define what they mean by puritan.
53	 .	 .
William Lamont, Richard Baxter and the Millennium (London: Croom Helm, 1979),
pp.24-21.
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Peter Lake has argued that the Elizabethan puritan
movement was even more enigmatic because there were a
number of "moderate" puritans. In other words,
according to Lake, it is incorrect simply to say that
puritans wanted out of an episcopal system or were more
"Calvinist" than others. Furthermore, an individual
may well have demonstrated more "puritan leanings" (if
puritan is equated over—simply with nonconformity) at
one point than at others. 54 "Different aspects of that
over—all position were given different degrees of
emphasis by different men in different situations." 5
Prior to the work by Collinson the major studies on
puritanism were those by R.G. Usher, William Haller,
Christopher Hill, Charles and Katherine George and
J.F.H.	 New.	 While	 each offered	 various
interpretations, they shared	 the broad view that
puritans were those within the Church who were
frustrated with the Elizabethan settlement; they wished
for further reform. It was not that puritans were more
Calvinist than others, rather they felt that Elizabeth
54 Peter Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982). Lake's chief example is Laurence Chaderton (1538?-1640), one time
Master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Chaderton was a puritan representative at the Hampton
Court Conference.
55
Lake, Moderate Puritans, p.283.
56 R.G. Usher, The Presbyterian Movement in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, as
illustrated in the Minute Book of the Dedham Classis 1582-1589, Camden 3rd series, vol 8,
1905; William Haller, Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1955); Haller, The Rise of Puritanism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1938; J.E.Christopher Hill, Economic Problems of the Church. From Archbishop Mhitgift to the
Long Parliament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956); Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English
Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); Hill, Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary
England (London: Panther, 1969); Charles and Katherine George, The Protestant Mind of the
English Reformation 1570-1640 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); and J.F.H New,
Anglican and Puritan. The basis of their opposition 1558-1640 (London: Adam & Charles Black,
1964).
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and certain of her bishops were not moving far enough.
What makes Collinson's work important is not that he
took any innovative steps to offer a new definition of
puritan, rather he has presented a picture of a
political movement	 theologically motivated.	 The
implication is that there may well have been a
theological unity to puritanism: a unity important to,
but not always evidenced in, the vestments controversy
of the 1560s and 1570s and the debates between those
who advocated episcopacy and those who called for a
presbyterian model. Taking it a step further Collinson
also challenged the assumptions held by Christopher
Hill and Michael Walzer who have maintained that
puritanism was primarily a radical social phenomenon
among a growing mercantile group. 57 Contrary to Hill
and Walzer, Collinson sees no clear evidence of a
politically	 radical	 and	 socially	 revolutionary
movement.
Collinson has had his critics. 	 Paul Christianson
challenged Collinson's interpretation and insisted that
58puritan can be defined more precisely.
	
He maintained
that puritan describes those who were firmly within the
Genevan sphere of influence and who advocated jure
divino presbyterianism up to the 1580s.	 Whereas
Collinson hesitated to	 equate puritan with anti-
episcopal sentiments, Christianson defined puritans as
57 For Hill see above, n.56. Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints: a study
in the origins of Radical Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966).
58 Paul Christianson, 'Reformers and the Church of England under Elizabeth I and the
Early Stuarts", JEH, (31,4), 1980, pp.463-82. Collinson responded to this article in the
same issue, "A Comment: concerning the name Puritan', JEN (31,4), 1980
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those strongly against episcopacy.	 Furthermore, he
suggested a clear distinction between those puritans
who remained within	 the Church, however strongly
presbyterian, and those who separated. Separatists
must be seen, claimed Christianson, as a distinct group
or entity from those whom he identified as puritan.
Ironically, therefore, the heart of the present
debate on the definition of puritan is the question of
precision. Collinson has introduced the idea of a
" nominalist" understanding of puritan: namely that
there was not a "puritan" type, rather individuals who
manifested certain attitudes and practices.
Lake has insisted that any understanding of puritan
which is rigidly defined as a party-based opposition is
ainappropriate.	 In contrast, Richard Greaves has
suggested that puritan is more than a relative term and
can be illustrated along a continuum. In fact, argued
Greaves, one can and must draw a distinction between
puritan and Anglican (sic), "it is historically
irresponsible to deny the substantial dissimilarity." 61
Clearly, in the light of the present debate it would
seem difficult to offer a definition of puritan which
could go unchallenged.	 Nevertheless, to insist too
much on the fluidity and relativism of the term puritan
does not altogether aid the historian. 	 There must be
something to the term which can help determine whether
59	 ,
Collinson, A Comment: concerning the name Puritan," JEH (31,4) 1980, p.487.
60 Lake, Moderate Puritans, p.280.
61	 .
Richard L. Greaves, Society and Religion in Elizabethan England (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p.29.
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it is appropriate to describe Baxter, Owen and others
in the mid-seventeenth century as puritans.
It is credible to offer initially that puritan
suggests those who were dissatisfied with the state of
the Church as it was from 1558 onwards. Yet, since
this obviously could include Catholic recusants and
certainly even some "conformists", it must be argued
that	 a	 key to	 understanding	 the	 puritans'
dissatisfaction with the English Church was their
concern for edification.	 John S. Coolidge drew
attention to this distinction.62 Curiously, Coolidge's
work is rarely considered in some of the more modern
studies of English Puritanism. Peter Lake addressed the
issue of edification in a fashion similar to Coolidge,
but with a more intuitive argument rather than one
based on detailed theological examination. While
Coolidge's methodology is possibly problematic in that
he presupposes that one can accurately interpret
Pauline theology and then look for evidence of this
theology in puritan writings, his findings are most
stimulating. He writes, "The puritan versus conformist
understanding of edification may well provide the key
to Elizabethan Puritanism."63
Elizabethan puritans evaluated everything on the
basis of whether or not the body of believers would be
61
- John S. Coolidge, The Pauline Renaissance in England - Puritanism and the Bible
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp.23-54.
63 Coolidge, Pauline Renaissance, p.27.
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built up, encouraged, disciplined and instructed. 64It
was precisely	 this	 theological	 orientation	 and
understanding
	 which	 pushed	 some	 puritans	 into
nonconformity.	 The questions of adiaphora were not so
much the result of excessive biblicism as they were a
matter of conscience. Peter Lake, while reluctant to
stress a sharp definition along party lines, expressed
the point being made.
For the refusal to conform was justified
and motivated by the need to avoid the
offense of the godly and the delusion of
the weak in faith... In short, rejection
of conformity was justified in terms of
'edification', that process through
which a true community of godly and
properly self-conscious true believers
was called gogether and sustained within
the church."
To understand how and in what sense Baxter and Owen
may rightly be placed within the category of puritan
the term needs to be interpreted as a sensibility
resulting from a conflict of conscience among certain
English Protestants.	 At the centre of this conflict
was the issue of edification. It was the political
failure of those who pressed for reform in the 15805 to
have the issues of conscience resolved which resulted
in the numerous and diverse puritan responses; and the
emphasis, as Peter Lake has shown, is on the plurality
and diversity of responses.	 There were moderates
64 
Coolidge rightly notes that many "conformists' were concerned with edification as
well. What distinguished the 'conformist" from the puritan was, in Coolidge's opinion, the
conformists	 reluctance to see edification	 including ceremony, 	 vestments and church
government.	 As long as right doctrine was maintained there was edification. Coolidge,
Pauline Renaissance pp.45-46.
65 Lake, Moderate Puritans, p.2. I agree with Lake, only wishing that he had taken
it further and asked why edification was theologically important. In this sense, Coolidge is
helpful as a complementary study.
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willing to protest against certain points of conformity
yet capable of accepting a reformed episcopate.
Equally there were radicals whose consciences were
affected	 with	 greater	 consequence:	 vituperative
expressions and even separation.
The definition of puritan, therefore, is elusive.
Still, it suggests an active protest against the
outward forms of the Elizabethan Church. The protest
came from a theological conviction that for the sake of
the godly and the elect, which some saw as the nation,
certain	 matters	 of	 polity and	 liturgics	 were
unedifying.
	
Without	 doubt	 there were	 various
expressions	 or	 temperaments within	 this puritan
conscience. Yet the diversity of practice and
expression need not hide the possibly unifying element.
That this unifying element was at times also expressed
by individuals not recognised as puritan should not be
too surprising.	 Neither should the fact that some
puritans	 eventually	 became	 Separatists	 preclude
interpreting Separatism as one of the logical
consequences of puritan thought and sentiment: thus
suggesting a possible unity rather than dissimilarity
between Elizabethan puritans, Jacobean puritans, Stuart
puritans,	 later	 Separatists,	 and	 even	 later
Independents and Congregationalists.
	
This observation points forward to	 a continued
longing for a national Church truly reformed after
1603, beyond Elizabeth's reign. The influence of a
puritan concept of edification was still evident. This
can be seen in the biographies of Baxter and Owen, to
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which we now turn.
1.3 The significance of Richard Baxter and John Owen 
Richard Baxter (1615-1691) and John Owen (1616-1683)
were men of prominence and influence during a period of
English history	 which can be	 best described as
tumultuous.	 As detailed below,	 Baxter and Owen
attracted	 a number	 of important	 associates and
followers; both were, to use an expression, "lodestars"
in mid-seventeenth century puritanism.	 This is not to
suggest that there were sharp party lines drawn around
them. Nevertheless, they well represent important
theological opinions within seventeenth century English
puritanism.
Another aspect is also worth considering. As
indicated above, both have been the subject of a number
of studies; yet a recognition of their association and
inter-relationship has never been fully presented. 66
They not only knew each other, but, as suggested below,
quite frequently their work interacted. A study of the
events which brought them together and the theological
controversies in which they met suggests that they are
representatives of two somewhat different perspectives.
The expression "perspectives" is used deliberately.
On many aspects of voluntarism and the Christian life
they agreed, but on others they differed: sometimes it
was a matter of qualification or emphasis, at others
fundamental disagreement. Thus, Baxter and Owen show
that this mid-seventeenth century "puritanism" was a
66 See above, pp.17-1S.
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consciousness which manifested
	 itself in	 varying
degrees and measures. Based on what Baxter and Owen
argued, this period of puritanism should be studied
with an eye towards fluidity and paradox rather than
clear cut terms and categories. As this section now
considers Baxter and Owen's biographies, it will be
seen that their concern for edification led them to
their respective breaks with the national church in the
1630s and later their views on church government; in
this sense they represent a continuity with earlier
Elizabethan puritans.
Richard Baxter was born on 12 November, 1615 at
the village of Rowton, near Shrewsbury in Shropshire.
His days as a youth were not necessarily the most
pleasant.	 0Baxter's	 academic	 education	 was
unfortunate. He attended neither Oxford nor Cambridge:
all the more intriguing when one considers his prolific
writing and observes within his work one very well read
in the classics, Scholastic theology and contemporary
political thought.
For his spiritual education, Baxter 	 gave large
credit to his father's influence. 	 His father, also
Richard, was labelled by his contemporaries as a
"puritan". 68	 In Reliquiae Baxterianae, Baxter's
autobiography which presents his personal reflections
on some of the controversies in which he was engaged as
a writer and as a church statesman, he records that his
father was more concerned with reading the Bible,
67 Nuttall, Baxter, pp. 2-3.
68 Baxter, Reliqivae, I.i.1 , p.3.
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prayer, and reproving drunkards than with church
69polity.	 It was this type of puritanism, concerned
with godliness	 and edification, which	 influenced
Baxter.
But though we had no better teachers, it
pleased God to instruct and change my
father, by the bare reading of the
Scriptures in private, without either
preaching, or godly company, or any
other books but the Bible. And God made
him the instrument of my first
convictions, and approbation of a holy
life, as well as of my r traint from
the grosser sort of lives.
While he was never able to pinpoint the exact
occasion of his conversion, he enumerated some of the
significant points of his spiritual development. 	 At
the age of fifteen he read Bunny's Resolution, a
practical work originally written by the Jesuit, Robert
Parsons, and later corrected by Edmund Bunny (1540—
M1619).	 Through this book, "it pleased God to awaken
my soul, and show me the folly of sinning, and the
misery of the wicked, and the inexpressible weight of
things eternal, and the necessity of resolving on a
holy life, more than I was ever acquainted with
69 Baxter, Reliquiae	 pp.2-3. It is worth noting, however, that while this
autobiography is invaluable, Matthew Sylvester, the subsequent editor, did not always
completely follow Baxter's manuscript. F.J. Powicke, Under the Cross, p.10, has written,
'there are frequent omissions and alterations and deviations from Baxter's directions.'
Geoffrey Nuttall also corroborates this conclusion: in particular Nuttall observes that
Sylvester toned down Baxter's criticism of John Owen.
	 Nuttall, 'The MS. of ReIiquiae
Baxterianae (1696)' JEH, Vol vi.! (April, 1955), pp.73-79.
70 
Baxter, Reliquiae I.i.1, p.2.
71 Pollard and Redgrave record that there were at least two editions of this work
(1584 and 1589). STC number 4088. A.W. Pollard and G.R. Redgrave, A Short-Title Catalogue of
Books Printed in England, Scotland and Ireland and of English Books Printed abroad, Second
edition, revised and enlarged, 2 vols., edited by W.A. Jackson, F.S. Ferguson and Katherine
F. Panzer (London: The Bibliographical Society, 1986). For Bunny see OMB, vol 7, pp.271-72.
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before." n	 Baxter found great comfort and benefit
from	 the works	 of	 Richard Sibbes	 (1577-1635),
especially Sibbes' Bruised Reed, which showed him the
n
"mystery of redemption."	 In Reliquiae he recorded
that he delved deeply into the earlier puritan works of
William Perkins, Edmund Bolton, John Preston, William
Whately and Richard Harris. was also concerned
to read the works of the school men, as he called them,
namely Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Durandus and Ockham.
Richard Baxter's non-conformity is not altogether
easy to define. Throughout his life he advocated both
a reformed episcopacy, guided by Archbishop James
Ussher (1581-1656), and a Presbyterian model. was
ordained deacon in 1638 by the bishop of Worcester,
John Thornborough, and possibly ordained priest in
M
developed during his stay in Shrewsbury in the 1630s.
In Reliquiae he wrote that the "Etcetera Oath" of 1640,
"roused him from his drowsiness to consider some of the
issues of conformity." n
	
After his ordination he
72 Baxter, Reliquiae I.i.3, p.3.
73 Baxter, Reliquiae I.1.3, p.4. Richard Sibbes was influenced by William Perkins
(1558-1602) and was converted by Paul Baynes. Sibbes became a lecturer at Gray's Inn, London.
Later he was master at St. Catherine's Hall. Lecturer for a period in 1615 and then again in
1633 at Holy Trinity, Cambridge.
74 Baxter, Reliquiae I.i.4, pp.4-5. For Bolton see DNB, vol 5, p.325; for Preston
see DNB, vol 46, p.308; for Whately see DNB, vol 60, p.430; and for Harrison see DNB, vol 25,
p.22.
75 For Ussher see DNB, vol 58, p.64 and R.B. Knox, Japes Ussher Archbishop of Arsagh
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1967).
76 Geoffrey Nuttall, Baxter, p.18 presents the case for concluding that Baxter uas
ordained priest.
77 Baxter, Reliviiae, I.i.22.6, p.16.
1641.	 Nevertheless, Baxter's
	
non-conformity
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spent a short period in Dudley and then moved to
Bridgnorth, to whom he later dedicated part of The
Saints Everlasting Rest (1650). Geoffrey Nuttall has
argued that in Bridgnorth Baxter's frustration with
poor church discipline and inadequate preaching marked
him as a clear non-conformist.78
Baxter is perhaps best known for his ministry in
Kidderminster, Worcestershire. By the time he arrived
in Kidderminster, in April, 1641, as a lecturer under a
79Rev. George Dance,Baxter's non-conformity was evident.
His first period of ministry at Kidderminster was
80interrupted by the initial fighting of the Civil War.
Leaving Kidderminster under some pressure and threats,
he went to Coventry.	 Here he eventually attached
himself to the Army as a preacher. Baxter gradually
became engaged as chaplain, first to the Earl of
Essex's army then later to a regiment under Colonel
Whalley.	 Baxter rejected an offer from Cromwell to
serve as chaplain: a post later forced upon John Owen.
His years in the Army were most important in the
development of his theology, notably his observance of
the more radical sects, whom he called "hotheads", and
the rising influence of Antinomians. 82 Baxter later
described his days in the Army as days when, with a
78 
Nuttall, Baxter, pp.20-21.
79 For Dance see Nuttall, Baxter, pp.24-27.
80 Baxter, Reliquiae I.i.57, p.40.
81	
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See below p.241, Baxter's relationship with Cromwell was mixed. He app reciated the
religious tolerance but frequently questioned Cromwell's power and intentions.
82 Baxter, Reliquiae 1.1.61-75, pp.43-52. For Antinomianism see below, pp.56-58.
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sense of mission, he debated, taught and corrected
soldiers regarding issues of liturgy but as well,
" sometimes about free—grace and free—will, and all the
points of Antinomianism and Arminianism."83
By 1647/48 Baxter returned to Kidderminster as their
84
"minister".	 His ministry at Kidderminster was
exceptional because of his emphasis upon visitation and
catechism teaching. In The Reformed Pastor (1656)
Baxter detailed how he and his assistant visited
fifteen or sixteen families a week among the 800
families of the congregation, with the specific purpose
of teaching and encouraging. At Kidderminster Baxter
also refined his	 views on church government and
liturgy.	 He	 also exercised a wider	 sphere of
influence: most
	
notably his contacts	 with other
ministers through his leadership of the Worcestershire
Association. 85 His success in Kidderminster not to the
contrary, Baxter was forced to leave in 1660 due to the
Act for Confirming and Restoring of Ministers (this
restored George Dance to his incumbency). Arriving in
London he was initially accepted by the returning
Royalists; Edward Hyde, Lord Clarendon, offered Baxter
the bishopric of Hereford -- which Baxter declined.86
83 Baxter, Reliquiae I.i.77, p.53.
84	
Nuttall,	 Baxter, pp.40-63, provides the	 best detail of his	 years at
Kidderminster.
85	 Geoffrey Nuttall provides details and membership of this group in 'The
Worcestershire Association: its membership,' JEN 1:2 (1950), 197-206.
86 Clarendon offered Norwich to Edward Reynolds (1599-1676) which Reynolds accepted,
Hereford to Baxter and Coventry and Lichfield to Edmund Calamy, the Senior (1600-66) who
turned down the offer. For Reynolds see DNB, vol 48, pp.40-41 and for Calamy see DNB, vol 8,
pp.227-30. Ian Green, The Re-estahlishnent of the Church of England 1660-1663 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1978), pp.83-87 explains the circumstances of this offer to Baxter and his
rejection. Green concludes that these offers of bishoprics were an expression of Charles'
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The years after 1660 were in many ways dark years
for Baxter. He was asked to serve on a Royal
Commission which sought to revise the Book of Common
Prayer, but this proved fruitless. 87 While his
writing continued, indeed it was his prime occupation,
life was full of frustration and problems. A highlight
was his marriage on 10 September, 1662 to Margaret
Charlton, twenty—one years younger than him yet who
tk7b9
preceded him in death. 88 In 1G02 and again in 1684 he
was arrested and imprisoned for preaching contrary to
the Clarendon Code and for engaging in a paraphrase of
the New Testament. 89 For the remaining five years of
his life he lived in London, active yet with an
increased sense of frustration.
John Owen was born in 1616 in Oxfordshire.	 In
contrast to Baxter, very little is known about Owen's
early days; for that matter there are few
autobiographical insights to be gained from any of
Owen's published works or the little correspondence
serious intention to bring a comprehensive settlement.
87 Nuttall, Baxter, p.89.
88 John Howe (1630-1705) preached the funeral sermon of Margaret Baxter. For Howe
see, Calany Revised, pp.279-80.
89	
See Nuttall, Baxter, pp.107-110.	 Powicke, Richard Baxter Under the Cross,
Appendix 8, p.285 provides Baxter's own account of the reason for his arrest in 1684. See
also Lamont, Richard Baxter and the Millennia,.
90 Peter loon counters the suggestion of the DNB that Owen was born in Stadhampton.
(DNB vol 42, pp.424-28). loon points out that only after Owen was born did his family move
to the village of Stadham (now Stadhampton), loon, God's Statespan, p.2. Sinclair Ferguson
gives Oven's birthplace as Stadham. Ferguson, John Omen, p.l.
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that survives. His father, Henry, was a clergyman
quite sympathetic to puritan sentiment and exercised a
non-conformist ministry in Stadham. According to Peter
Toon, the parish church in Stadham was of the puritan
sort, largely due
	 to the guiding influence
	 and
patronage of the D'Oyley family. 91	 In	 1631	 John
followed his older brother, William, to	 Oxford. A
student at Queen's College, he was	 admitted to the
degree of B.A.	 in 1632 and his	 M.A.	 in	 1635. At
Queen's Owen was under the tutelage of Thomas Barlow,
who eventually became Bishop of Lincoln and for whom
Owen had a high regard years later. Orme described
Barlow as "a Calvinist in theology, an Aristotelian in
philosophy, and an Episcopalian in church government."92
Oxford at that time underwent changes, largely due
to the influence and reforming concerns of William
93Laud.	 What Owen thought about the growing influence
of what some contemporaries believed to be Laud's
Arminianism, is difficult to ascertain. It is known
that he eventually left Oxford in 1637, and in all
probability his departure had much to do with the
9,1implications of Laudianism and Arminianism.
	 Owen,
however, was not anti-episcopalian, for just prior to
leaving Oxford he was ordained by the Bishop of Oxford,
91 loon, Sod's Statesnan, p.2 and n.3.
92 Orme, 'Memoir', p.I2. For Barlow (1607-1691) see DNB, vol 3, pp.224-229.
93 Nicholas Tyacke provides the best overview of Arminianism at Oxford during this
period.	 Tyacke details how Oxford was different from Cambridge during this period: Oxford
Arminians were far more assertive. Nicholas Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists. The Rise of English
Arsinianisn c. 1590-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp.78-86. For Laud see DNB, vol 32,
p.185.
94 For Arminianism see below, pp.49-51.
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John Bancroft, nephew of Archbishop Bancroft.95
After his departure from Oxford Owen spent time in
the private service of, first, Sir Robert Dormer, as a
tutor for his son, and then as chaplain to Lord
Lovelace. In 1643 he accepted the living at Fordham in
Essex, a living offered to him by Parliament. Already
Owen's	 non-conformist	 inclinations were	 evident.
According to Toon, Owen recorded in the parish register
that he was "pastor" not vicar. 96 At this time he was
more closely aligned	 with the Presbyterians, yet
gradually modified	 this view after	 reading John
Cotton's Keyes of the Kingdom of Heaven (l644).
too he married his first wife, Mary Rooke.
Owen was forced to leave Fordham by the patron in
1646 and became minister to a gathered church at
Coggeshall, Essex. St. Peter's was a puritan
stronghold: the Earl of Warwick, to whom Owen dedicated
his work on the atonement, Sales Electorum San guis Jesu
(1648), was the patron. Owen's immediate predecessor
was Obadiah Sedgwick, a member of the Westminster
Assembly. The previous clergy included, among others,
98John Dod Sr. and Ralph Cudworth. 	 It was here that
Owen's Independency developed. As to the popularity of
Owen's preaching ministry, Asty's "Memoir" reports that
95 
Orme, 'Memoirs', p.22.
96 Toon, God's Statesaan, p.17. For Mary Rooke see Toon, op.cit, p.17.
97 For Cotton (1584-1652) see Richard L.6reaves and Robert Zaller eds. Biographical
Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century (Brighton: The Harvester Press
Limited, 1982), vol I, pp.178-79. See also Larzer Ziff, ed. John Cotton on the Churches of
Neu England (1968).
98 
For Dod see DNB, vol 15, p.145 and for Cudworth see VHS, vol 13, p.271.
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on some Sundays close to 2,000 came to listen to him.
John Owen's preaching and potential were recognized
beyond the boundaries of Fordham and Coggeshall. His
first publication, A Display of Arminianism (1643) was
dedicated to the Parliamentary Committee of Religion.
In this work he strongly urged this body to heed his
warnings about the threat of Arminianism. As early as
1646, having recently arrived at Coggeshall, he was
invited to preach before Parliament, at one of its
fast-day meetings.	 The thirty year old preacher
took as his text Acts 16.9 and urged Parliament to
press on in the advancement of the gospel: interpreting
some of the recent Army victories as God's blessing and
encouragement in the face of so much spiritual darkness
in the land. From this sermon, not the only time Owen
preached on a parliamentary fast-day, his wider sphere
of influence developed.	 In 1647 he was introduced to
Henry Ireton, Oliver Cromwell's son-in-law, and other
officers of the New Model Army at the time of the
battle of Colchester. Owen later preached Ireton's
funeral sermon, published in 1651 as The Labouring
Saints Dismission to Rest.	 Owen too was involved in
ministry to the Army, beginning with those under the
command of General Fairfax. 	 He continued to gain the
favourable regard of Parliament, culminating, in a
sense, in his being called	 to preach after the
99 John Asty, 'Memoirs of the Life of John Owen,' in a Complete Collection of the
Sermons of the Reverend and Learned John Omen D.D. (London: 1721) p. vii. Doted in Toon,
God's Statesman, p.26.
100 Owen, R Vision of Unchangeable Free Nercy (1646). Gould ed., vol VIII. The DNB
erroneously dates this sermon as 1648.
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execution of Charles I on 30 January, 1649.
It would be fair to say, however, that Owen's
influence upon the affairs and leaders of the nation
reached its apex in his relationship with Oliver
Cromwell. 102	 UndoubtedlyOwen's preaching skill,
manifested on those occasions when he preached before
Parliament, was noted by Cromwell. Cromwell met Owen,
in April/May of 1649 through Fairfax. Following this
meeting Cromwell persuaded him to accompany his army to
Ireland as chaplain and later to investigate certain
activities at Trinity College, Dublin. 103	 Later Owen,
with Joseph Caryl, was ordered by Cromwell to accompany
him to invade Scotland late in 1650. 104
In 1651 Oliver Cromwell appointed Owen Dean of
Christ Church, Oxford, an appointment he held until
1659. 
105	 A year later Owen was appointed Vice—
Chancellor of Oxford. 106
 His years at Oxford were not
idle.	 Besides exercising a number of reforms to
101
This was later published as Righteous Zeal encouraged by Divine Protection
(1649), Goold ed, vol VIII.
102 loon, The Correspondence of John Omen (1616-1683) (Cambridge and London: James
Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1970) provides a total of seventeen items of correspondence between
Cromwell and Owen: 13 from Cromwell to Owen, 4 from Owen to Cromwell. These letters are
predominately concerned with practical matters regarding Oxford.
103	
Ferguson, John Omen p.7, notes that Cromwell urged the congregation at
Coggeshall to accept Owen's absence. It was also true that Owen's younger brother was with
Cromwell's troops heading for Ireland. This probably was his brother, Philemon, who was
eventually killed in Ireland, loon, God's Statesian, p. 2, n.2. As noted below it was in
Ireland that he had occasion to write his response to Baxter's aphorisms of Justification in
his Of the Death of Christ, the Price He Paid, and the Purchase He Made (1650).
104 For Caryl see Calany Revised, pp.103-104.
105 See loon, Correspondence, #3, pP.52-53.
106
See loon, Correspondence, #13, pp.62-63; #24, p.74; #35, pp.84-85; and #45,
p.94. It was a position which had to be renewed each year.
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student life and attempts to enhance lecturers' pay,
Owen joined forces with Thomas Goodwin, then president
of Magdalen College, in a preaching ministry at St.
Mary's Church. 107 From this shared preaching ministry,
during 1652-57, Owen produced some of his significant
pastoral works, eventually published for a wider
audience as On the Mortification of Sin (1656) and Of
the Nature and Power of Temptation (1658): both
preached mainly to young university students!
Owen played an important role at the Savoy
Conference which resulted in the Savoy Declaration of
1658. Along with Philip Nye, Thomas Goodwin, William
Bridge, William Greenhill and Joseph Caryl he helped to
formulate this Congregational confession. 108	 While
there is no significant doctrinal differences between
this Declaration and the earlier Westminster Confession
of Faith, its uniqueness was the clear call for the
autonomy of local congregations.
Owen's relationship with Cromwell is not altogether
clear.	 Certainly there was a mutual regard. 109 Owen
dedicated Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance
Explained and Confirmed (1654) to Cromwell, who by this
time was Lord Protector. He joined the efforts of the
107 Goodwin was appointed president of Magdalen by Cromwell at the same time Owen
was recommended to Christ Church. loon, Correspondence, 13, p.53. For Goodwin, a member of
the Westminster Assembly and the Savoy Congregational Conference see Calasy Revised, pp.228-
229.
108 loon, God's Statesman, pp.103-107 provides a helpful summary and interacts
critically with the earlier work by A.G. Matthews, The Savoy Declaration of Faith (1959). For
those mentioned see.
109	
loon, Correspondence, #16, pp.64-65 is a letter in which Owen expresses his
appreciation for Cromwell.	 While it is in an elaborate style, Owen's sincerity need not
necessarily be questioned.
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"Cromwellian" church to ensure that "godly" preachers
were in as many parish churches as possible by serving
as a"Trier" followingthe 1654 Settlement ofReligion.m
Throughout the Protectorate Owen frequently preached
before Parliament at such crucial moments as the
dissolving of the Barebones Assembly, the gathering of
the Nominated Assembly of Saints and Cromwell's second
Parliament in 1656. Yet there is no clear knowledge of
Owen's opinion of Cromwell's Irish campaign and his
invasion of Scotland. Equally, Owen challenged the
proposal that Oliver Cromwell become King. As will be
presented shortly, Owen also contributed to the
downfall of Richard Cromwell, following Oliver's death
in 1658.
With the return of the monarchy Owen's political
influence diminished. In 1659/60 he was removed from
Christ Church and subsequently moved to Stadhampton.
Apart from his involvement in 1667 to persuade
Parliament to pass a Toleration Act, his life and
ministry shifted more towards matters of church polity
and to his theological writing.
	
	 There was the notable
aoak
invitation from the First Congregational t in Boston, New
England, to become their pastor. This church, earlier
led by John Cotton and latterly by John Norton, was
well known to Owen, but for reasons known only to
110
loon, God's Statessan, p..84, n 1, points out that Owen was associated with
Thomas Goodwin, Philip Nye (Calm Revised, p.369), Sidrach Simpson (DNB, vol 52, p.277),
George Griffiths (Calasy Revised, p.237), William Strong (DNB, vol 55, p.62), William Bridge
(Calm Revised, p.74), William Greenhill (Calm Revised, p.233), Adoniram Byfield (DNB, vol
8, p.111) and Thomas Harrison (Calasy Revised, p.250).
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111himself he declined the offer.
	
His ministry moved
to London and by 1673 his Congregational flock combined
with the Leadenhall church led by the recently deceased
Joseph Caryl.
In this period of Oven's life a large proportion of
his works were published. Equally, Oven's leadership
role amongst Congregationalists was notable at this
time.	 His first wife, Mary, died in 1675.	 A year
later he married Dorothy D'Oyley.
	
Oven's final days
were spent in "retirement" at Ealing. Here, in
failing health, Owen still managed to produce his
Meditations on the Glory of Christ, which perhaps tells
us something of Owen's thoughts and concerns in those
last months. In one of those ironic moments of
history, John Owen died on 24 August, 1683, the twenty-
first anniversary of the Great Ejection of 1662, known
as "Black" Bartholomew's Day.	 His funeral sermon was
preached by David Clarkson, one of Owen's London
assistants. 112
1.4 Baxter and Owen's controversies in print and person 
It is not surprising to learn that Richard Baxter
and John Owen knew each other quite well. Their
relationship, however, was strained from time to time.
When Baxter published Aphorismes of Justification in
1649 he included an Appendix in which he rather
pointedly criticised Oven's thoughts on the death of
111 loon, Correspondence, #71, pp.135-36 is a transcription of a letter from the
General Court of Massachusetts affirming and ratifying this invitation to Owen. Later in 1671
Owen was invited to become President of Harvard: this too he declined.
112 For Clarkson see Calany Revised, p.120.
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Christ. 113
	
Owen soon responded with Of the Death of
the Price He Paid, and the Purchase He MadeChrist,
(1650).	 This initial clash affected Owen less than
Baxter. Years later Baxter admitted,
Two faults I now find in the book: 1. it
is defective, and hath some propositions
that	 need	 correction,	 being	 not
cautiously enough expressed. 2. I
meddled too forwardly with Dr. Owen, and
one or two more that had written some
passages too near to Antinomianism. For
I was young, and a stranger to men's
tempers, and thought others could have
born a confutation as easily as I could
do my self; and I thought that I was
bound to do my best publicly, to save
the world from the hurt of published
errours; not understanding how it would
provoke men more passionately to insist
on what they once have said. But I have
now learned to contradict errours, and
not to meddle with the persons that
maintain them. W indeed I was too raw
to be a writer.
Again, as will be explained introduced more fully in
chapters 3 and 4, Baxter's first publication embroiled
him in controversy for most of his remaining years.
Evidence suggests that he received responses from at
least seventeen different individuals in the period
1649-1675. 115	 The number of books,	 letters or
treatises in which Aphorismes of Justification was
either attacked or mentioned is well over thirty. If
one also considers that at least eight of Baxter's
later works deal directly with his first publication,
then it is safe to say that he never really escaped
criticism of this work.
113 The full details of this controversy are given below in 3.3.2, pp.193-205.
114 Baxter, Reliquiae 1.1.156, p.I07.
in See Appendix, pp.392-95 for a list of the major works.
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Owen's response in Of the Death of Christ (1650) was
measured, but to the point.
Indeed most of his exceptions do lie
rather	 against words,	 than things;
expressions, than opinions; 	 ways of
delivering things than the doctrines
themselves, as the reader will
perceive... Notwithstanding, because I
am not as yet convinced by anything in
Mr. Baxter's censure and opposition,
that there was any such blamable
deviation as is pretended, but rather
the words of truth and especially,
because the things pointed at are in
themselves weighty, and reading some
exactness in the delivery, to move to
attempt whether the grace of God with
me, who am the least of all the saints,
might give any farther light into the
right understanding of them, according
to the truth, to the advantage of any
that love the Lord Jesus in sincerity."
If some of his euphemisms and rhetoric are overlooked,
it is evident he was perturbed that Baxter even thought
to challenge him. What is relevant is that Baxter
continued the controversy in his Rich. Baxter's Apology
(1654), a work in response to criticism he received
from Thomas Blake, George Kendall, William Eyre and
John Crandon. 117 In the context of his reply to Eyre,
Baxter referred to Owen's Of the Death of Christ. He
explained that he decided "not to answer that book of
Mr. Owen's, till I saw a clear call proving it my duty,
because I had been foolishly drawn to be the beginner
of the controversy." Nevertheless, a year later,
1655, Baxter responded to Owen's publication in Rich:
Baxter' s Confession of his Faith. To this Owen replied
116 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, Goold ed., X, p.435.
117 See Appendix. For those sentioned see :Appe44is(-
_
118 Baxter, Rich. Baxters Apology, Part IV, p.36.
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in the same year with Vindicae Evangelicae (1655).
This book was principally against John Biddle, a
prominent	 proponent of	 Socinianism. 119	 Baxter
interpreted this move, however, as an attempt by Owen
to inculpate him in the Socinian controversy. Years
later Baxter wrote,
I thought it unfit to make any reply to
it, not only because I had no vacancy
from better work, but because 	 the
quality of it was such as would
unavoidably draw me, if I confuted it,
to speak so much and so offensively to
the person, as well as the doctrine,
that it would be a temptation to the
further weakening of his charity, and
increasing his desire of revenge. And I
thought it my duty (when the reader's
good required me not to write) to
forbear replying, and to let him have
the last word, because I had begun with
him. And I perceived that the common
distaste of men against him and his 4pok
made my reply the more unnecessary.
As will be argued in chapters 3 and 4, Baxter's views
on the death of Christ, the covenant of grace and
justification did not alter significantly. In
Reliquiae he quite clearly stated:
And yet, that I may not say worse than
it deserveth of my former measure of
understanding, I shall truly tell you
what change I find now, in the perusal
of my own writings. Those points which
then I thoroughly studied, my judgmeg
is the same of now, as it was then... "A
While he admitted that certain points regarding
Justification and the doctrine of the covenants were
"raw unmeet expressions" and that he "put off matters
119 For Biddle see DNB, vol 5, p.13; for Socinianiss see below p.50.
120 Baxter, Reliquiae I.i.163, p.111.
121 Baxter, Reliquiae, I.i.213.2, p.125.
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with some kind of confidence, as if I had done
something new or more than ordinary in them, when upon
my more mature reviews," nevertheless, "I find that I
said not half that which the subject did require: as
e.g. in
	 the doctrine of	 the covenants	 and of
justification... " 122	 He concluded by telling the
reader that he did not realize how others would respond
so vehemently to his criticism. While he did not
mention Owen, or anyone specifically, his criticism of
Owen is surely thinly veiled: "And withal I know not
how impatient divines were of being contradicted, nor
how it would stir up all their powers to defend what
they once said, and to rise up against the truth which
is thus thrust upon them, as the mortal enemy of their
honour..." 123
In addition to this clash of publications, Baxter
and Owen differed sharply over the leadership of
Cromwell's son, Richard. Baxter actually accused Owen
of orchestrating Richard Cromwell's downfall. 124	 In a
series of events in March-May, 1659, which came to be
known as the "Wallingford House Affair", Owen was
prominent in the discussions about the Army's rising
frustration with the Protectorate. 125 The Army had
complained bitterly about overdue pay and what they
considered to	 be Parliament's failure	 to resist
122 Baxter, Reliquiae I.1.213.2, p.125.
123 ibid.
124 Baxter, Reliquiae I.i.145, p.101.
125 loon, God's Statessan, pp.109-114, provides a clear account of the Wallingford
House Affair,
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Cavalier influences. 	 Richard Cromwell	 faced an
increasingly frustrated and rebellious Army. Owen's
culpability was exacerbated in that many of the Army
leaders were part of a gathered church which hadbegun
to meet at Wallingford House under his care.	 His
pastoral oversight of this "church" suggests surely his
awareness	 of	 its	 members) dissatisfaction	 with
Parliament and with Richard's leadership. Peter Toon
has shown that Owen was frequently an intermediary
between certain Army leaders and Cromwell, but by the
re-calling of the Rump Parliament in May he had sided
with those who wished Richard to be Protectorate in
title only. Richard Cromwell rejected this modified
position and on 25 May, 1659 resigned. Baxter sharply
denounced Owen for what he perceived to be Owen's
responsibility. It is hard to tell whether Baxter was
angrier about Owen's political views or that the group
which had begun to meet with Owen at Wallingford House
was strongly Independent. What is certain is that he
never forgave Owen, and in both the manuscript and
published versions of Reliquiae his disapproval of Owen
was conspicuous. 126
On various occasions Baxter and Owen met one another
over the issue of the fundamentals of the faith in
order to come to some sort of union among the various
factions of the period.
	 In 1654 Baxter and Owen were
126 Sylvester, in his preface to Reliquiae writes that he attempted to soften
Baxter's censure of Owen. He even stated that he wrote to Owen's widow, Dorothy D'Oyley, 'to
desire her to send me what she could, well attested, in favour of the Doctor, that I might
insert it in the margain, where he is mentioned as having an hand in that affair at
Wallingford House; or that I might expunge that passage. But this offer being rejected with
more contemptuousness and smartness than ay civility deserved, I had no more to do than to
let that pass upon record...'. Baxter, Reliquiae, Preface VII.
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members of a Parliamentary committee set up in the
attempt to achieve a modicum of theological unity. 127
In the course of this committee's work Baxter and Owen
fell out due to Baxter's reluctance to define the
fundamentals beyond the Apostles' Creed, Lord's Prayer
and the Decalogue. Apparently the other members
thought he was too broad and undefined. In turn they
produced some sixteen articles, but these were never
accepted by Parliament. Baxter accused Owen and
Cheynell in particular as "over-orthodox Doctors" and
clearly had no doubt about the origins of the more
rigid articles: "Dr. Owen; Mr. Nye and Mr. Sydrach
Sympson were his assistants and Dr. Cheynell his
scribe... ".	 128
Fourteen years later they met again at Baxter's
initiative in an abortive effort to reach union between
Baxter's Presbyterians and Owen's Congregationalists.
Baxter drew up a list of proposals relating to various
points of church order, liturgy and government. 129
Owen , however, let the whole effort drag on, much to
Baxter's frustration. No resolution came out of his
efforts and, judging from the surviving correspondence
between them, Owen was not committed to the attempt. 130
127 Baxter mentioned that along with Owen this committee consisted of Stephen
Marshal (DNB, vol 36, p.243), Edward Reyner (DNB, vol 48, p.38), Francis Cheynell (DHB, vol
10, p.222), Thomas Goodwin, Philip Nye, Sydrach Sympson, Richard Vines (DHB, vol 8, p.369),
Thomas Manton (DHB, vol 36, p.101) and Thomas Jacombe (DNB, vol 29, p.126).	 Baxter,
Reliquiae l I.ii.50, p.197.
129 Baxter, Relic/eine I.ii.53, pp.198-99.
129 Baxter, Religaine Part 111.141 - 145, pp.61-69.
130 See Powicke, Under the Cross, pp.202-211 for the subsequent implications of this
incident.
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1.5	 Their writing in its historical and theological 
context 
Richard Baxter and John Owen preached, ministered
and wrote	 in a time when
	 there were important
developments within Reformed theology.
	 Interpreting
these developments has never been trouble free. 131
 The
main question concerns continuity and discontinuity:
did later Reformers continue along the lines of Luther
and Calvin or were there fundamental developments? If
there were developments, were these inherent to
Luther's and Calvin's theologies, or methodological
novelties which Luther and Calvin never considered?
Much of the difficulty in answering these questions has
had to do with identifying what was central to Reformed
theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth century: was
it predestination, Christology or covenant theology?
To answer these central questions is another thesis in
itself, but it is relevant to this study of Baxter and
6e
Owen as	 it must L recognized that	 a number	 of
developments within Reformed theology influenced them.
One such development involved differing views on the
doctrine of predestination.	 The late sixteenth and
131 
Some of the major studies on the development of Reformed theology in this period
are: Paul Althaus, Die Prinzipien der deutschen reforlierten Dogratik is Zeitalter der
aristotelischen Scholastik (Leipzig, 1914); Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics. Translated by G.T.
Thomson, G.W. Bromiley, et al. 4 vols. (Edinburgh, 1936-69); Adolph von Harnack, History of
Dogma. Translated by Neil Buchanan. 7 vols. (New York, 1961); Heinrich Heppe, Reformed
Dogmatics. Edited by Ernst Bizer. Translated by G.T. Thomson (London, 1950); and Otto
Ritschl, Dopengeschichte des Protestantisous. 3 vols (Gottingen, 1927). These studies are
themselves part of the ongoing debate: for they represent different viewpoints and
philosophical assumptions about history and the development of doctrine.
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seventeenth century was a period in Reformed theology
when increasingly the question of God's decrees and
their relation to predestination was debated. Brian G.
Armstrong is one of a number of scholars who have
argued that there developed within Reformed theology a
Scholasticism. 22	 Scholasticism, according to J.P.
Donnelly, evolved largely out of the theology of
Theodore Beza, Jerome Zanchi, and Peter Martyr. 133	In
its broadest sense Scholasticsm developed a theological
system
	
based on logical and rational deductions.
There was a concentrated concern with metaphysical
matters, particularly the sovereignty of God and its
134relation to causality.
	
It is Armstrong's contention
that Protestant Scholasticsm was a departure from
Calvin's theology and stood in sharp contrast to French
humanism -- which stressed a less speculative approach
to theology and which resisted an emphasis upon logic
and reason. 135 Basinghis study on Walter Kickel's,
Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Theodor Beza (1967),
Armstrong argued that Beza, Zanchi and Martyr developed
a more systematic theology than Calvin: and in so doing
gave greater	 emphasis to limited
	 atonement, the
132
Brian S. Armstrong, Calvinism and the Asyraut Heresy. Protestant Scholastics'
and Humanism in Seventeenth-Century France. (Madison, Milwaukee and London: The University
of Wisconsin Press, 1969). Some of the earlier studies are: Ernst Troeltsch, Vernunft and
Offenbarung bei Johann Gerhard and Melanchthon (SIttingen, 1891); Robert Scharlemann, Aquinas
and Gerhard: Theological Controversy and Construction in Medieval and Protestant Scholastics,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); John W. Beardslee ed. and trans. Reformed Dogmatics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); and John Patrick Donnelly, Calvinism and
Scholasticism in Vermigili's Doctrine of Man and Grace (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976).
133 Donnelly, Calvinism and Scholasticss, p.207.
134
See Armstrong, Calvinism and the Alyraut Heresy, p.32.
135
Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, pp. 121-23.
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centrality of the doctrine of predestination and the
theory of supralapsarianism. 136	 Supralapsarianism
maintained that God decreed the elect before the fall
of humanity; an opposing view also emerged, identified
as infralapsarianism, which suggested that out of the
mass of fallen humanity God elected those predestined
to salvation.
	
Thus, the order of God's decrees was
debated.
In this context of Scholasticsm and the debate over
predestination there developed a number of varying
theological expressions. Most notable was the reaction
put forward by Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609). Arminius
disputed the idea of an unconditional divine decree and
supralapsarianism, and thus refuted the theology of
Frances Gomarus (1563-1641), and eventually Pierre du
Moulin (1568-1658) and Gisbertus Voetius (1588-1676).
"Arminianism", as it was later called, has been
described as a "protest against those tenents in the
theology of the Reformed Church that dealt with God's
Election and Reprobation of individuals to eternal life
or death." 137 Arminianism spread on the Continent as
a counter-reaction to Calvinist orthodoxy. As Nicholas
Tyacke has written, "Arminianism itself can plausibly
be understood as part of a more widespread
philosophical scepticism, engendered by way of reaction
to the dogmatic certainties of the sixteenth-century
136 Armstrong, Calviniss and the Asyraut Heresy, pp. 38-41.
137 A.W. Harrison, hrsinianiss (London: Duckworth, 1937), Preface.
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Reformation." 28	 Orthodox Calvinism responded to
Arminianism particularly in the Synod of Dort (1619):
giving further weight to the ideas of
supralapsarianism, limited atonement, unconditional and
irresistible grace, total human inability, and the
assurance of the final perseverance of the elect.
Arminianism in England was not merely an English
reaction to a Dutch conflict as Dewey Wallace has
supposed. 09 While the theological issues are not his
primary object, Nicholas Tyacke has, nevertheless, made
a more convincing argument: within English
protestantism there was already, by 1619, a reaction
against the Calvinist status quo. 140 Tyacke has drawn
attention to the controversy surrounding one William
Barrett, chaplain for Gonville and Caius College, who
in 1595 openly challenged the Calvinist predestinarian
schema. Barrett had been influenced by Peter Baro (at
that time Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, and who
resisted William Perkins). Barrett preached against
Calvinist predestinarianism; and thus incurred the
wrath of the Regius Professor of Divinity, William
Whitaker.
	 Barrett was eventually called before the
Cambridge Consistory Court and forced to recant.
Archbishop Whitgift had to mediate in the controversy.
With the ensuing debate and controversy came the
138	 NicholasTyacke, Anti-Calvinists. The Rise of English Arsinianiss o. 1590-1640
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p.245.
139 Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, p.80.
140 Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists, p.1.
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Lambeth Articles (1595). 141 These proved to be
"anathema to English Arminians during the 1620s". 142
While these articles were Calvinist, the controversy
they produced marked the growth of an undercurrent of
opposition to continental predestinarianism.
Accordingly, by the time of the Synod of Dort there
was already within English Protestant theology a
reaction against Scholasticism. Interestingly, Tyacke
has concluded that the participation of the English
Representatives at Dort -- George Carleton, bishop of
Llandaff, Joseph Hall, Dean of Worcester, John
Davenant, Professor of Theology at Cambridge and Samuel
Ward, Archdeacon of Taunton -- acted as a catalyst for
subsequent English Arminians. 143 The lines were
sharply drawn, and with the reluctance of James and
Charles I to embrace the canons of Dort the next twenty
years saw a clear schism. The theology of Richard
Neile, bishop of Durham, Lancelot Andrewes, bishop of
Winchester and John Cosin, Neile's successor to Durham
stressed a dislike of predestinarian language. Tyacke
has concluded that by 1628 the Arminian faction had
gained significant ecclesiastical power within the
English Church: clear Arminians such as Richard Neile
and William Laud were in positions of leadership. In
1633 the death of Archbishop Abbot made way for Laud to
move to Canterbury. Tyacke has maintained:
Laud and Neile actively sought to
enforce Charles's religious declaration
141 Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists, p.5.
142 Tyacke l Anti-Calvinists, p.31.
143 Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists, p.87.
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of 1628, throughout the dioceses of
England and Wales, which meant in effect
the proscription of Calvinism. Because
of royal support, Laud and Neile were
now increasingly able to implement icicas
which they had held for many years. I"
Thus, by the time Baxter and Owen were beginning their
ministries Arminianism had played a great role in
shaping the theological and ecclesiastical context.
Along with an increased interest in ceremony, and a
dislike of excessive preaching, Arminians challenged
some of the central doctrines of Calvinist orthodoxy:
of special relevance to this study on voluntarism was
the Arminian insistence that man was free to chose to
comply with grace, for predestination had less to do
with God's decree than with God's foreknowledge of
those who would believe and remain steadfast in their
faith.	 Tyacke has put it well: "Arminians, therefore,
not only rejected Calvinist orthodoxy -- they
transformed the issue of Protestant nonconformity. Not
surprisingly, with their reinterpretation of the Prayer
Book and imposition of new ceremonies, Arminians became
the bête noire of Puritans.445
Another reaction to Protestant Scholasticsm came
from the works of John Cameron (1579-1625) and his
pupil, Moise Amyraut (1596-1664); and both proved to be
important influences upon Richard Baxter. Brian
Armstrong has produced the most comprehensive study of
Cameron and Amyraut; and while his thesis that Amyraut
rescued	 Calvin's	 theology	 from	 the	 snares of
144 Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists, p.181.
145 Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists, p.246.
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Scholasticsm (thus preserving true Calvinism) can be
questioned with regard	 to Amyraut's view on the
atonement
	
and election,
	 his	 work is	 otherwise
helpful.'46
 Central to Cameron and Amyraut's theology
were two claims.	 First, they taught that "all true
religion necessarily consists in some covenant which
occurs between God and man." 147 Covenant theology, to
be explained in this section shortly, enabled Cameron
and Amyraut to describe the way in which God and man
interacted. Essential to their theology was the notion
that whereas the covenant of works made with Adam
before the	 fall required perfect	 obedience, the
covenant of grace involved only faith.
	
Second, the
covenant of grace, however, was not limited only to the
elect but was universal; in fact both Cameron and
Amyraut referred to a "hypothetical universalism".
This unorthodox theory suggested that grace and mercy
shaped the covenant of grace, not God's decree of
election.
	
Cameron claimed that before the decree of
election there was God's merciful decree to send Christ
into the world as a saviour. In this sense, Christ has
redeemed all humanity potentially. 148 The important
qualification, however, was that this potential
redemption was only sufficient for those who came to
personal faith and repentance.
Amyraut developed his teacher's theories. 	 Armstrong
has written, "The more one reads the treatises of
146 Armstrong, Calvinism and hy ped Heresy.
147 Armstrong, Calvinism and the hyraut Here5y, P .48.
148 Armstrong, Calvinism and the hyraat Heresy, P.59.
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Amyraut the more one realizes that the
	 peculiar
covenant theology he expounds is the key to the whole
theological program	 at Saumur." 149	 He gave
considerable attention to the hypothetical quality of
the covenant, concluding that the covenant of grace was
conditional: faith was the condition. He arrived at
this conclusion due to a methodological assumption: the
order of events in salvation history implied greater
importance to God's offer of mercy and pardon than to a
sovereign decree. Election was inscrutable; the gospel
call and promises, on the other hand, were clear and
straightforward.	 It was not that Amyraut denied an
absolute predestination (ie. that the elect of God came
to faith infallibly). He claimed, however, that the
elect came to faith through a conditional covenant
which God had accommodated to offer to all potentially,
provided that they believed. Amyraut's teachings
received pronounced criticism from orthodox divines,
for he also cut into the core of Reformed theology.
His	 views	 on	 predestination	 were	 particularly
controversial because of his claim that Calvin's
predestination had been twisted out of context by Beza.
Amyraut insisted that predestination was subordinate to
the doctrine of grace. 150 Accordingly, predestination
had to be understood as conditional for mankind as a
whole, but absolute for those who eventually believed.
Armstrong has argued: "Amyraut apparently believed that
the predestination doctrine of the orthodox, which was
149 Armstrong, Calvinis, and the Asyraat Heresy, P.140.
150 Armstrong, Calviniss and the Asyraat Heresy ' P.160.
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concerned exclusively with the absolute decree of God
and which categorically denied His conditional will,
both destroyed the balanced presentation of Calvin and
Justified his own heavy emphasis on the conditional
will." 151 Amyraut was tried for heresy in 1637 at a
national synod in Alencon. He is relevant to this
study for a number of reasons: first, he reveals a
development within Reformed theology which centred on
the nature of predestination; second, his theology
pronouncedly illustrates the prominence of covenant
theology in seventeenth century Reformed theology; and
finally, it was Amyraut who shaped Baxter's view of the
covenant as a conditional covenant; and as will be
detailed in chapter 3 (3.3), in some ways Baxter shared
Amyraut's criticism.
Mention has already been made of covenant theology.
In general, covenant theology taught that God had
established a covenant of works with Adam and after the
fall of Adam, there appeared a covenant of grace.
Through the covenants God related to mankind: in the
first he did so with a demand for full obedience to the
law, and in the second He offered pardon and mercy in
Jesus Christ. While fuller attention to this subject
must be postponed until chapter 3 (3.1) a number of
introductory comments can be made.
	 First, covenant
theology was a prominent feature of seventeenth century
Reformed theology.	 The nature of its prominence,
however,
	
is open
	 to	 considerable debate	 among
151 Armstrong, Calvinisn and the !Myna Heresy, p.202.
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scholars 152 Second, caution must be exercised when
reading covenant theology. It is not always clear when
writers referred to the covenant whether they meant it
as a bilateral contract or as a unilateral testament;
for at times both terms could be used. 153 Third, when
analyzing puritan covenant	 theology it must be
understood that it developed out of earlier Continental
traditions.	 The covenant motif can be found in the
writings of William of Ockham (c.1280-c.1349). It
appears in Luther and Calvin, becoming more explicit in
the writings of Heinrich Bullinger (1504-1575), Philip
Melanchthon (1497-1560), 	 Oecolampadius (1482-1531),
Martin	 Bucer (1491-1551), Ursinus (1534-1583) and
Olevianus (1535-1587). The number of Continental
theologians who treated the subject of the covenants
should suggest alone that covenant theology was diverse
and multi-faceted. Finally, and perhaps most
important, covenant theology should be seen as a
development within Reformed theology full of paradox:
on the whole covenant theology nullified neither a
sovereign will nor the importance of human response.
In many ways it was an evangelical expression: it
explained how the gospel was offered and the manner by
which a person received the gospel benefits. It is too
facile to conclude that covenant theology was simply a
152 See below 3.1.1, pp.10-59.
153 Attention to this distinction is the particular merit of J. Wayne Baker's,
Heinrich Ballinger and the Covenant: The Other Reformed Tradition (Athens, Ohio: Ohio
University Press, 1980). Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace, p.32, has insisted that the dichotomy
between covenant (implying bilateral) and testament (suggesting unilateral) is unacceptable.
Von Rohr argues that it was a both/and situation. Provided the paradox of a both/and is
acknowledged, the evidence from Perkins' writing and in both Baxter and Owen substantiates
Von Rohr's conclusion.
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mutual contract between God and man -- notwithstanding
the rhetoric of covenant theology. The contradictions
and paradox of covenant theology were fundamental to
its prominence in the seventeenth century.
Reference to covenant theology raises another aspect
of the context in which Baxter and Owen developed their
theology	 and to	 which they both responded:
Antinomianism.	 As the term suggests, this was a
movement within English Protestantism which reacted
against orthodox Calvinism's use of the law. 154 Dewey
Wallace is correct in his claim that Antinomianism was
an "extremism concerning predestinarian grace." 155
Led by John Saltmarsh (1612-1647), Tobias Crisp (1600-
1643) and John Eaton (0c.1575-1642) two essential
characteristics can be identified.	 156 First,
Antinomians challenged the
	
idea of a conditional
covenant.
	 Saltmarsh wrote; "He that offers Christ
offers all the conditions in him, both of Faith and
Repentance."
	
157 In this sense, they reacted against
Arminianism. It was argued that conditionality implied
human capability: and this was strongly denounced. In
154 See Yon Rohr, Covenant of Grace, p. 50.
155 Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, p.113.
156 Of importance are the following illustrative works: Saltmarsh, Free Grace; or,
the Flomings of Christ's Blood freely to sinners (1645); Eaton, The Honey-Cosbe of Free
Justification by Christ alone (1642); Tobias Crisp, Christ Alone Exalted, in Fourteen Sersons
(1643). For Saltmarsh see &eaves and Wier, Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals,
III, pp.136-37; for Crisp see Greaves and Zaller, op.cit, I, pp.191-92; and for Eaton see
Greaves and Zaller, ap.cit, I, p.242.
157
Saltmarsh, Free-Grace (1st edition, 1645, 10th edition corrected, 1700), p.147.
All subsequent references taken from the 10th edition.
158
Yon Rohr, Covenant of Grace, p.53.
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Von Rohr has written:
Antinomians warned that this view of
covenant could lead to another works-
righteousness. To rely on the
fulfillment of conditions is to rely on
one's own doing, and that is an unstable
foundation for covenant security. Even
to buildnne's faith is to build on bath
unsatisfactory and improper grounds. "2
Antinomians argued that the act of justification was
not dependent upon the performance of a covenant
condition. It was held that Christ's death procured
the salvation of the elect unconditionally: the
believers' faith in no way merited justification,
Christ satisfied all. "Christ hath believed perfectly,"
wrote Saltmarsh, "he hath repented perfectly, he hath
sorrowed for sin perfectly, he hath obeyed perfectly,
he had mortified sin perfectly, and all is ours, and we
are Christ's, and Christ is God's." 160	Accordingly,
Antinomians frequently stressed the idea that
justification was from eternity (or the other phrase
used was "immanent"): for the death of Christ was from
eternity and arose out of the eternal decree of God.
It was precisely this diminution of human activity
and exaltation of divine sovereignty which gave rise to
the second distinct characteristic of Antinomianism.
Stoever has called attention to the Antinomian idea
that led to a denial of obligations from ordinary
worldly existence. 161
This disruptive potential, moreover, lay
less in antinomianism's conclusions
about the uses of the law than in its
159 Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace, p.54.
160 saltmarsh, Free-Grace, p.71 see also pp.102 and 137.
161 Stoever, Faire and Easie May, p.161.
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premises about the work of the Holy
Spirit.	 Both forms of the syndrome
exalted	 the conditioned,	 unmediated
operation	 of	 the	 Spirit	 in	 the
application of redemption, to the point
of seriously minimizing, if not
altogether overruling, the Christian's
continuing rootedness in the onh2logical
and moral orders of creation.
Antinomianism, therefore, in many ways may be seen
as a reaction both	 to Arminianism and	 orthodox
Calvinism.	 Both Arminianism	 and Antinomianism
addressed the issues of predestination and human
responsibility: their differing responses, however,
related to that school of thought reflected best by the
Westminster Confession of	 Faith.	 The Confession
reflects a mid-seventeenth century theology concerned
with both Arminianism and Antinomianism. 163	 Thus,
Arminianism and Antinomianism were the two poles
between which Baxter and Owen's theology was expressed,
and both writers have to be read with an eye towards
these movements.
Yet, it is also necessary to appreciate that in
addition to Arminianism and Antinomianism there were
other influences. The seventeenth century was also
shaped by the rise of Socinianism: a movement developed
from the thought of Leo Sozzini (1525-62). Socinianism
denied the importance of substitutionary atonement,
imputed righteousness and, principally, the divinity of
Jesus. In this context was furthermore the development
162 Stoever, Faire and Easie Way, p.162.
163 See John H. Leith, Assembly at Westminster. Reformed Theology in the Making
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1973, second reprinting, 1978), pp.41-42.
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Inof what C.F. Allison has called, "moralism". 164
certain respects moralism was not confined to one
particular theological group. Moralism can be best
understood as an emphasis upon the capability of the
human will to make a necessary response to the ethical
demands of the gospel. At the heart of moralism lay
particular soteriological implications: faith became
more an issue of dutiful response rather than the
appropriation of Christ's righteousness.
Thus the context of Baxter and Owen's writings was
complex. It was shaped by developments within Reformed
theology both on the Continent and within English
theology. By the mid-seventeenth century, Reformed
theology had given rise to divergent counter-reactions.
When Baxter and Owen's theologies, and voluntarism in
particular, are considered this theological context is
highly germane: the remainder of this section pursues
this theme.
Baxter is noted for	 his rather exhaustive and
prodigious writing. He reported that his wife,
Margaret, "thought I had done better to have written
fewer books, and to have done those few better."
Baxter does not seem to have resented this opinion.165
This "pen in the hand of God" produced in his life time
a staggering list of works. 166	 It is with his writing
164 C.F. Allison, The Rise of Moralism. The Produation of the Gospel from Hooker
to Baxter (London: SPCK, 1966).
165 See 11 Breviate of the Life of Margaret Baxter (1681), pp.47, 66 and 77. Cf.
Nuttall, Baxter, p.95, n.l.
166 The expression 'pen in the hand of God' comes from Baxter's funeral sermon
preached by William Bates. For Bates see Calm Revised, pp.35-36. For Baxter's vorks see
the bibliography provided by Geoffrey Nuttall, Baxter; more helpful is Neil Keeble's 'A
Baxter Bibliography' in Puritan Ran of Letters, pp.156-84. Roger Thomas, The Baxter
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that this study is primarily concerned. It is helpful
to indicate here that Baxter's publications engaged in
controversy with some of the more prominent puritan
writers of the period. In addition to John Owen
Baxter's publications received criticism from: Anthony
Burgess, Richard Vines, John Tombes, William Twisse,
Christopher Cartwright, William Allen, Giles Firmin,
William Eyre, Bishop Edward Stillingfleet, John Wallis,
George Lawson, Joseph Caryl, and Joseph Crandon. 167
Baxter also wrote commendatory prefaces for some forty—
three works, by such notable figures as Joseph Alleine,
Samuel Clarke Sr, Samuel Clark Jr, Thomas Gouge,
Matthew Hale, John Howe, Thomas Manton, Cotton Mather,
and Richard Vines. Baxter's stature among his
contemporaries is evident. 168
Nevertheless, while Baxter may have been prominent,
his theology was controversial. Baxter himself
preferred to consider his theology "Catholick"; he
likened himself to express only "mere Christianity". 169
The evidence, however, suggests another story.
Treatises: A Catalogue of the Richard Baxter Papers (other than letters) in Dr. finials's
Library (London: Dr. Williams's Trust, Dr. Williams's Library, Occasional Paper No.8, 1959)
is a helpful guide to the unprinted manuscripts.
167 For Anthony Burgess see DNB, vol 7, p.308; Richard Vines (DNB, vol 53, p.369);
John Tombes (DNB, vol 52, p.2); William Twisse (DNB, vol 52, p.397); Christopher Cartwright
(DHB, vol 9, p.220); Giles Firmin (DNB, vol 19, p.45); William Eyre (Calamy Revised, p.187);
Bishop Edward Stillingfleet (DNB, vol 54, p.375); John Wallis (DNB, vol 59, p.141); George
Lawson (DNB, vol 22, p.289); Joseph Caryl (DNB, vol 9, p.253); and Joseph Crandon (Greaves
and Zaller, op.cit, I, pp.188-69.
168 
For 4,4414-1.
 list of those works for which Baxter wrote a preface see Keeble,
Puritan Nan of Letters pp. 170-72. For Alliene see DNB, vol 1, p.299; for Clarke Sr. see DNB,
vol 10, p.441; for Clarke Jr. see DNB, vol 10, p.442; for Gouge see DNB, vol 22, p.269; for
Hale see DNB, vol 24, p.18; for Howe see DNB, vol 28, p.85; for Manton see DNB, vol 26,
p.101; and for Mather see DNB, vol 37, p.8.
169 See Keeble, Puritan Han of Letters, pp.23-24.
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First, by the time he published Aphorismes of
Justification (1649) his theology had already gone
through a period of change and consolidation. Prior to
1649 Baxter agreed with the writings	 of William
Twisse. 170 Twisse promoted the ideas of justification
before faith, limited atonement, imputed righteousness
and even a degree of determinism. By 1649, however,
Baxter consistently expressed views closer to those
expressed by the Saumur divines, Amyraut and Cameron.
J.I. Packer has interpreted his 	 theology "as an
improved Amyraldism." 171 It is arguable that after
1649 Baxter never significantly changed or modified his
position on most points of theology; he had already
reached most of his conclusions pertinent to the issue
of voluntarism. In fact, it will be contended here
that	 his	 first	 publication,	 Aphorismes	 of
Justification, was a work from which he was never able
to escape. In this sense throughout this study no
reference is made to any linear development of Baxter's
work but considers it as a whole.
Secondly, however, it is suggested that his views
on the death and merits of Christ, the nature of the
covenant and the practical character of the Christian
life must not be interpreted solely as a mimicking of
170 
For Twisse see DNB, vol 52, p.397.
171 LI. Packer, 'The Redemption and Restoration of Man in the Thought of Richard
Baxter', Oxford D.Phil (1954), p. g of Abstract. Cf. Peter loon, God's Statessan, p.40 who
likewise identifies Baxter's view of the atonement as similar to those of Amyraut. As will
be detailed below in chapters 3 and 4 this interpretation is justifiable. While Baxter never
explicitly identifies Amyraut as his chief influence (he preferred to stress his exegesis of
Scripture), he did mention his favourable views toward the French theologian. Owen
recognized this in Baxter's writing and attacked this dependency, particularly in Of the
Death of Christ (1650), Goold ed., X, p.479.
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Amyraut. He is not so easily defined. A possible clue
to the whole of his theology is his experience of
Antinomianism in the Army.
But for all the writings and wrath of
men which provoked against me, I must
here record my thanks to God for the
success of my controversial writings
against the Antinomians: when I was in
the Army it was the predominant
infection. The books of Dr. Crisp, Paul
Hobson, Saltmarsh, Cradock, and
abundance such like were the writings
most applauded; and he was thought no
spiritual Christian, but a legalist that
favoured not of Antinomianism, which was
figured with the title of Free-grace;
and others were thffilght to preach the
Law, and not Christ.
As detailed in chapter 3, Baxter's understanding of
Antinomianism led him to argue consistently for a view
of the covenant of grace which included covenant
conditions (le. the benefits of Christ's universal
atonement were available upon the condition that a
person repents, believes and lives in obedience). To
be sure this may well explain what Owen and others
regarded as Baxter's unorthodox theology.
John Owen was a prodigious writer as well. 173 It
is significant for this study that, apart from his
views on church government, Owen's theology underwent
few if any major modifications in the course of his
lifetime. The major influence upon Owen, and the
person he quoted more frequently than anyone else, was
Augustine. Besides Augustine, Owen drew upon many of
172 Baxter, Reliouiae 1.i.163, p.I11.
173 For a partial list of Owen's works see Ming and loon, God's Statesoan, pp.179-81
(yet there are a number of inaccuracies in loon's list) Owen wrote commendatory prefaces as
well for the following: Theophilus Gale (Calm Revised, p.216), Edward Polhill, Samuel Petto
(Calm Revised, p.388), James Durham, Patrick Gillespie, Bartholomew Ashwood (Calm
Revised, p.18) and Elisha Coles and Henry Whit.
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• the church fathers, Aquinas, Bradwardine and
occasionally some of the early Reformers. One will not
find in Owen's writings (or for that matter Baxter's) a
great number of references to Calvin; yet 'Owen's
exegesis is similar to Calvin's on a number of central
Reformed doctrines.	 This study suggests that Owen is
representative	 of	 an	 ongoing	 tradition	 within
seventeenth century English Reformed theology. Dewey
Wallace has referred to those in this tradition as
"high Calvinists": those who responded to the issues of
moralism,	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 Christ	 and
predestination. 174 Wallacemakes sense up to a point,
though his contrast between Owen's high Calvinism and,
what he has called, Baxter's "moderate Calvinism" only
accentuates the problem of defining "Calvinism".	 Owen
consistently criticised moralism, Arminianism and
Socinianism: he repeatedly stressed the work of grace
and the Spirit in sanctification to counter moralism;
the sovereignty of God over against human independence
in response to Arminianism; and the meritorious
atonement in the death of Christ for the elect in sharp
defence against the Socinian denial of the divinity and
satisfaction of Jesus. His theological roots, however,
were not only in Calvin, but in Augustine and the
Church Fathers.
This investigation into voluntarism, an important
aspect of seventeenth century English puritanism, looks
at the works of Baxter and Owen and detects both a
174 Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, p.144.
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unity of opinion and a diversity. The presence of
unity and diversity is worth highlighting: it suggests
that, at least as evidenced by Baxter and Owen, one
must be cautious when making general statements about
puritan theology.	 Owen represents an element within
seventeenth century puritanism more clearly in line
with the Augustinian tradition.	 Baxter was still
largely dependent upon the Augustinian tradition, but,
by 1649, he was also pronouncedly influenced by
Amyraldism, from which he received many of his ideas
about a universal atonement and a universally offered
conditional covenant. These aspects of their theologies
are presented more fully in later chapters, but have
been introduced here in order to suggest that Baxter
and Owen represent not so much two opposing poles in
mid-seventeenth century puritanism as different shades
of opinion: agreeing on some points and yet strongly
disagreeing on others. When the influence they each
had upon contemporaries, as evidenced by their stature
during this period as well as the others they drew into
printed debate, is considered, it is arguable that
Baxter and	 Owen	 provide	 legitimate	 theological
paradigms	 of	 mid-seventeenth	 century	 English
puritanism.
1.6 Methodology
This thesis is largely concerned with doctrine and
its relevance to puritan practice. It is recognised,
however, that a study of a doctrine expressed by
individuals
	
at any given time	 must	 take into
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consideration the overall historical context. There
are two major aspects to an historical context, and in
this work the two approaches converge: a consideration
of antecedents and an awareness of the contemporary
context. With regard to the first, Baxter and Owen's
writings are considered within a larger doctrinal
development. Specifically, the doctrines of the will
as explained by Augustine and others within an
Augustinian tradition, a tradition which influenced
many in the mid-seventeenth century, are examined. As
Baxter and Owen are studied, it will be noted that
their arguments on voluntarism were influenced, to some
degree or other, by particular antecedents. 	 The
obvious evidence for this is their direct reference to
earlier writers.	 The less obvious	 evidence is
suggested in their use of various terms, concepts and
expressions. Certainly, the question arises: did
Baxter and Owen themselves suggest explicitly their
consciousness of doctrinal antecedents? 	 Sometimes
•this is the case. Furthermore, to what extent did
their interpretation of, say, Augustine compare and/or
contrast with that of Aquinas' and even that of their
contemporaries'? This is less easy to answer: for
often their references to earlier writers were given in
passing.
With regard to the second aspect, an attempt is made
to place Baxter and Owen within the context of the
period 1640-1690. While the predominate concern is
with an exposition of their writings, there was an
immediate context for much of Baxter and Owen's work.
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The importance of	 Arminianism, Antinomianism and
covenant theology, as earlier introduced in 1.5, is not
ignored. Nevertheless, this study is restricted to a
detailed theological examination of Baxter and Owen,
whose significance has been outlined above. Thus, it
is beyond the scope of this work to give a broader
picture of voluntarism in seventeenth century English
theology as a whole. Such a restriction is warranted
by, first, Baxter and Owen i s prominence and influence
and, secondly, the rather startling absence of studies
on puritan theology which pay attention to the theology
of particular individuals. It seems that in the attempt
to "discover" the pulse of seventeenth century
puritanism many of the finer details (which help
constitute the whole) are forfeited for the sake of the
"broad picture".	 Surely both methodologies are quite
necessary and legitimate; and while neither approach is
self-sufficient,	 there	 is	 merit	 in	 a	 study
predominately opting for one or the other.
Therefore it is largely the printed works of Baxterra
Owen which are examined. 	 While both were active
preachers, their major medium was published work. In
numerous cases, either the cause of publication or the
nature of the publication was due to specific pastoral
or polemical issues. Even some of the printed works
were reshaped sermons. In other words, a microcosm of
mid-seventeenth century puritan thinking, and even
experience, can be seen in printed works. 175
175 This assumption was made by Basil Hall, 'Puritanism: The Problem of Definition,'
In Studies in Church History, edited by G.J. Cumming, 2:283-96. (London: Thomas Nelson,
1965), p.295. See also Dewey Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, pp.ix-x.
67
The printed works by Baxter and Owen have been
selected on the following criteria. 176 First, having
observed that issues like Church polity were not
directly pertinent to voluntarism, only those works
which were concerned with the doctrines of election,
predestination, justification and sanctification have
been taken as relevant. 	 In Baxter's case he himself
provided recommendations. 177 Second, if there was any
obvious internal evidence which either suggested that
one work was in response to another, or was in
conjunction with an earlier work of the same author,
then this was included. Third, works by other mid—
seventeenth century puritan writers which received
either a commendatory preface, praise or a scathing
rebuke from Baxter and Owen have been examined.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the methodology
of this study assumes the validity of exposition.
Inasmuch as in 1.1 a	 call was given for	 more
theological studies of puritan spirituality, the
importance of examining in detail the texts of Baxter
and Owen has been presumed. This way we are made aware
of some of the nuances in their theology as well as the
ways in which sometimes they balanced their practical
assertions	 with	 either	 paradoxes	 or	 important
176 In this thesis reference is made to both first edition and later editions of
Baxter and Owen's publications; availability determined whether to use first edition or later
edition. In contrast to the studies of Baxter by Nuttall and Keeble and those on Owen by
loon and Ferguson, I have chosen to provide the title of the book cited and where appropriate
to later editions to add the volume number and the collection editor (eg. Orme's edition of
Baxter's works and either Goold's edition of Owen's work (predominately) or the Banner of
Truth reprint of Goold's edition). I sense this makes better reading.
177 
This
	 .	
i is given n the bibliography which Baxter provides in Compassionate Counsel
to all Young Hen (1681).
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qualifications. Throughout this work mention is made
of the development of Baxter and Owen's ideas from one
publication to another; yet, as argued in 1.4 neither
Baxter nor Owen significantly changed his ideas from
1649 to 1691.
1.7 The Aim of the thesis 
John Owen wrote:
It is the power of truth in the heart
alone that will make us cleave unto it
indeed in an hour of temptation. Let
us, then, not think that we are anything
the better for our conviction of the
truths of these great doctrines of the
gospel, for which we contend with these
men, unless we find the power of truths
abiding in our own hearts, and have a
continual experience of their necessity
and excellency in our standing4efore
God and our communion with him.
Owen reveals here one of the characteristics of puritan
theology and practice: its experiential quality.
Sinclair Ferguson's assessment of Owen is correct:
"[his] interests were primarily pastoral rather than
systematic.	 He was a theologian because he was a
pastor."
	 09	 Dewey Wallace
	 has suggested,
"Theological formulations function
	 in relation to
religious experience, but that latter phenomenon is the
soil out of which they grow and in which they
thrive.4 80
178 Owen, Vindicae Evangelicae (1655), Preface to the reader, Ooold ed., XII, p.52.
179 Ferguson, John Omen, p.262. Emphasis his.
180 Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, p.ix.
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Puritan theology was
	 a theology rooted in the
experience of men and women. In F. Ernest Stoeffler,
The Rise of Evangelical Pietism and August Lang,
Puritanismus und Pietismus have both made convincing
arguments that puritan theology should be seen within a
pietistic context. 182 WhileStoeffler and Lang have
avoided some of the complexities of defining puritan,
their assessments of puritan spirituality has validity.
To understand the nature of puritan piety one must
recognise that there was an internalisation of
doctrine. Peter Lake has aptly concluded, "Protestant
religion had two sides to it firstly the objective
realm of doctrinal truth, and secondly the subjective
religious experience undergone by the godly in their
internalisation of those truths." 23 Truth was that
given in God's word; puritan practice was far more than
subjectivism run wild, there was an objective element,
the word of God. This revelation, however, was
expected in turn to engage, transform and govern the
individual. In addition, this individual
internalisation of doctrine cannot be stressed at the
expense of the puritan insistence on corporate life.
181
The following also make the point above. Norman Pettit, The Heart Prepared:
Grace and Conversion in Puritan Spiritual Life (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1966), p.viii, New, Pnglican and Puritan, p.6, Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, p.8,
Lake,Roderate Puritans p.116; see also Richard Greaves, The Nature of Puritan Tradition. in
Reform, Canforsity and Dissent: Essays in honour of Geoffrey Huttall, edited by R.B. Knox
(London: Epworth, 1977), p.258. 	 Elsewhere, however, Greaves suggests that the puritan
experiential element came more from Luther than from Calvinism. Sreaves makes the
questionable assertion that Calvinism was more an intellectual expression, Greaves, John
Banyan (Appleford: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1969), p.29.
182	
Stoeffler, The Rise of Evangelical Puritanism (Leiden: F.J. Brill, 1965),
especially chapter 2 and A. Lang, Paritanismus and Pietismus (Darmadst: 1972), chapters 2-3.
183 Lake, Moderate Puritans, p.155.
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Thus, the experiential aspect of puritan theology is
appreciated as each chapter develops this study of
voluntarism.
Based on the definition of voluntarism given in 1.1
this thesis is structured within a specific framework.
As suggested earlier when defining voluntarism, the
human will chose in response to the divine initiative.
For Baxter and Owen explaining the divine initiative
involved examining the will of God, the sovereignty of
God, the grace of God, and the covenants of God. These
issues related proportionally to the nature and
function of the human will, the nature of faith, the
nature of repentance, the use of the means of the
gospel and the character and experience of one's
Christian life. Thus,	 the experiential aspect of
puritan theology	 is appreciated as	 each chapter
develops this study of voluntarism.
Chapter 2 presents certain antecedents to Baxter and
Owen's voluntarism. Here close attention is given to
the influence of Augustine, for it is arguable that
mid-seventeenth	 century	 puritans	 were	 within a
tradition originating with Augustine. Certainly,
Calvin too is of great concern in this study. The one
qualification is that comparing Calvin with later
"Calvinism" is fraught with difficulties. On the other
hand, it is necessary to appreciate that the role of
the human will in Calvin's theology encompassed his
anthropology, soteriology and Christology in ways that
reveal Calvin	 to be	 not nearly	 so free	 from
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04qualification, paradox and tension.	 With this in
mind not only will more insight into Calvin's theology
be gained, but a more profitable comparison and
contrast between Calvin and mid-seventeenth century
puritans is possible. The contribution to the "Calvin
versus Calvinists" debate made in this thesis is the
suggestion that voluntarism as seen in Owen and, to a
lesser extent, in Baxter reveals an affinity between
Calvin (and the Augustinian tradition) and certain
notable mid-seventeenth century puritans.
Chapters 3 through 5 are primarily concerned with
presenting the doctrinal framework of this voluntarism.
These chapters are presented in order to examine both
the "divine initiative" (which involved election,
predestination, effectual calling and justification)
and the "human response" (incorporating repentance,
faith and righteousness). The final chapters, 6 and 7,
offer the implications of the doctrinal assumptions and
so detail the practical elements of mid-seventeenth
century puritan voluntarism as suggested by Baxter and
Owen. These chapters investigate the importance of the
will in the Christian's life as he encountered the call
to holiness, the struggle with indwelling sin, the
question of assurance and the desire for the grace of
perseverance.
This thesis aims to explore mid-seventeenth century
puritan theology and practice with the goal of
understanding the internalisation of doctrine within
104 I 
am in particular agreement with the conclusions reached by William J. Bouwsma,
John Calvin. 4 Sixteenth Century Portrait (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988),
pp.233-34.
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puritan life. In short, through the works of Richard
Baxter and John Owen, we are looking at the puritan
self to see how the godly person understood his life in
Christ. It is argued that voluntarism was a principal
dimension of mid-seventeenth century English
puritanism. A broad definition of voluntarism is given
so as to appreciate the importance of willingness in
the Christian life. In so doing this thesis will
contribute to a better theological understanding of
late English puritanism. In the end it presents, as
seen in the work of Richard Baxter and John Owen, a
theological study of one aspect of puritan theology and
practice: the importance of the human will in the
Christian life.
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Chapter Two
DOCTRINES OF THE HUMAN WILL: IMPORTANT PRECEDENTS 
Introduction 
In 1643 John Owen produced his first major work,
e gopaXixt AuregouaLaaci.xn or a Display of Arminianism,
being a discovery of the Old Pelagian Idol, Freewill,
1
with the new Goddess Contingency.	 Owen claimed that
Arminianism was a threat because it challenged God's
omnipotent and exclusive will. It could only follow,
argued Owen, that Arminianism would elevate human
sufficiency and exalt the freedom of man's will. He
called Arminianism “ a discovery of the old pelagian
idol" because he believed it was the appearance of an
age old "idol", namely "freewill". What is pertinent
to this chapter is that in his debate with the
Arminians he drew upon a tradition going back to
Augustine of Hippo.
Accordingly, this chapter will go back to earlier
writers and present a survey of what may well be called
the doctrine of the human will. In order to understand
Owen and Baxter when they described the role of the
human will and the way in which men and women responded
to the divine initiative (the working definition of
voluntarism),	 it is
	 necessary to	 recognize the
1 Ofopabac AusfOup wrsoul or a Display of ArBinianis, (1643)	 Goold ed., X.	 All
subsequent references taken from this edition.
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contributions and influences of earlier writers. 	 The
primary suggestion is that while Baxter and Owen
infrequently quoted from any one source, their
understanding of voluntarism and the role of the human
will was very much the result of these earlier writers;
there was a background, or to use another analogy, a
backdrop to their voluntarism.
The survey begins with Augustine, considered perhaps
the father of both Scholasticism and Reformed theology,
and moves on to Aquinas who attempted to hold on to
Augustinianism and to Aristotelian metaphysics. The
counter-reaction to Aquinas' Aristotelianism in Duns
Scotus and William Ockham will be considered.	 In
Scotus and Ockham a voluntarism developed, but it was
not	 entirely	 similar	 to Augustine's.	 Thomas
Bradwardine	 will	 be	 shown	 to	 represent	 an
Augustinianism of the fourteenth century. Out of this
medieval context Luther
	
will then be considered;
particular attention will be given to his debate with
Erasmus. Focus will sharpen upon Calvin, both a loyal
follower of Augustine and the forerunner of certain
mid-seventeenth century puritan emphases. However, the
theory that later so called "Calvinists" departed from
Calvin's teaching on justification and grace will be
questioned: there were important differences, but there
was also a degree of continuity. Certainly, Baxter and
Owen were recipients of a tradition much earlier than
Calvin's theology. Thus, it has to be stressed that
while Baxter and Owen had their own contribution to
make to the discussion of the human will, they were
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also inheritors of traditions which more than anything
established the "framework" or "agenda" for their
voluntarism.
Instead	 of	 presenting the	 material	 strictly
chronologically the discussion will fall into three
sections.	 First, (1.1) considers the nature and
operation	 of the	 divine will	 as seen	 in the
contributions of major theologians from Augustine to
Calvin. It is impossible to discuss human choice
without referring to the divine will: human choice, as
those considered in this survey understood it, related
to God's will. Logically, therefore, it is essential
to examine what was meant by God's immutable will. Did
the will of God qualify human freedom of choice?
Likewise,	 how	 did	 human	 responsibility	 and
accountability fit in with an immutable and even
predetermined will of God? As explained shortly, the
question of the will's choice was actually more a
question of relative or proportional freedom.
Equally, there arises the issue of the relationship
between God's foreknowledge and his predetermination.
With the question of divine predetermination develops
the complicated issue of necessity. This term,
associated more with gcholasticism, can be generally
defined as: (1) something which exists as it only could
exist, its opposite is impossible (eg. God), necessitas
absoluta; (2) something which exists only as a result
of a previous act, or acts, which too could have been
different (eg. human actions among society), necessitas
consequentiae; and (3) something which exists because
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an external agent has coerced or imposed his will onto
another to produce an act or acts (eg. a parent's
command to a child), necessitas coactionis? As will
be shown, debate occurred on the question of whether
God's will involved a necessity of compulsion (3) or
that God merely foreknew the result of human choice
(2).	 Following along this line was the issue of
determinism, especially relevant to Augustine's
response to Pelagius and Erasmus' criticism of Luther.
Here developed the question of contingency, namely
actions which resulted not by any necessity but by the
free	 operation	 of	 human	 choice,	 thought	 and
3performance.	 This was precisely the crux of the
controversy, for it raised the question of whether
God's will was in some way dependent, or even
conditioned, by the secondary agency of men and women.
The heart of the matter, therefore, in (2.1) is: what
is the relationship between God's will and the role of
secondary agents?
Secondly, in (2.2) man's will and the nature of his
volitional actions are set in the proper context.
Nearly all the theologians with whom this survey is
concerned accepted the nature of man as described by
Plato and especially Aristotle: man was both body and
soul; the will was within the soul; it responded to the
exercise of understanding by means of reason; the will
2	 •
Richard Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terns, (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1980, pp.199-200.
3 Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, pal.
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chose according to the directions of understanding.4
For most of the individuals considered, understanding
the nature of the human will was not entirely a
philosophical or metaphysical task. 	 There was an
experiential or moral	 aspect which needs to	 be
appreciated.
	
Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin suggested
in one way or another that the activity of the will was
at the very centre of Christian piety. A number of
questions logically follow. To what degree has fallen
man's will and understanding been affected by sin? Was
the will merely subject to the failure of understanding
or was it itself affected by sin?
Finally, (2.3), the question of how the interaction
of the divine and human will is examined. In Augustine
and Aquinas the nature and operation of grace emerged
as the central issue. A notable change, however,
occurred during the medieval period as increasingly the
issue of merit, meritum, was debated. 	 By meritum
medieval writers basically meant the value of a human
action done obediently by grace. 5	 The question of
merit lay at the centre of medieval theology's doctrine
of justification, grace and sanctification. To these
medieval ideas of merit some of the early Reformers
responded. Luther did not simply reject the medieval
scholastic view of merit; he attempted to replace the
4 For Plato and Aristotle see David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought,
Vintage Books (New York: Random House, 1962), pp.3-15; J.B. Korlec, 'Free Will and free
choice' in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Fros the Rediscovery of
Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600 Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1902), p.629 writes that Aristotle's Hichosachean Ethics heavily inspired medieval
teaching on free choice.
5 Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, p.190.
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ideas of meritum with an emphasis upon what he believed
was the Pauline concept of righteousness. The later
Continental and English Reformers also dealt with the
question of merit and how the divine will and the human
will related. Since this work ultimately suggests that
voluntarism shaped the nature of mid-seventeenth
century piety and practice, understanding the framework
Baxter, Owen and others inherited is important: not
only for understanding their doctrine of the human will
but for better appreciating the inner dynamic of late
puritanism.
2.1 The Nature and Operation of the Divine Will 
4The thought Augustine of Hippo (354-430)	 is centralL
to an understanding of the development of the doctrine
of the human will. Apart from the biblical writers,
Augustine was the chief writer on whom most mid-
seventeenth century puritans depended. This is not to
suggest that prior to Augustine the question of human
liberty	 and choice	 was ignored.	 Nevertheless,
Augustine's	 response	 to	 both	 Manichaeism	 and
Pelagianism directed Western theology into patterns and
expressions of such importance that he cannot be
avoided in any analysis of doctrinal development.
Augustine so shaped the understanding of the role of
the will that, in one way or another, subsequent
writers considered Augustine the main teacher on the
role of the will. 6
6	
Alister McGrath comments that, 'All medieval theology is 'Augustinian', to a
greater or lesser extent.' Certainly a great deal of qualification is required here. See
Mister E. McGrath, lustitia Del: 4 History of Christian Doctrine of Justification, Volume 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.24. and Etienne Gilson, The Christian
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It is well beyond the purpose of this thesis to
present anything more than a general survey of
Augustine's work on the subject of the human will; and
in this section the primary concern is with his
teaching on the nature of God's will. His
understanding of this, as in many other areas of his
theology, developed over time. Yet how and to what
extent his view of God's sovereignty changed is open to
question. Etienne Gilson has claimed that Augustine's
ideas were not expressed in the same way before and
after Pelagius. 7 According to Alister McGrath
Augustine changed his mind around 396 or 397: prior to
this he actually accepted a free will; subsequent to
397 his view on justification and free will changed to
that which he expressed in his better known works. 8
On the other hand, Gerald Bonner has proposed that in
all probability Augustine was more or less as
consistent in his later writings (ie. after Pelagius)
with his earlier writings (ie. when he responded to
Simplicianus in c.396). 8 It is not necessary to
determine here which position is correct, but it should
be noted that Augustine's thought did develop and that
Pelagianism was not the sole determining influence upon
Philosophy of Saint Augustine. 2nd edition. (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1961), p.ix.
7 Gilson, Philosophy of St. Augustine, p.158.
8 McGrath, lustitia Del, pp.24-25.
9
Gerald Bonner, God's Decree and Han's Destiny: Studies on the thought of Augustine
of Hippo. Collected Studies Series, CS 255. (London: Variorum Reprints, 1987), p.xii.
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him. 10
Throughout many of his works Augustine was concerned
with the problem of evil; and, apart from the issue of
predestination, this was the context of his teaching on
the	 divine will as well as the issue of human free
will. Augustine's treatment of evil and the will of
God reveals his understanding of the relation between
God's will and human actions. A number of observations
stand out.
First, in the Confessions	 (c.397-401) Augustine
argued that God's will was immutable and sovereign.
For even as you totally are, so do you
alone totally know, for you immutably
are, and you know immutably, and you
will immutably. Your essence knows and
wills immutably, and your knowledge is
and wills immutably, and your will is
and knows immutably. Nor does it seem
just before you that in exactly the same
way as Light unchangeable knows itself,
so should it be known bK the mutable
being enlightened by it.
In Enchiridion (c.421), where arguably his theology
Is fully matured, a further thought is found.
	 Here
he balanced the sovereign will of God with the justice
of God; in particular he had in mind the question of
election and predestination. He suggested that while
God's will was sovereign and immutable, one must not
assign any culpability to the divine will: God was not
10	
For Pelagius and Pelagianism see G.R. Evans, Augustine an Evil, pp.118-49;
McGrath, lustitia Del, pp.71-72 and Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought. St. Augustine to Ockhas
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1957), pp.52-54.
11 Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine. Translated, with ani Introduction
and notes, by John K. Ryan. 	 Image Books. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company,
Inc.,1960), Book 13. Ch.16.19, p.347. 	 All subsequent references taken from this edition
unless indicated otherwise.
12 Bonner identifies Enchiridion as Augustine's most systematic exposition of his
beliefs. Bonner, Ood's Decree and Man's Destiny. Study II, p.270.
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the cause of evil. 0
	
Nevertheless, there was a
relationship between God's will and the evil activities
of humanity:
in a strange and ineffable fashion even
that which is done against his will is
not done without his will. For it would
not be done without his allowing it -
and surely his permission is not
unwilling but willing - nor would he who
is good allow the evil to be done,
unless in his omnipotenca he could bring
good even out of evil.
The second emphasis of Augustine to highlight here
balances his insistence upon a sovereign divine will:
he stressed human secondary agency. In his City of God
(c.413-426 7) he responded to the Greek and Roman idea
of fate; he asserted that fate was better understood
as the will of God.
	 As Augustine presented his
correction of Greek and Roman understanding of
causality he specifically mentioned that God both
foreknew and allowed the actions of secondary agency.
In fact it was through this secondary action that
events occurred; Augustine apparently thought this was
self-evident.	 In this context, however, it is
possible to discern a measure of determinism.
there is no need that I should labor and
strive with them in a merely verbal
controversy, since they attribute the
so-called order and connection of causes
to the will and power of God most high,
who is most rightly and most truly
believed to know all things before they
come to pass, and to leave nothing
13 Augustine, Enchiridion 8.23, in Albert C. Butler, trans., hegustine: Confessions
and Enchiridion. Library of Christian Classics, Volume 7. (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1955),
pp.353-54. All subsequent references taken from this edition unless otherwise indicated.
14 Augustine, Enchiridion, 26.100, p.399.
15 Augustine,City of God, Translated by Marcus Dods. The Modern Library edition.
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1950), Book V.9, pp.154-55. All references taken from this
edition.
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are-
unordained;	 from	 whom all powers,
although the wills of all are not from
Him. Now, that is chiefly the will of
God most high, whose power extends
itself irresistibly throligh all things
which they call fate ... "
The issue, however, involved the question of necessity.
Augustine insisted that while God's will was
infallible, humanity was not under a harsh necessity.
For if that is to be called our
necessity which is not in our power, but
even though we be unwilling effects what
it can effect - as, for instance, the
necessity of death - it is manifest that
our wills by which we live uprightly or
wickedly are not under such a necessity;
for we do many things which, if we were
not willing, we should not do.. This is
primarily true of the act of willing
itself - for if we will, it is; if we
will not, it is not - for w 	 not
will if we were unwilling.
Augustine clearly denied that God's will and decree
forced by necessity human action and choice. He was
equally insistent, however, that while free from a
constraining necessity, humanity was in no way free
from the sovereign will of God. 	 A delicate balance
existed, claimed Augustine. 	 Man was free only in so
far as he was free from a constraining or compelling
necessity. "So also, when we say that it is necessary
that, when we will, we will by free choice, in so
saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do
not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity
which destroys liberty." He went on to argue:
Therefore we are by no means compelled,
either, retaining the prescience of God,
to take away the freedom of the will,
or, retaining the freedom of the will,
16 Augustine, The City of God Book V.8, p.151.
17 Augustine, City of God, Book V.10, p.156.
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to deny that He is prescient of future
things, which is impious.
	
But we
embrace	 both.	 We faithfully and
sincerely confess both. The former,
that we may believe wehl; the latter,
that we may live well.
While more of Augustine's thought will be presented
later in this chapter, here the immediate intention is
to accent	 Augustine's	 insistence that	 God	 was
ultimately the sovereign initiator. 	 His will was
immutable and infallible. 	 Paradoxically, Augustine
accepted that God foreknew and actually willed a
freedom for secondary agents.	 There was no compelling
Or coercing necessity. Augustine's understanding of
the divine will accepted this paradoxical tension.
Subsequent theologians, however, did not follow his
reasoning so easily. While it is true that the Second
Council of Orange (529) fully embraced Augustine's
arguments, nevertheless, Alister McGrath claims that
the canons of Orange II were not widely known in the
medieval period. Furthermore, argues McGrath, many of
Pelagius' ideas were erroneously ascribed to Jerome. 19
McGrath's views are consistent with the earlier study
by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. He considered Anselm
and Peter Lombard important writers who moved away from
Augustine. Anselm's theological speculation led him to
attempt to define the precise nature of liberty; so his
methodology took him further away from Augustine's
paradox to "construct a mode of conception that would
18 Augustine, City of God, Book V.10, p.157.
19 McGrath, lustitia Del, pp.74-75.
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lend coherence to the mystery." 20 Gordon Leff, in an
earlier study, also suggested the importance of Anselm:
"Anselm differed from St. Augustine in going further
along the same path and in drawing conclusions for
which St. Augustine had not looked. His striking
novelty came from applying dialectic to Augustinian
premises. ,21 Peter Lombard (c.1095-1169) produced his
Book of Sentences (Libri Quatuour Sententiarum) (1157—
1158). This highly systematic work became the catalyst
for all subsequent medieval theology (including
Luther's). In this work Lombard gave greater emphasis
to reason and so shifted the methodology of theology
away from Augustine.22
This movement away from Augustine, however, cannot
be identified without also recognizing the contribution
of St. Thomas Aquinas.	 Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274)
defined the nature and
	 operation of God's will,
voluntas, not only in the Augustinian tradition but
fruitfully combine ristotelian metaphysics and/Logic. 23
Aquinas' three more significant works are: Commentary
on the Sentences (1253-57), Summa contra Gentiles
20	
Lonergan, Grace and Freedom. Operative Grace in the thought of St. Thomas
Aquinas, ed. by 1. Patout Burns, S.J. (London: Barton, Longman and Todd, 1971), p.6.
21 Leff, Medieval Thought, p.99.
22 See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, pp. 9-11 and Leff, Medieval Thought, pp.129-30.
23	 •	 •
This introduces the importance of Aristotle in Western theology. 	 According to
David Knowles, there was a rediscovery of Aristotle which began in the twelfth century due to
translations of his work. Knowles, Evolution of Medieval Thought, p.189. For Aristotle's
influence upon the West also see, Bernard S. Dod, 'Aristotles Latinus' in Cambridge History
of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp.45-79 and Leff, Medieval Thought, pp.17/-73. Aristotelian
logic was the dominant pattern in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: particularly with an
emphasis upon tracing the connection between primary cause and secondary causes, and in so
doing gave greater weight to reason and less to faith. See the article by Alan Donagan,
'Thomas Aquinas on human action' in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, p.642.
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(1261-64) and Summa Theologica (I and II) (1266-71) and
(III) (1272, but incomplete at the time of his death).
He argued that God foreknew all, and this foreknowledge
involved an immutable divine will. Yet in so willing
God did not nullify all contingent actions; hence
Aquinas allowed for the necessity of consequence. He
stressed the validity of contingents not to suggest
that there were unexpected or unconsidered events but
that contingents existed only because God willingly
permitted them.	 Harry J. McSorley has suggested that
Aquinas stressed contingency over against absolute
necessity because he wished to argue for the existence
of a relative free choice in	 man.	 Nevertheless, in
so arguing for contingency, Aquinas was not suggesting
that God's will was dependent or conditioned by
secondary agents. McSorley adds that in the Thomistic
scheme God did not dismiss contingency or consequence,
because it was precisely through contingency and
necessitas consequentiae that God's will was immutably
and infallibly accomplished. 26
It is important to note that Aquinas stressed the
relative or proportional freedom which God gave to
secondary causes or agents. Aquinas firmly held that
God was the prime mover, but in so moving other objects
and beings, God established a degree of intrinsic
freedom within the nature of the secondary agent. 	 In
24 See Lonergan, Grace and Freedon, p.103.
25	 Harry J. McSorley, C.S.P., Lather: Right or Wrong? An Ecusenical-Theological
study of Luther's 'ajar mork,'The Bondage of the Will', (New York and Minneapolis: Newman
Press and Augsburg Publishing House, 1969), PP.10-49.
26 McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong, p.157.
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one sense, while God was truly the prime mover and
agent, that which God moved was not only "moved upon"
but it had the free agency or natural ability to act.
Freedom does not require that a thing is
its own free cause, just as in order to
be the cause of something else a thing
does not have to be the first cause.
God is the first cause on which both
natural and free agents depend. Andjust as his initiative does not prevent
natural causes from being natural, so it
does not prevent voluntary action from
being voluntary but rather makes it
precisely this.	 For God Vworks in eachaccording to its nature.
The key concept for Aquinas, and one which will
recur in mid-seventeenth century puritan writing as
exemplified in Baxter and Owen, is that quoted above:
"For God works in each according to its nature",
operatur enim in unoquoque secundum ejus proprietatem.
This is how he accepted contingency and rejected an
absolute necessity and determinism.
	 There existed a
divine	 will:	 immutable,	 infallible	 and	 even
irresistible,	 but which	 worked not	 by absolute
necessity or compulsion. Luther, as we shall see,
could not accept this concept: he asked in effect, how
could there be an infallible will and yet exist truly
free and natural contingencies728
For Aquinas, however, there apparently was no
irreconcilable paradox. He was only emphasizing the
proprietas functioning of contingents, namely they work
according to their nature and God works in them
27 St. Thomas Aquinas, Sam Theologiae, 1a83.1., Blackfriars edition,
(London:Blackfriars, 1970), p.239. All subsequent references taken from this edition unless
indicated otherwise.
28 See below pp.93-95.
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according to their nature. 	 In this way, so Aquinas
suggested, the possibility of voluntary actions truly
existed.	 For example, when discussing predestination
Aquinas maintained that,
because God knows and wills that someone
will attain such a goal, predestination
is certain. But because God wills that
he be directed to such a goal according
to free will, this certitude does not
impose	 neqessity	 on	 the	 one
predestined."
In some ways later medieval theology was a counter-
reaction to Aquinas. Gordon Leff has argued that
Aquinas was the last medieval writer to hold a balance
between faith and reason. 3()	 Increasingly there
developed a philosophical scepticism: philosophical
ideals, or models, were considered impossible to prove;
only that which was observable mattered. Both Duns
Scotus (1266-1308) and William of Ockham (c.1280-
c.1349) represent later traditions which differed from
Aquinas. Duns questioned whether philosophy could lead
to a knowledge of God. 31	 Duns' principal argument,
however, was that God's will (voluntas) had a greater
determination than his intellect. This was a different
way of explaining the activities and sovereignty of
God. Duns' intention was to stress human liberty and
agency over against necessity; by stressing God's will
Duns attempted to "free" God from laws of nature: God
was free to suspend the laws of nature if he so chose.
29
Aquinas, Quodl, X1.q.3a.un., quoted in McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong, pp.160-
61.
30 Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians. A study of his 'De causa Del' and its
opponents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp.3-4.
21 Leff, Medieval Thought, p.272.
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32In this way, he claimed, humans were given freedom.
William of Ockham went further. Ockham is credited
with the rise of medieval Nominalism: this term (not
altogether helpful) is a phrase which describes broadly
the scepticism mentioned above. According to Leff, "he
limited knowledge in such a way that every thing
outside man's practical experience was beyond its
reach. Revealed truth and all that was extra-sensory
were, accordingly, not amenable to reason." 33 Unlike
Aquinas he argued that God willed and worked according
to his potentia absoluta (the absolute and omnipotent
power of God) and that this power was rationally
distinct from his potentia dei ordinata (God's power by
which he relates to creation, or his ordinary power).
In other words, Ockham drew a distinction, which
Aquinas did not, between God's will and how God
accomplished that will. Leff has written: "For Ockham,
then, God's omnipotence represents God's power to act
freely and contingently but always justly in relation
to everything else, since as God himself acting there
cannot	 be	 any divergence between	 essence	 and
Nomnipotence."	 There is the implication within
Ockham's thought that contingencies existed only
because God allowed them, potentia dei ordinata, rather
than because of any intrinsic property, as Aquinas had
argued. When such issues as grace and justification
32 See J.B. Korlec, 'Free will and free choice' in Caobridge History of Later
Nedieval Philosophy, p.639.
33 Leff, BradRardine and the Pelagians, pp.7-8.
34
leff,Millial of Ockhan. The netamorphosis of scholastic discourse (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1975), p.467.
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are considered within his thought, contingencies had a
reality only because God committed himself to
reciprocate to contingencies, namely man's volitional
responses and activities. Ockham's views, however,
were eventually condemned at Avignon in 1326: the
principal criticism was that his views on grace and
free will were Pelagian. His understanding of grace
and free will will be presented below, but at this
point it is crucial to appreciate Ockham's views on the
will of God.
Thomas	 Bradwardine (c.1290-1349)	 represents	 an
Augustinianism in sharp contrast to both Scotus and
Ockham. Bradwardine's De causa Del (c.1325-44?) was a
response to Ockham. With a particular dependence upon
Augustine, Bradwardine insisted that God's will was
35irresistible and sovereign.	 Like Ockham, he was
concerned to demonstrate that God's will was free from
any internal constraint or compulsion. 	 In contrast,
however, Bradwardine rejected the notion that God's
will was equated with God's potentia ordinata; this, he
claimed, only led to an exalted view of secondary
agency and human merit. More has to be said about
Bradwardine, and this is done below; the issue here is
that he was an outspoken critic of Ockham at a time
when	 Ockham's	 views	 were	 labelled	 Pelagian.
Bradwardine's primary concern was to counter any
exalted view of human liberty and capability: he
thought that Ockham's writings were of this sort.
In this context the views of Martin Luther (1483-
35 
Leff, Bradmardine against the Pelagians, p.35.
90
1546) can be given. Gerhard Ebeling has written: "no
other thinker has spoken in such compelling terms of
the freedom of man on the one hand, and with such
terrifying force of the bondage of man on the other, as
Luther." 36 The influence which medieval theology had
upon Luther is now seen
	 to have been powerful.
Whereas, Harry J. McSorley questioned whether
Nominalist teaching was so dominant as to have been
much of an influence upon Luther, this view has come
under question.
	 Heiko Oberman and Steven Ozment both
argue that Luther's early thinking, up to 1520, was
influenced in many ways by Ockham. 38 Alister McGrath
has argued that Luther's theology prior to 1517-19 was
typically medieval.
	
He points out that Luther
approved of Ockham and even called him Magister meus.
According to McGrath, the early Luther (that is prior
to 1519) must be read as one very much in the via
moderna of Scotus and Ockham: his views on grace and
justification	 were in keeping with this line of
thought.	 The real break came in 1518 with Luther's
theologica crucis which arose chiefly regarding the
36 Gerhard Ebeling, Luther. An introduction to his thought. trans. by R.A. Wilson
(London: Collins, 1970), p.211.
27 McGorley, pp.214-15.
38 Oberman, 'Facientibus Ouod in se est Deus non Denegat Gratiam: Robert Holcot O.P.
and the beginnings of Luther's theology', in The Reformation in Redieval Perspective, ed. by
Steven Ozment, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p.129 ff; Ozment, The Age of Refors, p.244.
McGrath, Lather's Theology of the Cross, p.25. Actually McGrath's thesis is not
altogether new: B.A. 6errish made a similar interpretation in Grace and Reason. A study is
the theology of Luther. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp.54-56, and p.114 ff.
40 McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross, p.36.
39
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question of the righteousness of God.41
The evidence would suggest that prior to 1519-20
Luther's thought conformed to Ockham's view. Luther's
notes on Peter Lombard's Sentences (Libri Quatour
Sententiarum 1157-1158) displayed a dependence upon the
earlier interpretations of Ockham and Biel.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that in this work
Luther was hesitant to define necessity beyond the
point of making a distinction between absolute and
conditional necessity: in this sense he was following
the example of Aquinas. Yet as early as 1515, however,
a change was apparent. In his marginal notes to Biel's
Collectorium he shifted	 away from scholastic and
Nominalist thinking, particularly on the issues of free
will and necessity. Not only did he give clear
reference in these notes to servum arbitrium, he
insisted upon a necessity of immutability: events
happened without the least possibility of occurring
otherwise, and had nothing to do with choice. Luther
elaborated this point later in 1516 in his lectures on
Romans. 42 According to McSorley, by 1516 Luther had
made an either/or distinction: either one accepted
absolute necessity or accepted conditional necessity:
43both cannot exist.	 More recently, Marilyn J. Harran
has argued that by 1513-1516, with the publication of
Dictata Super Psalterium and Lectures on Romans, Luther
was quite clearly opposedto the idea of human merit in
41 McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross, pp.36 and 92.
42 Luther, Lectures on Roans. LH, vol 25, pp.162-63.
43 McSorley, Luther: Right or Prong, p.230.
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conversion.	 She suggests that by this period Luther
gave far more emphasis to the divine activity than to
44human participation.
If the general observations made above about
Aquinas, Ockham and Bradwardine are recalled, then the
significance of Luther's position is all the more
striking. The issue for Luther by 1516 was this: could
there be contingency within divine providence? 	 It
seems that Luther had concluded that while there was no
determinism,	 nevertheless	 contingency and divine
providence were contradictory terms.
While it may be invidious to jump ahead to 1525,
greater attention must be given to Luther's debate with
45Erasmus.	 Erasmus (c.1466-1536): this gifted and
•significant man is even today enigmatic. What did he
really think about human choice?
	 Does De Libero
Arbitrio (1524) represent his full view? 46	 In De
Libero Arbitrio he did not support his argument for
free choice by appealing to Thomistic terms
	
or
employing the scholastic distinction between potentia
44
Marilyn J. Harran, 'The Concept of Conuersio in the Early Exegetical Writings of
Martin Luther', au, 72 (1981), pp.I3-31. See also p.26. This interpretation is consistent
with the evidence: see Lectures on Rosans, LW, vol 25, pp.204-05, 211 and 286.
	
45	
For a review of Luther's relationship with Erasmus see Gordon Rupp, The
Righteousness of God (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), pp.259-85.
46 Most recently Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle, 'Erasmus and the 'Modernist' Question: Was
He a Semi-Pelagian?', ARS, 75 (1984), pp.59-77, has suggested that Erasmus' definition of
freedom in De Libero grbitrio needs to be greatly qualified. She claims that it rhetorically
was not a definition, 'he meant it as such a focal point for the comparison he was about to
undertake. It was a guide-star or a topographical map for exploring the texts to be
interpreted. It was not a definition, however.' p.69. In fact, she posits that Erasmus was
very Augustinian, pp.74-75.
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absoluta and potentia ordinata.	 He was far more
inclined to move the discussion of free choice away
from the speculative realm of metaphysics. In fact,
Erasmus, curiously enough, wished that the whole
question of free choice receive less strident attention
than Luther was giving it.
	
In sharp contrast, Luther
argued,
Here, then, is something fundamentally
necessary and salutary for a Christian,
to know that God foreknows nothing
contingently, but that he foresees and
purposes and does all things by his
immutAble,	 eternal,	 and .infallible
will.'m
Luther's De Servo Arbitrio is a work which must be
central to any discussion about the doctrine of the
will. It has been argued that it is "the greatest
piece of theological writing that ever came from
Luther's pen." 49	 Apparently, Luther considered his
children's Catechism and De Servo Arbitrio the only two
works worth preservation. 50 	 this work he argued
the impossibility	 of any contingency vis—a—vis God's
will; the two were diametrically opposed.	 Whereas
Erasmus essentially followed scholastic thinking when
he accepted the	 existence of contingency, Luther
47 In fact he labels as 'superfluous and hidden' such terms as: contingency, the
accomplishment of the will, passive or active will, necessity and voluntarism. Erasmus, De
Libero hrbitrio, in Lather and Ennuis: Free Rill and Salvation, trans. by Philip Watson, in
The Library of Christian Classics, Volume XVII, (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1969), p.39. All
subsequent references from De Libero hrbitrio and Luther's De Servo hrbitrio are taken from
this edition.
48 Luther, De Servo hrbitrio, p.118.
49 From the Introduction to J.I. Packer and O.R. Johnston trans., Kartin Lather OR
the Bondage of the Henan Mill (London: James Clarke and Co., Ltd., 1957), p.40.
50	 •
b •iid.
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rejected these.	 Erasmus preferred to reject absolute
necessity in favour of conditional and contingent
necessity. M Luther, to put his views baldly, argued
that God's will came about just as God wanted but
without force or coercion. This was at the heart of
Erasmus' disagreement with Luther.
Luther would not accept the co-existence of human
free choice within a sovereign divine providence.
Accordingly,	 in De	 Servo Arbitrio he
	 rejected
contingency,	 for if	 accepted,	 contingency would
threaten the very nature and function of God's will.
Thus God's foreknowledge and omnipotence
are diametrically opposed to our free
choice, for either God can be mistaken
in foreknowing and also err in action
(which is impossible) or we must act and
be acted upon in accordanEp with his
foreknowledge and activity.
Luther's thought may be taken one step further in
its logic. In the quotation above he suggested that
there was either free choice (but this would mean that
God's will was conditional) or that God's will was
supremely immutable. In De Servo Arbitrio he gave
considerable attention to the immutability of God's
will. From all appearances he urged immutability over
against contingency because he denied the possibility
of any agent having the potential to do that which
could be otherwise. Accept this, implied Luther, and
God's will was dependent upon the activity and choice
of man.	 Yet it might well be asked of Luther, if
51	 •
Philip S. Watson, 'The Lutheran Riposte' in Lather and Erassas: Free Will and
Salvation, trans. by Philip Watson, in the Library of Christian Classics, Volume XVII,
(London: SC1 Press Ltd., 1969), pp.20-21.
52 Luther, De Servo Arbitrio, p. 244.
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contingency is not allowed, then is man's will passive
to a determinism of God?
Luther's answer, at least as evidenced in De Servo
Arbitrio, was a tentative denial of determinism. He
insisted that, however much the human will was passive
to God, there was no sense of coercion; there was only
an immutable necessity: God's will must necessarily be
accomplished in the final analysis. Consider his view
of Judas' betrayal of Jesus:
let us have two sorts of necessity, one
of force with reference to the work, the
other of infallibility with reference to
the time; and let anyone who listens to
us understand that we are speaking of
-the latter, not of the former; that is
to say, we are not discussing whether
Judas became a traitor involuntarily or
voluntarily, but whether	 at a time
preordained by God it was bound
infallibly to happen that Judas by fin
act of his will should betray Christ.
Luther never denied that willingness or choice was
important. What was far more important for him was the
independence of God's will from contingency. In one
sense Luther may be frustrating to the modern reader:
he did not explain how God accomplished his purpose so
that his will did not in itself become a force of
compulsion de facto.
The importance of Luther, therefore, for this survey
is that he represents the way in which a change in
perspective had occurred since Augustine. In a sense
it had begun with Thomas Bradwardine, yet Luther's
thought, by 1525, marks a developmental milestone:
subsequent discussion on the nature of the divine and
53 Luther, De Servo Arbitrio, p.246.
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human will related more to the question of
predestination than to either Aristotelian/Thomistic
metaphysics or the Nominalist distinctions of the
powers of God. Thus the doctrines of predestination
and of God's will, as understood by Reformers like
Luther and Calvin, influenced later explanations of the
human will. By suggesting the importance of
predestination this is not to imply that it was the
classicus locus of subsequent Reformed theology; this
would be too simple an	 interpretation.	 No one
illustrates this aspect of Reformed theology better
perhaps than John Calvin. 54 Calvin was both a
conservator of Augustinianism and an innovator in his
own right. While detailed study of Calvin is presented
in subsequent chapters, some general observations are
in order here; only in later chapters will any
comparisons be made between Calvin and later English
puritans. Attention will now focus upon the 1559
Institutes and some of his Commentaries.
To a certain extent Calvin agreed with Aquinas,
namely that secondary agents possessed a property
peculiar to their being and through which God acted as
prime mover.
	
And concerning inanimate 	 objects we
ought to hold that, although each one
54 In the study which follows, Wendel's reminder that in the 1536 version of the
Institutes predestination was not the chief ,doctrine is readily acknowledged. By the
publication of the 1537 French edition, however,rappears that predestination was sore central
to his theology.	 In the 1559 Latin edition, so Wendel insists, Calvin revised his plan and
placed the discussion of predestination within the section on soteriology. 	 Wendel argues
that Calvin did this in order to stress the fact that predestination is always in Christ and
not solely in relation to the decree of Sod.
	
This interpretation seems correct and indeed
Calvin's christology, by 1559, actually governed his understanding of predestination. 	 See
Francois Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and DeveIopaent of his Religious Thought, translated
from the earlier French edition by Philip Mairet (London: Collins, 1965), pp.265-68. 	 See
also the 'Introduction' to L.C.C. edition of the Institutes, p.xxxvii.
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has by nature been endowed with its own
property, yet it does not exercise its
own power except in so far as it is
directed by God's ever-present hand.
These are, thus, nothing but instruments
to which God continually imparts as much
effectiveness as he wills, and according
to his own purposes bends and turnh them
to either one action or another.
While Calvin was only discussing inanimate objects
here, note the similarity to Aquinas: secondary agents
existed and possessed a distinct capacity for movement.
Yet also note the fundamental departure from Aquinas:
the capacity for movement was not totally free but was
itself determined by the will of God. God was more
than the first mover letting things move as they will.
Even in their own agency they were "instruments".
Caution must be exercised admittedly, for Calvin's use
of Aristotelian vocabulary may not necessarily mean
that Calvin was explaining causality in the same way as
his predecessors, or for that matter disagreeing with
them.	 Still, two important implications can be put
forward.
First, like Augustine, Calvin accepted a degree of
contingency. He suggested in the Institutes that there
was an ordering of all 	 events based upon God's
providential will.	 The paradox, however, was that
Calvin rejected absolute contingency, while he allowed
a degree of relative or subordinate contingency. He
pointed out that human perception was fallible and
finite: accordingly men and women saw events occurring
in such a way that they thought accident and chance
55 Calvin, Instit. I.xvi.2. OS, III, p.189: sunt igitur nihil aliud instrumenta
quibus Deus assidue instillat quantal vult efficaciae, et pro suo arbitrio ad hanc vel illam
actionem flectit ac convertit.
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were true components of reality. 56
	
Here was where
Calvin differed from Luther. Whereas Luther seemed to
reject any notion of relative conditionality, Calvin
was not as negative. While he preferred to look beyond
the appearances of contingency and see the influence of
God, still contingencies may occur: not absolutely, but
conditionally. In other words, he argued that men and
women acted as they chose and wished, either in
compliance or disobedience; but these actions were
actually never totally (ie. absolutely) free from God's
influence.
but what for us seems a contingency,
faith recognizes to have been a secret
impulse from God ... But what God has
determined must necessarily so 	 take
place, even though it is neither
unconditionally, noruof its own peculiar
nature necessary.
Calvin was able to accept a distinction between
absolute and relative necessity, provided certain
qualifications were accepted. God both foreknew and
willed that which occurred. In the occurrence of
certain events, secondary agents were allowed, and
willed, to act according to the nature which God had
given them.	 This has a familiar ring to Aquinas'
notion, mentioned above, of operatur enim in unoquoque
secundum ejus proprietatem. 	 It was quite possible,
Calvin allowed, that what an agent did or chose could
be otherwise.	 Calvin used the example of Christ's
bones (John 19.33,36).	 It was absolutely necessary
56 
Calvin, Instit. Lxvi.9.
57 Calvin, Instit. I.xvi.9. OS, III, p.201: ...sed quae nobis videtur contingentia,
secretum Dei impulsum fuisse agnoscet fides... Interea quod statuit Deus, sic necesse est
evenire ut tamen neque praecise neque suapte natura necessarium sit.
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that as a human being Jesus should have had fragile
bones;	 yet	 in	 God's	 infallible will	 it	 was
conditionally or relatively necessary that Jesus' bones
be unbroken. Yet, Jesus' bones could have been broken
just as any other human's. 58
The second implication to which attention must be
drawn is his suggestion that in the nature and
operation of the divine will there was both a hidden
and revealed will.	 Luther touched upon this in his
debate with Erasmus. 59	 Calvin went further than
Luther. He claimed that God's revealed will in
scripture involves imperatives, commands, intentions
and expectations which comprise what men know of God's
will but which may not necessarily comprise God's
hidden will. This was not, however, to suggest that
there was a duality.
He referred to this distinction between a revealed
will and a hidden will because he was concerned with
the question of sin and evil, again in agreement with
Augustine. How, asked Calvin, could God's immutable
will not only permit but actually predetermine that
which openly appeared contrary to God's revealed will
in scripture? One of the ways Calvin resolved this was
by comparing the intention or motivation of God with
the intention of Satan. Calvin suggested that at times
God could appear to be the author of evil, not just by
58 Calvin, Instit. I.xvi.9.
59 Luther, De Servo Arbitrio, p.209.
60 Calvin, Inst it. I.xviii.3.
100
permission but by his will. 	 point, however, was
that God's motivation or purpose was still consistent
with his blamelessness and righteousness.
How may we attribute this same work to
God, to Satan, and to man as author,
without either excusing Satan as
associated with God, or making God the
author of evil?	 Easily, if we consider
first the end, and then the manner of
acting ... Therefore we see no
inconsistency in assigning the same deed
to God, Satan, and man; but let the
distinction in purpose and manner cause
God's righteousness to shine forth
blameless there, while the wickedness of
Satan and of man betrays itself by its
own disgrace.
Calvin drew further implications from this notion of
God's	 will hidden	 and revealed	 as	 it related
particularly	 to predestination and 	 election.	 0
Suffice it to say for now that Calvin did not remove
human culpability and responsibility; justice was not
abrogated. Calvin, having Augustine's Enchiridion in
mind, argued:
so that in a wonderful and ineffable
manner nothing is done without God's
will, not even that which is against his
will. For it would not be done if he did
not permit it; yet he does not
unwillingly permit it, but willingly;
nor would he being good, allow evil to
be done, unless being also almightK he
could make good even out of evil.
61 On Romans 1.24 Calvin writes, 'It is certain indeed that He not only permits men
to fall into sin, by allowing them to do so, and by conniving at their fall into sin, but
that He also ordains it by His just judgment, so that they are forcibly led into such mad
folly not only by their own evil yearnings but by the Devil as well.' He goes on, however,
and insists, 'God, however, is not on this account cruel, nor are we innocent, since Paul
clearly shows that we are delivered up into His power only if we deserve such punishment.'
See also Calvin's interpretation of Romans 9.19-21.
62
Calvin, lastit. II.iv.2. OS, III, p.202.
63 See especially Calvin, Instit., III.xxiv.8-10,15-17.
64 Calvin, Instit. I.xvii.3. OS, III, p.225: ut miro et infallibi modo non fiat
praeter eius voluntatem quod etiam contra eius fit voluntatem: quia non fieret si non
sineret: nec utique nolens sinit, sed volens: nec sineret bonus fieri male, nisi omnipotens
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What is seen, therefore, in a review of thought on
the nature and operation of the divine will from
Augustine to Calvin is both continuity and a degree of
discontinuity.	 The infallibility of the divine will
was always recognized. How the will of God was
accomplished vis-a-vis secondary agency was explained
differently. Whereas Augustine allowed for the paradox
of contingency without stressing a determinism, by the
time Luther responded to medieval views of merit this
paradox was resolved by insisting on an either/or
choice. For the most part, Calvin did not depend upon
Luther so much as Augustine. This is important in
understanding Baxter and Owen; for, as will be shown in
subsequent chapters, both are more inclined to allow
for relative secondary agency and contingency.
2.2	 The Human will and the Nature of Volitional Acts 
Much of what has been considered in the previous
section sheds light on what will now be presented. In
this section the central issue is the degree of freedom
which the human will possesses: if God's will was
infallible, sovereign and immutable, what then of human
action and freedom?
At the outset it is important to appreciate that few
Reformed theologians thought the human will was free or
neutral. Most recognized the effects of sin not only
upon the will but also upon reason, conscience and the
etiam de malo facere posset bere.
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affections. From Augustine to the Reformers it was
axiomatic that man was in a state of non posse non
peccare. The questions which developed had more to do
with the extent of sin's corruption.
Two ways of approaching the issue will be woven
together in the discussion that follows. The first is
to consider the relationship between grace and nature.
The second is to examine precisely what was meant by
human volitional acts, specifically whether man was
voluntarily capable of choosing both good and bad, or
whether man can only chose that which was bad.
Augustine is often considered the doctor of grace.
B.B. Warfield suggested, arguably in an exaggerated
fashion, that "the great contribution which Augustine
has made to the world's life and thought is embodied in
the theology of grace, which he has presented with
remarkable clearness and force, vitally in his
"Confessions", and thetically in his anti-Pelagian
treatises." 65	 Augustine responded both to Manichaean
determinism, which tended to play down human choice and
grace, and to Pelagianism, which stressed the liberty
4,0,0214Ya
of human choice and the *a44-e34 necessity of grace. In
the context of these two heresies his doctrine of grace
developed. G.R. Evans has written, "the more he
thought about it the clearer it seemed to him that
grace was the key to a vast complex about the working
of	 human	 free	 will, God's	 foreknowledge,	 and
65 B.B. Barfield, Calvin and Augustine, p.320. Cf. Mister McGrath, lustitia Dei,
pp.28 ff who rightly points out that Augustine's doctrine of grace is only part of the larger
issue of man's election and justification.
103
predestination." "
Augustine never considered grace to be opposed to
nature. Pertinent to this study is his claim that
human nature had suffered a severe debilitation as a
result of the fall of Adam. 	 He stressed the unity of
humanity in Adam's fall and in Christ's redemption. 67
Augustine's writings about the fall of Adam, in many
ways reveal his teaching on nature. In City of God,
for	 example, a work written
	 in the context of
Pelagianism, Augustine referred to the original state
of uprightness and subsequent fall of mankind in Adam.
For God, the author of natures, not of
vices, created man upright; but man,
being of his own will corrupted, and
justly condemned, begot corrupted and
condemned children. For we all were in
that one man, since we all were that one
man who fell into sin by the womaneho
was made from him before the sin.
Augustine argued that nature was affected and suffered
from the negative loss of original rectitude and
righteousness. Humanity in particular suffered a loss
primarily due to the willful disobedience of Adam.
Whatever else may be said about the fall, for Augustine
it was chiefly a matter of the will. This theme runs
through both his early and later works. 69 	 only
66 Evans, Augustine on Evil, p.126.
67 See Gerald Bonner, God's Decree and Man's Destiny, Study III, p.502 who is quite
correct when he contends: 'No one is likely to dispute the harshness of the Augustinian
doctrine of original sin; but it must be recognised that it was from the notion of the
coinherence of fallen humanity in Adam that Augustine derived his vision of the coinherence
of redeemed humanity in the Body of Christ.'
68
Augustine, The City of God, Book XIII.14, p.422.
69 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, 0.24. Translated by David L. Mosher
in The Fathers of the Church, Gen. ed., Hermigild Dressler 0.F.M., Volume 70. (Washington DC:
The Catholic University of America Press, 1982), p.51; Confessions, Book.9.Ch.1.1, p.205;
Enchiridion, 8.23, pp.353-54; Rebate and Grace 17 in The Marks of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop
of Hippo. ed. Marcus Dods, 15 Vols. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1872-1876), Vol 15, Vol III of
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solution for this problem was God's grace. In this
sense, then, the first observation to be made is that
Augustine denied that nature and grace were opposed;
strictly speaking grace radically renovated and healed
nature.
The real issue, however, is how Augustine balanced
the necessity and operation of grace with the freedom
of human choice. In the previous section it was argued
that Augustine wanted to hold on to both truths,
however much a paradox. Gilson has commented, "among
the problems raised by the Augustinian doctrine of
grace, that considered most formidable is the problem
of the reconciliation of grace with free choice."
Essentially, grace, while the only hope for humanity's
renovation, never coerced or constrained a person.
Instead, claimed Augustine, grace actually liberated
the will out of its bondage:
But, after the Fall, God's mercy was
even more abundant, for then the will
itself had to be freed from the bondage
in which sin and death are the masters.
There is no way at all by which it can
be freed by itself, but only through
God's grace, which is 7ade effectual in
the faith of Christ.
In Grace and Free Will (426/427) he wrote:
But the grace of God is evermore good;
and by its means it comes to pass that a
man is under the influence of a good
will, though he was previously possessed
by an evil one. By the same grace it
also comes to pass that the very will,
which has now begun to be good, is
enlarged, and grows so great as to be
able	 to	 fulfil	 whatever
	
divine
'Anti-Pelagian Writings', trans. Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis, p.86.
70 Gilson, Philosophy of Saint Augustine, p.157.
71 
Augustine, Enchiridion, 28.106, pp.403-404.
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commandments it may wish, when it has
once firm, and completely formed its
desires.
Thus a general statement can be made on the
relationship of grace and nature for Augustine. He
argued that apart from the renovating or healing work
of grace upon nature there was no hope.	 Humanity's
fundamental flaw was a will which chose in opposition
to God. Out of his grace God turned and healed the
will so that its freedom was re-directed back towards
God. The will chose: hence Augustine advocated a free
will, but its freedom only resulted from the initiating
grace which came from God's loving election in Christ.
In the final section of this chapter (2.3) a closer
examination will be made of how, once renovated by
grace, the human will coordinated with God's will and
commands.
Aquinas	 suggested that the relationship between
grace and nature was hierarchial. Grace was
transcendent over nature; but the transcendence of
grace did not preclude the infusion of grace into
nature. In other words, grace and nature were not so
opposed as to preclude nature being redeemed.	 His
understanding of the nature of grace and nature is
evident when he	 considered the state
	
of fallen
humanity.
	 Aquinas used Aristotle's metaphysics of
M
"accidents" and "substance" to describe reality.
Man in nature was substantially distinct from grace.
72 Augustine, Grace and Free Will 31 [XV] in The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop
of Hippo, ed. Marcus Dods, Vol.15, Vol.III of 'Anti-Pelagian Writings', trans. Peter Holmes
and Robert E. Willis, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1876), p.46.
73 Ozment, Age of Reborn, p.33.
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Man's substance, or that which constituted his essence,
was reason.	 Due to the fall, however, reason was
weakened or
	
status naturae corruptae; 	 the will,
however, was even more damaged. This point should not
be passed over lightly. Man needed grace argued
Aquinas. Only by grace could man's condition be healed
and corrected.
But in the state of spoiled nature man
falls short even of that which he is
capable of according to his nature, such
that he cannot fulfil the whole of thi4
kind of good by his natural endowments.17
The significant point, according to Steven Ozment, is
the way in which Aquinas viewed the operation of grace
in nature.	 Grace did not change man's substance but
man's accidents.	 In this way Aquinas argued for a
co-existence between grace and nature. In man grace
was really present.	 Similarly, man's substance,
reason, remained intact.	 Furthermore those aspects
natural to man remained; once corrupted by sin, but
capable of being healed through grace. This is the
point relevant for understanding the status of the
human will after the fall: grace could heal and correct
its natural operation; there was 	 no need for a
"recreated will". As will be shown below, Calvin
disagreed with Aquinas on this: he contended that it
was not a matter merely of repairing or correcting
man's will; man needel6n entirely new nature andPill. 76
Nevertheless, for Aquinas there was, to use a later
74 Aquinas, Sava la2ae, 109.2, p.75.
75 Ozment, Age of Refors, p.33.
76 Calvin, Instit. II.iii.6 and
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expression, a dialectic between nature and infused
grace. Nature was corrupt, spoiled, and frequently,
when humanity was considered, unreasonable.
Nevertheless, man's essence was not totally devoid of
God's image. This implied that man's rationality still
existed and that man was capable of choosing the means
to obtain that which lead to a desired goal. 77 Aquinas
was not necessarily voluntaristic for he defined the
choice of the will as a rational appetite: thus the
will was dependent upon the intellect. 78	 Still, that
men and women often chose improperly, which was one of
the effects of sin, did not dismiss the actual
operation of the will. In fact, claimed Aquinas, sin
was precisely the consequence of abusing free will. He
recognized	 this	 proclivity	 of	 the	 will;	 his
Augustinianism prevented him from suggesting that the
79
will was neutral.
	
Like Augustine, Aquinas' main
insistence was that the human will was free in that it
was not under any coercion. 80 For that matter, McSorley
has suggested that Aquinas followed Augustine more
closely than did Luther, for Aquinas was willing to see
a distinction between the existence of free choice and
the power of the will to accomplish its actual choice.
Aquinas readily acknowledged that the will was liberum
77 See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, p.95 and Alan Donagan, 'Thomas Aquinas on human
action' in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp.644-45.
78 See Alan Donagan, 'Thomas Aquinas on human action" in Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy, p.644.
79 McSorley, Lather: Right or Wrong, p.146.
80 See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, p.97.
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arbitrium captivatum et infirmatas arbitri liberi.81
Heiko Oberman has suggested that 	 no medieval
theologian ever really departed from the Augustinian
and Thomistic insistence upon the need for grace. 82
McSorley, however, has argued differently. He questions
whether Biel's views,	 for example, are close to
83Aquinas'.	 While certainly it is difficult to present
a definitive Nominalist view of grace and nature,
nevertheless, some general observations may be made.
To begin with, Nominalist theology recognized that
nature was affected by sin and irrationality: the
severity was debatable. On the whole, however, most
Nominalists did not go so far as Aquinas had done
earlier and suggest a distinction between grace and
Mnature.	 According to Gordon Leff, Duns Scotus, while
he accepted the need for supernatural habits for
meritorious actions, nevertheless added, "that God
could dispense with such forms if he willed. All that
God has ordained He could as well achieve by other
means." 85 Ockham, for one, suggested that nature was
able to reach God's demands for love and obedience
independent of grace. He meant that grace need not be
infused into nature: instead God has prescribed ways by
81 McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong, p.110.
82
Heiko A. Oberman, Forerunners of the Reforsation, The shape of Late Medieval
Thought illustrated by key docusents. (New York: Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1966), p.127.
83 Morley, Luther: Right or Wrong, p.208.
84 For helpful comments on this, see Paul Vignaux 'On Luther and Ockhae, translated
by Janet Coleman in, Oberman, The Refornation in Medieval Perspective, pp.107-17.
85 
Leff, Medieval Theology, p.271.
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which men and women can be met with his mercy and
forgiveness. He was critical of the idea of the need
for an infused spiritual habit. 86 According to Ockham,
sin had not extinguished nature's ability to respond to
the loving overtures of God. Sin had only resulted in
nature's loss of its original righteousness. This had
particular implications regarding the human will. Most
important was the Nominalist implication that the will
was free enough to choose naturally what was good and
right. From this position certain late medieval
theologians proposed the notion that God would not deny
grace to those who do what is in them: facientibus quod
in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam.	 How were such
conclusions reached? Two issues stand out.
First, as Oberman points out, in the Nominalist
view, man before the fall of Adam was in a state of
puns naturalibus. In this state man was capable of
87
making a knowledgeable choice between good and bad.
As a result of Adam's rebellion, when his lower powers
rebelled against his higher powers, as Biel expressed
it, man's discernment became prone to sin and weakness.
This implied, so it was argued, that the will was
weakened in its ability to choose properly. To quote
Biel, the will was in a condition: "propter haec
voluntas mutabilis est et instabilis et ex peccati
fomite infirma et vulnerata." 88	 Second,	 the
state of fallen man was considered somewhat differently
86 Leff, Milliat of Ockhan, p.470.
87 Oberman, Harvest, p.48.
88 Biel, II Sentences, d 28, q 1, art 3, dub 2, as in Oberman, Harvest, p.49.
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than Augustine. While Biel, for example, agreed that
man was debilitated and suffered as a result of
concupiscence, there still was an inextinguishable
spark of goodness in man's reason and will - syntersis
rationis et voluntatis. The implication was that man's
will was nevertheless free and could be changed by
naturally choosing what was good and right. 89	 It
explained how there still existed within humanity an
irrepressible desire for truth and goodness. As
Oberman has suggested, Biel taught that man, even if
lacking the infused grace of fides formata, could still
intellectually assent to the truths of the Christian
faith, fides informis, and by his will repent of his
sins so as to be in a condition to receive illumination
by the Spirit and receive the grace of justification. 90
Such was the basis for the Nominalist notion that as
long as man did what God required from him (by both
assenting to the truth and trusting in faith) God would
not fail to respond in mercy and grace: facere quod in
se est.
Thomas Bradwardine in De causa Del attacked Ockham's
alleged Pelagianism. Bradwardine criticized the idea
of any human merit. There was a radical and even harsh
distinction between grace and nature.	 Fallen human
nature needed created
	
grace: a supernatural gift
unmerited.	 Bradwardine challenged the Ockhamist view
89 
Oberman makes this point in Harvest, p.129.	 See also Ozment, The Age of Refors,
p.242.
90 
Oberman, Harvest, pp.131 and 132.
91 
Leff, Bradmardine Against the Pelagians, p.68.
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of both grace and nature. This led him, claims Leff,
to a rather unfavorable view of humanity. 92
It was precisely the Scholastic and Nominalist view
of the human condition and the will to which Luther
responded. Whereas Biel saw the corruption of nature
as a serious sickness, yet one naturally curable,
Luther saw nature thoroughly corrupted and the will
ontologically powerless to do anything other than evil.
In this sense Luther was dependent upon Augustine.
Luther's argument, however, developed gradually: during
the period 1509-1516, from his comments on Lombard's
Sentences to his own Lectures on Romans.	 Steven
Ozment has argued that two of Luther's early sermons of
1510-12 contain the view that fallen man's will was not
totally devoid of a positive capability to choose good.
This idea was not to minimize his teaching on the
poverty of the will, but to show that there still
existed a longing for God.
By 1516, in Disputation Theses for Bernhardi, Luther
had argued that man was culpable for sin; but sin, even
slavery to sin, was the result of serva voluntas.
Luther departed from Aquinas, maintaining that before
regeneration man was free only to sin. In his Lectures
on Romans (1516) he described original sin as:
not only a lack of a certain quality in
the will, nor even only a lack in the
mind or of power in the memory, but
particularly it is a total lack of
uprightness and of the power of all the
92 Leff, op.cit, p.71.
Oberman, "Facientibus Ouod..." in Ozment, Refornation in Medieval Perspective.,
pp.119-41. See also McSorley, Lather: Right or Mrong pp.219-29.
94 Ozment, Hos° Spiritualis, pp.139-40.
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faculties both of body and of the whole
inner and outer man. On top of all
this, it is a propensity toward evil.
It is a nausea toward the good, a
loathing of light and wisdom, and a
delight in error and darkness, a flight
from an abominationo,of all good works, a
pursuit of evil...
This development in his position is further evident in
the Heidelberg Debate (1518), in which he insisted that
free choice after sin was an empty word. % By 1519 and
the Leipzig Debate, Luther went so far as to suggest
97that there was no natural freedom whatsoever.
It is fascinating, therefore, to discover that in
1525 he wrote to Erasmus and stated that Erasmus alone,
in his De Libero Arbitrio of 1524, recognized what
Luther considered to be the real issue and essence of
his complaint against Rome: namely the issue of the
human will. 98 McSorley has written:
Luther's doctrine of the unfree will is
essential to his justification teaching
and, as we shall see, to his concept of
faith. To affirm one is to affirm the
other. And to reject the doctrine of
the unfree will in whole or in part is
to alter not only Luther's teaching on
justification,	 but	 his	 entire
99theological structure.
This is evident in the debate between Luther and
Erasmus. An overall assessment of their debate reveals
that Erasmus understood Luther's notion of servum
arbitrium.
	
Accordingly Erasmus, in his attempt to
95 
Luther, Lectures on Romans, LH, vol 25, p.299.
96 
Luther, Heidelberg Debate, LW, vol 31, p.40.
97 
Luther, Leipzig Debate, LW, vol 31, p.317.
98 
Luther, De Servo Arbitrio, p.333.
99 Morley, Luther: Right or Wrong, p.12.
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challenge Luther's apparent determinism, moved the
question away from such ideas of necessity and towards
the question of divine justice and human
accountability. If this were not so, claimed Erasmus,
then scriptural imperatives, promises of reward and the
call to repent were meaningless. 100 Accountability
presupposed human ability to co-operate with grace. 101
Luther's response is intriguing, both in its content
and the way in which he actually moved further from
Augustine. Luther maintained that imperatives,
commands and promises are given in scripture not to
show humanity of what it was capable but to show the
profound need for grace. 	 Furthermore, imperatives in
scripture are precisely that: in the imperative mood,
not in the indicative. 102 ConsequentlyLuther asked
how one could suggest a free choice and at the same
time insist that the will cannot choose good unless
aided by grace? "Yet if you add this mournful rider,
that apart from the grace of God it is ineffective, you
at once rob it of all its power.	 What is ineffective
power but simply no power at all?" 	 103 Hispoint was
made manifestly clear: "Therefore, to say that free
choice exists and has indeed some power, but that it is
an ineffectual power, is 	 what the Sophists call
100 Erasmus, De Libero Arbitrio, p.75.
101 Erasmus, De Libero Arbitrio, p.96.
102 Luther, De Servo Arbitrio, pp.185-87, 190, 196 and 209.
103 Luther, De Servo Arbitrio, p.141.
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oppositum in adjecto."
De Libero Servo and De Servo Arbitrio are important
works in the history of the development of the doctrine
of the human will. Both are concerned with the issues
which were raised particularly in the medieval period.
Yet both Erasmus and Luther demonstrated a departure
from Scholastic and Nominalist methodology.	 Erasmus,
perhaps	 due to	 his humanism, was	 sceptical of
philosophical argument and tried to frame his argument
upon linguistics, biblical 	 interpretation and the
rational demands of justice. There was a distinct
absence of the philosophical distinctions between God's
absolute and ordained power. This is not to infer that
Erasmus' conclusions were significantly different from
Biel's or Holcot's, but his methodology was different.
Luther renewed Augustine's emphases, but also went
further. It is arguable, however, that Luther's
arguments, in the final analysis, did not have a direct
influence upon Baxter and Owen. They were aware of a
much broader Reformed tradition which involved some of
the	 metaphysical	 distinctions	 which	 Luther had
dismissed.
To	 appreciate this	 Reformed tradition	 it	 is
necessary to examine the contribution made by John
Calvin.
	
Calvin maintained that nature was God's good
creation. To be sure, since the fall of Adam nature
shared in the effects of sin.
	 Nevertheless, within
104 Luther, De Servo Arbitrio, p.141.
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05nature grace had a very active role.	 H. Rolston III
has presented a valuable interpretation of Calvin's
theology of nature: for Calvin "the will and purpose of
God was incorporated or instituted into the universe at
creation. All things are ordered according to the
movement of God's grace in creation and purpose in
redemption." 06 Thus creation was still good, despite
the effectO of man's fall: it was originally created
good. God h ad not abandoned nature and creation: grace
was active and present within nature; natural laws
existed, wilich served to render man inexcusable but
still pointed to God's commitment to nature. 107	 When
Calvin discussed grace and nature, however, his chief
concern wao to address the issue of human nature:
specifically, how grace 	 affected human nature in
regeneration. Three general observations arise.
105 An important issue of Calvin's theology is raised here, concerning Calvin and
natural theology. See Gerald J. Postema, 'Calvin's Alleged Rejection of Natural Theology',
SJT, Vol 24,1971.	 In this article Postema deals with the knowledge of God in Calvin's
theology. He suggests that both Aquinas and Calvin recognized natural experience as the
meeting ground of man and God. Where they differed,however, was in the quality of knowledge
which man possesses from nature. Calvin stressed the idea of commitment, Aquinas suggested
the idea of recognition or attestation.	 This is a helpful article but for two of the
writer's assumptions. 	 First, while Postema is correct about Aquinas and even Ockham's
epistemology (pp.424,425), by his own nebulous definition, it is difficult to conclude that
Aquinas and Ockham were natural theologians. (Cf. Oberman, Harvest, pp.40-41.)	 Second,
Postema wishes to addressm certain modern interpreters of Calvin, who he thinks are
suggesting a divorce between reason and faith. 	 This concern leads Postema to interpret
Calvin's references to natia and cagnitia as a qualified acceptance of natural theology. Yet
this may well be reading into Calvin an argument which never really existed for him. Even
Postela hints that Calvin never suggested that man can come to true knowledge of God apart
from illumination by the Spirit, the influence of the Word and by incorporation into Christ.
Therefore, Calvin's explanation of faith, particularly the awareness of God's favour to his
people, seriously limits any natural knowledge one may obtain - even this knowledge is an
implanted knowledge, and thus the work of grace.
106	
H. Rolston III, 'Responsible Man in Reformed Theology: Calvin versus the
Westminster Confession', SJT, Vol 23, 1970, p.137.
107
Calvin, /nstit. II.ii.22.
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First, according to Calvin, man had degenerated from
his original condition. 108 He stressed that the
sinfulness of man was not through nature itself: it was
entirely man's own doing in Adam.
Adam, by sinning, not only took upon
himself misfortune and ruin but also
plunged our nature into like
destruction. This was not due to the
guilt of himself alone, which would not
pertain to us at all, but was because he
infected all his posterity with thM
corruption into which he had fallen.
Because of Adam the human race not only bore Adam's
guilt; each individual possessed Adam's character. In
this way human nature was an infected nature, devoid
not only of original righteousness but with a
continuously manifest degree of rebellion and hostility
towards God. 110 In Calvin's opinion human nature was a
deranged nature.
For our nature is not only destitute and
empty of good, but so fertile and
fruitful of every evil that it cannot be
idle. Those who have said that original
sin is "concupiscence" have used an
appropriate word, if only it be added —
something that most will by no means
concede — that whatever is in man, from
the understanding to the will, from the
soul even to the flesh, has been defiled
and crammed with this concupiscence. Or
to put it more briefly, the whole of man
is	 of	 mself	 nothing	 but
concupiscence."'
108 
Calvin, Instit., II.i.10.
109 Calvin, Instit., II.i.6. OS, III, p.235.
110 Calvin, Instit., II.i.6; II.i.B.
111 Calvin, Instit., II.i.B. OS, III, p.238: Non enia natura nostra boni tantum
mops et vacua est: sed malorum omnium adeo fertilis et ferax, at otiosa esse non possit.
Oui dixerunt esse concupiscentiam, non nimis alieno verbo usi sunt, si modo adderetur (quod
minim conceditur a plaerisque) quicquid in homine est, ab intellectu ad voluntatem, ab anima
ad carnem usque, hac concupiscentia inquinatum refertumque esse; aut, ut brevis absolvatur,
totum hominen non aliud ex seipso esse quam concupiscentiam.
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Second,	 despite
	 this sinful	 condition,	 there
remained within nature and within humanity a divine
witness or remnant of man's original condition. Note
how this sounds familiar to Aquinas and even the
Nominalist understanding. Man, according to Calvin,
still possessed innately a natural knowledge of God.
Calvin did not suggest what might be identified as a
natural theology, for the knowledge to which Calvin
referred is an implanted knowledge by God himself.I12
What is important is that it was precisely this vestige
by which man became inexcusable; for despite its
presence within man, man turned away from its
witness.113 Calvin argued essentially that the human
race, while in every area deprived and depraved, still
bore the Im	 114ago Del.	 He claimed that man still
possessed a continued operation of conscience and
accordingly	 this	 points
	 to the	 importance	 of
accountability. Likewise, human reason was not
entirely wiped out, but "partly weakened and partly
corrupted, so that its misshapen ruins appear." 115
112 Calvin, Instit., I.iii.1; see also his Comm. on Acts 17.27, pp.118-19.
Nevertheless, Calvin recognized that within nature there were clear evidences of revelation,
yet with qualification. In his exposition of Romans 1.20 (1st edition Latin, 1540) Calvin
made the following point. 'We must, therefore, make this distinction, that the manifestation
of God by which He makes His glory known among His creatures is sufficiently clear as far as
its own light is concerned. It is, however, inadequate on account of our blindness. But we
are not so blind that we can plead ignorance without being convicted of perversity. We form
a conception of divinity, and then we conclude that we are under the necessity of worshipping
such a Being, whatever His character may be. 	 Our judgment, however, fails before it
discovers the nature or character of God.' Calvin, Coss. on Romans 1.20, pp.31-32.
113 
Calvin, Instit.,
114 The interpretation of Calvin's use of Imago Dei is open to various explanations.
See Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth Press, 1952). A more
recent study has been offered by Mary Potter Engel, John Calvin's Perspectival Anthropology
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), especially pp.37-73.
115 Calvin, /nstit.,II.ii.12.
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Third,	 Calvin	 maintained	 that	 because	 man's
conscience and reason were not destroyed by the fall
neither was man's will.
	 Nevertheless, the will's
operation bore all the evidence of rebellion. 	 116
Calvin wanted to emphasize that while sin had vitiated
man's conscience and reason, and thereby the will,
humanity still had the ability of perception and the
ability to choose. Calvin consistently argued that
while humanity only groped in a blind way for that
which was	 righteous, often falling	 further into
rebellion, the intellectual and moral capability still
existed.	 The will, therefore, had a capacity for
choosing; the will was not neutral but could choose.
From these three general observations about Calvin's
teaching on grace and nature we can next consider how
Calvin understood the nature of man's volitional acts.
Like Luther, Calvin found the expression "free will"
problematic. 117 He argued that originally Adam was
free to choose, for Adam originally was endowed with
right reason, discernment and choice. His will was,
" completely amenable to the guidance of reason." 	 118
This was man in his integrity. But to what extent was
his will truly free? Calvin's answered that before the
fall Adam's will was free but in an insecure position.
But it was because his will was capable
of being bent to one side or the other,
and was not given the constancy to
persevere, that he fell so easily. Yet
his choice of good and evil was free,
116 Calvin, /nstit.,II.ii.12.
117	 Calvin, /nstit.II.ii.8: 'it will, on the contrary, be a great boon for the
church if it be abolished.'
118 Calvin, /nstit.ii.xv.6.
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and not that . alone, but the highest
rectitude was in his mind and will, and
all the organic parts were	 rightly
composed to obedience, until in
destroying 4imself he corrupted his own
blessings.
The important phra se is: "not given the constancy to
persevere..."
	 (nec	 data erat	 ad perseverandum
constatia...). This was one of the key aspects of what
2
Calvin called the renovated, or new will, which 4T-4givenL
to the elect.	 Calvin did not explain why Adam was
denied this ability to persevere, except that the
answer was in God's hidden plan. The human race
lacked, according to Calvin, the ability to discern
always what was good and right and then to persevere in
choosing what was righteous. Only those regenerate
possessed this ability, because they were given a new
nature. 120 Therefore, Calvin's understanding of the
freedom of the will was similar to Augustine's: prior
to regeneration a man only chose to do what was sinful,
but freely for there was no coercion. "Man will then be
spoken of as having this sort of free decision, not
because he has free choice equally of good and evil,
but because he acts wickedly by will, not by
compulsion. " 121
Following Augustine, Calvin understood freedom in a
limited sense. Freedom did not imply the ability to
119 Calvin, lnstit. I.xv.8. OS, III, p.186: sed quia in untranque partem flexibilis
erat eius voluntas, nec data erat ad perseverandum constantia, ideo tam facile prolapsus est.
Libera tamen fuit electio boni et mali: neque id modo, sed in mente et voluntate summa
rectitudo, et omnes organicae partes rite in obsequiam compositae, donec seipsum perdendo,
bona sua corrupit.
120 Calvin, Instit.I.xv.8; see also II.iii.9; and II.iii.11.
121 Calvin, /nstit. II.ii.7.
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move towards that which was beneficial and truly just;
rather freedom explained the independent nature of
human volitional acts. In one sense Calvin was merely
suggesting that the will functioned in direct relation
to its own warped character. Similar to Aquinas'
notion of the will acting according to its nature,
Calvin argued that the will was neither forced or
coerced into choosing, but did so "freely". Yet Calvin
had this clear point: the human will, until grace
transformed the will, freely chose only to sin. There
was a necessity,	 argued Calvin: humans willfully
sinned.	 The paradox, however, was that humanity was
not compelled to sin, but did so freely. 	 The sum of
the matter for Calvin is that humanity's choice was
consistent with its character. As all in Adam have
sinned, and are therefore ontologically bent towards
choosing sin, so in the new Adam, Jesus Christ,
redeemed humanity was given a new ontology and a new
inclination of the will towards what was holy. For
Calvin, it was not a matter of what man performed
meritoriously; it was not a matter of infused grace
with which man cooperated; but a matter of man made
new, with a new will consistent to this nature.
2.3
	 The interrelation between the divine will and 
human will 
In this section we come to the heart of the
matter: how God's will and the human will interrelate.
Augustine is first examined and three main observations
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about his understanding of the interrelation between
the divine will and the human will are presented.
First, fundamental to Augustine's theology was the
importance of the human will and its role in the human
response to the grace of God. In 2.1 it was shown how
Augustine stressed the sovereignty of God's will; yet,
however much a paradox, God's immutable will
accommodated the contingent actions of the human will.
In 2.2 we saw how for Augustine grace was the only hope
for the renovation and liberation of the human will's
bondage to sin. These central suppositions reveal that
in Augustine's theology the role of the human will was
at the centre of the life of faith.
	 Gilson has
concluded that for Augustine,
every movement of the soul is directed
either towards a good to be acquired or
retained, or away from an evil to be
avoided or removed; but the soul's free
movement to acquire or to retain a thing
is the will itself. Every movement of
the so}, therefore, depends on the
will.
This implies that in Augustine's theology the will
actually chose as it so decided; as mentioned earlier,
there was no coercion or compulsion placed upon the
will. The soul was self-moving.
One is aware that the soul moves of
itself when one is aware of the will
within oneself. For if we will, no one
else wills for us. And this movement of
the soul is spontaneous, for thl :i has
been granted to the soul by God.
The problem,	 according to Augustine, was	 that
humanity in Adam wilfully chose that which was bad and
122 Gilson, Philosophy of Saint Augustine, p.133.
123 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, 0.8, p.40.
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opposed to God. Human perversity involved the will,
claimed Augustine. In Enchiridion he wrote, "The cause
of evil is the defection of the will of a being who is
mutably good from the Good which is immutable. 	 This
happened
	
first in the case	 of the angels and,
afterward, that of man. " 124	 Nevertheless, Augustine
insisted that the fall of Adam, and his subsequent
posterity, neither compromised God's will nor
humanity's ability to will.
But since he did foreknow that man would
make bad use of his free will - that is,
that he would sin - God prearranged his
own purpose so that he could do good to
man, even in man's doing evil, and so
that the good will of the Omnipotent
should be nullified by the bad will of
man, but 125should nonetheless be
fulfilled.
Adam could have chosen not to sin and so arrived at the
"fullness of blessing", but he chose freely to sin;
God neither forced nor constrained Adam to sin.126
Practically, therefore, all humanity shared in this
fallen state, and experienced what Augustine identified
within himself as a battle of "two wills".
For this very thing did I sigh, bound as
I was, not by another's irons but by my
own iron will. The enemy had control of
my will, and out of it he fashioned a
chain and fettered me with it. For in
truth lust is made out of a perverse
will, and when lust is served, it
becomes habit, and when habit is not
resisted, it becomes necessity. By such
links, joined one to another, as it were
- for this reason I have called it a
chain - a harsh bondage held me fast. A
new will, which had begun within me, to
wish freely to worship and find joy in
124 Augustine, Enchiridion, 8.23, pp.353-54.
125 Augustine, Enchiridion, 28.104, p.402.
126 Augustine, Rebuke and Grace, 28,p.97; 32,p.101; and 37,p.106.
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you, 0 God, the sole sure delight, was
not yet able to overcome that prior
will, grown strong with age. Thus did
my two wills, the one old, the other
new, the first carnal, and the second
Spiritual, contend with one another, and
by thO.r conflict they laid waste my
soul."'
The solution to this human dilemma, according to
Augustine, was found not with man or human efforts but
with the grace of God. God graciously turned and
renovated the will of his elect. Apart from this work
of God there was no hope for humanity. 128
The second observation made here about Augustine is
that he firmly denied the notion that there was any
human merit involved in faith.	 To be sure, he argued,
faith involved the response of the will, but in this
choosing there was no merit whatsoever. This point
correlates to Augustine's understanding of election and
predestination. In one of his early works he wrote,
Therefore, before merit, the calling
determines the will. For this reason,
even if someone called takes credit for
coming, he cannot take the credit for
being called. And as for him who is
called and does not come, just as his
calling was not a deserved reward, so
his neglecting to come when called lays
the	 found44on	 for	 a	 deserved
punishment. "3
Good works had little to do with the change of the
will; neither was it merely a matter of choosing to
obey God once informed of the gospel: "Could he do this
by the determination of his free will? Of course not!
127 Augustine, Confessions. Book 8.Ch.5.10, pp.188-89.
128 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, 168.5, p.164; Confessions. Book
13.Ch.1.1, p.335; Enchiridion, 9.31, p.357; Grace and Free Mill, 29.,p.43 and 43., p.62.
129 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, .68.5, pp.164-65.
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For it was in the evil use of his free will that man
destroyed himself and his will at the same time." 20
This leads to the third and final observation about
Augustine's understanding of the human will. In
essence, he argued that grace moved the human will. In
this way he suggested God's sovereign electing mercy in
Christ	 rescued the enslaved	 will.	 Still, the
importance of a willing response to Christ was
fundamental. "By the same token, the mercy of God is
not sufficient by itself unless there is also the will
of man." 21	 There was, according to Augustine's
theology, an inter-play between grace and the human
will: not that of equal partners, for grace was always
superior, but of primary and secondary partners:
it is given of grace, not of debt; and
by so much the more is given through
Jesus Christ our Lord to those to whom
it has pleased God to give it, that not
only we have that help without which we
cannot continue even if we will, but,
moreover, we have so great and filich a
help as (to cause us] to will.
Thus the interrelation between God's will and the human
will, according to Augustine, was one in which the
human will was freed by God's will and grace in Christ
to choose what was good. Willingness was an important
aspect of the life of faith. Gilson has commented that
for Augustine willingness involved free choice. 03
Liberty or freedom of the will, however, was qualified.
130 Aegestieet fochiridieff 9,20, p.256; see also Rebuke and Grace 31, pp.99-100.
13 1 Augtstime, Enchiridiam 9,22, p,1156,
132 Aegestioto tetske sahl &me 12, 11,101,
133 Gilson, ibillisobl 7f §41#t hgw§ti#e, p,157,
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The will only had the ability to choose the gospel as
the result of God's saving influence. Gerald Bonner
observed: "It is true that Augustine, to the end,
paradoxically defended human freedom in the interest of
moral responsibility; but, from the individual's point
of view, that freedom, in the face of Divine
Omnipotence which elects some to salvation and leaves
the rest to reprobation, can at best be only a very
limited and circumscribed 	 endowment."	 134	 This
important paradox lay at the centre of Augustine's
understanding of the interrelation of the divine will
and the human will; to go one step further, it
illuminates Augustinian voluntarism. As Augustine put
it, "The freedom of the will is defended in accordance
with the grace of God, not in opposition to it; because
the human will does not attain grace by freedom, but
rather attains freedom by grace, and a delightful
constancy, and an insuperable fortitude that it may
persevere." 25
For Thomas Aquinas the interrelation between God's
will and man's will had everything to do with the
nature and work of grace. As with Augustine, three
points are outstanding in Aquinas' theology of grace
and the human will.
First, the movement of the will towards that which
was good and just was solely the result of grace.
Man's turning to God does indeed take
place by his free decision; and in this
sense man is enjoined to turn himself to
God. But the free decision can only be
134 Bonner, God's Decree and Ran's Destiny, pp.xi-xii.
135 Augustine, Rebuke and Grace 17, p.86.
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turned to Gfig when God turns it to
himself...
much he gave priority to the intellect andHowever
reason, Aquinas did not deny the movement of the will;
to will was part of the order of salvation. Yet
Aquinas insisted that grace alone moved the will
towards God. On his own man could not turn to God, for
apart from the influence of grace man chose primarily
that which was evil.	 Man needed, claimed Aquinas, the
medicine of grace. 07
Second, Aquinas maintained that there was no way man
prepared himself for this infusion of grace: "And so it
is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the
light of grace except by the gratuitous assistance of
God moving him within." 26 Nevertheless, there was a
preparation for salvation; but this was done by God
himself, "est ex	 auxilio Dei moventis animam ad
bonum." 29 We shall see shortly that for the medieval
Scholastics the question of merit was central to their
understanding of the ordo salutis; Aquinas, however,
argued that man did not merit grace, meritum de
congruo. Humanity performed acts of repentance,sorrow
and obedience (meritum de condigno) but these acts were
only the consequence of God moving the will in the
first place.	 Accordingly, the interaction between
grace and the human will in no way involved any degree
..
136 Aquinas, SUM la2ae.109.6, p.91.
137 Aquinas, Sam la2ae.109.2, p.75.
138 Aquinas, Sum, la2ae.109.6, p.91.
139 Aquinas, SUM la2ae.112.2, p.149.
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of obligation on God's part except in the sense that
whatever God willed was moved to its necessary end.
Since our actions have a meritorious
character only on the presupposition of
a divine ordination, it does not follow
that God becomes simply obliged by debt
to us but to himself, in the sense that
an obligation of debt holds thM his
ordination should be fulfilled.
How did Aquinas explain this movement? He referred to
an "interior" and an "exterior" activity on the part of
the will. The interior activity occurred as a result
of the infusion of grace.	 This infusion in turn
produced an exterior	 activity, namely the will's
choosing to repent of sin and to love God.	 This
exterior activity was distinct from the initial,
interior activity, but was no less dependent upon
grace. "And since for this act too God helps us, both
by confirming the will within so that it might achieve
its act and by providing the means of action without,
grace is called cooperative in respect of this act." 141
Aquinas was thus able to hold in tension both the
need for grace and the relative necessity of human
choice. He did so to the extent that he saw a
qualified degree of cooperation between the divine will
and the human will. But whereas Aquinas was careful to
avoid isolating one component of the antinomy from the
other, it can be argued that those who followed him
Later medieval theologians moved away fromwere not.
Aquinas' thought.
According to Steven Ozment, the overall opinion of
140 Aquinas, Samoa la2ae.114.1, p.203; see also la2ae.111.1, p.127.
141 Aquinas, Sum la2ae.111.2, p.131.
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medieval theologians	 was that opposites	 did not
attract: God and man were not reconciled until man was
healed and transformed. 142 Because the Trinity was
bound together by love God could only be reconciled to
those who were loveable. 	 Salvation was understood to
be more a matter of like attracting like. 	 It was not
that grace was unnecessary. What mattered, however,
was the role of grace as initiator and the role which
man himself played as a willing mover, or to use the
expression of the period, homo viator. Stated simply,
man as homo viator was one in whom grace had initiated
a change in heart which in turn resulted in human acts
of love, charitas, to which God had committed to
reward. 143 Grace was infused into man, but then man
preformed works of love or works in a state of grace:
accordingly man could be loveable. 144
To be sure, the fundamental question, "how can God
and man be reconciled?", was never ignored during the
medieval period. Yet two fundamentally different
strains of thought existed which attempted to resolve
this	 dilemma.	 One was	 committed to a revived
Augustinian	 predestinarianism.	 The	 other placed
greater emphasis upon 	 man's natural abilities to
produce works	 of love,	 once infused	 with	 and
transformed by grace.
142 Ozment, The gge of Reform, p.242.
143 Ozment, 'Homo Viator: Luther and Late Medieval Theology', in The Reformation in
Kedieval Perspective, pp.275-87.
144 Ozment, The gge of Reform, p.242 claims that this notion of 'likeness' became
the cornerstone of medieval theology. This is true, but in a qualified sense: how 'likeness'
was produced was never explained univocally during the period between Aquinas and Luther.
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Among those who stressed predestination, two names
stand out: Duns Scotus and Bradwardine. Duns
criticized Aquinas' idea of cooperation between the
divine will and the human will. While he argued that
faith was fundamentally a matter of the human will and
not logical proofs, he insisted that the divine will
must be primary in the definition of a Christian. In
other words, an individual was only a Christian because
God first willed it, specifically in predestination.
There was no inherent human merit, claimed Duns, by
which God must accept an individual. He argued "nihil
creatum formaliter est a Deo acceptandem." 145 Thomas
Bradwardine was concerned with what he saw as a growing
semi-Pelagian influence. 146	 Heinsisted that works of
merit were the particular result of grace and of grace
alone. Following Augustine, Bradwardine strove to
maintain the free nature of God's infused grace.
Grace is given to you, it is not a
payment. For this reason it is called
grace, because it is freely given. With
preceding merits you cannot buy what you
have already received as a gift.
Therefore the sinner has received first
grace in ofiger that his sins might be
forgiven.
Yet there were	 others for whom the issue	 of
predestination was not an entirely sufficient
explanation. Ockham attempted to divorce Christianity
from Aristotelian influences and gave greater emphasis
145 Ouotedin Ozment, The Age of Reform, p.242. A slightly different emphasis is
found in Heiko Oberman's claim that Scotus did advocate a notion of works of merit. Oberman
suggests, however, that what protected Scotus from a isemi-Pelagianism' was his strong
predestinarianism. Oberman, Forerunners, p.130.
146 Leff, Bradmardine Against the Pelagians, pp.13-15.
147 Quoted in Oberman, Forerunners, p.156.
130
to the natural faculties of man. According to Ockham,
man was capable of doing his best so as to merit, de
congruo, God's grace. While it is true that Ockham
argued that God was never indebted to man, nevertheless
he accepted that man's will possessed the capability of
choosing good, ex puns naturalibus.
Robert Holcot (c.1290-1349) and Gabriel Biel (1420-
1495) were two theologians indebted to Ockham, but
followers who made certain modifications. Holcot
argued that man could not earn eternal life by his won
merits, ex condigno, only in a partial way, meritum de
congruo. Even so he maintained that man's works had
merit only because God had contracted, "that he who
does good works in a state of grace shall receive
eternal life." 148 There was a value to works because
they were the very acts to which God has contracted
himself.	 Still, wrote Holcot, "our Lord becomes a
debtor because of His own promise, not because of what
we do.n 149
Biel's emphasis had more to do with the role of
grace as an initiator of good works. Man had a natural
love for God, "viatoris voluntas humana ex suis
naturalibus potest diligere Deum super omnia. 11150 He
qualified this by insisting on the role of grace as an
initiator.
The grace of which we speak is a gift of
148 Holcot, Lectures on the Misdos of Sololon, Chp.III, Lecture 25 as in Oberman,
Forerunners, p.143.
149 Holcot, op.cit. as in Oberman, Forerunners, p.144.
150 Biel, Secundun Opiniones Scoti, Ockhan quoted in P. Vignaux, 'On Luther and
Ockham', trans. by Janet Coleman, in The Reforsation in hedieval Perspective, ed. by Steven
E. Ozment (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p.109.
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God supernaturally infused into the
soul. It makes the soul acceptable to
God and sets it on ie path to deeds of
meritorious love.
Grace was a supernatural gift. 	 Man accepted this
infused grace and there was a subsequent transformation
of his nature; and this merited eternal life. 152	 Yet
after this acceptance of grace the viator sustained his
relationship through works meritum de condign° and by
the practical exercise of charitas.
Grace is nothing other than infused love
(charity), because the same effects are
attributed to both. For love (charity)
is that which prompts us to love God
above everything else, which makes us
beloved to 159od, without which no one is
beatified.
When we move on to Luther, one of the more apparent
aspects of his theology was his rejection of the idea
that God and man were reconciled by the merits of human
actions. Luther suggested that it was unlikeness which
was the uniting principle of religion: "to be conformed
with God meant to agree with his judgement that all men
are sinful and still believe his promise to save them
nonetheless." 154 As we have already noted, Luther's
theology developed gradually. It may be suggested that
Luther in his Dictata Super Psalterium (1513 -1516)
retained both the initiatory role of grace and meritum
de congruo. 155 On the other hand, Marilyn J. Harran
151 Biel, The Circanision of the Lard quoted in Oberman, Forerunners, p.168.
152 See Oberman's definition of terms in, Harvest, p.459.
153 Biel, The Circascision of the Lord quoted in Oberman, Forerunners, p.170.
154 Ozment, The Age of Reform, p.243.
155 McSorley, Luther: Right or Pang, p.222.
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has argued that in his Dictata Luther had already
questioned man's ability to earn righteousness before
God. She maintains that by the time of his Lectures on
Romans his rejection of merit was more apparent:
"Although some ambiguity remains, Luther claims more
consistently in Romans than in the Dictata that
preparation for conversio is itself God's." 156 By 1517
in his Disputatio Contra Scho/asticam Theologiam he had
clearly broken away from his Scholastic and Nominalist
heritage. In this work he specifically attacked
Ockham's views on justifying grace; he was far more
reliant upon Augustine. "It is false to state that the
will is free to choose between either of two opposites.
Indeed, the inclination is not free, but captive." 157
Paul Vignaux points out how Luther, rejecting meritum
de congruo, argued instead that "Non potest Deus
acceptare hominem sine gratia Dei iustificante."15EI
By 1525 Luther denounced Erasmus for suggesting that
man had a preparatory role and capability; he rejected
any possibility of preparation for salvation. 159
Luther argued that both scripturally and experientially
the notion of merit, preparation and free choice robbed
the gospel of its most precious promise: the sole
156 Marilyn J. Harran, 'The Concept of Conversio in the Early Exegetical Writings of
Martin Luther', ARG, 72, 1981, p.26.
157 Luther, Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, LW, vol 31, p.9. Ebeling
wrote that, 'Luther made clear, in the most extreme terms, that there was no room here for a
human will that still remained neutral.' Ebeling, Lather, p.222.
158 P. Vignaux, 'On Luther and Ockham', trans. by Janet Coleman in The Reforiation
in Medieval Perspective, edited by Steven E. Ozment, p.108. See Luther,Dispatation Against
Scholastic Theology, LW, vol 31, 156, p.13.
159 Erasmus, De Libero Arbitrio, p.37 and Luther, De Servo Arbitrio, p.213.
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sufficiency and satisfaction of Christ. "If we believe
that Christ has redeemed men by his blood, we are bound
to confess that the whole man was lost; otherwise, we
should make Christ either superfluous or the redeemer
of only the lowest part of man, which would be
blasphemy and sacrilege." HO
Luther's view of course had an influence upon
subsequent Reformers: they concluded that he had
maintained a view of the relationship between the will
of God and the will of man fundamental to the doctrine
of justification. By 1530 the Augsburg Confession, as
a representation of "Lutheran" thought, rejected any
suggestion of meritum de congruo and preparation:
quod homines non possint justificari ...
coram Deo propriis viribus, meritus aut
operibus, sed gratis justificentur
propter christum per fidem ... hanc
fidem imutat Deus pro justicia coram
ipso.
Furthermore, whereas	 Luther was not	 as positive
concerning matters inferioribus, as the Augsburg
Confession put it, the Confession's verdict on free
choice is clearly from Luther:
Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto
efficiendae justiciae Dei seu justiciae
spiritualis ... tamen interiores motus
non potest efficere, ut timorem Dei,
fiduciam erga162 Deum, castitatem,
patientam etc. 
Phili p 	Melanchthon	 (1497-1560),	 the	 principal
160 Luther, De Servo hrhitrio, p.333.
161 The Augsburg Confession, Article IV, 'De Justificationae° in The Creeds of the
Evangelical Protestant Charches, ed. by Philip Schaff (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1877),
p.10.
162 The Augsburg Confession, Article XVIII, 'De Libero Arbitrio' in Schaff, Creeds,
pp.18-19,
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architect of the Confession, followed his teacher's
leading as early as 1521: in Loci Communes Theologici
he argued that men were incapable of controlling their
affections, affectus - which can be translated as
attitude or disposition. Man's disposition overruled
all desires and resolutions, clearly indicating that
the will had little control or power: "internal
affections (affectus) are not in our power, for by
experience and habit we find that the will (voluntas)
cannot in itself
	 control love, hate	 or similar
affections,	 but	 affection
	 is	 overcome	 by
affection. 463
 Melanchthon pointed to human impotency
vis-a-vis the affections and concluded that all
humanity could really do was sin and wrong doing. From
this line of thought, he wrote disparagingly of human
merit and cooperation:
Now, as for those things which the
Sophists hand out about the merit of
congruence, namely, that by moral works
which we do in the strength of our own
nature, it is congruence (for thus they
speak) that we merit grace, you
yourself, dear reader, understand that
these are false blasphemies dishonoring
the grace of God. Further, since the
power of human nature cannot Without the
inspiration of the Holy Spirit cannot do
anything but sin, what shallmwe deserve
for our efforts but wrath.
Melanchthon, like Luther, stressed sola fides.	 In no
way did he deny human responsibility and
accountability, but what concerned him the most was
striking at the roots of meritum de congruo and facere
163 Melanchthon, Loci Comes Theologici in Nelanchthon and Bacer, ed. by William
Pauck in The Library of Christian Classics edition, Vol. XIX (London: Collins, 1965), p.27.
All subsequen t references taken from this edition.
164 Melanchthon, Loci Comes Theologici, p.43.
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quad in se est.	 Melanchthon argued that such concepts
exalted works and gave rise to a false understanding of
righteousness.	 In his opinion works done by the
natural capabilities only possessed an "external
agreement with righteousness", they lacked the true
righteousness. "Those who try to keep the law by their
natural powers or free will (arbitrium) simulate only
the external works: they do not give expression to
those attitudes (affectus) which the law demands."165
Finally, what was Calvin's teaching on the
interrelation between the divine will and the human
will? For the sake of clarity, three associated points
will be examined.	 All deal with his understanding of
the way in which a person was made new in Christ.
First, it is important to consider how the will of
God was seen by Calvin to be the sole source of a
believer's regeneration. As Calvin expressed it, there
was no other cause "outside his will." 16G Regeneration
originated within God's will for the elect; even
reprobation was established by the divine will. The
implication is that Calvin, while accepting a relative
necessity of secondary agents, gave greater importance
to an immutable divine will. Accordingly, he rejected
the idea that God's will was only the consequence of
his permission; such would be changing relative
necessity to a necessitas consequentis. Stated simply,
Calvin rejected the contention that God's will and
decree	 were only the result of what he foresaw
VOL
165 Melanchthon, Loci Coplanes.Theologici, p. 117.
166 Calvin, Instit III.xxiii.2.
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happening.
	 Rather, God's ordination was the chief
cause 167
Calvin,
	 therefore,	 disallowed	 any	 idea	 of
preparation
	
for faith; he called	 the idea mere
babble. 168 This is not to say that he rejected the
opinion that there was a preparation of faith: he
agreed that the Spirit, the Word and the law prepared
an individual, but always within the economy of God's
grace. Similarly he did not totally deny implicit
faith, namely the beginnings of faith which' then
through obedience and love matured into faith with
assurance. 169 What he denied was the idea that
through human cooperation and works of merit man
prepared himself for faith.	 Human cooperation and
merit contradicted election,	 as Calvin understood
election in the 1559 Institutes. 170 Inanother work,
his commentary on Ephesians (1548, revised 1551 and
again 1556), he wrote,
Ought we not then to be silent about
free-will, and good intentions, and
fancied preparations, and merits, and
satisfactions? There is none of these
which does not claim a share of praise
in the salvation of men; so that the
praise of grace would not, as Paul
shows, remain undiminished. When, on
the part of man, the act of receiving
salvation is made to consist in faith
alone, all other means, on which men are
accustomed to rely, are discarded.
Faith, then, brings a man empty to God,
that he may be filled with the blessings
167 Calvin, Instit. III.xxiii.8.
168	 Calvin,	 Instit. II.ii.27. OS, III, p.271: Facessat igitur quicquid de
praeparatione multi nugati sunt.
169 Calvin, Instit. III.ii.5. OS, IV, p.12: Vocare etiam fidem implicatam licet quae
tamen propri e nihil aliud est quam fidei praeparatio.
170 Calvin, Instit. III.xxiv.3.
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of Christ.	 171
In his commentary on Philippians (1548, revised in 1551
and 1556) Calvin addressed the question, to what
extent did the human will cooperate with God's will?
For we acknowledge that we have a will
from nature; but as it is evil through
the corruption of sin, it begins to be
good only when it has been reformed by
God. Nor do we say that a man does
anything good without willing it, but
only when his inclination is ruled by
the Spirit of God. Hence , in so far as
concerns this part, we see that the
whole is ascribed to God, and that what
the Sophists teach us is frivolous, that
grace is offered to us and placed, as it
were, in our midst, that we may embrace
it if we choose. For if God did not work
in us efficaciously, He could nRt be
said to produce in us a good will."'
We can sum up this first point by stating that for
Calvin it was only God's benevolence by which man was
made regenerate. By the will of God alone the elect,
through grace, came to faith in Christ and were made
new. Yet we can take it further by considering,
secondly, how one actually came to faith.
Secondly, therefore, it is necessary to look at the
will's participation in the process of regeneration.
For Calvin, the will's denial of sin followed by its
choosing good could only be accomplished by grace.
Repentance was most assuredly involved in regeneration,
but as it was a movement of the will (and
understanding) which only God began, even repentance
was a gift from God. As Calvin defined it, repentance
was: "the true turning of our life to God, a turning
171 Calvin, Com on Ephes 2.8, p.144.
172 Calvin, Com on Phil 2.13, p.254.
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that arises from a pure and earnest fear of him; and it
consists in the mortification of our flesh and of the
old man, and in the vivification of the Spirit." 173
Taken out of context, this definition might imply some
degree of human effort; seen in the fuller dimensions
of regeneration it
	
becomes	 more apparent	 that
repentance	 was never	 separated	 from faith
	 and
assurance.	 To	 Calvin, repentance too	 was the
consequence of God's activity. Strictly speaking,
repentance warranted no merit. According to Calvin one
never repented in order to believe, one believed and so
repented. It was always grace which initiated belief
and, therefore, grace which brought about repentance.174
The means by which grace worked repentance and
renovation, however, was supremely through the Holy
Spirit. We shall see that Baxter and Owen gave
considerable attention to the work of the Holy Spirit,
attention which we shall suggest came from the
influence not only of Calvin, but also from Augustine.
Nevertheless, Calvin's understanding of the Spirit is
highly significant for our study of voluntarism: he,
more clearly than any of the other Reformers, explained
regeneration through the Spirit in such a way as to
allow for relative necessity. In the first instance,
Calvin argued that the regenerate individual is united
with Christ by the Holy Spirit. 175	 Through the
spirit's work the righteousness and merits of Christ
	
-__,-
1 73 Calvin, Instit. III.iii.5.
174 Calvin, Instit. III.iii.2.
175 Calvin, Instit. III.i.l.
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are imputed, thereby establishing the individual in
righteousness. Furthermore, by the Spirit one is
illuminated and possesses the knowledge and certainty
of faith. 176 Mostrelevant to the will, however, was
Calvin's contention that only by the Spirit was the
will made new, restored and renovated:
When the Lord establishes his kingdom in
them, he restrains their will by his
Spirit that it may not according to its
natural inclination be dragged to and
fro by wandering lusts.	 That the will
may be disposed to holiness and
righteousness, He bends, shapes, forms
and directs it to the rule of his
righteousness. That it may not totter
and fall, he sustains and strpgthens it
by the power of his Spirit.
The renewal of the will, or heart as Calvin
elsewhere called it, was a work which involved not
merely a repair of the will but a transformation of the
will. The infirmity of man's will was such that grace
did not add to man's will but radically changed it.
What specifically happened to the will? Calvin used
various terms:
	 the will's	 effacement (voluntatem
aboleri), a correction of the will (corrigat), a
substitution of one will for another (a seipso bonam
submittc4, and the extinguishing of the old will (ve/
potius aboleat). 178
	 In other contexts, however, he
suggested that the will was a new creation just as the
whole of man was made new in Jesus Christ. 	 In this
sense, there was	 a restoration: fallen man 	 was
176 See the notable definition of faith given by Calvin in Instit. III.ii.7.
177 Calvin, lnstit. II.v.14. OS, III, p.314: the verbs Calvin used here are flecit,
conponit, forsat and dirigit.
178 Calvin, /nstit. II.iii.6; II.iii.7; and II.iii.8
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restored; yet for Calvin Jesus, the second Adam, not
only restored humanity but created a new humanity, with
a new nature.
In addition, it should be noted that in regeneration
the will, claimed Calvin, was never moved passively.
It was not moved as a stone; it voluntarily moved. In
this respect we can detect his Augustinianism.
Nothing now prevents us from saying that
we ourselves are fitly doing what God's
Spirit is doing in us, even if our will
contributes nothing of itself distinct
from grace ... yet because we are by
nature endowed with will, we are with
good reason said to do those things the
praise for which God rightly claims for
himself; first, because whatever God out
of his lovingkindness does in us is
ours, provided that we understand that
it is not of our doing; secondly,
because ours is the mind, ours the will,
ours the strivin
n
a9 which he directstoward the good.
This leads to the third and concluding observation
about	 Calvin's teaching on 	 the interrelationship
between God's will and the human will. It follows
logically from the points already made: that Calvin
insisted that it was God's will which was the sole
source of regeneration; and that the will chose in
regeneration as it was moved by grace and changed by
the Holy Spirit.
Calvin insisted that once regeneration occurred,
although it had continuous and progressive
implications, namely sanctification, man was still
dependent upon grace. For Calvin it was not a matter
of man continuing what God had begun. God continued to
move a believer by grace and the Spirit into the life
179 Calvin, /nstit. II.v.15.
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of holiness. Significantly, the will was active, but
active still because of grace, not just out of human
effort.
What remains now for free—will, if all
the good works which proceed from us
have been received from the Spirit of
God? Let godly readers weigh carefully
the apostle's words.	 He does not say
that we are assisted by God. He does
not say that the will is prepared, and
has then to proceed in its own strength.
He does not say that the power of
choosing aright is bestowed upon us, and
that we have afterwards to make our own
choice. This is what those who weaken
God's grace (so far as they can) are
accustomed to babble... He means to
prove that man does not in any way
procure salvation for himself, but
obtains it freely from God. The proof
is tha 0t man is nothing but by divinethgrace.
The fundamental aspect of what might be called
Calvin's voluntarism is this: the will's choosing to
respond to the divine initiative. The importance of
willingness in the life of faith, according to Calvin,
was great. Despite the problems of indwelling sin and
even the struggle with doubts, the believer was led by
the Spirit-in a life of faith which involved the will's
N1choosing.
	
The will was not passive, nor was it
forced.	 In	 the sense that the	 life of faith
necessitated a renewed mind as well as the will, it
would be wrong to suggest that Calvin gave prominence
to the will. Nevertheless, the life of faith for
Calvin, like Augustine, was expressed in voluntaristic
tones: tones	 suggesting the importance
	 of human
MO
Calvin, Coss. on Ephes 2.10, pp. 145-46.
181 See Calvin, Cass. on Romans 7.21-23, pp.152-53; also Coss. on Galatians 5.17-25,
pp. 102-107 for his comments on fighting sin. Calvin did recognize the problems of doubting,
see Instit. III.ii.17, p.562.
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willingness and choosing to do what God commands. That
grace was given and that the Holy Spirit operated to
produce this willingness did not, in Calvin's opinion,
minimize the importance of human agency and choice.
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a survey of the doctrine
of the human will from Augustine to Calvin, in order to
provide a background for the writings of Baxter and
Owen. The historical precedents outlined here formed a
background or agenda for the context in which Baxter
and Owen wrote and preached. This chapter has shown
how both the nature of the will and the way in which
the will was said to be "free" changed and developed
from Augustine to Calvin. It was argued that from
Augustine on freedom of the will meant that man was
capable, even after the fall, of choice. Yet, this
choice was not understood to imply a neutral will: sin
had so radically altered both the righteousness and
inclinations of man that the will chose sinfully. The
only hope for the human will according to the
Augustinian tradition was through grace. Augustine had
pointed to humanity's fundamental need for grace;
during the medieval period his view of grace was
displaced with another, via moderna. Eventually
critics of this thought, notably Bradwardine and above
all, Luther, forced the issue back along the lines of
Augustine.	 Calvin, however, was enigmatic: he was
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thoroughly Augustinian, yet compared to Luther he gave
slightly more potential to human nature. What is clear
is that Calvin interpreted the nature of the Christian
life in a voluntaristic way: to be sure, the will was
not dominant, yet the importance of a willingness is
clear.
Thus, in order to understand mid-seventeenth century
teaching on voluntarism it is essential to go back to
Augustine. Equally, however, it must be appreciated
that Baxter and Owen were not only echoing Augustine,
or for that matter Calvin: they were not only
recipients of a tradition, a tradition that moves from
Augustine to Calvin and beyond; but also participants
in seventeenth century debate. Yet only after
examining historical antecedents, as this chapter has
done, will the vocabulary and the issues important in
the time of Baxter and Owen make sense.
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Chapter Three
THE DIVINE INITIATIVE 
Introduction 
The last chapter showed that from Augustine to
Calvin it was assumed that no discussion of the human
will made sense apart from a consideration of the
divine will. Richard Baxter and John Owen argued
similarly, for they were indebted to the antecedents
outlined in the last chapter.	 For Baxter and Owen
"freedom of the will" was a problematic expression
until freedom was defined. They contended that freedom•
was a relative word: in relation to the activity or
influence of one agent over against the activity of
another agent. Accordingly, a study of voluntarism,
which by logic raises the question of "free will",
involves asking, freedom in relation to whom and what?
Baxter and Owen's answer was God and his will. Their
voluntarism supposed that the human will was
subordinate to the will of God. Yet they also insisted
that this sovereign will invited a response from men
and women: by the preaching of the gospel men and women
were called to change their ways, to embrace the
promises of God and to exercise obedience. God issued
his invitation to humanity in a way which presumed a
divine will in relation to a human will. The paradox
was constant: a sovereign God still never forced a
human being into unwilling compliance.
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To appreciate their understanding of God's will, or
the divine initiative (as per the definition of
voluntarism offered in 44e- chapter 1), it must be
recognized that they wrote in a theological context
post Calvin.	 Mention has already been made of this
context, with particular attention to Arminianism and
Antinomianism.	 Of equal importance to this study is
covenant theology. While the origins and
characteristics of covenant theology have created a
mine-field for modern scholarship, it is unavoidable
for this present study; in many ways the covenant of
grace was the arena for voluntarism. William K.B.
Stoever was correct when he wrote: "In formal Puritan
divinity the covenant locus is the medium by which the
doctrines	 of God	 and man
	
are related	 in the
application of redemption" to particular individuals,
and it forms the context for considering the specific
"means"	 by	 which	 individual
	 regeneration	 is
accomplished and revealed." 2	 The covenant of grace,
according to Baxter and Owen, was the context for the
divine/human encounter. Moreover, the covenant of
grace, and covenant theology, enabled divines like
Baxter and Owen to address the antinomy of divine
sovereignty and human responsibility. 	 John Von Rohr
has	 observed: "[covenant 	 theology] served	 as a
comprehensive	 connective	 bringing	 into
interrelationship the dualities, and even antinomies,
which followed Puritan stress upon both the evangel and
See chapter 1, pp.48-51 and 56-58.
2 Stoever, Faire and Easie Nay, p.n.
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election."
In this chapter, therefore, sixteenth and
seventeenth century covenant theology is introduced
(3.1) as the arena or, to use Stoever's phrase, locus,
of the divine initiative. Here several issues have to
be considered: how and by whom covenant theology
developed; the major aspects of covenant theology; how
covenant	 theology related	 to	 soteriology and
Christology; and	 of paramount importance 	 to the
relationship between Calvin	 and later Calvinists,
Calvin's view on the covenant. Second, (3.2), what
Baxter and Owen meant by the sovereignty of the divine
will is presented. This is done because, while both
Baxter and Owen referred to a covenant of grace which
involved a human response, they insisted that the
divine initiative was infallible and not dependent upon
human contingency. The problematic and differing
conclusions which they reached on this issue are
directly relevant to interpreting their voluntarism.
Third, (3.3), it will be shown that both Baxter and
Owen employed terms from covenant theology, but due to
varying views on the meaning of condition (3.3.1) and
the death and satisfaction of Christ (3.3.2) they
arrived at two distinct opinions of the covenant of
grace and, thus, the divine initiative.
While the content of this chapter is predominantely
doctrinal, it should not displace the overall goal: to
highlight that for Baxter and Owen the will of God was
the initiating cause by which a person entered the
3
Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace, p p . 9-10.
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covenant of grace and into a relationship with Him.
Thus, the doctrinal framework expressed in this chapter
in every way shaped	 Baxter and Owen's practical
theology (detailed in chapters 5-7). 	 When they
considered the divine initiative they appreciated
particular practical implications and did not divorce
questions of morality, responsibility and spirituality
from the question of God's will.
3.1 Covenant theology and the locus of the divine 
initiative 
In this section particular attention will be given
to the nature of covenant theology. As explained in
-t-lie- chapter 1, mid-seventeenth century puritan covenant
theology was not uniform or necessarily consistent. In
large measure this had to do with the fact that
covenant theology developed in a number of different
contexts: in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and
England.
To facilitate an interpretation of Baxter and Owen's
understanding of the covenant of grace, it is prudent
to begin (3.1.1) with a broad picture of the major
themes of	 covenant theology and	 some its early
proponents. This will involve greater attention to
certain theological issues than what was given in the
Introduction. Special consideration will be given to
Calvin (3.1.2) in order to compare and contrast (in
3.1.3) important English theologians such as William
Perkins and William Ames and the general teaching of
the Westminster Assembly. Having done so we are better
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prepared to move on to Baxter and Owen in 3.2 and 3.3.
3.1.1 Major themes of covenant theology and its early 
proponents 
Covenant theology was an
	 important aspect	 of
sixteenth and seventeenth century Reformed theology;
how important,
	
however, is questioned
	 by modern
4scholars.	 The crucial question has to do with the
relationship between Calvin and covenant theology. Was
covenant theology an aberration or merely a logical
extension of Calvin's theology? The seminal work of
Perry Miller, in particular, drew a distinction between
Calvin's theology and later Calvinism, significantly
because of the latter's covenant theology. In The New
England Mind Miller offered that covenant theology was
a response to Arminianism and t:ntinomianism, but
especially it was an attempt to go beyond Calvin and
bring a knowledge of God's ways into line with the
5existential needs of men and women. 	 Referring to New
England puritans who embraced covenant theology, Miller
declared that "their imposition of the covenant
doctrine upon the system of Calvin produced at last in
the New England	 theology an altogether different
4 Cf. Peter Teen, Hyper-Calviaisn, pp.20-28; Brian 6. Armstrong, Calvinism and the
Amyraut Heresy, p.141; Mark W. Karlberg, 'The Mosaic Covenant and the Concept of Works in
Reformed Hermeneutics', unpublished Ph.D thesis, Westminster Theological Seminary (1960),
p.54; John W. Beardslee, Reformed Dogmatics, p.20; Holmes Rolston III, 'Responsible Man in
Reformed Theology: Calvin versus the Westminster Confession', SJT, 23, 1970, pp. 129-56; and
Lyle D. Bierma, 'Federal Theology in the Sixteenth Century: Two Traditions?", NJT, 45 (1963),
pp.304-21 for a survey of recent secondary scholarship. Perhaps the most significant recent
work on covenant theology is John Von Rohr, Covenant of grace.
5
Miller, The Hem England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Boston: Beacon Press, 1939
and 1954).
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philosophy from any propounded in Geneva." 6	 In
another important work, "The Marrow of Puritan
Divinity", he presented his controversial thesis on
Calvin and later covenant theology:
For all ordinary purposes He (ie. God)
has transformed Himself in the covenant
into a God vastly different from the
inscrutable Divinity of pure
Calvinism.He has become a God chained -
by His own consent, it is true, but
nevertheless a God restricted and
circumscribed - a God who can be copnted
upon, a God who can be lived with.
Miller's argument has not yet fully been dismissed,
even though he has received considerable criticism.
Everett H. Emerson has accepted that covenant theology
particularly flourished in the seventeenth century.
Like Miller, he has viewed it as a reaction against
both Reformed scholasticism and Arminian teaching on
predestination.	 Furthermore, Emerson has agreed that
"by using the covenant idea, theologians shifted
emphasis from the eternal decrees of God, central High
Calvinist teachings, to God's relationships with man,
without abandoning predestination." Nevertheless,
claimed Emerson, Miller was wrong to make such a sharp
distinction between Calvin and later covenant theology.
Calvin may not have been a covenant theologian, but
there are hints in his writings which suggest a closer
correlation between Calvin and later Calvinists than
6	 .
Miller, The Neu England Kind, p.367.
7	 .
Miller, 'The Marrow of Puritan Divinity', in Errand into the Nilderness, (New
York: Harper and Row, 1956 and 1964), p.63.
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Miller believed. 8	 Jens G.	 Mc/11er has sharply
criticized Miller's thesis, declaring it to be the
result of a tendency "to neglect both theology and
9history".	 Miller has argued for a continuity between
Calvin and later covenant theologians. In similar
fashion, Brian Armstrong has also maintained that
covenant theology was not incompatible with orthodox
Calvinism. 0 Charles L. Cohen makes no mention of
Calvin's relation to covenant theology, but has assumed
that later covenant theologians were following Calvin's
nlead.	 Dewey Wallace has seen no central importance
to covenant theology; it did not compromise a doctrine
of predestination by grace. 	 Michael McGiffert has
maintained that English covenant theology had its
origins in some of Calvin's teaching on the covenant of
grace and the sovereignty of grace; in this way he
challenged Miller's theory that the covenant was a
means of reducing the harshness of divine sovereignty.
The significant work by William K.B. Stoever, while
reluctant to draw any sharp parallels between Calvin
8 
Emerson, 'Calvin and Covenant Theology', CH,25, 1956, pp.136-42; Peter loon argues
along the same line, Hyper Calvinism, pp.20-22; Rolston, op.cit, p.137, considers Calvin not
technically a covenant theologian.
9 
Jens G. M#11er, 'The Beginnings of Puritan Covenant Theology', JEH 14 (1963),
p.46.
10 Armstrong, Calvinism and the Asyraat Heresy, p.141.
11 Cohen, God's Caress, pp.47-72.
12 
Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, Appendix, pp.197-98.
13 Michael McGiffert, 'American Puritan Studies in the 1960s.' William and Nary
Quarterly, 3rd series 27 (1970), pp. 36-67. See also his more recent study, 'Grace and Works:
The Rise and Division of Covenant Divinity in Elizabethan Puritanism.' Harvard Theological
Review 75(1982): 463-505.
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and later English covenant theologians, has struck at
the central weakness of Miller's thesis: Stoever
rightly argues that divine sovereignty and human
responsibility, which covenant theology embraced, were
not mutually exclusive truths.	 John Von Rohr's work
on covenant theology in the seventeenth century
continues this present line of thought; he is in close
agreement with McGiffert and Stoever. He has argued:
So the Calvinist heritage of sovereign
grace was not compromised through the
urging	 of	 human	 participation and
agency, nor was that human
responsibility rendered insignificant by
the proclamation of God's predestinating
power. Both can be seen as incorporated
into the totality of God's gracious
covenanting with humanity -- so felt
these Puritan divines	 -- for	 that
covenant	 is	 both	 conditional	 and
absolute. 0 •
While this chapter intends to show that Baxter and Owen
represent a wider diversity of opinion in the mid-
seventeenth century than 	 perhaps Von	 Rohr	 has
suggested, we concur with the above mentioned
criticisms of Miller. It is not, however, possible to
agree with Dewey Wallace's conclusion that covenant
theology was an insignificant element in seventeenth
century predestinarian theology.
Covenant theology has a bearing not only on the
interpretation of sixteenth and seventeenth century
puritanism, but also how Calvin's theology of
predestination and grace is to be understood. Calvin's
14 Stoever, Faire and Easie Ray, p.14.
15 Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace, p.30.
16 Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, Appendix, p.I97.
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ideas on the covenant will be examined shortly, but
before this it will be helpful to present a survey of
the important themes of covenant, or federal, theology.
Sixteenth and seventeenth century covenant theology
stated that God makes a covenant (foedus, pactus,
contractus - relating to berith and dLa9rwri) with his
people. Johannes Wollebius (1586-1629), one of the
prominent Continental covenant theologians, explained:
"God's covenant with man is twofold, a covenant of
works and one of grace: the first before the fall, and
the second after it." 17 In one sense the covenants
which God made were like human contracts: promises were
made by both parties in return for the performance of
particular	 conditions.	 To	 quote William	 Ames
(1576-1633), an important developer of English covenant
theology, "This covenant is, as it were, a kind of
transaction of God with the creature whereby God
commands, promises,	 threatens, fulfills;
	
and the
creature	 binds itself	 in obedience	 to	 God so
demanding." 18 	 covenants with man, however,
were not made between equals and hence the similarity
falls short; still the idea of mutual obligation and
17 Wollebius, Conpendiuo Theologiae Christianae, Ch. VIII (1), translated by
Beardslee, Reformed Dogmatics, p.64. This York was very prominent in Reformed circles, see
Beardslee's Introduction, p.11.
18 Ames, The Marron of Theology, Ch. X,9 in John Dykstra Eusden, The Marron of
Theology. Translated from the Latin Medulla Theologica, 3rd edition, 1629. (Durham: The
Labyrinth Press, 1983) p.111. All subsequent references taken from this edition.
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the presence of conditions remained. 19	 As seen in the
earlier	 quote	 from Wollebius, some	 covenant
theologians referred to two covenants which God made
with mankind: the covenant of works (or innocency or
nature) and the covenant of grace. N As to which one
was made first, there was no clear agreement.
The covenant of works, so it was argued, was Made
by God with Adam (Genesis 2.15-17). This was referred
to as the covenant of innocency or the covenant of
nature. 21 In this covenant the blessings of fellowship,
intimacy and fruitfulness were given to Adam solely on
the condition that Adam obey God's command not to eat
from the tree of knowledge. This covenant had nothing
to do with grace as such; it was more based on law and
morality. 22 With the rebellion and fall of Adam the
covenant of works was transgressed. Mankind fell under
the curse and condemnation of this covenant's justice.
What made matters worse was that men and women
continued to try to relate to God on the basis of their
obedience; but an obedience tainted with moral failure,
hence deserving condemnation.
19 See Francis Lyall, 'Of Metaphors and Analogies: Legal Language and Covenant
Theology', SJT, 32, 1979, pp.1-17. Lyall is a lawyer and offers no historical or theological
assistance yet he is helpful in explaining, from a legal perspective, the nature of
'bilateral' and 'unilateral' voluntary contracts.
20 I emphasise 'with mankind' because it was also suggested by some covenant
theologians that there was a covenant made between the Father and the Son to establish the
means by which the as of yet uncreated elect would be saved. See Ames, Harrow of Theology,
Ch. XIX, 4-6, in Eusden, p.132 and Ch.XXIY, 3-5 in Eusden, p.149. See also Heppe, Reformed
Dogmatics, trans. by George T. Thomson (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950), pp.376-83.
21 Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, p.283-94.
22 Jens Oiler, op.cit, p.47.
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With the fall, however, it was also revealed that
another covenant existed: the covenant of grace. In
one sense, this covenant stood in contrast to the
law-demands of the covenant of works. In another sense,
the covenant of grace was an addition to the first
covenant in that Christ came to satisfy the demands of
the covenant of works and by his satisfaction the
covenant of grace was established. The chief element of
the new covenant of grace, or testament as it was also
called, was the covenant mediator: Jesus Christ. Upon
his merit and satisfaction God was pleased to establish
the covenant of grace. 23	Accordingly, William Ames
described the covenant of grace as "a covenant of
reconciliation between enemies." N Or as Johannes
Cocceius (1603-69), one of Ames's students at Franeker,
put it, "The first effect of the testament is ...
tolerance." 25
Repeatedly this covenant was the tenor of God's
relationship with his people in salvation history. The
covenant was renewed, or furthered, with Noah (Genesis
6.18 and 9.8 ff),	 Abraham (Genesis 15-17), Israel at
Mt. Sinai (Exodus 19-20) and finally brought to
fulfillment in the life, death and resurrection of
Christ. Wollebius taught that the covenant of grace was
expressed in three forms, "the first for the period
23 Heppe, Reforiled Dogiatics, pp.316 and 385.
24 Ames, Narrow of Theology, Ch. XXIV, 13, in Eusden, p.151.
25 Cocceius, Supra Theologiae (1699), XL,3, quoted in Heppe, Reforsed Dogsatics,
p.372. His other important work appeared in 1648, Saisa doetri pae de foedere et testapento
Del. For a helpful summary of Cocceius see Charles S. McCoy, 'Johannes Cocceius: Federal
Theologian,' SJT 16, 1963, pp.352-70.
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from Adam to Abraham, the second for that from Abraham
to Moses, an4he third for that from Moses/toChrist." 26
Within this general framework, there were a number
of vital issues which covenant theology developed.
According to covenant theologians the covenant of grace
entered in even at the fall itself, in that God did not
carry out the full penalty of death; he promised that
the seed of the woman would crush the serpent (Genesis
3.15). Furthermore, the covenant of grace was not
based on the previous covenant condition: in other
words it was not perfection which was required, but
faith and repentance. Referring to the saints'
perseverance, Zacharias Ursinus (1534-83), an important
Heidelberg divine, wrote: "When as He judgeth according
to the Gospel, that is not according to the covenant of
workes, as our obedience, which should satisfie the
law, but according to the covenant of faith, or the
righteousness applied unto us by faith..." 27 Ursinus'
argument illustrates, however, one of the problems
which arose in later covenant theology: was faith
something which man offered back to God quid pro quo?
Additionally, was this condition of faith possible for
all, or only for the elect who would possess this faith
through predestination ? n	 Another problem is
26 WoIlebius, Compedias, Chap. XXI, (1), prop. XI, in Beardslee, Reformed
Dogmatics, p.118. Yet the issue of the Mosaic law and its relationship to the covenant of
grace was frequently a topic for disagreement.
27	 •
Ursxnus, The Same of Christian Religion	 94, quoted by Kendall, Calvin and
English Calvinism, p.39.
28	
Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, p.385 ff suggests that early covenant theologians
argued that the covenant of grace was unconditional. 	 We will see below that by the time of
Baxter the issue of conditions raised considerable controversy.
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revealed in the thought of Wollebius: "The giving of
the covenant of grace is the act by which God promises
himself as a father in Christ to the elect, if they
live in filial obedience." 29 Many recognised the
importance of holy living as a true fruit of faith.
Faith without sanctification was unthinkable. M
	But
did this imply an over-emphasis upon human works of
"filial obedience" rather than on the appropriation of
the finished work of Christ? Finally, covenant
theologians differed over the question of whether or
not Christ procured the condition for the elect. Such
are the principal themes and issues	 of covenant
theology.
It has already been shown that modern scholars
differ about the significance of covenant theology.
Nevertheless, it is important to ask how it developed
and what theologians shaped covenant theology. Peter
Toon has suggested that the idea of a covenant of works
began in the application of the Scholastic doctrine of
lex naturae: societies were based on contracts, namely
between God and King, King and people and people and
people. Toon referred to Wolfgang Musculus (1497-1563)
who, in his Loci Communes Theologiae Sacrae (1560),
wrote about a general covenant with all men and a
specific covenant with Abraham and his seed. 	 This of
course was an idea with	 biblical warrant.	 The
implication,
	
however,	 was	 that	 medieval
	
legal
29 Wollebius, Cospedios, Chap. XXI, Cl) in Beardslee, Reforsed Dogsatics, p.117.
30 John von Rohr, 'Covenant and Assurance in Early English Puritanism,' CH (34),
1965, p,196.
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terminology pactus and foedus could be	 used to
illustrate God's relationship with his people. Toon
has argued that covenant theologians like Musculus in
some ways strained the meaning of the Hebrew, berith
and the Greek, elloccenicri.
A number of other scholars, however, suggest that
covenant theology began 	 earlier in the sixteenth
century. Jens G. M011er has claimed that the Swiss
reformer Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531) in Annotationes in
Genesin provided the first significant discussion of
the covenant in ways which led to subsequent covenant
theology. According to M011er it was in Zwingli that
the moral emphasis was stressed: "Pactum del cum homine
est, ut ipse sit deus noster; nos integre ad voluntatem
eius ambulemus! Qui in hoc sunt pacto, populus sunt
dei." 32 Pettit has recognised this moral
emphasis (nos integre ad voluntatem eius ambulemus) and
has argued that it was later picked up by Heinrich
Bullinger (1504-1575).
	
According to Pettit, it was
Bullinger who furthered the movement towards a theology
of the covenant.	 John Von Rohr has agreed with this
observation of Bullinger claiming that, "whereas
Zwingli emphasized somewhat more the gift of the
character of the covenant and its blessings, Bullinger
stressed strongly the covenant's bilateral nature and
31 loon, Hyper -Calvinism, p.21; cf. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism	 p.39,
n.2; Trinterud, 'The origins of Puritanism', CH 20, 1951, pp.41-42.
32
Zwingli, Annotationes in Genesin (c. xvii) in Opera, ed. Schuler and Schulthess,
1835, p.71 as quoted in M011er, op.cit, p.47. Other scholars point to Zwingli as well: cf.
Emerson, op.cit p.136 and M. Osterhaven, 'Calvin on the Covenant', in Readings in Calvin's
Theology, ed. by Donald K. McKim (Brand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1984), p.89.
33 Norman Pettit, The Heart Prepared, pp.38 ff.
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the fullness of responsible human participation."
mentioned in the Introduction to this study, R.T.
Kendall has argued that covenant theology owed its
development to the departure of Beza's theology from
Calvin's.	 Most scholars, however, agree that the
notable Heidelberg divines, Zacharias Ursinus (1534-83)
and Caspar Olevianus (1535-87), expressed the clearest
form of covenant theology: stressing the distinction
between the "covenant of works" and the "covenant of
grace". 35 By 1563 the Heidelberg Confession stressed a
clear distinction between the two covenants. Covenant
theology, particularly in the seventeenth century, was
furthered by the importance of such Dutch writers as
Cocceius, Francis Burmann ( 1628-79) and Herman Witsius
(1636-1708).
English writers also shaped the pattern of covenant
theology. Whether or not William Tyndale (c.1494-1536)
was a covenant theologian is very much open to debate,
but in his work there exists evidence of central
elements of covenant theology. M011er, for one,
insists that Tyndale's strong insistence upon personal
holiness led to a high view of the law, even as a
Ncondition for the promise of the New Testament.
Michael McGiffert	 has also	 highlighted Tyndale's
34 Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace, Appendix, p.I93.
35 Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace, Appendix, p.196; Trinterud, op.cit, p.48; Emerson,
op.cit, p.I36; loon, Hyper-Calvinism, p.21; Osterhaven, op.oit, p.89; but cf. Ian Breward,
The Norks of Millias Perkins, ed. by Ian Breward. The Courtenay Library of Reformation
Classics. Vol. 3.(Appleford: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970) p.90, who plays down the
covenant theology of the Heidelberg group stressing that their theology of the covenant was
used more 'to clarify the nature of grace and moral obligation.'
36 Hillier, op.cit ,pp.50-54; Trinterud, op.cit, pp.43-44.
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influence: particularly with his emphasis upon covenant
conditionality. As for the further development of
English covenant theology, Dudley Fenner (1558-1587),
whose works include A briefe treatise upon the first
table of the lawe (1588) and Sacra Theologia (1585),
played a prominent role. Additionally reference needs
to be made to Robert Rollock (1555-1599), principal of
the University of Edinburgh, who wrote the significant
work entitled, Tractatus de Vocatione Efficari (1597).37
Peter Bulkeley	 (1583-1659), produced	 The Gospel-
Covenant; or The Covenant of Grace Opened (1646).	 In
this work he stressed the overwhelming superiority of
the covenant of grace over against the covenant of
works. 38 Bulkeley was also quite clear about the
conditionality of the covenant of grace: the covenant
promises were only for those who repented and believed;
and while he gave more attention to Christology this
emphasis of Bulkeley became a recurring theme in
English covenant theology. 39 Yet by far the most
influential English theologians were William Perkins
(1558-1602) and one of his students, William Ames
(1576-1633): to these two divines we shall return in
3.1.3, but before this attention must be given to
Calvin.
37 cf. Miller, The Na England Kind, Appendix, for a list of other significant works
from English writers.
38 See Stoever, Faire and Easie Way, p.95.
39 See Stoever, Faire and Easie WO, P.98.
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3.1.2 John Calvin and the covenant 
It will be recalled that reference was made earlier
to the relationship between Calvin and later covenant
theologians: some scholars have argued that Calvin was
definitely not a covenant theologian, others have
pointed to a close affinity between Calvin and later
writers.	 What is clear is that Calvin's position on
the	 covenant is
	 problematic;	 nevertheless,	 the
following points can be suggested.
First, Calvin did not refer to a covenant of works
as distinct from a covenant of grace. 	 When Calvin
mentioned God's covenant he had in mind one covenant. 0
Calvin's understanding of Adam's short—lived innocency
was not expressed in what would later be covenant
language. He recognised the imposition of a duty, but
his emphasis is not the same as that of later covenant
theology. Calvin stressed the command as a test
(obedientiae examen) rather than as a condition. 41
40	
The following passages from the 1559 Institutes illustrate his use: (a)
II.viii.21 'solemn covenant of the church' - salmi Ecclesiae foedere, 05 111, p.362; (b)
II.xi.4 'covenant of the law' and 'covenant of the gospel" - Foedus Legale, foedere
Evangelic°, OS III, p.427; (c) II.xi.11 "covenant of his grace' - foedas gratiae, OS III,
p.433; (d) III.vii.5 'covenants of his mercy" - (e) other examples include: III.xxi.5-7 in
the context of election; IV.xiv.6; IV.xv.22; IV.xvi.5,6,14; IV.xvii.20 all dealing with
sacraments. In this sense I cannot agree with Emerson when he writes: 'The covenant is not a
basic element for his system...', p.136. While Emerson raises the question regarding the
elements of Calvin's system (a question which Bouwsma, John Calvin, p.5 insists must be
suspended), the argument here is that the covenant was a vital aspect of Calvin's biblical
exegesis.
41
Calvin, OS, III, p.231.
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A law is imposed upon him in token of
his subjection; for it would have made
no difference to God, if he had eaten
indiscriminately of any fruit he
pleased. Therefore, the prohibition of
one tree was a test of obedience. And
in this mode, God designed that the
whole human race should be accustomed
from the beginning to reverence his
Deity; as doubtless, it was necessary
that man, adorned and enriched with so
many excellent gifts, should be held
under restraint, lest he siruld break
forth into licentiousness.
Similarly Calvin's exegesis of Genesis 3.15 reveals
his reluctance to equate the seed 	 of the woman
automatically with Christ.	 As mentioned above, this
43
was a notable feature of later covenant theology.
Calvin, however, interpreted the seed as a collective
whole of the victory of humanity over Satan. He
accepted that this victory was fully established in the
corporate body of Christ, but the point is he did not
employ covenant language in his exegesis.44
Secondly, however, where Calvin referred to God's
covenant it is possible to identify themes which later
covenant theologians would employ. Thus, it is not
entirely justifiable to draw a sharp contrast between
Calvin and covenant theology. For example, commenting
upon Genesis 12-17 he referred to the mutuality of
God's agreement with Abraham: "Here the extraordinary
kindness of God manifests itself, in that he fàmiliarly
makes a covenant with Abram, as men are wont to do with
42 Calvin, Cossentary on Genesis 2.16 (Banner of Truth edition, 1975), pp.125-26.
All subsequent references taken from this edition.; cf. Calvin, Instit, II.i.4.
43 See above, p.155.
44 Calvin, Comm. Genesis 3.15, pp.170-71; cf. Comm. Romans 16.20, p.325:
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their companions and equals." 45
 Furthermore, Calvin
did point to a human activity or condition which God
required: the call to uprightness."
The foundation, indeed, of the divine
calling, is a gratuitous promise; but it
follows immediately after, that they
whom he has chosen as a peculiar people
to himself, should devote themselves to
the righteousness of God. For on this
condition, he adopts children as his
own, that he may, in return, obtaip, the
place and the honour of a Father. '1
The third aspect about Calvin's theology of the
covenant is that the one covenant is another way of
expressing the gospel. He made this important point in
two significant ways in Book II of the 1559 Institutes:
first, in his discussion of the law and, secondly, in
his comparison of the Old Testament with the New
Testament. He began with a discussion of the law in
order to show both the progressive nature of revelation
and that the New Testament (however superior) was never
to be considered apart from the Old Testament. These
two themes -- the law and the contrast between the Old
and New Testaments -- are now taken each in turn.
When Calvin referred to the law he, at times, meant
all of Moses's teaching; both the ceremonial and the
moral instructions. Of course, Calvin was more often
than not primarily interested in the moral law; but
both the ceremonial and the moral complemented the
45
Calvin, Comm. Genesis 12.3, p.347.
46 Cf. Keller, op.cit, p.49. See also Bierma, op.cit pp.304-309 and pp. 313-14 for a
discussion of the unilateral or bilateral aspect of the covenant.
	
47	
Calvin, Cam Genesis 17.1, p.444; cf. Instit.III.xvii.5 in his discussion of
	
good works.	 See 6.1 of this thesis for a discussion of Calvin's view of holiness in the
Christian life.
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covenant promise made to Abraham. In this way Calvin
claimed that the law was not opposed to the covenant of
grace: "And Moses was not made a lawgiver to wipe out
the blessing promised to the race of Abraham. Rather,
we see him repeatedly reminding the Jews of that freely
given covenant made with their fathers of which they
were the heirs. Itwas as if he were sentto renew it." 48
From this thought Calvin proceeded to discuss the
positive role of the law, including the third use of
the law — to assist	 New Testament believers in
discovering the will of God so as to grow in obedience
49and holiness.
	
In this manner Calvin also stressed
the moral importance of the law. It was not, of
course, that the law acted as a "rigorous enforcement
officer" (rigidi exactoris vicem) pressing believers to
a legal perfection. Instead "the law points out the
goal toward which throughout life we are to strive."
(sed in hac ad quam nos adhortatur perfectione, metam
demonstrat ad quam nobis tota vita contendere).
Accordingly, Calvin suggested that it was wrong to
oppose completely the law with the gospel: they were
48 
Calvin, Instit. II.vii.1; OS III, p.326 Neque enim datus est Moses legislator
qui benedictionem generi Abrahae promissam aboleret: imo videmus ut passim revocet in
memoriam Iudaeies gratuitum illud foedus cum patribus eorum percussum, cuius haeredes erant:
acsi ad illud renovandum missus foret.
49 
See Instit. II.viii.1 where Calvin refers to the insufficiency of natural la y to
bring men a knowledge of God's values. For his emphasis on obedience, one not out of fear
but holiness, see Instit. II.vii.14,15 and II.viii. 1-59.
50
Calvin, Instit. II.vii.13; 03 111, p.339.
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components of the one covenant. to say, the
supremacy of Christ's personal work over against the
law was Calvin's chief emphasis; he insisted on the
priority of the New Testament. Yet he suggested that,
the gospel did not so supplant the
entire law as to bring forward a
different way of salvation. Rather, it
confirmed and satisfied whatever the law
had promised, and gave substance to the
shadows... From this we infer that,
where the whole law is concerned, the
gospel differs from it only in clarity
of manifestation. Still, because of the
inestimable abundance of grace laid open
for us in Christ, it is said with good
reason that through his advent God's
Heaven	 Kingdom was erected upon
earth.
It was only after Calvin demonstrated the law's
positive quality with reference to the gospel that he
compared the Old Testament with the New Testament. In
this comparison, however, he proceeded to show how all
of salvation history was one covenant. "The covenant
made with all the patriarchs is so much like ours in
substance and reality that the two are actually one and
the	 same.	 Yet they	 differ in	 the mode	 of
dispensation."	 Calvin pointed to the important
differences between the Old Testament and the New
51 
See /Wier, op.cit, p.50 who suggests the opposite and in fact argues that
'Calvin's covenant theology is primarily a theology of the Covenant of Grace which is opposed
to the 1 damnationis ministerium° of the Law. It is on this point that Calvin makes his most
important contribution to the covenant theology.' I think that here, and again on pp.63-64,
killer is minimising the third use of the Law.
52 Calvin, Instit. II.ix.4; OS III, pp.401-02: Sed non ita successit Evangeliun toti
Legi, ut diversum rationem salutis affernet: quin potius ut sanciret ratumque esse probaret
quicquid illa promiserat, et corpus umbris adiungeret... Uncle colligimus, ubi de tota Lege ab
ea differe: caeterum propter inaestimabilem gratiae affluentiam, quae nobis fuit in Christo
exposita, non abs re cius adventu dicitur erectus fuisse in terris caeleste Dei regnum.
53 Calvin, Instit. II.x.2; OS III, p.404: Patrum ominum foedus adeo substantia et re
ipsa nihil a nostro differet, ut unum prorsus atquae idem sit: administrato tamen variat.;
cf. Instit. II.x.4.
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Testament not only to demonstrate the superiority of
the New but to show how the Old was fulfilled by the
54New.	 Referring to the Old Testament ceremonies,
Calvin's notion of covenant unity was apparent.
Or, if you prefer, understand it thus:
the Old Testament of the Lord was that
covenant wrapped up in the shadowy and
ineffectual observance of ceremonies and
delivered to the Jews; it was temporary
because it remained, as it were, in
suspense until it might rest upon a firm
and substantial confirmation. It became
new and eternal	 only after it was
consecrated-and established by the blood53of Christ.
Calvin's	 understanding of	 the covenant,
	
then,
included the following aspects. God's people, his
elect, came into one covenant: begun with Adam, through
Abraham and the Patriarchs, through the renewal with
Moses,	 through the
	 Davidic promise
	
and finally
completed in the supreme person and work of Jesus
Christ.	 Calvin was not willing to speak of two
radically distinct covenants. Above all God's covenant
was a covenant of grace and mercy, freely given. 56
This did not imply that the law was insignificant or
nullified with the coming of Christ. It must be noted
that while Calvin never denied the condition of faith
and repentance, nevertheless, the certainty of the
covenant rested with God's sovereign and merciful
54 Calvin, /nstit. II.xi.1-14.
55 Calvin, Instit. II.xi.4; OS, III, p.427: God si malis, ita accipe: vetus fuisse
Domini Testamentum, quod umbratili et inefficaci ceremoniarum observatione involutua
tradebatur; ideoque temporarium confirmatione subniteretur. Turn vero demum novum aeternumque
factum fuisse, postquam Christi sanguine consecratum stabilitumque fuit.
56
Calvin, Instit. III.xxi.5.
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election in Christ the covenant mediatorF
	
He alone
assured that those with whom He covenanted endured and
persevered to the end. These themes of Calvin's views
of the covenant were not totally dismissed in mid-
seventeenth century puritan theology. To draw a sharp
distinction between Calvin and later Calvinists on the
issue of covenant theology cannot be entirely allowed
without significant qualification.
3.1.3 Later Calvinists and covenant theology
In this subsection certain Reformed divines who
followed Calvin will be examined. The selection that
has been made needs justification, for there were other
important covenant theologians whose work will not be
mentioned here.	 Those who will be considered are:
William Perkins (1558-1602), an important English
theologian whose influence was profound and extensive;
William Ames (1576-1633), one of Perkins's students,
later professor at Franeker, with considerable
influence on Continental and New England theology, and
who expressed a clear voluntarist theology; and finally
the teaching contained in the Westminster Confession
and	 Catechisms which	 reflected	 a consensus	 of
mid-seventeenth century non-conformist theology of the
covenant.
New ground will be broken in the attention drawn to
a number of themes which have not so far received
adequate notice. Two themes in particular are sharply
57
Calvin, Instit. III.xxi.G. In this context he referred to Ishmael's and Essau's
failure to obey the condition of covenant faithfulness.
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relevant to the debate between Baxter and Owen: first,
the	 importance of	 the covenant	 condition, and,
secondly, the righteousness of this condition. 	 These
are fundamental issues for a study of mid-seventeenth
century puritan voluntarism. They are important
because this thesis is concerned with willingness in
the puritan life of faith. An individual responded to
God's gracious initiative not only with the intellect
but with an actual choice. Did God, however, regard
this choice as a condition to be performed before the
covenant blessings were conferred? Or was the will's
choosing a necessary, but consequential, action as a
result of grace? Inasmuch as the covenant of grace was
the locus of voluntarism, the condition of faith was
central. But what was meant by faith? Was it thought
of as seated primarily in the intellect or in the will?
Likewise, did faith - if a condition - possess its own
appropriate
	 righteousness	 or	 was	 it	 solely
instrumental? These were questions implicit in mid-
seventeenth covenant theology and Baxter and Owen's
treatment of the covenant of grace. In this sense, the
new ground that is to be broken is the relationship
between covenant language and voluntarism. 	 We begin
with William Perkins.
Perkins's use of covenant language and covenant
theology suggests that he accepted covenant theology
but with some of his own emendations. Ian Breward has
contended that "Even though Perkins made it more
central to his thought than his English predecessors,
it was not the organising principle of his thought and
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underwent considerable further development	 in the
writings of puritans like John Preston and Peter
Bulkeley, or Perkins' disciple William Ames." 58 	While
Breward is correct, it is possible to stress more
strongly the prominence of covenant theology in
Perkins. This is not to suggest, however, that Perkins
was a covenant theologian in the strictest sense like
Bulkley or Ames.
It is true that when Perkins mentioned the covenant
of works he was hesitant to refer to a covenant made by
God with Adam before the fall. In Chapter XXXI of A
Golden Chain he mentioned the covenant of works, but
Chapters IX and XXX made it clear that he identified
this covenant with the moral law and the Decalogue.
When he considered Adam's innocence he did not employ
59the term covenant of works. 	 His treatment of Adam's
innocence in A Golden Chain agreed with Calvin's.
Where he departed from Calvin was in the distinction
between the moral law and the covenant of grace. The
Mosaic law, with its moral emphasis, constituted "an
abridgement of the whole law and covenant of works."
The Decalogue revealed a conditional covenant: the
condition of the covenant being perfect obedience.°
Like Calvin, however, Perkins was far more concerned
with the covenant of grace; and it is arguable that it
59 Breward, Perkins, pp.90-91; cf. Miller, op.cit, pp.58 ff.
59 Perkins, A Golden Chain IX, in Breward, Perkins, pp.187-88.
69 Perkins, A Golden Chain XIX, in Breward, Perkins p.211; cf. Perkins, Foundation
of Christian Religion, the fourth principle expounded, in Breward, Perkins, p.156. Perkins
addresses the role of the law in preparation. In this sense it is the covenant of works
which is instrumental in preparation. For preparation see chapter 5.4 of this thesis.
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was his Christology which shaped his view of the
covenant of grace. He defined the covenant of grace in
the following manner:
The covenant of grace is that whereby
God freely promising Christ and of his
benefits, exacts again of man that he
would by faith receive Christ and repent
of his sins. This covenant is also
named a testament; for it hath partly
the nature and properties of a testament
or will. For it is confirmed by the
death of the testator.
He discussed covenant theology not only with reference
to God's decrees of election and predestination, but in
the context of his teaching on the election, nature,
office and humility of Christ. To be sure, covenant
theology served to	 explain the outward means of
executing	 the decree of	 election.	 Still, his
Christology was central to his explanation of the
eternal decrees of God.	 For Perkins the condition of
faith and repentance was demanded, yet the fulfillment
of this condition originated in the believer's election
in Christ. Thus, even the condition of the covenant was
given in and by grace. In A Reformed Catholic (1597),
where Perkins explained his differences with the Church
of Rome, he commented on conditions as follows:
In the covenant of grace two things must
be considered: the substance thereof and
the condition. The substance of the
covenant is that righteousness and life
everlasting is given to God's church and
people by Christ. The condition is that
we for our parts are by faith to receive
the foresaid benefits and this condition
61 Perkins, A Golden Chain XXXI, in Brevard, Perkins p.213.
62 Cf. Breward, Perkins, p.91; In this sense, however, we must disagree with Jens
M#Iler, p.59.
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is by grace as well as the substance. 0
Perkins, however, did not minimize the necessity of
voluntarism: the predestined had to choose to receive
by faith that which God offers in the gospel.
And this giving on God's part (ie. the
giving of Christ within the Word
preached) cannot be effectual without
receiving on our parts: and therefore
faith must needs be an instrument or
hand to receive that which God givetht,
that we may find comfort by his giving."
Perkins's importance 	 can be	 summarized in	 the
following fashion. In Perkins it is possible to see
how covenant language — of both English and Continental
covenant theology — was used to explain soteriology.
It provided a point of reference.	 The covenant of
grace was very much the arena for the divine/human
encounter. In this covenant theology Perkins never
once reduced the centrality of predestination and
election. He accepted covenant theology, however, but
controlled its ramifications.	 His Christology enabled
him to argue that the believer's election in Christ met
the covenant condition. 0 Equally, he insisted upon
the logical necessity of human choice, or the condition
63 Perkins, A Reformed Catholic in Breward, Perkins, p.537.
64 Perkins, A Reformed Catholic, in Breward, Perkins, p.538.
65 Cf. Richard A. Muller, 'Covenant and Conscience in English Reformed Theology',
MTJ 42 (1980), pp.310-11. Muller fails to consider the importance of condition and thus
claims that Perkins referred to both a foedas diplueron and faedas monoplaeron so that
conversion was the 'nexus' where both a two-party covenant, diplaeron, and a single-party
covenant, sonoplueron, meet. Additionally, argues Muller, it was Perkins's diplaeric concept
which gave rise to his voluntaristic casuistry. Muller is certainly correct to note in
Chapter XIX of A Golden Chain both a monoplaeron and diplaeron covenant. Nevertheless, it is
apparent that while Perkins accepted the necessity of the condition of faith he viewed the
covenant of grace as one in which man did not give anything back to God in response to grace;
the covenant of grace in this sense is not diplaeric. Muller's otherwise helpful comments on
Perkins demonstrates the importance of studying what Reformed divines wrote about covenant
conditions.
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of faith and repentance. The condition of the covenant
involved the will, but the performance of the condition
was	 by grace	 and on	 its own	 possessed	 no
righteousness. Faith was both a condition and an
instrument: it met the covenant demand to receive the
alien righteousness of the covenant mediator, Christ.
It can be argued, therefore, that Perkins's covenant
theology facilitated his explanation of soteriology;
additionally, however, it helped to explain how divine
sovereignty and human voluntarism could co-exist. It
will be seen later on how influential this idea was in
seventeenth century puritan thought.
Of course, Perkins's influence was not the only one.
William Ames (1576-1633) also furthered the development
of covenant theology. Ames influenced later covenant
theologians, notably Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669), a
student of Ames's
	
at Franeker, and	 John Cotton
(1584-1652), the prominent New England divine. 	 Ames's
two major works on the covenant were, of first
importance, Medulla Theologica (Amsterdam, 1623 and
later) translated as Marrow of Theology (London, 1638
and later), and De Conscientia... (Amsterdam,1630)
translated as Conscience with the Power and Cases
thereof (London,1639). In a study of voluntarism Ames's
covenant theology is relevant for a number of reasons.
First, covenant theology was so central to his theology
that it actually led him to his definition of the
church as the community of the covenant of grace. The
local congregation was a gathering of the visible
saints who covenanted together, either explicitly or
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implicitly, to live out their membership in 	 the
covenant of grace. "
Secondly, unlike his mentor Perkins, Ames insisted
67that the covenant of grace was unconditional.
Writing on "The Application of Christ" Ames offered:
Yet because it is a free gift and
confirmed by the death of the giver, it
is more properly called a testament, not
a covenant, Hebrews 9:16. This sense is
not found in a firm determination, which
is not so pr erly called a testament as
a covenant.
He proceeded to contrast the Old Covenant with the New
Covenant and maintained that the two differed,
in the action, for in the former there
was an agreement of two parties, God and
man, but in the new only God covenants.
For man being dead in sin has no ability
to make a spiritual covenant with God.
But if two parties are necessary in the
strict sense of a covenant, then God is
a party assuming and Aonstituting and
man is a party assumed.
Five paragraphs later, still contrasting the Old and
New Covenants, Ames displayed his view on covenant
condition:
[They differ] in the conditions, for the
old required perfect obedience of works
to be performed by man of his own
strength prior to the carrying out of
the promise, which would then be in the
form of a reward. But the present
covenant requires no properly called or
prior condition, but only a following or
intermediate condition (and that to be
given by grace as a means to grace,)
66 For this meaning of voluntarism or voluntaryism see chapter I, p.3.
67	 .
Miller, Errand, p.58 misses this point. 	 Similarly, Muller, 'Covenant and
Conscience in English Reformed Theology,' MTJ, 42 (1980), pp.310-1I suggests that both
Perkins and Ames held to an unconditional covenant. But a sharper distinction between Perkins
and Ames should be made. Ames was more insistent upon an unconditional covenant.
68
Ames, Marrow of Theology I.xxiv.I2 in Eusden, pp.I50-51.
69 Ames, The Marrow of Theology I.xxiv.14 in Eusden, p.I51.
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which is the proper nature of faith. M
Ames argued that the covenant of grace had no condition
upon which God suspended the benefits of the covenant.
His explanation was his Christology. In this respect
he followed Calvin and Perkins by stressing the
centrality of Jesus, the covenant surety, in the
covenant of grace: I When Ames considered the sacraments
of the church he argued, "The spiritual thing which is
signified by the sacraments of the new covenant is the
new covenant itself, or Christ himself with all the
blessings which are prepared in him for the faithful."72
In Marrow of Theology the application of the covenant
comes under the heading of "The Application of Christ".
Thus, Ames's covenant theology was subordinate to
Christology. It will be shown that this relationship
between Christology and the covenant of grace was a
fundamental aspect of later puritan covenant theology.
In particular, it was Owen's central argument when he
discussed the covenant condition.
The immediate context in which Baxter and Owen wrote
about the covenant developed from the influences of
those considered above; this is not to argue that
Calvin, Perkins and Ames were the sole contributors.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the importance of
John Cameron and Moses Amyraut in Baxter's theology of
predestination and the nature of faith cannot be
70 Ames, The Harrow of Theology I.xxiv.19 in Eusden, p.151.
71 Ames, The Harrow of Theology, I.xxiv.4; xxv.27-29; xxvii.17.
72 Ames, The Harrow of Theology I.xxxvi.23 in Eusden, p.198.
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forgotten. 73 From Amyraut Baxter taught that the
divine will was sovereign, but the covenant was also
conditional: faith was required. This will be detailed
In the next chapter, but is mentioned here to suggest
that by the mid-seventeenth century the pertinent
issues of covenant condition and the nature of covenant
righteousness had changed the parameters of covenant
theology.
This is revealed more closely when the theology of
the Westminster Assembly is considered. Earlier it was
stated that	 the Westminster Confession	 of Faith
represented a general consensus of mid-seventeenth
century puritan thought. is not actually until
chapter VII that the Confession considers the covenant;
and this is after its teaching on predestination and
the fall of man. Strictly speaking, however, covenant
theology was not the driving force of the Westminster
Divines. True enough the Confession teaches that there
was a covenant of works with Adam which required his
perfect obedience, and even the moral law reflected
nthis.	 Nevertheless, in chapter XIX the Confession
teaches that the moral law, while under the covenant of
works, nonetheless
	 has a	 positive role
	
in the
Christian's life. 76
 This is also taught in the Shorter
............
73 See chapter 1, pp.51-54.
74 see chapter 1, p.50.
75 Westminster Confession, VII.ii in Schaff, Creeds, PP. 616-17.
76 Westminster Confession, XIX.vi in Schaff, Creeds, PP.641-43.
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nCatechism.	 Far more important, however, is the
covenant of grace; yet it is noticeable that the
Divines stressed the centrality of Christ rather than
the covenant itself. Christology shaped the Divines'
understanding of the covenant (in fact the words foedus
and testament/ are used interchangeably): "This
covenant of grace is frequently set forth in the
Scripture by the name of a testament, in reference to
the death of Jesus Christ the testator, and to the
everlasting inheritance, with all things belonging to
it, therein bequeathed." 78	The greater stress appears
to be on the election of the saints in Christ from all
eternity than on the universal covenant of grace. 79
Thus, the Westminster Assembly appears to have
emphasized both the sovereignty of God's initiative and
the equal importance of a person's faith, yet in such a
way as to minimize the notion that the covenant was
conditional. It is arguable, therefore, that by 1647
certain implications within covenant theology -- faith
as a condition to be performed, the use of the law in
leading a person to faith, and the issue of
predestination -- resulted in modifications. In fact,
it is possible to suggest that the Westminster theology
was not altogether dissimilar from Calvin's at least as
far as the covenant was concerned. These factors need
to be considered when Baxter and Owen's theology of the
77 Westminster Shorter Catechism, 0. 16 in Schaff, Creeds, p.679.
78 Westminster Confession, VII.iv in Schaff, Creeds, p.617.
79 Westminster Confession, VIII.vi in Schaff, Creeds, p.621. See also III.iii-viii,
pp.608-611, XI.iv, p.627, and XVII.ii, p.636.
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covenant is interpreted in 3.2 and 3.3.
3.2 The Sovereign Divine Initiative 
As inheritors of an enduring theological tradition
beginning with Augustine and stretching to the
Westminster Confession, Baxter and Owen argued that
God's will was totally sovereign. It was free from
external constraint, or in other words, nothing apart
from God determined or influenced the divine will.
There was no constraint to which God was subjected.
John Owen, in A Display of Arminianism (1643), wrote,
"all the decrees of God, as they are internal, so they
are external, acts of his will, and therefore
unchangeable and irrevocable; mutable decrees, and
occasional resolutions, are most contrary to the pure
nature of Almighty God." ID Owen argued that if God's
will was susceptible 	 to change due	 to external
influences (eg. human compliance or even disobedience)
then God ceased to be God. EU	 His concern was to
dismiss any idea that God's will in salvation was
dependent upon human consent or, stated negatively,
resistance:
So that the purpose of God, and
immutability of his counsel, Heb 6.16,
have their certainty and firmness from
eternity, and do not depend on the
variable lubricity of mortal men, which
we must needs grant, unless we intend to
set up impotency against omnipoten
and arm the clay against the potter.
80 Owen, A Display of ArAinianis, (1643), &old ed., X, p.14.
81 Owen, A Display of Arsinianisb pp. 19-20.
82 Owen, 4 Display of Arsinianisb p.20; see also p.37.
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Baxter argued likewise: he was concerned to show that
God's will was the sovereign initiative in the covenant
of grace. In The Saints Everlasting Rest he identified
the following relation between God's sovereign will and
human activity:
Here is also supposed, 	 a superior,
moving cause, and an influence
therefrom, else should we all stand
still, and not move a step forward
towards our rest; any more than the
inferior wheels in the watch would stir,
if you take away the spring, or first
mover. This primum movens is God... If
God moves us not, we cannot move:
therefore, it is a most necessary part
of our Christian wisdom, to keep our
subordination to God, and dependence on
him; to be still in the path where he
walks, and in that way were his Spirit
doth most usually move.
Yet, how could a sovereign will accommodate human
activity and freedom? What needs to be examined here
is the manner by which Baxter and Owen described this
coordination between divine sovereignty and human
response, for at the heart of the issue a problem
existed. How could God's will be what it was claimed
to be and yet be in coordination with men? It seemed
that either sovereignty must be a misnomer, or human
activity must be swallowed up in sovereignty and hence
utterly meaningless.
For Baxter and Owen the answer to this question had
a great deal to do with "secondary agency" and "means".
"Secondary agency", a 	 icholastic term, meant the
ability of humans (for	 example) to act in ways
according to their nature without being forced by God.
83 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest, (first published in 1650), Book III, Orme
ed., Vol. 22, p.39.
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For example, if a man dropped a stone into a pond his
action was free and not coerced; he chose to drop the
stone. "Means", again a Scholastic term, were
instruments by which the agent performed a particular
act; for example, preaching, the sacraments, prayer and
the Bible were considered means of faith.	 By and
through them God called sinners to faith; by and
through them, but with no inherent merit, believers
grew in grace and faith. Nevertheless, while secondary
agency and means were accepted concepts, the
Westminster Confession taught, "God, in his ordinary
providence, maketh use of means, yet is free to work
without, above, and against them, at his pleasure."85
Owen expressed this in his work on the Holy Spirit,
published in 1674.
there are distinct actings of the
several persons [ie. the Trinity] ad
extra, which are voluntary or effects of
will and choice, and not neutral or
necessary... Now these are free and
voluntary acts, depending	 upon the
sovereign will and counsel [and]
pleasure of God, and might not have been
without the least deinution of his
eternal blessedness.
This was not an attempt to qualify the sovereignty of
the divine will, rather a way of explaining God's will
in relation to the created reality beyond him, namely
human activity.
Clearly, to state simply that God's will was free
84 For a more detailed consideration of means see 6.1.3, p.312.
85 Westminster Confession of Faith, V.iii, in Schaff, Creeds, pp.612-13.
86 Owen, TEuparaxopa; or a Discoarse Concerning the Holy Spirit (1674), p.46;
hereafter simply Holy Spirit. See also his earlier work, Sales Electora, Sanguis Jesu; or
The death of Death in the Death of Christ (1648), p.92; hereafter simply
Sales Electorus Sanguis Jesu.
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and sovereign, however, was not to present the whole
picture.	 A	 host of subsequent issues followed.
Intriguingly, while Baxter and Owen both recognized the
supremacy of God's will they differed over certain
implications. Most relevant to this study is the
question of futurity: namely, the way in which God's
will related to future events.
	
Baxter insisted that the divine 	 will was sovereign
but this	 did not	 mean that	 God's will	 alone
predetermined the eventual outcome. In Catholick
Theologie (1675), Baxter maintained, "Prescience with
predestination or decrees do not infer causally that
necessity of the event as predetermining premotion
doth... It is not therefore the predetermination of
bare decree which lay those consequences on, but
efficient predetermination." 87 In this work Baxter
wanted to make a major assertion related to salvation:
God's predestination of the elect did not exist as a
decree, for this would minimize human agency and at the
same time suggest that the cause of one's faith was an
eternal decree rather than a personal response to grace
and the gospel. 88 Baxter did not state it as simply,
or as clearly, as this. Nevertheless, his point is
discernable:
To say that a thing may be, or will be,
which now is not, is to say that now it
is nothing. Nothing is no effect, and
henceforth hath no cause: Therefore
things posgiible and future as such, have
no cause.
87 Baxter, Cathdick Theologie (1675), I.i, p.46.
88
Specific detail of his argument is presented in chapters 6 and 7 below.
89 Baxter, Catholick Theologie, I.i, p.8.
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He went on to explain,
Therefore also God is no cause of any
eternal possibility or futurity
therefore the possibility and futurity
of things conceived as an effect hath no
eternal cause:	 or there is nothing
eternal but God.
Stated baldly, Baxter was concerned that certain of
his contemporaries were stressing God's eternal decrees
too	 much	 and	 so	 falsely concluding	 that
predetermination is equated with causality. 91	 In
Catholick Theologie he preferred to shift the argument
to the nature of God's foreknowledge.
	 Rather than
arguing that God's sovereign will determined a future
action (eg. the faith of an individual) Baxter
suggested that God foreknew the truth of the certainty
of the individual's faith. What was the point of this?
Baxter shunned predeterminism because he insisted on
contingency and conditionality. As will be shown
below, contingency and conditionality were metaphysical
terms which formed the basis of Baxter's voluntarism.
For the	 moment, however, reference	 to Catholick
Theologie illustrates the issue at hand:
But if you might suppose God to have
eternal	 propositions, therein
	 their
being is considerable before their
verity; and their verity hath its cause.
But that cause is nothing but what is in
God himself, which is either his decree
of what he will cause, or his
foreknowledge of what will be caused by
a sinning creature: And neither of them
as a cause of the truth of the
proposition, causeth that the thing will
be: nor yet is any other existent cause
90 Baxter, Catholick Theologie, I.i, p.9.
91	
In Catha/ick Theologie,	 I.i Section Y, 'Futurity and its pretended causes',
Baxter principally attacks William Twisse's work, De Scientia Media.	 For William Twisse
(1578-1646) see DNB., vol 57, pp.397-99.
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supposed; but only that God knowing that
he will make the free agent, knoweth
also that this agent will freely sin.
In all which the futurity is nothing,
nor is any existent cause of it
necessary, but only the truth of the
proposition	 would	 result	 from thA
infinite perfection of God's knowledge.'
A better understanding of Baxter's argument can be
gained when it is contrasted with Owen's. Owen
maintained that what God willed from eternity indeed
determined futurity. Owen too appreciated secondary
agency but in most of his writings in which he referred
to the will of God the emphasis was on the absolute
certainty of God's will: a certainty not at all because
of mere foreknowledge regarding human agency, but a
foreknowledge of that which he decreed. Owen wrote,
"whence, it hath hitherto been concluded, that whatever
God doth in time bring to pass, that he decreed from
all eternity so to do: all his works were from the
beginning known unto him." 93 Owen insisted that this
certainty was the basis of the believer's confidence
and assurance:
It is no small comfort to be assured
that we do, nor can, suffer nothing, but
what his hand and counsel guides unto
us: what is open, and naked before his
eyes, and whose end and issue he knoweth
long before: which is a strong motive to
patience, a sure anchoL of hope, a firm
ground of consolation. JI
Owen was not as reluctant as Baxter to suggest a
predeterminism.	 For Owen it was God's immutable
92 Baxter, Catholick Theologie, hi, p.10.
93 Owen, A Display of Arsinianiss, pp.91-20.
94 
Owen, A Display of Arsiniap iss, p.29. The issue of assurance is examined in
detail in chapter 7.
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character which defined God's will and thus guaranteed
the certainty of his will for the future. "His
purposes and his works comprise all his actings. As
the Lord hath purposed so he hath done."95
In conclusion, the aspects of Baxter and Owen's
understanding of the divine initiative introduced in
this section (3.2) are worth reiterating. Baxter and
Owen accepted the premise that in order to consider the
freedom of humanity in choosing and acting it was
essential to begin with a consideration of the divine
will. God's will was the point of reference. Man's
will chose in relation to God's will, either in
obedience or disobedience. Yet what was meant by God's
will? First, the divine will was immutable and free
from external force or influence. God chose according
to the simplicity of his will; in this sense he was the
prime mover of all things and events. Still, as noted,
such a claim did not lead Baxter or Owen to minimize
the activity of human choice and activity (referred to
as human secondary agency). Man's choosing and acting
were subordinate to God's will; but God accomplished
his will in and through the activity of men and women.
This final assertion was the basis for the
coordination between the divine will and human choosing
and activity. Having highlighted this basis their use
of covenant theology and its language, examined next,
makes more sense.
95 Owen, Vindicae Evanagelicae (1655), 600ld ed., XII, p.109.
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3.3 Baxter and Owen and the covenant of grace 
Both Baxter and Owen employed terms and concepts
from covenant theology as it had developed throughout
the sixteenth and seventeenth centur-94 They recognised
a covenant of works and a covenant of grace. 	 Both
argued, in effect, that the covenant of grace was God's
saving initiative to humanity. 	 Men and women were
invited by God to enter into this covenant through
faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. What was quite
important, however, was that Baxter and Owen disagreed
on some of the more fundamental aspects of covenant
theology. Two aspects are outstanding. First, they
differed over the meaning of condition. Baxter argued
that the condition of faith was an appropriate and
suitable demand on God's part before a person enter the
covenant of grace. Owen countered that Baxter's view
only gave rise to self-dependence which diminished the
satisfaction of Christ and God's sovereign election.
Second, at the very heart of their disagreement was
their contrasting views on the satisfaction and merits
of Christ as covenant inaugurator. There was a
profound inter-relationship between Christology and the
covenant of grace: Baxter argued that Christ died
universally and so established the condition that
whosoever believed was brought into the covenant; Owen
argued that Christ only died for the elect, satisfying
the demands of God, and by his imputed righteousness a
believer is accepted into the covenant of grace. These
two aspects of their differing covenant theologies will
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serve as the basis of this section: the meaning of
condition (3.3.1) and the death and satisfaction of
Christ (3.3.2). By looking at both as components of
their understanding of the covenant of grace their
presentation of the divine initiative is made clear.
3.3.1 The meaning of condition 
In his first and controversial work, Aphorismes of
Justification, Baxter argued that the covenant of grace
was a conditional covenant: God suspended the covenant
promises and blessings on the condition of faith.
Whereas the covenant of works required perfect
obedience to the law of God, the covenant of grace
required faith, "he that believeth, shall be saved; and
he that believeth not shall be damned." 96 Gone was the
demand for perfect obedience: Christ satisfied this
demand. Men and women were to believe and trust in
Christ. In 1658 he declared in his evangelistic work, A
Call to the Unconverted, "the Lord Jesus hath made you
a deed of gift of himself, and eternal life with him,
on the condition you will but accept it and return. He
hath on this reasonable condition offered you the free
pardon of all your sins...". 97 For Baxter the new
covenant was a covenant of undeserved mercy and grace
extended to all but with the provision that there be
faith and repentance. It was on the condition of faith
that God had suspended the covenant promises and
96	
Baxter, Aphorisies of Justification (1649), Appendix, p.45. The extent of this
controversy was earlier described in the Introduction, pp.32-34.
97 Baxter, Call to the Unconverted (1658), p.206.
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blessings of forgiveness, justification and peace.
What did Baxter mean by "condition" ? In Aphorismes
and in	 his later defense of
	 this work, Baxter
maintained	 that conditions
	
were central
	 to any
98covenant, legal contract or binding agreement.
	 By
strict definition there were two important types of
conditions. "Antecedent" conditions were what one
party promised to perform in order to receive the
bestowal of the other party's benefits. "Consequent"
conditions were those demanded for the continuance of
the benefits. A condition of either sort was not a
cause or meritorious in itself. Unlike a law, which
was prescribed and enforced, a condition was largely
dependent upon the willingness of the lesser party. In
this sense the gospel commanded all to repent and
believe, but "As it is a Law, it is by Christ
prescribed, and flatly enjoyned; and either obedience,
or the penalty shall be exacted. As it is a Covenant,
it is only tendered (and] not enforced...".
Baxter was sharply	 criticised for his use
	 of
condition;	 this criticism	 began with	 those who
challenged his Aphorismes of Justification and involved
not only John Owen but others. Richard Vines (1600? -
1656), a prominent member of the Westminster Assembly
and one of the two to whom Baxter had dedicated
Aphorismes, wrote to Baxter regarding Aphorismes that,
98 
See for example the following later works: Rich. Baxter's Apology (1654), sig A2,
p.4 and pp.26 ff; True Christianity (1655), p.133; Of Justification (1658), p.7; Treatise
of Justifying Righteousness (1676), pp.57-63, 97-98, and 116-18; and An End of Doctrinal
Controversies (1691), p.217.
99 Baxter, Aphorisses , p.76.
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"Therein I doe finde that your searchings inquiry into
truth about the vulgar way makes you lesse understood
or misunderstood of men that will take no paines to
study ye same..." 100
	
One of Vines's concerns was
Baxter's use of condition. In another letter Vines
explained to Baxter:
You use the word, condition, and have a
great fancy to it, but it is a very
blind: if not carefully and so large in
some especially in the vulgar dialect.
That it combines almost any thinge under
it and therefore you that deny faith to
be cause or instrument and say it is a
condition might distinguish well for
causa est cui ubi vos est and such is
conditio...
It is significant that Baxter appealed to legal
definitions of condition in order to clarify his use of
the term. This was not explicitly clear in Aphorismes
but in the 1658 publication, Of Justification, Baxter
quoted from the writings of Accursus (1151-1229),
Barthole (1313-1356), DuPrat (1520-1569?) and Cujacius
(1520-1590).	 102	 Fromthese legal writers Baxter
suggested that a condition had more to do with the idea
of suspension: the actions of one party were merely
suspended until the other party performed the necessary
condition. Many years later Baxter summed up this
thought in the following way: "so the performance of a
100 Letter from Vines to Baxter dated July 1, 1650. Dr. Williams's Library, London.
Baxter MS 59 Correspondence 5.15. For Vines (1600? -1656) see DNB, vol 58, pp.369-71
101 Letter from Vines to Baxter dated July 3, 1651. Dr. Williams's Library, London.
Baxter MS 59 Correspondence 5.17(18).
102	
Baxter, Of Justification, p.73.	 For Accursus and DuPrat see Biographie
Universelle (Michaud), Ancience et Noderne, Nouvelle Edition (Paris: Chez Madame C.
Desplaces, no date), Vol. 1, p.110 and Vol.12, p.47; for Barthole and Cujacius see h
Dictionary of Universal Biography (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1916,1976), p.42
and p.143.
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condition as such, is no efficient of the gift, but a
Uremoving of the suspending impediment. '1 1
Anthony Burgess, rector of Sutton Coldfield, another
member of the Westminster Assembly and the other person
to whom Baxter dedicated Aphorismes, also challenged
Baxter's use of the word condition. 104	 In 1654
Burgess referred to the issue of covenant conditions
and it is difficult to think that he did not have
Baxter's view in mind.
Now this is an execrable errour, to hold
Christ died only to make a way for
reconciliation, which reconciliation is
wholly suspended upon a man's faith, and
that faith comes partly from a man's
will, and partly from grace, not being
the fruit of Christ's death, as well as
remission of sins it self. But we say a
far different thing, Christ satisfied
Gods wrath, so that God becomes
reconciled, and gives pardon, but in the
method and way he hath appointed, which
is faith, and this faith God will
certainly work in his due time, that so
there may be,an instrument to receive
this pardon. 1"
Burgess did not dismiss conditions entirely. He argued
that Christ died for the elect who would possess saving
faith.	 This faith	 was necessary as it was an
103 Baxter, An End of Doctrinal Controversies (1691), p.275.
104 Baxter wrote in Reliquiae Baxterianae 1.1. /156, p.107 that he received only a
few letters from Burgess regarding Aphorismes. These are included in Baxter's 1658 Of
Justification and in this work he entitled Treatise II: 'Whether any works be any conditions
of it? Containing a necessary Defense of ancient verity, against the unnecessary opposition
of a very learned, Reverend, and dearly Beloved brother, in his Treatise of Imputation of
Righteousness, and his Lectures on John 17." Burgess did publish a work entitled, CXLV
Expository Sermons upon the mhole 17th Chapter of the Gospel according to St. John: or,
Christ's Prayer before his Passion explicated and both practically and polemically improved
(London:1656). The other work to which Baxter may have referred is Burgess's, The True
Doctrine of Justification Asserted i Vindicated.., or a Treatise of the Natural Righteousness
of God, and Imputed Righteousness of Christ (London:1654). For Burgess see D.N.B., vol 7,
p.308.
105 Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification asserted and Vindicated from the
errours of Papists, Arminians, Socinians & more especially Antinosians (London:1654), p.208.
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instrument of salvation. Burgess denied, however, that
faith was an antecedent condition: Christ died for the
ungodly while they were indeed so. In contrast to
Baxter he preferred to call conditions "consequent" or
concomitant, which has been explained earlier as those
acts required so as to continue the benefits of the
contract or covenant. 106 Herejected the notion that
conditions suspend; if they could, he argued, then it
would have to be apart from grace, and this would be
Arminianism. Burgess chose to suggest that faith was
the condition of the new covenant, but it was "a
qualification wrought by the Spirit of Christ, whereby
we are enabled to receive those benefits, which come by
his death." 107
It is not evident that Burgess totally understood
Baxter: Baxter never denied the very real necessity of
grace to move the will to faith and to sustain the
believer in the life of faith. Baxter made this point
in Aphorismes, and nowhere more clearly than in the
Appendix.
For in the absolute covenant he doth not
promise to make us Believe and Repent
against our wills: Much less, that He or
Christ, shall Repent and Believe for us;
and so free us from the duty: But that
he will give us new and soft hearts,
that we may do it willingly: which that
we may do, he commandeth and perswadeth
us to do it in the conditional covenant:
not bidding us do it without his help;
but directing us to the Father to draw
us to the Son; and to the Son, as
without whom we can do nothing; and to
the Spirit, as the sanctifier of our
106 See above, p.105.
107 Burgess, True Doctrine of Justification, p.211.
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hearts, and exciter of our Graces. 108
Baxter insisted in Aphorismes and elsewhere that the
performance of the condition was not in any sense the
cause of the subsequent benefits. 109 When it came to
the covenant of grace, he argued, the condition of
faith was not the cause of justification, it was rather
that in the covenant of grace justification in Christ
and through Christ's righteousness was suspended until
one actually believed in Christ. 110
To illustrate his point about the condition of faith
and the new covenant Baxter gave an analogy in
Aphorismes. Suppose a tenant fell into considerable
debt to his landlord.	 The tenant was accordingly
evicted and	 imprisoned.	 The	 landlord, however,
presented a new agreement and asked his own son to pay
the tenant's outstanding rent. 	 By so paying this debt
the son enabled the tenant to return to his former
rented residence. The son, however, asked for one
condition: the payment of one peppercorn per year.
This payment would suitably acquit all previous debts
and rents.
	
Should the tenant	 fail to pay the
peppercorn then the old lease would be reintroduced and
the tenant would face the charge of nonpayment.111
All of this was to illustrate:
the value of Christ's satisfaction is imputed
to us, instead of the value of a perfect
obedience of our own performing, and the
value of Faith is not so imputed: But because
108 Baxter, Aphorisnes Appendix, p.46.
109 Cf. Baxter, Catholick Theologie, p.44 and p.80.
110 Cf. Baxter, Of Justification, p.75.
111 Baxter, Aphorisnes, pp.127-28.
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there must be some personal performance of
homage, therefore the personal Performance of
Faith shall be imputed to us for a sufficient
personal payment, as if we had paid the full
rent, because Christ, whom we believe in,
hath paid it, and he will take this for
satisfactory homage. So it is in point of
personal performaAqe, and not of value that
Faith is imputed. 1"
Yet it was not just to legal definitions that Baxter
appealed to explain his use of conditions. He also
referred to the moral aspect of faith itself. Baxter
gave special weight to the condition of faith because
he called faith a "moral" or "dispositive" condition.
By "moral" he meant that faith, produced by grace,
possessed a moral quality suitable to the covenant:
faith involved the human soul's repentance from sin,
choice of Christ, love of God and love for God's ways.
The meaning of "dispositive" condition: it pointed to a
state of character on the part of the believer. Baxter
was much clearer in later works in his use of these two
ideas, but even this meaning of condition was not
entirely different than that suggested in Aphorismes:
neither a moral condition nor "dispositive" condition
were	 meritorious
	
but	 merely	 those	 which were
U3appropriate and suitable to the covenant blessings.
John Owen rejected Baxter's use of condition. In a
work specifically directed at Baxter, he attacked the
way in which Baxter used the term:
their conditional satisfaction, or their
suspending the fruits of the death of
Christ upon conditions, as though the
Lord should give him to die for us, upon
112 Baxter, Aphorisies, p.129.
113 Cf. Baxter, Of Justification (1658), p.24, 73 and 77; Catholick Theologie (1675)
Lit, p.44; and An End of Doctrinal Controversies (1691), p.242.
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condition of such and such things, is a
vain figment, contrary to the
Scriptures, inconsistent in itself, and
destructive of the true vave and virtue
of the death of Christ... "'
He admitted that there was a matter of time between the
death of Christ and the actual moment of justifying
faith which one exercises, but "Things have their
certain futurition, not instant actual existence, from
the eternal purpose of God concerning them." 115 Even
with this in mind, however, it did not imply that the
purpose of God in Christ's death was suspended upon a
condition. Rather, Owen argued, Christ's death
accomplished its purpose with respective to the elect
absolutely. He explained it thus:
Lawyers tell us, that all stipulations
about things future, are either sub
conditione or sub termino. Stipulations
or engagements upon condition that are
properly so, do suppose him that makes
the	 engagement	 to	 be	 altogether
uncertain of the event thereof.
Stipulations sub termino are absolute,
to make out the things engaged about at
such a season. Upon the very instant of
such a stipulation as this an obligation
follows as to the thing, though no
action be allowed to him to whom it 4
made,until thelterm and timelappointed.
In an earlier work on the atonement he had argued
with regard to the covenant of grace that through the
death of Christ God effectually brought about the faith
114 Owen, Of the Death of Christ. The price he paid, and the purchase he Jade: or,
the Satisfaction and serif of the death of Christ cleared; the universality of redenption
thereby oppunged; and the doctrine concerning these things, forserly delivered in a treatise
against universal redesption, vindicated, fro s the exceptions and objections of Br. R.B.
Scold ed., X, p.450. All subsequent references taken fro g this edition.
115 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, p.456.
116 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, p.465.
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of his elect. In other words, in the covenant of works
God commanded perfect obedience but in the covenant of
grace God himself promised that the elect would be
given the faith which the covenant demands. His point
was that no one could ever, on their own, repent and
believe; only God could bring about this. Baxter, as
mentioned before, argued this just as strongly, but
Owen went further and insisted that even the faith
required was given absolutely through the death of
Christ. It was this absolute provision which Owen
argued made the covenant of grace superior to the first
117
covenant.	 Owen's intent was not to split hairs in
debate with Baxter but to argue that Christ's death
procured the justification of an individual, even
though there was a delay in time before the particular
11Bindividual enjoyed the benefit of this pardon.	 The
delay, though, was not as Baxter argued: namely, on the
basis of suspension. The actual procurement of
Christ's saving merit rested with the sovereign liberty
of God. Because Owen limited the atoning death of
Christ for the elect alone he stated that since Christ
died for the elect they would enter into the covenant
of grace by faith. 119	 They became members of the
covenant, however, not conditionally (for this implied
uncertainty in Owen's opinion) but absolutely (even
though this implied a time delay). Furthermore, Owen
argued that Christ procured the faith of the elect
117 Owen, Sales Electorun Sanguis Jesa, pp.103-04.
11 0 Cf. Owen, 4 Display of 4rninianiss, P. 97.
119 See Owen, Of the Death of Christ, pp.467-68.
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through his death.
3.3.2 The death and satisfaction of Christ 
It is evident from the subsection above that the
nature of the covenant and the covenant condition
involved at its centre Christology: specifically the
death and satisfaction of Christ. In 1655 Baxter wrote,
Christs death hath taken away the curse
of that covenant, not absolutely from
any man, but conditionally, which
becomes absolute when the condition is
performed. The Elect themselves are not
by nature under the covenant of Grace,
but remaine under the curse of the fi t
covenant till they come into Christ.
In this subsection it is necessary to examine in
greater detail Baxter and Owen's understanding of
Christ and the covenant. Baxter, on one hand, feared
that Antinomianism suggested a justification before
faith: in other words, because Christ died for the
elect they were justified at that moment, even before
they actually exercised faith. He was equally
concerned to respond to those like Owen, who emphasized
imputed righteousness and vicarious atonement.
Interestingly, Baxter stated in Aphorismes that at one
point he did accept the idea of vicarious atonement due
to the influence of William Twisse (1578? -1646) and
William Pemble (1592-1623). in In his theological
development, however, he moved from such a view to
120 Baxter, True Christianity (1655), p.133. Cf. Baxter, Richard Baxter's Cat holick
Theologie (1675) I.ii, p.53 and Universal Redenption (1694), ed. Joseph Reade and Matthew
Sylvester, pp.39-40.
121 For Twisse see DUB, vol 52, p.397; for Pemble see DHB, vol 44, p.283.
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embrace the theory suggested by Amyraut. 	 Baxter
argued that while it was certain that the elect would
come to faith and justification, nevertheless, Christ's
death did not absolutely procure the justification of
any one individual until he or she believed. Christ's
death established a conditional covenant for the whole
human race. If Christ died absolutely for the elect
then what need would they have to repent and believe:
they would have no guilt. So he wrote in Aphorismes,
"I undertake to manifest to you, that this Doctrine of
Christ's immediate Actual delivering us from guilt,
wrath, and condemnation 	 is the very pillar	 and
foundation	 of the	 whole frame	 and	 fabrick of
Antinomianism." 123 According to Owen, however, Christ
died absolutely and exclusively for the elect and his
death procured the faith of the elect which they would
in time exercise.
Christ hath purchased remission of sins,
and eternal life for us, to be enjoyed
on our believing, upon the condition of
faith; but faith it self which is the
condition of them, on whose performance
they are bestowed, that he hath procured
for us _absolutely, on no condition at
124all...
The contrast is important. Baxter held that Christ died
with universal effect, that is, a universal covenant.
Owen, however, argued that Christ died particularly for
the elect and so established an unconditional covenant
for them.	 Thus both Baxter and Owen explained the
..........s.....
...
122 Baxter, Aphorisses, Appendix, p.164. For Amyraut see chapter 1, pp.51-54.
123 Baxter, Aphorisses, Appendix, p.164.
124 Owen, Salta Electoral Sanguis Jesu, p.88.
195
covenant of grace on the basis of their interpretation
of Christ's satisfaction, substitution and
righteousness. In what way and on what basis did they
form their understanding of the death and satisfaction
of Christ?
As noted in the previous subsection, Baxter argued
that the condition of the first covenant was perfect
obedience to God. 125 This covenant had a penalty:
death. Baxter insisted in Aphorismes, however, that in
actuality this penalty of death was never carried out
by God; instead, through grace, there was a relative
relaxation of the penalty.	 Adam's death was not
instant or	 hopeless.	 Adam's penalty	 did bear
resemblance to the God's threat in the first covenant,
but it was not the identical penalty. Man could not
have endured the identical penalty, claimed Baxter. 126
Much later, in 1674, he was clearer. He argued that
Christ was never hated by God, deprived of the Spirit,
never under the rule of Satan, never accused by his
conscience, never despaired of salvation or sent to
Hell for eternity: this is what the original penalty
implied. 127
To use Baxter's expression, Christ's satisfaction of
the old covenant was a sacrifice tantundem, of "like"
kind, vis-a-vis the penalty threatened to Adam. Christ
did not pay a sacrifice idem, or identical.
Christ did suffer a paine and misery of
the same sort, and of equal weight with
125 See above, p.184.
126 Baxter, Aphorisses p.18.
127 Baxter, A Treatise of Justifying Righteousness (1674), Part 1, pp.53-54.
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that threatened; but yet because it was
not in all respects the same, it was
rather satisfaction than the payment of
the proper debt, being such a paymmt as
God might have chosen to accept.
The important idea here is "rather satisfaction than
the payment of the proper debt." By this Baxter meant
that God chose Christ's death, while not identical to
the penalty threatened under the first covenant, as the
satisfaction	 for His	 justice. 129	 In Methodus
Theologiae Christianae (1681), a Latin treatise which
he considered complementary to his earlier Catholick
Theologiae (1675), he wrote:
Christi igitur, non fuit omnio legis
illius poenalis impleto seu executio;
sed causa ne executione impleretur. Per
ejus poenas igitur, non idem fertur aut
Solvitur, quod a nobis peccatoribus
debitum erat; Quia debita fuit juxta
Legis sensum, ipsius delinquentis poena.
Sed aequivalem datur aut tantundem,
loco ejusdem.
Furthermore, as the Son of God, Christ was raised to
life and established the righteousness of the new
covenant. In this sense Christ offered the acceptable
sacrifice but not the identical. In so satisfying the
law-giver there were suitable grounds for establishing
the covenant of grace. 21
In short, this was Baxter's way of refuting the
notion of vicarious substitution: the idea that Christ
128 Baxter, Aphorisms p.35; cf. also Baxter to George Lawson, August 5, 1651. Dr.
Williams's Library, London. Baxter MS 59 Correspondence, 6.197, f 64. For Lawson (d. 1678)
see pliB I vol 32, p.289.
129 Cf. Baxter, Of Justification (1658), pp. 382-83 and Baxter, Catholick Theologie
p.40.
130 Baxter, Nethodas Thelogiae Christianae (1681), III, p.45.
131 Baxter, Aphorisms p.90.
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died in the place of sinners, and bore their due
penalty. His fear was that such an idea would excuse
men and women from their own personal guilt and
responsibility to the Law. In other words, he was
afraid of extreme Antinomianism - but also of the
implications of ideas of divines like John Owen. In
1648 Owen had suggested "that considering that
relaxation of the Law which, by the supreme power of
the Law-giver was effected, as to the persons suffering
the punishment required, such actual satisfaction is
made thereto, that it can lay no more to their charge
for whom Christ died than if they had really fulfilled
in the way of obedience whatsoever it did require." 132
In Baxter's view Owen actually denied the guilt and
need for repentance, implying a justification from
eternity. Responding once again to Owen he wrote, "We
did neither Really, nor in God's Account, dye with
Christ when he dyed, nor in him satisfie God's Justice,
nor fulfil the Law through Christ." 133
	Accordingly
Baxter, while adamant that Christ alone provides the
satisfaction for the sins of the world, consistently
argued, as he wrote years later in 1691, "The person of
our Mediator was neither in the sense of the Law, or in
God's account, properly the person of the sinner;
Christ and we are distinct persons." 04
132 Owen, Sills Electoral Sanguis lesa, p.146.
133	 Baxter, Confession (1655), p.229; cf. Baxter, Catholick Theologie I.ii,
pp.38-39.
134 Baxter, An End of Doctrinal Controversies (1691), p.260.
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When Baxter explained how Christ died for sinners
he meant that Christ died voluntarily so as to be a
mediator and satisfy God's justice for human
disobedience vis-a-vis the covenant of works and the
law; provided that the condition of receiving Christ
was met then one could say that Christ died loco
nostro. 
135 What Baxter refused to accept, however, was
that Christ died particularly and singularly for any
one person; he did not die, strictly speaking, for a
specific person. 136 This would have been to satisfy
idem one's guilt under the covenant of works. A number
of the ideas already outlined can be detected in the
following quote from his work on justification.
But that Christ in dying did strictly
represent the person of the sinner, so
as either naturally, or morally in Law
sense we may be said to have satisfied
then, in or by him, as the Law calls
that the action of the Principal, which
is	 done per
	
Delegatum, Desputatum,
Vicarium etc.	 This is the soul of
Antinomianism, and directly and
unavoidably introduceth Justificat(ion)
before Faith, or before we are born, the
non-necessity of any other
Justification, but in foro conscientiae;
it certainly overthrows any pardon of
sin at a1,1, and so all Petition for
Pardon..."'
In his Appendix to Aphorismes Baxter challenged
Owen's ideas on Christ's satisfaction of the old
covenant and the conditionality of the new covenant.
Baxter's interpretation of Owen in Aphorismes suggests
135 Cf. Baxter, Of Justification, pp.382-83.
136 Baxter, An End of Doctrinal Controversies, p.158.
127 Baxter, Of Justification, p.383; cf. Baxter, An End of Doctrinal Controversies,
p.158 and p.262.
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he grasped Owen's argument, and was critical of it.
Owen, however, was quick to accuse him of missing the
essentials. He replied to Baxter and claimed that they
differed not only about the nature of Christ's death --
whether it was ejusdem or tantundem -- but over the
"immediate fruit, or effects of the death of Christ,
the state of the elect redeemed ones before actual
believing, the nature of redemption, reconciliation,
the differing of persons in God's eternal purposes." 138
As Owen wrote in 1648 so he urged against Baxter in
1650. "I affirm that he paid idem, that is, the same
thing that was in the obligation; and not tantundem,
something equivalent thereunto, in another kind." 29
It will be recalled from above that Baxter had
suggested in Aphorismes that there was a relaxation of
the penalty of the first covenant and this enabled
Christ's substitution and satisfaction. 	 Baxter, to
repeat, insisted that Christ's death did not free one
absolutely from the curse of the law. 1°	 In contrast
to Baxter, Owen insisted that there was no mention in
Scripture of the penalty of the old covenant being
relaxed.
I assert a relaxation of the law, which
might be done, and yet the penalty
itself in reference to its constitution
be established. In those places, then,
In the day Thou eatest, etc. There is
death and the curse appointed for the
penalty, and the person offending
appointed for the sufferer. That the law
is relaxed, in the latter I grant. That
nn••••
138 Owen, Of The Death of Christ, p.436.
139 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, p.438.
140 Baxter, Aphorismes, Appendix pp.I52-54; cf. Baxter, Catholici Theologie
pp. 38-39.
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the formr was executed on Christ I
prove.
Owen's "proof" came in a very detailed argument. In
summary, he cited examples within Scripture which
referred to a translation of the subject for punishment
without speaking of a different punishment: Romans
8.32, for example. In this way, argued Owen, the
punishment due to men and women was fully contained in
the law but undergone by Christ (Galatians 3.13). How
could one be sure of this? He suggested that the
punishment was a full condemnation of sin; God did this
in Christ (Romans 8.30) and the condemning of sin was
the infliction of the penalty. Christ underwent actual
death (cf. Genesis 2.11 and Hebrews 2.14). 	 According
to Owen this death indicated that the sacrifice of
Christ was idem and for the sins of the elect.	 Owen
recognised that Christ did not endure eternal death
because of the dignity of his person; yet the
obligation that death occur under the first covenant
was met fully by Christ. His substitution was not just
an acceptable sacrifice, it was in strict terms a full
satisfaction.
	 "There is	 a sameness	 in Christ's
sufferings with that in the obligation in respect of
essence, and equivalency in respect of attendencies. 442
In this way Owen challenged Baxter's suggestion,
mentioned earlier, that the death of Christ was more to
do with the satisfaction of the law-giver than actual
141 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, p.443.
142 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, p.448.
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guilt under the law. 143
Moreover, Owen urged Baxter to consider the "end" of
Christ's death: in other words, the reason for Christ's
death. Owen held that the end of the death of Christ
was not merely to relax the law and to establish a
conditional covenant, but to bring the elect into
justification, pardon and sanctification. In his work
on the atonement Owen had referred to the death of
Christ as a "means" to an end: that is to say, the
death of Christ was the instrument by which God's
eternal purpose for his elect were established. 144
Throughout most of his doctrinal works Owen insisted
that Christ's death and oblation had to have
accomplished God's intention, for Christ could not have
died in vain.
	 The end of Christ's death, then, was
145salvation for the elect.
	
It was the elect alone
for whom Christ died and interceded; Owen held the two
together. 146 As he put it in 1648: "The summe of all
is: the death and bloodshedding of Jesus Christ hath
wrought, and doth effectually procure, for all those
that are concerned in it, eternal redemption,
consisting in grace here, and glory hereafter." 10
The death and intercession of Christ could not be said
to have been in vain or	 merely to establish a
143 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, p.455; cf. Baxter, Aphorisnes, p.90.
144 Owen, Sales EIectoras Sangais Jesus, pp.27-28.
145 Owen, Display of Arsinianiss, p.90.
146
	 Owen, Display of hroinianiss, p.90;	 Owen, Saha Electoras Sangais Jesa,
pp.22-23,29,32-33.
147 Owen, Sal us Electoral Sangais Jesa, p.3.
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conditional covenant of pardon; it had a specific and
absolute end:
To save sinners; not open a door for
them to come in, if they will or can;
not to make a way passable, that they
may be saved; not to purchase
reconciliation and pardon of his Father,
which perhaps they shall never enjoy;
but actually to save them from all their
guilt and power of sinne, and from the
wrath of God for sinne, which if he doth
not accomplish, he fails of the end of
his coming; and if that ought not to be
affirmed, surely he came for no more
than	 towards whom	 that	 effect is
Auprocured.
Baxter did not accept this line of argument and it
was one of
	
his constant concerns, not 	 only in
Aphorismes but in other later works. Baxter argued
that the "end" of Christ's death (Owen's argument
above) had more to do with satisfying God the law-giver
than freeing men and women from their guilt under the
first covenant. 149	 Baxteraccepted that faith was a
fruit of Christ's death but not with the same stress as
Owen. For example, in one of his last doctrinal works,
he wrote,
148 Owen, Sales Electoras Sanguis Jesu, p.61; cf. pp.61-64.
149 Baxter, Of Justification p.264.
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Faith is a fruit of the Death of Christ,
(and so is all the good which we do
enjoy): But not	 directly as it is
satisfaction to Justice; but only
Remotely, as it proceedeth from that jus
Domini which Christ hath received, to
send the Spirit in what measure and to
whom	 he will
no
 and to	 succeed it
accordingly...
It was not only an idea which Baxter expressed in his
late works: in his earlier Confession (1655) he had
written,
Upon the satisfaction of Christ God was
pleased to offer a new covenant of
grace; but the satisfaction of Christ
did not in itself procure an
individual's justification. So that God
as the offended Legislator of the first
Law, upon satisfaction made, was
reconciled, as far as the Intention of
the Satisfier and satisfied did require;
that is, so far as to Permit all into
the Redeemers hands, and give him Power,
Right and Commission to grant pardon by
a new Law, which should not be as the
old which was fitted to man in
perfection, but a law of Grace, fitted
to man in sin and misery, giving him a
Saviour and salvation on condition of
mere Acceptance. (Purposing to causnihis
chosen infallibly to accept him).
Yet it should be noted that in this quotation Baxter
did not minimise election and predestination:
"purposing to cause his chosen infallibly to accept
him." Baxter declared he was no Arminian. 152 His
explanation was that the elect were sure to receive
150 
Baxter, Universal, RedeAption, p.42; cf. the comments in his earlier work,
Cat holick Theologie, I.i, p.41 and I.iii, p.57 where he denied the absolute promise of faith
to any person, only the promissory prediction that God will draw some to Christ and they
shall believe and live.
151 Baxter, Confession, p.246; cf. Baxter, Universal Redemption, p.34; cf. Baxter,
And End of Doctrinal Controversies, pp.161-62.
152 See Baxter, Confession, Preface, sig Av.
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grace and thereby come to saving faith. 153	 In one
way, he argued, Christ died for the elect in so far as
he died for all men. 154	 Theelect, however, by God's
secret will, were caused de eventu the grace which
would lead them to faith. In his response in his
Apology to William Eyre he went so far as to insist "It
was the intent and absolute will, yea and undertaking
of Christ dying, to cause all the Elect of God
infallibly to perform this condition." 155
	At this
point it might be tempting to conclude that he agreed
with Owen. Yet Baxter, as noted earlier, argued that
Christ died for all men, loco omnium aequaliter yet
"effectively" only for the elect.	 In his opinion
Christ died for all men but not with the intention to
produce equal benefit, in omnium bonum aequaliter. 156
In short, what Baxter suggested was that Christ died
for all humanity so as to relax the law and to
establish a conditional covenant; but in God's decrees
his death and offering of himself are only effectual
for the elect because only they would be given the
grace to fulfil the covenant condition. 157 What we
see then is that Baxter advocated a universal atonement
and so a universal covenant of grace, but a limited
153	 See Baxter to Lawson, August 5,1651. Dr. Williams's Library, London. MS 59
Correspondence 6. 197, f 60.
154 Baxter, Confession, Preface, sig A.
155 Baxter, Apology IV, p.26. For Eyre see Calasy Revised, p.187.
156 See especially Baxter, Universal Redemption, pp.23 and 63; cf. Baxter, An End of
Doctrinal Controversies, p.160.
157 Baxter, An End of Doctrinal Controversies, p.158.
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provision of grace. His view of election was
subordinate to the establishment of the covenant of
grace.
Owen suggested a markedly different view; and this
shaped his understanding of the divine initiative. He
argued that Christ's death was not universal.	 His
defense of this position had not so much to do with
the sufficiency of Christ's death (for he did suggest
that Christ's death was sufficient for the sins of the
whole world) as it did with the end of his death.
According to Owen, Christ's death was not to provide a
potential, or conditional, covenant but to bring the
elect to salvation.	 Through his death the elect were
absolutely pardoned and reconciled. 158	 Owen agreed
with Baxter on one point though: an individual was not
regenerate and pardoned until he or she believed and
repented. In this sense Owen was denying a
justification from eternity (which Baxter accused him
of doing), for he agreed that even the elect were very
much under the wrath and judgment of God for sin until
they were converted. 159	 Nevertheless, their faith and
te-liwm
trust wa-s established not merely by the decree of
election but through the death of Christ. By his death
Christ actually procured the fruit of his death.160
The end, or fruit, of his death was the fulfillment of
God's purposes for the saints. Owen agreed that there
158 Owen, Display of Arninianisn, pp.89-91;	 Owen, Salas Electoran Sangais Jesa,
p.223 but misnumbered p.233.
159 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, pp.466-67.
160 Owen, SaIas Electoras Sasgais Jesa, pp.87,101-112 and 163; Owen, Of the Death of
Christ, p.469.
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was an important distinction between the time of
Christ's death and the time when one actually believed.
As explained earlier, this time-delay, however, was not
proof of a conditional covenant. 161 Owen responded to
Baxter and insisted,
Hence it is that the discharge of the
debtor, doth not immediately follow the
payment of the debt by Christ; not
because that payment is refusable, but
because in that very covenant and
compact, from whence it is that the
death of Christ is a payment, God
reserveth to himself this right and
liberty, to discharge the debtor, when
and how he pleaseth. I mean as to times
and seasons; for otherwise the means of
actual freedom is	 procured by that
payment, though not considered merely as
a payment, which denotes only
satisfaction
'162 but as it had adjoined
merit also.
Owen is not always crystal clear to read, and the above
quotation is a good example. His point, however, was
that he and Baxter disagreed over the effects of the
death of Christ and the covenant of grace. 163
Conclusion 
Covenant theology
	 held a
	
central position	 in
seventeenth century puritan theology. As argued in
this chapter, interpreting this covenant theology is
not entirely a clear cut matter; there were various
emphases	 and	 differences.	 Baxter	 and Owen's
161 See above, p.191.
162 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, pp.613-14.
163	 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, p.479 where he states this explicitly and
criticises Baxter's dependence upon Amyraut.
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understanding of the covenant deserves consideration
for the ways in which they used covenant motifs to
explain the	 divine initiative.	 The fundamental
difference between Baxter and Owen was whether the
divine initiative was conditional or absolute. John
Von Rohr has written:
It is not, however, as though it were
either conditional or absolute. Puritan
theology rejected at this point the
"either/or" and affirmed a "both/and",
with the connecting link found in the
fulfillment of the conditions
themselves. The distinctive feature of
the covenant as absolute is that it
becomes God's means of bringing to
completion the covenant as conditional.
For God's chosen there is the divinely
covenanted	 commitment	 that	 the
conditions will be fulfilled by God's
own doing, and	 th	 commitment	 is
without conditions."
Von Rohr has rightly identified a paradox within
puritan covenant theology, yet it is argued here that
such an interpretation minimizes the differences
between puritan divines like Baxter and Owen. Baxter,
while insisting that God's will was sovereign, claimed
that the covenant was conditional. Owen disagreed: the
covenant was unconditional because of the death of
Christ.
A further concluding thought has to be presented.
When Baxter and Owen's use of covenant theology is
examined, it is difficult to ignore their respective
Christologies. This implies that by the mid-seventeenth
century covenant theology had evolved with differing
emphases than what had been expressed by earlier
covenant theologians. 	 We would argue that due to the
164 Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace, p.81.
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challenges of Arminianism, which questioned a limited
covenant of grace, and Antinomianism, which refuted the
idea that there was any condition, there resulted the
modifications seen in both Baxter and Owen.
Finally, this chapter has illustrated only one half
of the divine/human encounter: the divine initiative.
As stated at the beginning of the chapter, this shaped
and qualified Baxter	 and Owen's understanding of
freedom and human choice. Consideration of the human
response is given in the next chapter, following on
from the study of the divine initiative given here,
leading to a clearer view of voluntarism.
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Chapter Four
THE HUMAN RESPONSE 
Introduction 
God offered humanity pardon, meicy and new life in
the gospel, or covenant of grace. The covenant of
grace originated in his sovereign initiative; but there
was a counterpoint: human response. While only grace
could rescue humanity from the effects of the fall,
nevertheless, man was called to repent from sin and
believe in the gospel promises. As shown in the
previous chapters, such assumptions were made, to
varying degrees, by Augustine, Aquinas, Nominalist
divines, Luther, Calvin,
	
Perkins, Ames and later
English Calvinists.	 Covenant theology too addressed
both the divine initiative and the human response.
Likewise, Baxter and Owen wrote about the human
response. In fact, the human response was for them the
central concern: they wrote as pastors concerned to
evangelize, to encourage believers and to promote
holiness and godliness.	 Baxter and Owen strove to
specify the human response to the divine initiative.
They did not, however, agree on all aspects of this
human response. As presented in chapter 3, Baxter
claimed that God established in Christ a conditional
covenant: available to all who would repent
	 and
believe; faith, thus, was the covenant condition.
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Owen, on the other hand, while equally insistent upon
the necessity of faith, denied that God's covenant was
conditional; by the death and satisfaction of Christ
for the elect the faith of the elect was procured. The
human response, according to Owen, was not a faith
which fulfilled the covenant condition but a faith
which accepted Christ in all his covenant
righteousness.
Still, both	 Baxter and	 Owen acknowledged	 the
profound necessity of a human response. Here, then, is
the foundation of their voluntarism. In this chapter
attention will be given to their opinions about the
human response to the divine initiative. First,(4.1),
the nature of the human response will be considered; it
will be shown that the nature of this response,
according to both Baxter and Owen, ultimately involved
the prominence, but not dominance, of the human will.
Second, (4.2), the question of the ability of man to
make such a response will be studied; and here the
question of "free will" will be raised.	 Finally,
(4.3), it will be shown why they thought a willing
response was essential. All three sections will argue
that while Baxter and Owen arrived at their voluntarism
in different ways, they both called Christians to a
life of faith in which their willingness to engage in
the covenant, to repent of their sins and to live in
obedience was fundamental.
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4.1 The nature of the human response 
According to Baxter and Owen the human response to
the covenant of	 grace involved two inter-related
truths.
	
First, God's sovereign will in	 no way
nullified the secondary agency of humanity. God did
not force or coerce man into faith and repentance. In
chapter 2 it was argued that this was axiomatic among
those who followed Augustine. Augustine had declared:
Therefore we are by no means compelled,
either, retaining the prescience of God,
to take away the freedom of the will,
or, retaining the freedom of the will,
to deny that He is prescient of future
things, which is impious.
	 But we
embrace	 both.	 We	 faithfully and
sincerely confess both. The former,
that we may believe we?.1; the latter,
that we may live well.
The second truth argued by Augustine and readily
acknowledged by Baxter and Owen was that the ability to
choose was part of the dignity with which humanity was
bestowed.2
	This meant that God's commands in the
gospel for repentance and faith were appropriate to
humanity's nature. While Baxter and Owen insisted that
only grace and the Holy Spirit could facilitate an
individual's faith and repentance, nevertheless, faith
and repentance were suitable to the human intellect,
will and affections. Mid-seventeenth century puritans
like Baxter and Owen argued that the ability to choose
constituted man's "moral" character. By "moral" they
meant the aspect of humanity which chose to avoid what
1 Augustine, City of God, Book V.10, p.157.
2 See above, 2.2, where this aspect of human nature is presented in Augustine,
Aquinas, Luther and Calvin.
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was evil in favour of that which was good; the
intellect discerned between good and evil, but it was
the will which then directed the affections and
intellect according to its choice. To be sure, the
function of all his faculties (reason, will and
affections) reflected the Imago Del. Still, if man was
not able to will then he would cease to be man. These
two truths, then, were the key elements in Baxter and
Owen's explanation of the human response to the divine
initiative; both served to accent the appropriate
character and quality of faith. For it was faith, in a
word, which constituted the human response to the
divine initiative. Accordingly, this section will
consider first, (4.1.1), how Baxter, Owen and a number
of their contemporaries acknowledged that human choice
was compatible with a sovereign will; second, (4.1.2),
how they argued that choice reflected the moral quality
of the Imago Del; and, finally, (4.1.3), how they
defined faith.
4.1.1 Human choice and Divine sovereignty 
God's will was not any less sovereign or immutable
because
	
He	 accommodated	 secondary	 agency or
contingency.3	It was through a mysterious dialectic of
contingent actions by humans and divine sovereignty
that God accomplished his will. The Westminster
Confession of Faith explained this dialectic in the
following way:
3
See above 2.1 where the antecedents of this view are considered.
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God from all eternity did, by the most
wise and holy counsel of his own will,
freely and unchangeably ordain
whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as
thereby neither is God the author of
sin, nor is violence offered to the will
of the creatures, nor is the liberty or
contingency of second c.fuses taken away,
but rather established.'
•
The Westminster divines appreciated the logic of their
argument and wasted no effort in their denial of rigid
predeterminism. While Owen rejected Baxter's idea of
condition, he still argued that:
God carries on the growth of corn by a
way of natural and necessary causes, but
this activity of rational agents is by
such ways and means, as may entirely
preserve their liberty; that is,
preserving them in their being, and
leaving them to be such agents. As then
God causeth the corn to grow by the
shining of the sun, and the falling of
his rain, so he causeth believers to
persevere in obedience, by exhortations,
promises and threatenings, and such ways
and means, as, are suited to such agents
as they are. '
Baxter too appreciated the mysterious' balance
between the supremacy of God's will and human secondary
agency. He argued that God's will never forced mankind
into disobedience: sinners willingly disobeyed God. It
may be incomprehensible why God allowed men and women
such an ability, but such was the case. God was no
less sovereign, rather humanity was endowed with a
unique freedom and responsibility:
The case lyeth thus: God antecedently to
his laws, framed nature, that is, the
being and natural order of all the
world; and so he became the head or root
of nature; the first cause, who by his
wise decree, was to concur to the end
with that natural frame, and to continue
4 
Westminster Confession of Faith III.i in Schaff, Creeds, p.608.
5 Owen, The Doctrine of the Saints Perseverance (1654), &laid ed., XI, p.437.
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to things	 their proper
	 forms	 and
motions: and man is one of his
creatures, having a nature of his own,
to which God as the God of nature doth
antecedently concur. By this natural
concourse of God, the fornicator, the
murderer, the thief etc. are naturally
able to do those acts: but being free
agents that can do otherwise, God maketh
them a law to restrain and regulate
them. And when they break this law,
they resist that gracious concourse,
which suitable to the organical cause,
God conjoyneth with the means. But they
do this by their natural power and
activity; not used as God requirettl
them, but turned against his own law.
It must be appreciated, however, that when mid—
seventeenth century puritan writers like Baxter and
Owen argued for the liberty of secondary agency they
were quick to insist that God's will	 was never
dependent	 upon human	 action.	 The	 Westminster
Confession of Faith, as an example of general
consensus, declared, "In his sight all things are open
and manifest; his knowledge is infinite, infallible,
and independent upon the creature; so as nothing is to
him contingent or uncertain." 7 There was, however, a
paradox: divine sovereignty and human choice. Baxter
wrote, "Here is supposed an internal principle of life
in the person. God moves not man like a stone, but
enduing him first with life, not to enable him to move
without God, but thereby to qualify him to move
himself, in subordination to God the first mover."8
6 Baxter, Catholick Theologie (1675) I.iii, p.22.
7 Westminster Confession of Faith II.ii in Schaff, Creeds, p.607. See also Baxter,
Catholick Theologie I.i, p.55; Baxter, An End to Doctrinal Controversies (1691), p.31; and
Owen, A Display of Aroinianist, p.29.
8 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest (1650), Part III, Orme ed., Vol 22, p.39. In
a marginal note he wrote, 'I speak not here de gratia operante but gratia operata; not of the
cause but the effect."
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In essence, God's will could not exclude human
contingency and agency without making accountability
meaningless. "Notwithstanding any predetermination or
operation of God", wrote Owen, "the wills of men are at
as perfect liberty as a cause in dependence of another,
is capable of." 9
4.1.2 Choice as a reflection of Imago Dei 
Mention has already been made of the dignity which
God gave to humanity: they were rational creatures
capable of choice. Baxter and Owen accepted an
anthropology which stated that man, while fallen and in
sin, still retained vestiges of the Imago Del. Man's
intellect, will and affections reflected, albeit in a
diminished way, the original character of man. Baxter
wrote, "for there is a twofold image of God in man; the
one is natural, and that is, our reason and free-will,
and this is not lost. 	 The other is qualitative and
ethical, and this is our holiness, and this is lost,
and by grace restored...". 10	 In this	 anthropology
the will played an important role, yet always in
relation to the understanding and affections. It was
the will, however, which revealed the moral dimension
of man. Certainly the intellect and the affections
were indications of the Imago Del, yet in a singular
way it was the will which reflected the uniqueness of
man in the created order. The will, according to Owen
9 Owen, ilindicae Evangelicae (1655), Soold ed., XII, p.13I.
10	
Baxter, A Call to the Unconverted , Preface; see also Baxter, Hethodus
Theologiae, I, p.156. See Owen, Holy Spirit, p.75.
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and Baxter, defined human moral accountability and
responsibility: that which distinguished man from the
other animals. In essence it was the will which shaped
man as a free and self-determining creature. To be
sure, it was maintained, human rationality also defined
the uniqueness of man in the created order. Yet, while
puritan preachers addressed the intellect, they were
principally concerned with the moral dimension of man:
attributable to his will, not the intellect alone.
Owen never minimized the importance of faith as
involving reason; yet, as he explained to a group
gathered for a monthly lecture in April, 1676, after
the assent of the understanding there was a demand for
a life of the will.
if you will abide with Christ there must
be an acting of your will in it also,
and that is in great diligence which
Christ doth require in all the instances
of it. This is a great way of abiding
with Christ, when we labour to have our
wills in a
	
readiness unto all the
instances
	 of obedience,
I
, that Christ
requireth at our hands. 
Baxter and	 Owen never	 defined faith as	 mere
knowledge.	 They argued that faith involved both
intellect and the will.
	
They were not alone.	 The
Westminster Assembly's Larger Catechism stressed both
assent (le. the intellect) to the truth and promise of
the gospel and "receiving and resting upon Christ." 12
Baxter wrote: "faith which is in Scripture is made the
11 Asty,	 Complete Collection of the Sermons of the Reverend and Learned John Omen
D,D, (London:1721) Discourse VI, p.552.
12 
WestminsteiAssembly, The Larger Catechism 1L72 as in T.F. Torrance, School of
Faith: The Catechisms of the Reformed Church (London: James Clarke and Co., Ltd., 1959),
p.198.
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condition of pardon and salvation, doth essentially
involve the acts of every faculty, even assent, consent
and affiance...". 13 fact, where knowledge was
great true faith was not necessarily alive. "The
soundness of knowledge and belief is not best discerned
in the intellectual acts themselves," wrote Baxter,
"but in their powerful, free and pleasant efficacy,
upon our choice and practice."	 What mattered,
according to Owen, was believing in and with the
"heart". In his Greater Catechism he wrote that
justifying faith was, "A gracious resting upon the free
promises of God, in Jesus Christ for mercy, with a firm
persuasion of heart, that God is a reconciled Father
unto us in the Son of his love ... H . In a footnote to
this answer he declared, "Faith is in the
understanding, in respect of its being and subsistence,
in the will and heart, in respect of its effectual
working."
	
Elsewhere he expressed his idea with more
homely tones than usual:
And he that hath much knowledge but
little love, will find that he labours
in the fire, for the increase of the one
or other.	 When in the diligent use of
means, our wills and affections do
adhere and cleave with delight unto the
things wherein we are instructed, then
we are in our right course; then if the
holy gales of the Spirit of God do
breath on us, are we in a blessed
tendency towards perfection, 2 Thess
13 Baxter, An End to Doctrinal Controversies (1691), p.226,	 Baxter stated this
elsewhere: cf. Aphorismes of Justification (1649), p.264; Of Saving Faith (1658), pp.74-75;
Directions for Heak Distempered Christians (1669), p.6; and Universal Redemption (1694), p.11
and p.375.
14
Baxter, The Divine Life (1664), p.188.
15 Owen, The Greater Catechism, p.486.
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2.10.
Here emerges one of the central concerns of a study
of voluntarism: the relationship between the intellect
and the will. Chapter 1 discussed how R.T. Kendall has
argued that later Calvinists departed from Calvin in as
much as they placed faith more in the activity of the
will than the intellect.
	
Charles Cohen has suggested
that, in effect, the will was seen as the chief faculty
only because later Calvinists recognized that it was
the "heart" whic/Ineeded to be renovated bqthe Spirit. 2
On the other hand, both Stoever and Von Rohr have
stressed that there was actually a closer correlation
between the intellect and the They have argued
that the majority view was one which suggested that the
will followed the intellect; but the will's choice was
the crucial act in the human response.
What, then, should be made of Baxter and Owen's
views? They assumed that there was a united
relationship between the will and intellect. Both were
equally and corporately affected by sin. "We are not
only blind in our understanding", wrote Owen, "but
captives also to sin in our wills."
	 It was within
this unity that God worked simultaneously upon the
16 Owen, Exercitations On the Epistle to the Hebrews. Four volumes (1668-1634), vol
3 (1680), p.7.
17 See above, chapter 1, pp.4 ff.
18 Cohen, God's Caress, pp.96-98.
19 Stoever, Faire and Easie May, pp.61-62 and 106-107; Von Rohr, Covenant of Grace,
pp.68-72.
20 Owen, 4 Display of drsinianism, p.127.
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intellect and the will.	 Furthermore, it was never
denied that the intellect had a crucial influence upon
the will.	 Without a doubt the will related to the
understanding. Nevertheless, the will received a
particular emphasis which the understanding did not.
Owen explained in his work on the Holy Spirit:
Now the will is the ruling, governing
faculty of the soul, and the mind is the
guiding and leading. Whilst this abides
unchanged, unrenewed, the power and
reign of sin continues in the sou141
though not undisturbed, yet unruined.
In a practical work entitled, The Divine Life, Baxter
explained how the will was responsible when the gospel
was rejected:
Walking with God doth greatly help us
against the deceitful and erroneous
disposition of our own hearts. The will
hath a very great power upon the
understanding; and therefore ungodly,
fleshly men will very hardly receive any
truth which crosseth the carnal interest
or disposition and will hardly let go
any error that feedeth them because
their corrupted wills are a bias to
their understandings and make them
desperately partial in all their reading
and hearing, and hypocritical in their
prayers	 and inquiries	 after truth.
Interest and corruption locketh y.p their
hearts from their observation.
	 4
Baxter and Owen appreciated that every faculty was
affected by sin, but the chief flaw in man was his
moral impotency, or the perversion of his will. Baxter
and Owen frequently suggested that intellect could not
alone lead the fallen will. The will's perversity was
in a way more damaging than that of the intellect's.
21 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.199.
21
- Baxter, The Divine Life, Section II, Ore ed., Vol. 13, p.257.
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With a marginal reference to William Ames's Medulla
Theologica, Baxter argued in one of his books on
justification:
And indeed he that observeth but how the
Scripture throughout	 doth hang mans
salvation or damnation on his will
mainly, (so far as it may be said to
depend on our own acts), rather than on
any acts of the understanding (but only
as they refer and lead those of the
will) might well wonder, that if
justifying faith, the great needful act,
should be only intellectual, and not
chiefly in gq..F by the will, as well as
the rest.
Likewise, he wrote, "Moral power and impotency are
primarily such in the will (the first seat of morality)
and derivatively or secondarily in the intellect and
executive power."	 The role of the will in choosing
the truth, Baxter argued in Methodus Theologiae, was
interrelated to the intellect; but the choice of what
was "good" was the will's unique action: "Quatentus ad
Verum, principium motus est a Intellectu; Quatenus ad
Bonum principium motus est a Voluntate." 25 In another
work he proclaimed, "sin hath debilitated man's very
natural vivacity and activity to things spiritual, and
also darkened and undisposed his understanding to them;
but especially disaffected him, and perverted his will,
with an indisposition, averseness and enmity to God." 26
Owen	 stated that however	 central the intellect,
nevertheless, "the will of sinning may be restrained
23 Baxter, Of Justification (1658), p.356.
24 Baxter, CathoLick Theologie (1675), I.iii, p.44.
25 Baxter, Hethodus Theologiae, I, p.200.
26 Baxter, An End to Doctrinal Controversies (1691), p.91.
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upon a	 thousand considerations, which 	 light and
convictions will administer, but it is not taken
away. "27
Puritans other than Baxter and Owen gave attention
to the will because, in their opinion, the will was the
principal faculty of morality. Earlier, Richard
Sibbes, whose work had a great influence upon Baxter,
wrote, "Not that judgement alone will work a change,
there must be grace to alter the bent and sway of the
will before it will yield to be wrought upon by the
understanding." 28 Firmin, who frequently
communicated with Baxter on liturgical and theological
matters, maintained that "when the Spirit of God doth
thus savingly illuminate the understanding, he doth at
the same time savingly work upon the will."
	 William
Allen, for whom	 Baxter had regard and	 wrote a
commendatory preface, explained that even though the
intellect was the superior faculty, nevertheless the
will very often negatively influenced the
understanding. By this Allen meant it particularly
directed the intellect to dismiss the importance of
making a heart—felt response: making faith to be
nothing more than an intellectual assent to the truths
27 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.199.
28	 •
Richard Sibbes, The Bruised Reede and Snaking Flax (1630, 3rd edition 1631)
p.273. All subsequent references taken from 3rd edition. For Sibbes see DNB, vol 52, p.182.
29	 •
Giles Firmin, Real Christian; or a Treatise of Effectual Calling (1670), p.34.
Firmin (1614-1697) was influenced by the preaching of John Rogers at Dedham, Essex. 	 Firmin
attended Emmanuel College, Cambridge. In 1632 he went to Boston and was there ordained
deacon and worked along with John Cotton. In 1647 he returned to England, a year later
becoming vicar of Shalford, Essex. He frequently corresponded with Richard Baxter on such
matters as Separatists, church polity and ministerial practice. In 1657 patterned an Essex
version of Baxter's Worcestershire model. 	 In 1662 he was ejected from Shalford and then
practiced medicine. See DNB, Vol. 19, pp.45-46.
highest degree of sinning
willingly, and this after
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of the gospel. M A contemporary of Baxter and friend
of Owen, John Bunyan, in his Holy War, created the
character Mr. Willbewill who is the chief culprit in
Mansoul's acquiescence to Diabolus. 31
 Thomas Goodwin,
a member of the Westminster Assembly and with whom Owen
shared an important preaching ministry at Oxford in the
late 1650s, wrote: "The more knowledge a man sinneth
against, the more the will of the sinner is discovered
to be for sin, as sin.., the
is expressed to us by sinning
knowledge, Heb.10."
The conclusion, therefore, which can be reached
about the will's relation to the intellect is fourfold.
First, mid—seventeenth century puritan divines did not
deny the essential unity of the faculties. In this
sense a study which isolates the will stretches the
reality of the context. Second, this unity not to the
contrary, it was assumed that the real battle was in
20 William Allen, d Disccarse of the Mature, Ends and Difference of the Two
Covenants ( 1673), pp.166-99. I have been unable to find biographical information about this
William Allen in either Calasy Revised or DNB. There is a William Allen listed in Richard L.
Greaves and	 Robert Zaller eds., Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the
Seventeenth Century (Brighton: The Harvester Press Limited, 1982), vol I, p.111 	 I am not
convinced, however, that the Allen listed in this dictionary, a radical Baptist, is the same
Allen with whom wkare immediately concerned.Suicao)„04c1-45., 'Law% ki-ormeok	 prAgetikeat
likak	 -4,e.	 ti
31 John Bunyan, Holy War (1682), p.27. For John Bunyan (1628-1688) see DNB, Vol.7,
pp.275-84 and Richard Greaves, John Banyan. Courtenay Studies in Reformation Theology.
(Appleford: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1969.).
32 Thomas Goodwin, Aggravation of Since (1643), p.42. Thomas Goodwin (1600-1680) was
a graduate from Christ's College, Cambridge. He was a hearer of Richard Sibbes and John
Preston. Goodwin himself became a lecturer at Holy Trinity Church, Cambridge in 1620 and
then in 1632 was appointed vicar. 	 In 1634 he resigned to become an Independent and
surrendered his living to Sibbes. 	 During the Laudian period he was pastor of an English
congregation in Arnheim in the Netherlands.	 In 1643 he was appointed to the Westminster
Assembly, and was one of the "dissenting brethren".	 He was close friends with John Cotton.
In 1650 he was appointed president of Magdalene College, Oxford and here came into contact
with Stephen Charnock, Theophi,111Gale and John Howe (1630-1705). Goodwin was asked to
attend the Savoy Conference in 4arand here worked with John Owen to develop a confession of
faith. See DNB, Vol.22, pp.148-50.
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the human will. "The crossness of thy will to the will
of God", wrote Baxter, "is the sum of all the impiety
and evil of the soul; and the subjection and conformity
of thy will to his, is the heart of the new creature,
and of thy rectitude and sanctification."
the role of the will was germane to the issue of human
accountability. Accountability, so these writers
argued, was not based so much upon human intellect and
affections, but on choice. Owen explained that no one
was "sent to hell" by God against his or her will, for
human guilt was always chiefly the consequence of free
volition.	 In other words, that which distinguished
humanity from the rest of creation, the will, was the
very faculty which principally lead to enmity between
man and God. "So every one in his own person who
believes not does by a voluntary act of his will reject
the Gospel, and that on such corrupt principles as none
can deny to be his sin." 35 Finally, as will be argued
in chapter 5, the importance of the will implied that
the will received prominent attention in preaching and
pastoral care. Baxter explained, "You are never truly
changed till your hearts be changed; and the heart is
not changed till the will or love be changed." 36 For
those unconverted and those already in Christ the
33
grAteeeffr-440.431-2.2 p.57. Cf. Owen, HolyBaxter, Christian Directory,
Spirit, pp.225-26 and John Bunyan, Holy Mar, pp.25-26.
34 
Owen, Holy Spirit, p.245.
35 
Owen, Hebrews, vol.2 (1674), p.121.
36
Baxter, Christian Directory, Orme ed., vol.2, p.55 The role of the preacher is
examined more closely in chapter 5.2 in which the will and the 'effectual call' is
considered.
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message was clear: the will mattered.
4.1.3 Faith: the response defined 
Baxter and Owen stated that within the gospel
there was a necessity for a human response which
involved the	 whole of man: intellect,	 will and
affections; this response was faith.	 Man was not
merely to assent to the gospel but to embrace it and
respond to its summons.
	
There must be a moral aspect
to the human response. He had to demonstrate an
attitude or disposition appropriate for those who knew
they were sinners but who placed their confidence and
hope in the merit of Christ Jesus. Baxter likened the
covenant of grace to marriage; and faith tied "the
marriage knot". 37 Owen also insisted upon faith as a
heart response:
The nature of justifying faith, with
respect unto that exercise of it whereby
we are justified, consisteth in the
heart's approbation of the way of
justification and salvation of sinners,
by Jesus Christ, proposed in the gospel,
as proceeding from grace, wisdom, and
love of God,	 with its acquiescenu
therein, as unto its own concernment.
In his third volume on the Epistle to the Hebrews,
commenting on Hebrews 6.10 Owen declared, "He is a most
vain man who thinks otherwise, who hopes for any
nbenefit by that faith which doth not work by love."
37 Baxter, Aphorisnes, p.264.
38 Owen, Doctrine of Justification (1677), Goold ed., V, p.93.
39 Owen, Hebrews, vol 3 (1680), p.97.
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According to Baxter it was this aspect of faith which
replaced the demand for perfect obedience in the
covenant of works; making faith, in his opinion, an
easier condition. Owen affirmed how much greater the
covenant of grace was, it was a covenant of free mercy,
but lest anyone think that faith and love were easy he
wrote:
Faith and love are generally looked on
as easie and common things; but it is by
them who have it not. As they are the
only springs of all obedience towards
God, and usefulness toward men, so they
meet with the greatest opRositions from
within and from without.
Where Baxter and Owen differed on the nature of
faith was over the issue of faith as a covenant
condition. Baxter, as noted above, argued that faith
was the condition of the covenant. In the covenant of
grace God had committed himself to pardon on the
condition of faith, nevertheless faith "is not active
in the justifying of a sinner, but is a mere condition
or moral disposition, which is necessary to him that
will be in the nearest capacity to be justified by
God.. 41 Owen denied this; he argued that while faith
was necessary as the human response, Christ's death
procured even this faith for the elect.
For a close of all, that which in this
cause we affirm may be summed up in
this: Christ did not die for any upon
condition if they do believe, but he
died for all God's elect, that they
should believe, and believing have
eternal life; faith itself is among the
principal effects and fruits of the
death of Christ... Salvation indeed is
bestowed conditionally, but faith which
40
Owen, Hebrews, yo1.3, p.108. Here too the context is Hebrews 6.10.
41	
Baxter, Of Justification, p.7. See also especially p.264.
claimed that the covenant of grace was a
covenant and so was universal: open to
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is	 the	 condition
procured. 42
is	 absolutely
As explained in the Introduction, one of Baxter's
43
concerns was Antinomianism.	 Since his days in the
Army he had thought Antinomianism undermined the
gospel. He accused Antinomians of stressing the death
of Christ to the exclusion of the need for personal
faith and repentance. An over emphasis of the death of
Christ, claimed Baxter, led to an over emphasis of
Christ's imputed righteousness. In Baxter's opinion,
this denied in effect the necessity of the human
response.
	 As was explained in chapter 3, Baxter
believe and repent; faith led them into
In this respect, Baxter criticized Owen's
not only of the death of Christ but his
conditional
all who would
the covenant.
understanding
understanding
of faith: as mentioned earlier, this was his primary
criticism of Owen in the Appendix of Aphorismes of
44Justification.
It is important to appreciate the fullness 	 of
Baxter's definition of faith.	 Only Christ satisfied
the law and established the covenant. Furthermore, it
was the Spirit which moved a man to faith and so
45
satisfied the condition. 	 Yet faith, produced by
grace, was the "appropriate" response. 	 As outlined
42 Owen, Salta Electoros Sangois Jeso (1648), pp.101-102 (but misnumbered 112); see
also p. 127.
43 See above chapter 1, pp.48-51.
44 
See above pp.198-99.
45 
Baxter, Catholick Theologie I. p.45.
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above, by appropriate he meant that faith involved all
the human faculties which performed according to their
natures: faith never involved that which was beyond the
created capability of man. 46 It was not a question of
ability, but suitability. In 4.1.4 it will be argued
that Baxter did not minimize man's radical need for
grace to produce faith; but, because he held that faith
was something appropriate even to fallen man, faith was
that upon which God suspended the covenant of grace.
Faith was also the condition of the covenant because it
was "desireable", for it involved a moral quality. 47
When man, by grace, exercised faith he was choosing
good rather than evil. Again, this was why Baxter
called the condition of faith a moral or "dispositive"
condition. 0 	Faith	 in this sense	 involved a
repentance, a sorrow for sin, a desire to please God
and a deep heart-felt love for Christ and his saints.
Furthermore, faith moved the sinner from a trust in
personal righteousness, which would expect a reward out
of debt, to a reliance upon the merit and righteousness
of Christ Jesus as he was held out in the covenant of
grace.
BaXter, however, caused 	 considerable controversy
when he also defined faith as a condition which
possessed an inherent righteousness. 	 Baxter claimed
that faith was not merely an instrument to receive
Christ's imputed righteousness.	 As he expressed it in
46 See above, p.211.
47 See Baxter, Hethodus Theologiae, III, p.80.
48 See above, pp.211-12.
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Aphorismes of Justification:
The fulfilling of the conditions of each
Covenant is our Righteousness, in
reference to that Covenant: But faith is
the fulfilling of the conditions of the
New Covenant,	 therefore it	 is our
Righteousnc,ss
	 in	 relation to	 that
Covenant. '3
The important phrase is "in relation to that Covenant".
The new covenant was based on the supreme righteousness
of Christ and it was within the covenant of grace that
one was pardoned freely and undeservedly.
Nevertheless, God bestowed this pardon on the condition
of faith.	 Faith was suitable and appropriate, and so
was itself covenant righteousness.
He never maketh a relative change, where
he doth not also make a real. God's
decrees gives no man a legal title to
the benefit decreed him, seeing purpose
and promise are so different: A legal
title we must have, before we can be
justified; and there must be somewhat in
our selves to prove that title, oh else
all men should have equal right.
God commanded faith and by grace brought it about in
his elect. With faith one was found "right" vis-a-vis
the covenant of grace. Baxter wrote: "And salvation
will be adjudged us as we are found to have been
personally righteous or unrighteous, in respect to the
terms of the Law of Grace...". 2	 When one, through
grace and the Spirit, believed in Christ and took him
as Lord one possessed not merely an imputed
righteousness but a personal righteousness, or what
Baxter called in Aphorismes and elsewhere "evangelical
49 Baxter, Aphorisms, p.126; cf. Baxter, Catholick Theologie, I.ii. p.82.
SO Baxter, Aphorisms p.95.
SI Baxter, An Appeal to the Light, (1674), p.3.
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righteousness". 52	 In claiming this Baxter never
suggested that the righteousness of faith was anything
but subordinate to the righteousness of Christ. 2 To
recall the analogy of the peppercorn, faith (like the
single peppercorn paid to the son by the tenant) is not
that which frees the guilty party but is the personal
homage or "personal performance required". 54 In one
of his last doctrinal works Baxter's long-held view was
evident:
no one till he is a Believer is related
as a Member of a perfectly Righteous
Saviour; and that is done no sooner (in
time) than he hath the Inherent
Righteousness of his personal faith and
federal consent; and that obligeth him
to further active righteousness of a
holy life, and all these three conjunct
(though not co-ordinate) make up the
total Righteousness of a Saint, viz. 1.
our Relation to Christ in Union as to a
perfectly Righteous Head, who fulfilled
all righteousness for us to merit our
Justification (which is called Christ's
Righteousness Imputed to us, as being
thus far reputed ours). 2.	 And our
penitent believing consent to his
Covenant, which is the condition of the
foresaid Relation to Christ. 3. And our
after sanctification and obedience to
Christ's Law.
Owen	 attacked Baxter's	 understanding
	
of	 the
satisfaction and righteousness of Christ,
	 and so
52 Baxter, Aphorismes, pp.107-08 and p.125; Baxter, Of Justification, pp.269-271;
and Baxter, Treatise of Conversion, Orme ed., vol. 7, p.318.
53	 Hepas quite clear especially in The Saints Everlasting Rest, Orme ed., Vol.
22, pp.43-44.
54 See above, p.189 and Baxter, Aphorises, pp.127-29.
SS Baxter, Catholick Theologie I.ii, p.78.
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challenged his views on the nature of faith. 56 In Of
the Death of Christ, the price He paid, and the
purchase He made (1650) Owen's principal criticism of
Baxter concerned the death of Christ and the covenant
condition: "I know not any man that hath run out into
more wide mistakes about the immediate effects of the
death of Christ, than Mr. Baxter, who pretends to so
much accurateness in this particular." 57 His view was
expressed throughout this work consistently referring
to faith as the fruit of Christ's death:
What spiritual blessings soever are
bestowed on any soul, I mean peculiarly
distinguishing mercies and graces, they
are all	 bestowed and	 collated for
Christ's	 sake., that is, they are
purchased by his merit, and „„procured by
his intercession thereupon.
Owen disavowed that he was minimizing the importance of
personal faith: "for pactional (sic) justification,
evangelical justification, whereby a sinner is
completely justified, that it should precede believing,
I have not only not asserted but positively denied, and
disproved by many arguments...". n
In 1655 he responded again to Baxter, to his
Confession of his Faith (1655), and implied that
Baxter's notion of the righteousness of faith was close
to Socinianism.	 It will be recalled that Socinianism
56 See above, p.I99 where mention was made about Owen's criticism of Baxter's views
on the death and satisfaction of Christ.
57 Owen, Death of Christ, Goold ed., X, p.473. It is particularly chapter XIII where
Owen addressed Baxter's ideas about covenant suspension and faith as the satisfying covenant
condition. The earlier chapters deal with justification before faith.
58 
Owen, Death of Christ, p.469. See also p.450.
59 Owen, Death of Christ, p.449.
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denied the full satisfaction of Christ. a
	
Owen
responded
	 to the	 Socinian teaching	 in Vindicae
Evangelicae.	 In this work he criticized John Biddle
(1615-1662), who had previously denied that the death
of Christ propitiated a divine wrath. 61 In his
refutation of Biddle, Owen picked up his earlier debate
with -Gwe-a- about the causality of the death of Christ.
At least as he recorded it in Religuiae, Baxter was
most displeased by this attack by Owen. 62
Owen differed from Baxter also when he described
faith as an instrument. This is hardly surprising,
given Owen's views outlined immediately above: faith
laid hold of Christ and his righteousness; it had no
inherent righteousness. Commenting on faith as a
condition Owen wrote in Doctrine of Justification by
Faith through the Imputation of the Righteousness of
Christ (1677):
And there is an obvious sense wherein
faith may be called the condition of our
justification. For no more may be
intended thereby, but that it is the
duty on our part which God requireth,
that we may be justified. And this the
whole Scripture beareth witness unto.
Yet this hindereth not, but that as unto
its use, it	 may be the instrument
whereby we apprehend or receive Christ
and his righteousness. But to assert it
the condition of the new covenant, so as
from a preconceived signification of
that word, to give it another use in
justification, exclusive of that pleaded
for, as the instrumental cause thereof,
is not easily admitted; because it
supposeth an alteration in the substance
60 See above, chapter 1, p.58.
61 For Biddle see DNB., vol 5, pp.13-14.
62 Baxter, Reliquiae l.i 1163, p.111.
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of the doctrine itself.
In his exposition of Hebrews 6 he insisted that, "when
we say, we are justified by faith only, we do not say
that faith is our righteousness, but as it apprehends
the righteousness of Christ, as he is the end of the
Law for righteousness unto them that do believe. And
this is the use that God hath designed faith unto, and
which in its own nature it is suited for."&I
How, then, did Owen understand faith? As mentioned
in this section, faith was an instrument which received
Christ's imputed righteousness merited by his death on
the cross. The faith of a man was a necessary response
which he had to make personally; yet its importance was
subordinate to the satisfaction and merits inextricably
associated with the death of Christ. In Salus E/ectorum
Sanguis Jesu (1648) Owen had detailed the nature of
faith; there were five essential aspects:
The	 first	 thing which	 the Gospel
enjoyneth sinners, and which it
persuades and commands them to believe
is, that salvation is not to be had in
themselves, inasmuch as all have sinned
and come short of the glory of God, nor
by the works of the Law, by which no
flesh living can be justified...
[second] that there is salvation to be
had in the promised seed in him who was
before ordained to be a Captain of
salvation to them that do believe...
[third] that Jesus of Nazareth, who was
crucified by the Jews, was the Saviour,
promised before: and that there is no
name under heaven given whereby they may
be saved besides his... [fourth] the
Gospel requires a resting upon this
Christ so discovered and believed on to
be the promised Redeemer, as an all
sufficient	 Saviour,	 with	 whom	 is
plenteous redemption, and who is able to
63 Owen, Doctrine of Justification, p.113.
64 Owen, Hebrews, vol 3, p.98.
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save the utmost them that come to God by
him, and to bear the burden of all weary
labouring souls that come by faith to
him; in which proposal there is a
certain infallible truth, grounded upon
the superabundant sufficiency of the
oblation of	 Christ in	 itself, for
whosoever (fewer or more) it be
intended... [fifth) these things being
firmly seated in the soul and not before
we are every one called in particular to
believe the efficacy of the redemption
that is in the blood of Jesus towards
our own souls in particular: which every
one may assuredly do in whom the free
grace of God lith wrought the former
acts of faith..."
Owen was not alone in his attack on Baxter and wrote
a preface foranother opponent of Baxter, WillialEyre. 66
Eyre responded to Aphorismes in his challenge to
Benjamin Woodbridge (1622-1682) who had earlier
preached a sermon on justification which echoed many of
Baxter's opinions. 67
 In a later publication of the
sermon Woodbridge criticized Owen and his views: "In
like manner we are not first justified, and then
believe on Christ that hath justified us; but we
believe in Christ that we may be justified." 68
Woodbridge was concerned to refute the notion of
justification from eternity (a view which both he and
Baxter thought Owen implied, but which Owen denied) by
insisting upon the necessity of faith as a condition of
the covenant. Justification from eternity could imply,
Woodbridge argued, a denial of personal guilt and
65 Owen, Sales Electoram Sangais Jesa, pp.193-94.
66 Eyre, Viodicee Justificationis 6rataitas (1653). For Eyre see Malty Revised,
p.187.
67 For Woodbridge see DRS., vol 62, pp.385-86.
68 Woodbridge, Justification by Faith (1653), p.I6,
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accountability; faith was a condition for it involved
repentance. Eyre, however, entered the fray insisting
that the idea of faith as a condition was erroneous; it
implied that one believed first and then was reconciled
to God, "for the condition must be performed, before
the benefit which	 is promised thereupon, can be
received." Eyre refuted such an explanation and
claimed that "men are not believers before they are
justified; the Scripture witnesseth, that the subject
of justification is a sinner, or ungodly person, Rom.
4.5 and 5.8,10." °	 He insisted that faith was a
"receptive	 instrument":	 it	 received	 Christ's
righteousness.	 Faith was not righteous in itself nor
did it procure justification.	 "It is called an
instrumental cause of our justification, taking
Justification passively, not actively; or in reference
to that passive application, whereby a man applies the
righteousness of Christ to himself, but not to that
active application, whereby God applyeth it to a man,
which is only in the mind of God." 70 	 criticism
of Baxter and Woodbridge was echoed by Thomas Blake
(1597-1657) in his Vindicae Foederis (1653).	 Blake
also disputed Baxter's views on the righteousness of
faith.	 He argued	 that men had	 to possess a
righteousness	 "extrinsical" to themselves: the need
was for an alien righteousness, namely Christ's. While
69 Eyre, Vindicae Justificationis Gratuitas, p.3.
70	 Eyre,	 Vindicae Justificationis Gratuitas, pp.30-31; cf. his comments on
pp.42,49,88 and 121.
71 For Blake see DNB., vol 5, pp.179-80.
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Blake had little problem with the notion of faith as a
condition, nevertheless he disagreed with Baxter about
the righteousness of faith. It was through the
instrumentality of faith that one received the imputed
righteousness of Christ.	 Faith did not possess any
inherent righteousness, it was an instrument. 72
	 In
1654 Baxter responded to 	 Eyre and Blake in his
publication Apology.	 In this work he repeatedly
insisted that faith was not at all the cause of
justification, for it was only 	 a condition. 74
Furthermore, as he explained to Eyre, "no man can
perform this condition without God's special grace." M
What Baxter again rejected, however, was the idea that
faith was an instrument. Interestingly he turned his
opponents' objections right around and argued that an
instrument actually suggested	 that man	 justified
himself. Baxter contended that if faith was an
instrument then, by metaphysical definition, it was an
"efficient cause" (what produced the motion or change);
and if faith was an efficient cause then man's faith
effectively justified him, not the merit of Christ.
But this was precisely what his critics accused him of
suggesting by his insistence upon faith as a condition
72 Blake, Vindicae Faederis (1653), pp.72-76.
73 Part I was his response to Blake and Part IV to Eyre.
74
Baxter, Apology, I p.4, IV pp.9 and 20.
75 Baxter, Apology, IV p.26.
76 Baxter, Apology, I, p.20. Baxter here assumed a definition of efficiens caasa
(efficient cause), an Aristotelian term used by medieval scholastics, Reformers and
Protestant scholastics. See Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, p.61.
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with inherent righteousnessr
Anthony Burgess also declared his opposition to the
idea of faith's inherent righteousness. He argued that
there was only the righteousness of Christ; were one to
advocate an inherent righteousness of the believer then
"here appeareth no lesse pride or arrogancy in this,
then the opinion of the Papists, and in some respects
it doth charge God worse...". 78	Baxter responded to
Burgess's criticism in 1658 with Of Justification,
Treatise II. Here he insisted "our faith and love and
obedience, which are for the receiving and improving of
him and his righteousness and so stand in full
subordination to him, are not to be made co-partners of
his office or honor." 79 Throughout his response his
arguments conformed to the patterns already outlined.
This section, then, has shown the differing
interpretations which Baxter and Owen gave to the
nature of faith as the human response to the divine
initiative.
	
At the centre of the debate was the
question of	 righteousness: more
	 precisely, whose
righteousness? Was it the righteousness of Christ
which faith received? Or was it that faith satisfied a
covenant righteousness? This difference of opinion had
a further implications when both considered the ability
of a person to respond to God's initiative.
77 Baxter, Apology, I, pp.20-26; cf. Baxter, Of Justificatioa Treatise III, p.271.
78 Burgess, True Doctrine of Justification II, p.17.
79 Baxter, Of Justification II, p.76.
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4.2 The ability of man to respond 
In Catholick Theologie (1675) Baxter wrote, "but all
defining is vain, till the ambiguous word [freedom] be
distinguished, and the sense accordingly variously
stated." BO It became clear in chapter 1 that "freedom
of the will" was difficult to define succinctly. In
this present section it must be noted that mid-
seventeenth century puritan writers acknowledged a
freedom of the will, but a particular degree of
freedom. Their emphasis was that the will was free
from compulsion or predetermined necessity (ie. the
choice could absolutely be nothing else). The will, so
the argument went, was a self-determining agent; yet
the will was always fundamentally dependent upon God
because the will was not morally capable of choosing
the ways of God.	 It had not lost its natural ability
to choose, rather it suffered from a moral debility
which only God could
that Baxter and Owen
of the will.
Freedom was limited
will was never forced
act according to its
correct.	 It was in this sense
qualified the meaning of freedom
in the following way. 	 While the
or compelled, it was only free to
E
nature.	 The problem with the
human will was that it shared in the fallen state of
humanity. Its nature was affected by enmity and
resistance. The will was free in its fallen state to
BO Baxter, Catholick Theologie Li, p.28 marginal note.
81 This idea was similar to that of both Augustine and Aquinas as suggested earlier
in 2.3.
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the extent that it chose as a fallen will.
	 Owen
expressed it this way,
The will though in itself radically
free, yet in respect of the term or
object to which in this regard it should
tend, is corrupted, enthralled, and
under a miserable bondage; tied to such
a necessity of sinning in general, that
though
	 unregenerate	 men are	 not
restrained to this or that sin in
particular, yet fgx the main they can do
nothing but sin.
It is appropriate here to question how Owen could
refer to "bondage" and "necessity of sinning" and still
suggest that the will was "radically free". He tried
to maintain the paradox of the will's nature, but at
times his logic proved problematic. Still, Owen
attempted to hold together the will's self-determining
ability with a rejection of both Pelagian implications
and Arminian inferences. In Owen's view the will acted
freely but its freedom was only as a sinful will. It
was not forced by any external compulsion or even by
God's predetermination. It did not even have to sin;
it did so only because it was morally debilitated.
Baxter expressed similarly:
Your will is naturally a free, that is
self-determining faculty,	 but it is
vitiously inclined,	 and backward to
good, and therefore we see
	 by sad
experience that it hath not a virtuous
moral freedom. But that is the
wickedness ofi it, which deserveth the
punishment.
82 Owen, h Display of Prsinianiso, p.128. Note here how Owen avoided one meaning of
necessity: it had to do with sin in general versus sinning in particular, namely that no
particular action was by predetermined necessity. Were this quote taken in isolation Owen
might appear to have suggested such a necessity which would exculpate humanity, but the
material introduced throughout the rest of this section serves to elucidate his suggestion in
this quotation.
83 Baxter, 4 Call to the Unconverted (1658), p.232.
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What the will was not free to do was choose what was
spiritually good and well pleasing to God. On one
level the will still chose what it considered good, but
this "good" was counterfeit compared to the goodness of
God and the Gospel. On another level the will did not
choose the goodness of God because its moral ability to
do so was lost. The freedom of the unregenerate will,
thus, was a particular freedom. Was this playing with
words? Owen apparently thought not:
But you say, here I quite overthrow
free-will which before I seemed to
grant; to which I answer: that in regard
of that object concerning which we now
treat, a natural man hath no such thing
as free-will at all, if you take it for
a power of doing that which is good and
well pleasing unto God in things
spiritual, for an ability or preparing
our heArts unto faith and calling upon
God... "7
The point is, many English Calvinists of this period
qualified the idea of the freedom of the will. They
were insistent, however, that even after the fall the
will was free from constraint and compulsion. Were the
will coerced it would cease to be a human will. The
fallen will still possessed vestiges of the Imago Dei.
As the Westminster Confession put it, "God hath endued
the will of man with that natural liberty, that is
neither forced nor by any absolute necessity of nature
determined to good or evil." 85 Human beings were not
84 
Owen, a Display of Arsinianiso, p.128.
85 
The Westminster Confession of Faith ILi, Schaff, Creeds, p.623.	 See Peter Toon,
The Emergence of Hyper-Calvinism in English Honconfornity (London: the Olive Branch, 1967),
p.23.	 Toon fails to see this, and so suggests that most 'High-Calvinists' (his term)
believed that God convinced the mind of His truth and 'constrained the will to accept His
offered grace."	 The argument presented here challenges Toon's view on this, though his
comments are in general helpful.
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forced into sin, even by their natures, so it was
argued. Sin was voluntary; were it not then
accountability was a misnomer.
Baxter and Owen understood the will as a "self-
determining agent". 	 This term defined the will as
eXbicAt.
free to choose with a liberty of 14441-Liazance: in
short, the will could equally choose what was truly
good and what it erroneously determined as good. The
significant implication of this idea was that the will
chose the ways of God just as equally as it chose to
sin. Baxter and Owen accepted that the will was
naturally capable of choosing what it desired. Baxter
insisted that the will had an appropriate function
which no other faculty could perform. The will's
activity involved both the capability of selection and
then free choice.
From whence it is clear that the nature
of man's will is such as that it is made
to use a power which doth necessitate,
or determine it self, or is determined
necessarily, but freely: and that it is
no deifying of the will, nor extolling
it above its nature, to say that it can
act or determine it self, without God's
pre-determinating premotion; or by that
same measure of help which at another
time doth not determine it. Though its
nature, and its act as such be of God,
yet so is its liberty too; and therefore
by the power and liberty given by God,
the will can act or not act, or turn it
self to this object or that, without
more help than the said natural support
and concurse: And this power and%liberty
is its nature, and Gods image. 
This line of thought is complicated to say the least,
but the argument can be drawn together into two overall
points.
86 Baxter, Catholick Theologie, I.ii, p.28.
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First, when Baxter and Owen referred to the self-
determining of the will they did so to explain human
accountability within a theological system which argued
for God's sovereignty. As chapter 3 considered, the
mid-seventeenth century puritan wanted to know: how
could God be sovereign while men and women broke his
revealed will?	 Either God caused sin or else his rule
was in question. Baxter and Owen argued that neither
was the case. God neither caused sin nor forfeited his
sovereign will to the agency of men and women. Part of
this explanation was the relative liberty of secondary
agents,	 and this	 implied a	 self-determining of
secondary agents.
	
If there was no degree of self-
activity involving choice, so their argument went, then
secondary agency was an empty concept. The real
problem was that men and women rebelled against God in
their self-determining. As Baxter put it,
No man of brains denyeth that man hath a
will that's naturally free; it's free
from	 violence,	 and	 it's a	 self-
determining principle.	 But it's not
free from evil	 dispositions.	 It's
habitually averse to God and holiness,
and inclined to fleshly tgl,ings.
	 It's
enslaved by a fleshly bias.'
The second point about the importance of the will's
self-determination was that this concept explained how
the human will responded to God's initiative without
losing its own freedom. Owen made the following point,
He therefore offers	 no violence or
compulsion unto the will. This that
faculty is not naturally capable to give
admission unto. If it be compelled it
is destroyed. And the mention that is
made in the Scripture of compelling
(compel them to come in) respects the
97 Baxter, a Call to the Unconverted, Preface.
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certainty of the event, 
notRI the manner
of the operation on them.
Both Baxter and Owen attempted to balance the passivity
of the will to God's grace and the importance of human
choice.	 Grace could not be minimised, yet the will
could not be nullified either.
	
Self-determination,
then, was seen as part of the explanation. In
conversion, so it was suggested, God neither overthrew
the will nor coerced the will; rather it was moved
through its own self-determination.	 Owen wrote:
A self-sufficiency for operation,
without the effectual motion of Almighty
God, the first cause of all things, we
can allow neither to men, nor angels,
unless we intend to make them gods; and
a power of doing good, equal unto that
they have of doing evil, we must not
grant to man by nature, unless we deny
the fall of Adam, ad fancy ourselves
still in paradise ..."
Nevertheless, in the same context he explained,
we grant as large a freedom and dominion
to our wills over their own acts, as a
creature subject to the supreme rule of
God's providence is capable of; endued
we are with such a liberty of will, as
is free from all outward compulsion and
inward necessity, having an elective
faculty of applying itself unto that
which seems good unto it, in which it is
a free choice, notwithstanding it ih
subservient to the decree of God ...
Baxter and Owen did not consider the will free from
God's initiative and primary influence. In this sense
they rejected the idea of a "liberty of indifference".
To them, the will was radically dependent upon God, for
88 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.27; cf. Display of Arminianiss, p.36.
89	 Owen, A Display of Arlinianisi, p.119.	 See pp.119-120 where Owen attacks
Arminians for this view. 	 In his argument he frequently appeals to Article X of the 39
Articles.
90 Owen, Display of Arminianiso, p.119.
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only God could liberate the will from its sinful self-
determination.	 No view of the freedom of the will
was acceptable which divorced the will from a
dependency upon God. In his work on the Holy Spirit
Owen explained,
Suppose now, that God by his grace doth
no more but aid, assist, and excite the
will in its actings, that he doth not
effectually work in all the gracious
actings of our souls in all our duties;
the proposition would hold on the other
hand, not grace, but I, [1 Cor 15.10]
seeing the principal relation of the
effect is unto the next and immediate
cause, and thence hath its denomination.
And as he worketh them, to will in us,
so also to do; that is, effectually to
perform those	 duties whereunto	 the
gracious aqings	 of our	 wills are
required.
Owen reflected the opinion that the will was only
free to choose the Gospel after God had first moved the
will in its choice;
	
the will was passive to God's
influence then active in its choice. Such was the
total and radical dependency of the will upon God.
Nevertheless, no violence was done to the will; even
though the acting of grace was antecedent to the will's
action the will still acted and moved with its "own
liberty in exercise". Owen argued, "There is therefore
herein an inward almighty secret act of the power of
the Holy Ghost, producing or effecting in us the will
of conversion unto God, so acting our wills, as that
they also act themselves, and that freely." "	 Owen
attempted to balance the idea of the superior agency of
91 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.284.
92 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.470.
93 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.272; cf. Display of Arainia p is,, p.133.
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grace with the subordinate, yet free, agency of the
will. He did not argue that the human will was
independent from God; this was not the freedom of the
will.	 Instead, the will was still "free" even when
moved by sovereign grace and by the Spirit. The fact
that grace moved the will in no way violated the will's
agency or minimized the freedom of its choice, "it is
no more necessary to the nature of a free cause, from
whence a free action must proceed, that it be the first
beginning of it, than it is necessary to the nature of
a cause, that it be the first cause."
Freedom of the will, then, was accepted by Baxter
and Owen: provided that the word freedom was qualified.
While the will was naturally capable of an important
self-determination, it was equally seriously wounded
and weakened by its sinfulness. Nevertheless, God did
not convert an individual against his or her will. In
this sense, so it was suggested, even conversion was
not at the expense of the qualified freedom of the
will. True, God influenced infallibly the choice of
the elect, but no violence was done to the will. This
paradox was recognised as tenuous, but strikingly the
same overall argument was expressed by individuals who
were not always in agreement on other issues.
4.3 The importance of a willing response 
Based on the observations in the previous sections
two conclusions can now be put forward.
	 First, the
will was	 understood to be the central moral faculty,
94 Owen, Display of hrsinianiss, p.120.
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and so the role of the will in the Christian life
received	 prominent
	 attention.	 Consequently,
"willingness"	 was a	 notable feature	 of puritan
practical divinity. Second, the importance of the
will's role, and the significance of willingness, meant
that puritan preachers frequently appealed not only to
the intellects of their audience but to the "heart" or
will. In no way is this to ignore the rationalistic
emphasis of many preachers. But, many referred to the
problem of unwillingness more than to the problem of
misunderstanding.	 The gospel they preached presumed
that the human problem was disobedience and
stubbornness as well as ignorance. Here, then, we see
the type of voluntarism which a number of important
mid-seventeenth century puritans presented: the
prominence, but not dominance, of the will's choice in
response to the divine initiative; seen in the stress
on "willingness".
This is evident, first of all, in the way in which
believing and willingness were frequently used
interchangeably. In The Saints Everlasting Rest Baxter
declared:
So that if thou be willing to have
Christ upon his own terms, that is, to
save and rule Thee, then thou art a
believer: thy willingness is thy faith;
and if thou have faith, thou hast the
surest of all evidences... But to him
that is willing to have Christ for King
and Saviour, I will not say, believing
is easy: but it is lready performed;
for this is believing.
95 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest,p.507.
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Owen explained that a willingness was involved in
faith, and not only at the beginning of one's Christian
life but daily.
The accepting of Christ by the will, as
its only husband, Lord and Saviour.
This is called "receiving" of Christ,
John 1.12; and it is not intended only
for that solemn act whereby at first
entrance we close with him, but also for
the constant frame of the soul in
abiding Aith him and owning of him as
such.
Secondly, the choice of the will was absolutely
essential, as was the assent of the intellect, but the
will's role received primary consideration. It was the
will's closing or choosing which distinguished true
saving faith from either temporary sorrow which arose
out of guilt or a faith which was superficial. Baxter
explained how central the will was in response to the
gospel:
we cannot convert you against your will.
There is no carrying mad men to Heaven
in fetters. You may be condemned
against your wills, because you sinned
with your wills;	 but you cannot be
saved against your wills. The wisdom of
God hath thought meet to lay mens
salvation or destruction exceeding much
upon the choice of their own wills...
In fact Baxter explained that one could obtain
assurance of one's union with Christ by asking whether
one was truly willing to receive Christ.
If you consent to the Gospel offer, and
are but truly willing to be his, and
that he be yours in that relation; faith
is not only called a receiving of
Christ, but it is oft expressed by this
term of [willing] him.	 And therefore
96	
Owen, Of COBOUDiOD, Goold ed., Banner of Truth reprint vol 2, p.58. All
subsequent references taken from the Banner of Truth reprint.
97 Baxter, Call to the Unconverted (1658), p.259; cf. Baxter, Conpassionate Counsel
to All Young-len (1681), p.79.
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the promisemis to [whosoever will], Rev
22.17 ...
It was not, however, that the gospel's success in
spreading through the land was dependent upon the will
99of men and women.	 Nevertheless, the reason why many
failed to respond to what they heard from puritan
pulpits was because, so the argument went (at least
from the preachers!), their wills were contrary. Owen
explained that while illumination and conviction tended
to lead to the goal of regeneration, often this
tendency was thwarted by the stubbornness of the will.
Only by God's gracious intervention was the resistant
will ameliorated)" Baxter, with rather more emphasis
than others, i nsisted that the covenant of grace was
only	 redemption in potentia
	 until an individual
personally	 believed
	
and	 chose	 Christ.	 101
Experientially, the problem of unbelief rested not so
much with the inscrutability of election and
predestination as much as it did with the hardened
will. On one level, explained Baxter, sinners went to
hell because they were unwilling to receive Christ,
"not because God was cruel to you, but because you were
cruel and unmerciful to yourselves. I tell you this
will prove true at the last." 102 In A Call to the
98 Baxter, Directions for Meek Christians (1669), pp.6-1. The question of assurance
is dealt with more fully in chapter 7.
99 Owen, Hebrems, Vol 2, p.190.
100 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.198; cf. Baxter, Call to the Unconverted, pp.230-31.
101 Baxter, Universal Redetption (1694), p.41. His teaching on the covenant of
grace was studied in chapter J.
102 Baxter, A Treatise of Conversion, Orme ed., vol 7, p.139.
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Unconverted, he explained to his readers,
If your necessities did not require it,
we would not gall your tender ears with
truths that seem so harsh and grievous.
Hell would not be so full, if people
were but willing to know their case, and
to hear and think of it. The reason why
so few escape it, is because they strive
not to enter in at the straight gate of
conversion, and to go to the narrow way
of holiness, while they have time: and
they strive not, because they are not
awakened to a lively feeling of the
danger they are in; and they are not
awakened because they are loth to think
of it: and that is partly through
foolish tenderness, and carnal self-
love, and partly because they do not
well Wieve the Word that threateneth
it.
It was the preacher's task to be the chief means of
God to awaken sinners to their danger, to challenge
them to a reasonable consideration of the gospel, and
furthermore to address the intellect in order to move
the will. Preachers preached to effect a willingness;
only grace and the Holy Spirit could produce this
willingness, but the preacher could be a means in the
process. Baxter confided to his readers in A Call to
the Unconverted,
If you had a will that were freed from
wicked inclinations, I had no need to
write such books as this to persuade you
to be willing in a case which your own
salvation lieth on. To the grief of our
souls,	 we perceive	 after all	 our
preaching	 and persuasions	 that the
ungodly have not this spiritual free
will.	 But this is nothing, but your
unwillingness
	
it	 self,	 [and]
inclinations
	
to	 be	 willing,	 and
103 Baxter, A Call to the Unconverted, pp.22-23.
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therefore the want of this is so far
from excusing you, that the more you
want it (that is, the more you are
wilful in sin) the more you are md the
[surer] will be your punishment. I"
Conclusion 
We are now closer to a proper understanding of
Baxter and Owen's voluntarism. In this chapter it was
argued that the human response to the divine initiative
was summed up in the meaning of faith. Faith, as it
can be seen in the difference between Baxter and Owen,
was defined with contrasting emphases and implications.
The human response was, nevertheless, seen by Baxter
and Owen as something more than an act of the
intellect; the fundamental problem of men and women was
a moral one. Only by an aided and renovated will could
a person respond to the divine initiative. 	 On the
basis of this assumption puritan preaching, as seen in
Baxter and Owen, called for a willingness.	 This
willingness was not a contradiction to the
predestinarianism of the mid-seventeenth century. What
has been shown in chapters 3 and 4 is that voluntarism
involved a paradoxical but essential interrelationship
between a sovereign will and a human will.	 The next
104 Baxter, A Call to the Unconverted, Preface.
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chapter explores more fully the interrelationship: for
the mid-seventeenth century puritan lived a faith in
which the two appeared to him to be intertwined.
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Chapter Five
JUSTIFICATION: THE NEXUS OF THE DIVINE INITIATIVE AND 
THE HUMAN RESPONSE 
Introduction 
In the previous	 two chapters the two foci of
voluntarism were presented: the divine initiative and
the human encounter.	 Voluntarism encompassed both a
sovereign immutable divine will and a human will which
was free to choose according to its nature. Yet, a
study of voluntarism cannot be restricted merely to
defining these two aspects: it was the meeting of the
two which was crucial. It will be recalled that the
definition of voluntarism taken here is: the
prominence, but not dominance, of the will's response
to God's sovereign initiatives in the divine/human
encounter. 1 The divine initiative was considered in
chapter 3; an initiative expressed within the covenant
of grace. The human response was detailed in chapter
4; a response summed up in the meaning of faith.
This chapter examines how these two met, or the
divine/human encounter. It is argued that
justification was the nexus of the divine initiative
and the human response. There are several reasons for
claiming this. First, Baxter and Owen did not argue
that God merely presented a covenant of grace; he also
called men and women into the covenant. 	 In other
1 See chapter 1.1, p.3.
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words, they claimed that the covenant of grace was not
offered by God with a neutral ambivalence; there was a
divine wooing or persuading. Second, by the very
manner in which this calling or wooing was given -- in
the preaching of the gospel, the reading of the Bible,
the use of the sacraments and the practice of prayer --
both the sovereign divine initiative and the human
ability to choose interacted. Baxter defined
justifying faith as, "a grace or habit infused into the
soul, whereby we are enabled to believe, not only that
the Messiah is offered to us, but also to take and
receive Him as Lord and Saviour, that is, both to be
saved by Him, and obey Him...". 2 In fact, the
interaction of the two in a person's experience often
made it difficult to discern which was more central.
Third and lastly, when a person truly believed and
repented of sin, according to Baxter and Owen, he was a
converted and justified child of the covenant. They
claimed that a justified person was not only the
recipient of divine grace and mercy (ie. the divine
initiative) but through the influence of grace and the
Holy Spirit he had freely exercised a willing choice.
At the outset of this discussion of justification as
the nexus of the divine initiative and the human
response, it is important to recognize that both Baxter
and Owen followed the Reformed pattern when they
explained how a sinner progressed into justification;
this process was called the ordo salutis. They
recognised as the first step in the ordo salutis the
2 Baxter, 4 Treatise of Justifying Righteousness (1676) To the Reader, sig A8v.
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importance of election.	 The next step	 was the
effectual call.	 Baxter and Owen stressed that it was
the effectual call by which the Holy Spirit brought the
elect into the covenant of grace.	 Following the
effectual call came conviction. Conviction arose
through a variety of means: preaching, exhortation and
especially a harmony between the law and gospel. The
sinner was confronted with his or her condition before
a holy God.	 This confrontation resulted in the
sinner's conscience made "sensible" and the sinner's
affections disturbed. It will be argued that Baxter
and Owen advocated a balance between the law and
gospel. Furthermore, they saw the Holy Spirit as the
principal cause in conviction, the law was just a
secondary means. After conviction came an assent to
the gospel: but this was not merely an intellectual
conviction, for the definition of faith for both Baxter
and Owen was more than an act of the intellect.
Additionally, only after the Spirit created a new will
could the sinner truly repent, be converted and then
exercise justifying faith. It was by this faith that a
person entered into the covenant of grace where he
received as an adopted child the benefits of
justification and remission of sin. Next, both Baxter
and Owen insisted that sanctification and perseverance
had to follow. Finally, glorification and the joys of
heavenly "rest" was the goal of the saint's progress.
Such, then, was the overall scheme of the ordo salutis.
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In order to comprehend how justification was the
meeting of these two aspects of voluntarism -- the
divine initiative and the human response -- this
chapter begins (5.1) with Baxter and Owen's views on
election. In (5.2) what they wrote about the effectual
call will be presented. Both taught that through
"means" God issued the effectual call; means were the
sacraments, prayer, the reading of the Scriptures and,
supremely, the Word preached. In (5.3) attention will
be given to they emphasis which both gave to the work
of the Holy Spirit in fulfilling the effectual call
which resulted in justification.
	 The next section,
(5.4)	 will
	
examine
	
the issue	 of	 preparation;
considering here whether or not
	 Baxter and Owen
continued an emphasis which (as mentioned in the
Introduction)	 Norman Pettit and R.T. Kendall have
argued was a salient aspect of early seventeenth
century puritanism. 3 Finally, (5.5), it will be
important to examine Baxter and Owen's views on the
irresistibility of God's calling. It will be recalled
that this was touched upon briefly in 4.2, but here it
is necessary to investigate the role of the will in
relation to the use of the law, the preaching of the
gospel and the secret work of the Holy Spirit.
5.1 The importance of election 
Owen wrote that the call of God was inextricably
associated with election. "Our effectual calling, is
the first effect of our everlasting election - we have
3
See above p.5, n.6 and Pettit, Heart Prepared, pp.45-47.
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no actual interest in, nor right unto, Christ, until we
are thus called." 4 Baxter, on the other hand, never
denied the centrality of election but questioned the
primacy of election as a cause for an individual's
faith. In 1655 one Samuel Whittell wrote to Baxter and
asked whether election was the only cause of believing
and whether anything else intervened. He responded
stating that he was not sure whether personal election
was a cause, at least it was not the sole cause. 5
Baxter differed from Owen because he viewed election of
the individual as a specific event in time, and not
merely on the basis of an eternal decree. He argued
this due to his insistence upon the need for an actual
response to the covenant and the condition of faith.6
In reply to Christopher Cartwright he declared: "As
God's decree is, that all the elect shall believe, and
yet his Law doth most fitly require faith of them, as
the condition of their justification and glory." 7
Baxter assumed election; what is significant, however,
was the way in which he moderated election.
And, though I do believe that there is
an absolute election of individual
persons to faith and salvation, yet it
is certain, that the words elect, and
election, do often signify that which is
in time, if not far more often than that
which is from eternity : when God by his
Spirit's effectual grace doth choose
4 Owen, The Greater Catechisi, p.486, notes 2 and 3.
5
Whitten to Baxter, dated March 5, 1654/5. Dr. Williams's Library, London. Baxter
MS Treatises,7 1 item 270 and Baxter's response dated March 9 of the same year, Treatises 7,
item 272. I have been unable to ascertain the identity of Samuel Whitten.
6 See above 3.3.1 - 3.3.2, pp.184-205.
7 Baxter, An Account of my Considerations of the friendly ... Chr. Cartmright (1652)
third item bound in A Treatise of Justifying Righteousness (1676), p.63. For Cartwright see
DNB, vol 9, p.220.
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one, and pass	 by another, this is
(executive) election, and these so
actually chosen or taken out of the
world to Christ, are elect : and this is
the most usual sense of the word in
Scripture, as I think.
Baxter wanted to stress that election could never
exclude the necessity of a personal response to the
call of God. Election and the call were associated, but
not in any way which would reduce the call to a mere
pretension. In 1651 he wrote to George Lawson:
Doubtless this election is begun in our
effectual vocation or conversion: for
before we were actually children of
wrath. And this may well be called
[Election in Execution]; because it is
the first special Effect of eternal
election on the soul of the elect: and
so the first discovery to us of that
confirms election.'
In opposition to Baxter, Owen placed election within
the sovereign eternal purposes of God. According to
Owen it was the immutable decree and secret purpose of
God in election which resulted in the effectual call of
the saints. "From the execution of these decrees flows
that variety and difference we see in the dispensation
of the means of grace, God sending the Gospel where he
hath a remnant according to election." 0 Owen was
emphatic about the immutability of the divine will and
purpose in election. The decree of election was, he
wrote : "The eternal, free and immutable purpose of
God, whereby, in Jesus Christ, he chooseth unto
himself, whom he pleaseth, out of whole mankind,
Baxter, Rich: Baxter's Confession of his Faith (1655), p.224.
9 Baxter, Letter to Lawson, dated August 5, 1651. Dr. Williams's Library, London.
Baxter, MS Treatises 6, item 197, p.59b. For Lawson see DNB, vol 32, p.289.
10 Owen, The Greater Catechist, p.473, note 8.
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determining to bestow upon them, for his sake, grace
here, and everlasting happiness hereafter, for the
praise of his glory, by the way of mercy."
Owen insisted upon this view of election for a
number of reasons. Of course, he wished to denounce
any notion of merit attached to the human response to
God's calling; he was always concerned to respond to
what he thought were Arminian views on justification.
He also wanted his readers to know that election had
been established from eternity by God, merited by the
death of Christ, and effectually established by the
Spirit. 13 death of Christ was crucial; and here
again the different views which Baxter and Owen had
about the extent and effect of the cross of Christ must
be recognised. This contrast between them reveals a
tension within Reformed theology and especially among
those who lived in the days after the Synod of Dort. "
At one extreme was an explanation of election which
stressed the absolute and immutable decrees of God. At
the other were those who were inclined to stress
election de eventu.	 In between were seventeenth
century Reformed theologians who attempted to
accommodate some elements of the two extreme positions.
What may have happened, however, is in fact that which
G.C. Berkouwer referred to when he wrote of the history
of the doctrine of election.
11 Owen, The Greater Catechist, p. 473.
12 
See chapter 1, pp.48-51.
13
See 3.3.2, pp.199-202.
14 See the context outlined in 1.5.
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The history of the doctrine shows that
the danger of a deterministic
interpretation of the word was often
feared. But this fear often led to a
tempering of the altogether merciful and
sovereign superiority of the divine act
of election, and to the establishing of
the "counterpoise" - man's freedom to
decide - which was to be a component
factor	 i	 bringing	 about	 man's
salvation.
When Baxter and Owen are examined, then, it is
evident that they wanted to show how election related
to the human response to God's saving call. Baxter's
stress on the condition of faith coincided with an
understanding of	 election which, while	 it never
diminished God's sovereignty, emphasized a close
coordination between election and the actual response.
For Baxter the issue had to do with the general or
universal extent of the covenant of grace.	 Since
common grace was given to all, election could not be
the principal cause of the saints' faith. He
acknowledged that Christ's merit was the meritorious
cause, but there had to be lesser causes.
But the one thing I am to prove, is,
that the Meritorious Cause is not the
only cause and that Christ in his other
actions is as truly the efficient cause,
as in his meriting, and that all do
sweetly and harmoniously concur to the
entire effect; and that faith must have
respect to the other causes of our
Justification, and not alone to the
Meritorious cause, and that we are
justified by this entire work of Faith,
and not only by that Act which respects
the satisfaction of merit."
15 G.C. Berkouwer, Divine Election, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
reprinted 1972), p.48. By far, however, the most important study of this doctrine appears in
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Geoffrey Bromiley translator (Edinburgh: T &T Clark) 11.2.
Also helpful, albeit too brief in sections, is Paul K. Jewett, Election and Predestination
(Grand Rapids:Eerdmans, 1985), pp.5-21.
16
Baxter, Of Justification, Treatise I, p.24.
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In Aphorismes of Justification he had identified the
various causes of justification: "the causa sine qua
non, is both Christ's Satisfaction, and the faith of
the Justified."	 C.F. Allison has interpreted this
controversial aspect of Baxter's teaching on
justification and concluded: "according to Baxter, the
imputation of our own faith is the formal cause of
justification." 2	 This interpretation is unwarranted:
it comes from reading Baxter's implications rather than
his precise declarations. In Aphorismes he argued that
the "principal efficient cause" was God 	 and the
"instrumental cause" the promise or grant in the new
covenant.	 In	 the same	 section	 he identified
"procataretick" causes tie. those causes which precede,
in the sense of preparation, the covenant]: the
"meritorious cause" was the satisfaction of Christ; the
"moral persuading cause" was the intercession of Christ
and the supplication of the sinner; the "objective
cause" was the necessity of the sinner; and the
occasion cause" was the opportunity and advantage for
the glorifying of God's justice and mercy. 2
Nevertheless, Baxter's understanding of justification
rested primarily in his view of the nature of the
covenant. "Common Redemption and the Decree of Common
Grace," wrote Baxter, "both antecede that which is
properly called Election, in order of Nature in esse
objectivo; that is, God decreeth to give Faith and
17 Baxter, Aphorismes, p.213.
18 C•F• Allison, The Rise of Moralis,, p.157.
19 Baxter, aphorises, p.213.
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Salvation to some of them that had common grace." 20
In contrast, Owen, while equally concerned with the
necessity of faith, offered his understanding of
election in order to show with what absolute certainty
the elect responded to the call of God. The
coordination between election and the actual response
occurred in God's secret predestinating will: which
decreed for whom the Son would die and assured the
effectual call of those chosen by God. Nonetheless,
Owen recognised that election in itself was not part
of God's revealed will. 21	Owen argued, therefore, that
the gospel called for faith and repentance,	 not a
knowledge of election. In a work of 1655 he wrote,
"the issue that lies before them who are commanded to
draw nigh to God is, whether they will believe or no,
God having given them eternal and unchangeable rules;
'He that believes shall be saved, and he that believes
not, shall be damned ...'". n Still, it has to be
appreciated that his definition of justifying faith
depended upon Christ's merits for the elect, and only
the elect had this faith: "The gracious free act of
God, imputing the righteousness of Christ, to a
believing sinner, and for that speaking peace unto his
conscience, in the pardon of his sin, pronouncing him
20 Baxter, An End of Doctrinal Controversies (1691), p.161.
21 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.523.
22 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.524.
23 Owen, Vindicae Evangelicae: or the Mystery of the Gospel Vindicated (1655), 600ld
ed., XII, p.553. All subsequent references taken from this edition.
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to be just, and accepted before him. ii,24
Again the marked difference between Owen and Baxter
should be noted; while Owen agreed that the gospel
could and should be preached to all, nevertheless, this
did not imply a universalism or even antecedent common
grace. It is worth quoting Owen at length
We say, though God hath chosen some only
to salvation by Christ, yet that the
names of those same are not expressed in
Scripture; the doing whereof would have
been destructive to the main end of the
word, the nature of faith, and all the
ordinances of the gospel; yet God having
declared that whosoever believeth shall
be saved, there is sufficient ground for
all and every man in the world, to whom
the gospel is preached, to come to God
by Christ, and other ground there is
none, nor can be offered by the
assertors of the pretended universality
of God's love. Nor is this proposition,
'he that believes shall be saved',
founded on the universality of love
pleaded for, but the sufficiency of the
means for the accomplishment of what is
therein asserted: namely, thT5 blood of
Christ, who is believed on.
Baxter's
	
reaction	 to	 Owen's	 teaching	 on
justification deserves further comment: for it shows
Baxter's multiple meanings of the term justification.
Essentially he accused Owen of suggesting that the
moment of faith for a man was simply a justification in
foro conscientiae.	 By this he meant that Owen was
coming close to the Antinomian argument that a believer
was merely appropriating the justification already
procured for him when Christ died but which his guilty
conscience needed to receive. In his Confession Baxter
referred to Owen and argued: "The Justification by
24 Owen, Greater Catechiss, Goold ed., I, p.467.
25 Owen, Yindicae Evangelicae, pp. 553-54.
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Faith, so called in the Scriptures, is not the
knowledge or feeling of Justification before given, or
a Justification in and by our own consciences, or
terminated in conscience, but is somewhat that goes
before all such Justification as this is; and is indeed
a Justification before God." 26 He attacked Owen on
this point because he understood justification not only
as the pardon of a man from his past sins and failures;
Baxter	 also	 interpreted	 justification	 as	 a
righteousness vis-a-vis the covenant demand for faith.
This multiple meaning	 of justification cannot be
emphasised enough.	 Baxter claimed that there was a
continuous need for justification: there was
forgiveness and reconciliation when believers came into
the covenant, but on the day of judgment there will be
a different aspect of justification. Stated baldly,
the final judgment will not, maintained Baxter, be
solely whether a man possessed the righteousness of
Christ, but whether he was true to the covenant of
grace. To quote Baxter at length:
But the turning point of the day is yet
behind; 1. our allegation of
Justification by Christ and the Covenant
may be denied. It may be said by the
Accuser, that the Covenant justifieth
none but penitent Believers, and giveth
plenary Right to Glory to none but
Saints and persevering Conquerors, and
that we are none such.	 Against this
26 Baxter, Confession, p.189. See especially pp.190-91 where Baxter accuses Owen of
advocating such a position. See also Baxter's Catholick Theologie I.ii, p.38 where he
explains the causality of Christ's death in relationship to God's eternal decree for an
individual.	 In this passage Baxter insists that God merely foresaw, from eternity, the
causality of Christ's death and obedience.	 His confusing point seems to be that to speak
strictly of Christ's death as an existent cause from eternity is wrong: the actual moment of
Christ's sufferings and obedience were at one specific time of history. 	 The best
interpretation of this thought lies with Baxter's understanding of the death of Christ as the
means by which a new covenant and new relation to the law is established. 	 See the argument
offered in chapter 3.
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accusation we must be
	 justified or
perish; else all the rest	 will be
ineffectual. And here to say, that it
is true, I died an impenitent Person,
and Infidel, Hypocrite, or Ungodly, but
Christ was a penitent believer for me,
or sincere and holy for me, or that he
died to pardon this, all this will be
false and vain.	 Christ's Merits and
Satisfaction	 is	 [sic]	 not	 the
Righteousness
	 it	 self	 which	 must
justifie us against this Accusation; but
our own	 personal Faith, Repentance,
Sincere Holiness and Perseverance,
purchased by Christ and wrought by the
Spirit in us, but thence, our own acts.
He that cannot truly say, The Accusation
is false, I am a true Penitent,
Sanctified persevering Believer must be
condemned and perish. Thus faith and
Repentance are	 our Righteousness liy
which we must thus far be justified.
This could well substantiate C.F. Allison's
interpretation, mentioned earlier, but Baxter was quick
to point out in the same context that, "this is but a
particular mediate subservient Righteousness, and part
of our Justification, subordinate to Christ's Merits." 18
48-
Owen answered Baxter's criticism in Of the Death of
Christ (1650).	 In this work he denied that he
advocated	 a	 justification in	 foro conscientiae.
Nevertheless, he wrote, "I suggest also, whether
absolution from the guilt of sin, and obligation unto
death, though not as terminated in the conscience for
complete justification, do not precede our actual
believing." 29 This sounds suspiciously close to the
criticism which Baxter made about Owen's views on
27	
Baxter, Catholick Theologie II, p.71. See also Baxter, The Saints Everlasting
Rest, Orme ed., vol 22, pp.91-92.
28 Baxter, Catholick Theologie II, p.71.
29 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, Goold ed., X, p.470.
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Justification: there was a measure of justification,
because of the decree of election, before the actual
moment of faith. Owen claimed that in every sense, the
elect, prior to faith, were under the wrath and
condemnation of God. 	 There was, however, a modicum
of contradiction in Owen's thought: on one hand, he
insisted that the death of Christ merited ipso facto
the justification of the elect, his death was a cause
independent from the faith of the believer; on the
other hand, Owen stressed the necessity of faith and
repentance, for in the truest sense a person was not
justified before personal faith. However, because he
challenged the idea of suspension or conditionality,
and emphasized the death of Christ to such an extent,
Baxter assumed he was suggesting a justification from
eternity. 21	Owen stated that in the strictest sense,
yes, there was a justification from eternity but this
was an incomplete justification. Until actual faith
and repentance, what was lacking was: first, "that act
of pardoning mercy terminated and completed in the
conscience of the sinner"; second, "the heart isn't
persuaded of the goodness and mercy of the promise";
and, lastly, "the soul hasn't rolled itself upon
Christ, and received Christ." n
30 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, p.468.
31 Owen had written; that our deliverance is to be referred to the death of Christ,
according to its own causality; that is, as a cause meritorious. Now such causes do
actually, and ipso facto produce all those effects, which immediately flow from them; not in
an immediation of time but causality.' Of the Death of Christ, p.450. Baxter seemingly
missed this subtle qualification by Owen: easily done given the complexity of Owen's
rhetoric.
32 Owen, Of the Death of Christ, p.471.
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Thus, the contrast between Baxter and Owen over the
issue of election is important to an understanding of
their views of justification. 	 Both assumed election
and predestination. Baxter gave greater stress,
however, to the universal extent of the covenant; he
was concerned to maintain the necessity of personal
faith.	 Owen's views on election appear to have been
based upon an emphasis on God's eternal decrees; yet
this would be an inadequate interpretation. It was
Owen's Christology which shaped his view of election;
so too his Christology (ie. the death and merits of
Christ)
	
which	 determined	 his	 explanation	 of
justification by faith.
5.2 The effectual call 
Reference has already	 been made to the	 term,
"effectual call", when examining Baxter and Owen's
opinions on election. What did they mean by this?
First, Owen and Baxter accepted a distinction between
the external and the effectual call. 	 Calvin	 had
earlier referred to the "inner call", or simply to the
n
"calling" and elsewhere to God's calling.	 Perkins
described an effectual call which was distinct from the
Ncall which reprobates received. 	 It was William Ames
who distinguished between what he called the outward
and the inward calling: the outward call was a
promulgation of the gospel promises to all alike; the
inner call was a kind of spiritual enlightenment which
33 Calvin, Instit. IV.i.2; III.vi .2; and III.xxii.4.
34 Perkins, A Golden Chain XXXVI, p.225 and see also LIII, pp. 251-55.
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only the elect received. 	 statements of doctrine
took up this reference to the inward or effectual call
of God.
In his	 Greater Catechism of 1645 John Owen
defined the call of God.
Q. What is our vocation, or this calling
of God ?
A. The free, gracious act of Almighty
God, whereby in Jesus Christ he calleth
and translateth us from the state of
nature, sin, wrath and corruption, into
the state of grace, and union with
Christ, by the mighty, effectual
workings of his Apirit, in the preaching
of the Word ...
Baxter in, A Call to the Unconverted (1658), assumed
that God issued an outward call to sinners. "He
sendeth not you Prophets or Apostles, that receive
their message by immediate Revelation; but yet he
calleth you by	 his ordinary Ministers, who	 are
commissioned by him to preach the same Gospel which
Christ and his Apostles first delivered". 38 Through
the Spirit and grace this outward call led to sincere
faith and repentance.
Baxter and Owen were convinced about the importance
and priority of preaching: it was for them the chief
means of grace and so the primary way in which the
effectual call was given. Through the preached word,
they assumed that God addressed the minds and moved the
wills of the congregation.	 By the means of preaching
35 Ames, The Marrom of Theology, XXVI.10 and 13-14, p.158.
36	
Synod of Dort, headings 3 and 4, Schaff, Creeds, pp.589-90 and Westminster
Confession, X.i and ii, Schaff, Creeds, pp. 624-625.
37 Owen, 8reater Catechism, p.486.
38 Baxter, e Call to the Unconverted, Preface.
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the elect were effectually called. Owen wrote, "For
they [preachers] are used and employed in the work it
self by the Spirit of God, and are by him made
instrumental for the effecting of this new birth and
life." 39	 In	 The Reformed Pastor (1656), a work
first prepared for fellow ministers of the
Worcestershire Association, Baxter pressed the need for
preaching and teaching the gospel to the unconverted:
The work of conversion is the first and
great thing we must drive at; after this
we must labour with all our might.
Alas! the misery of the unconverted is
so great, that it calleth loudest to us
for	 compassion...	 0,	 therefore,
brethren,	 whomsoever	 you	 neglect,
neglect not the most miserable!
Whatever you pass over, forget not poor
souls that are under condemnation and
curse of the law, and who may look every
hour for the infernal execution, if a
speedy change do not prevent it. 0 call
after the impenitent, and ply this great
work of convertingosouls, whatever else
you leave undone.
Both Baxter and Owen insisted that the preacher, after
studying and applying the Word to himself, was to
exposit the Scriptures in a clear and straight-forward
way; he was the flock's pastor who must feed the sheep.
Baxter and Owen recognised that God called generally
to all and specifically to his elect. Moreover, they
both insisted that God's effectual call was as such due
to the work of the Holy Spirit; it was the Spirit which
enabled the man or woman to believe and repent.
Commenting on Hebrews 3.1, Owen wrote in 1674:
These Hebrews came to be Holy Brethren
39 Owen, Holy Spirit, pASS.
40	
Baxter, The Reforsed Pastor, ed. by	 William Brown. Puritan Paperbacks.
(Edinburgh/Carlisle: The Banner of Truth Trust,
	
1974 and 1979), pp.94 and 96. For
Worcestershire Association see above chapter 1, p.31, n.85.
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children of God, united unto Christ, by
their participation in an Heavenly
calling. We are called out of darkness
into his marvelous Light, 1 Pet 2.9. and
this is not only with the outward Call
of	 the Word, which	 many are made
partakers of, who never attain the
saving knowledge of Christ, Matth 20.16.
but with that effectual call, which
being granted in the pursuit of God's
purpose of Election,	 Rom 8.28.	 is
accompanied with the energetical
quickening power of the Holy Ghost,
Ephes 2.5. : giving Eyes to see, Ears to
hear, and an Heart to obey the Word
according unto the Promise of the
Covenant; Jerem 32. 33,34. And thus no
man can come to Christ Alunless the Father
draw him, John 6.44.
Baxter had a similar view. In his second publication,
The Saints Everlasting Rest (1650), he wrote, "The
chief distinction between those ineffectually called
and those effectually called is that the latter receive
the influence and illumination of the Spirit - to open
their eyes to Scripture." 42 Human activity was
recognised; and this indeed formed the rationale for
the call of God to his people. Nevertheless, what
could be easily forgotten was the importance of the
Holy Spirit as the primary agent through whom the means
of the call (preaching, reading Scripture, and the
sacraments) had validity.
5.3 The work of the Holy Spirit 
Attention to the role of the Holy Spirit is one of
the chief characteristics of seventeenth century
puritan theology. Geoffrey Nuttall has illustrated the
41 Owen, Exercitations on the Epistle to the Hebrews, 4 vols. (1668-1684), Vol 2,
42 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest, Orme ed., Vol 22, pp.176-77.
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practical and experiential puritan understanding of the
Holy Spirit. 43	 This experiential emphasis upon the
activity of the Spirit came not only from English
puritanism's possible affinity with pietism as
Stoeffler and Lang have suggested, but originated out
of the earlier tradition of Calvin, Perkins and Ames
John Dykstra Eusden, in his introduction to Ames's The
Marrow of Theology, has suggested:
For Calvin, most Reformed theologians,
and the Puritans the work of the Holy
Spirit was central; they were concerned
especially with the present action of
God in the lives of men; they were
physicians	 of	 the	 soul	 analyzing
symptoms	 of	 spiritual	 decay and
prescribing ways in which religious
experience and renewal could take place.
Some of Calvin's most poetic language in
the Institutes is found in the sections
dealing with the Holy Spirit, described
now as the water which washes clean and
refreshes and now as 4he fire which
purges and makes bright.
Baxter and Owen's understanding of the Holy Spirit
in the calling of the saints show similarities to
earlier Reformers. Both insisted that the Spirit was
the principal agent in the call of a believer to faith.
It was the influence and illumination of the Spirit
43 Geoffrey F. Nuttall, The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1947) p.7 and passim. Also Norman Pettit, The Heart Prepared, pp. 9-10 and Charles
L. Cohen, god's Caress, pp. 75 ff.
44
Puritan theology and practice as an expression of pietism is considered briefly
in chapter 1 of this thesis; the works concerned in the present argument are: F. Ernest
Stoeffler, The Rise of Evangelical Pietism (Leyden, 1965), especially Chapter 2, and August
Lang, Paritanisnus and Pietismus (Darmstadt: 1972), especially Chapters 3 and 4. For the
significance of the Holy Spirit within Reformed theology see Alasdair Heron, The Holy Spirit
(London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1983), pp. 102-110 ; B.B. Warfield, Introduction to
Abraham Kuyper, The Mork of the Holy Spirit, Reprinted (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979),
p.xxxiii ; and Richard A. Gaffin, Jr., 'The Holy Spirit', MIJ, Vol. 43, 1980/81, pp. 61-62.
45	 •	 •
William Ames, The Marra of Theology, translated from the Latin with an
introduction by John Dykstra Eusden. Forward by Douglas Horton (Durham /
 North Carolina: The
Labyrinth Press, 1983), p.36.
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which brought about an individual's faith and
repentance, or response to God's call. When discussing
the ordo salutis Baxter referred to the "order of these
workings of the Spirit". 46 Elsewhere he described
conversion - which was the consequence of the effectual
call - as the work of the Spirit. 	 provided in
1674 one of the fuller works on the Holy Spirit. In
this work he proposed, "For it is the peculiar work of
the Holy Spirit, to make those things of the Father and
Son effectual unto the souls of the Elect, to the
48praise of the Glory of the Grace of God."
	 Owen's
treatise on the Holy Spirit was his comprehensive
study, yet many of his ideas were suggested in some of
49his earlier works.	 What made his 1674 work
important was the way in which he offered a very
detailed analysis of the Spirit's role in initiating
the response to God's call. He emphasised that the
Holy Spirit was not a "moral principal agent" - that is
merely persuasive - but actually exercised a "physical
immediate operation". Owen meant that the Spirit's
influence actually was as a dynamic or power which
worked upon, but never violated the will, in order to
bring about faith and repentance. As shown in chapter
4, neither Owen nor Baxter suggested that the will was
46
47
48
49
p.175.
Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest, Orme ed., Vol. 22, p.196.
Baxter, A Treatise of Conversion (1657), Orme ed., vol 7. p.23.
Owen, Holy Spirit, p.155.
See for example, Owen, Saints Perseverance, pp. 300-01; Owen, Of Cossunion,
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coerced by the Spirit or grace. N For Owen it was an
aided or healed will which responded to God's
invitation; and only the Holy Spirit could aid and heal
a sinner's will.
There is therefore necessary such a work
of the Holy Spirit upon our wills, as
may cure and take away the depravation
of them before described, freeing us
from the state of spiritual death,
causing us to live unto God, determining
them in and unto the acts of faith and
obedience.	 And this he doth, whilst,
and as he makes us new creatures,
quickens us who were dead in trespasses
and sins, gives us a new Heart, and puts
a new Spirit within us, writes his law
in our hearts, that we may do the mind
of God, and walk in his ways; worketh in
us to will and to do, making them who
were unwilling and obstinate, to become
willing and sbedient and that freely and
of choice.
Owen and Baxter recognised, therefore, a particular
effectual call of God. Furthermore, they both insisted
that it was the Holy Spirit which caused the human
response to the call of God, that is, faith and
repentance. The Spirit employed the work of the
preacher and the means of grace such as the Bible,
prayer and evangelism to accomplish the effectual call.
The specific ways in which the Spirit brought about the
renewal of a person (or, as Baxter put it, how the new
life "discovers itself") need to be considered next;
specifically the question of preparation	 must be
studied 52
50 See chapter 4, p.211.
51 
Owen, Holy Spirit, p.284.
52 Baxter, Saints Everlasting Rest, p.178.
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5.4 The question of preparation 
Preparation for justification involved an attempt to
explain how men and women were affected by the call of
God, through its means, and then how they responded to
this call. As noted in the Introduction to this
thesis, preparation implied the use of the law to
convict a
	 person which
	 in turn resulted	 in a
self-involvement on the part of the individualP 	 The
notion of some type of preparation existed within
NReformed Theology.	 Within sixteenth and seventeenth
century Reformed theology there was a tension between
the notion of God's supreme sovereignty in calling and
justifying his people and the counterpoint call to,
"Cast away from you all the transgressions which you
have committed against me, and get yourselves a new
heart and a new spirit ! Why will you die, 0 House of
Israel ?" (Ezekiel 18.31). The coordination between
human debility and human accountability was never free
from misinterpretation. What occurred within Reformed
theology, and English Reformed theology, as seen in the
work of Perkins and Ames, was an attempt to express a
balance	 between these two	 seemingly antithetical
truths. By grace alone men and women were saved, yet
they also had to respond to grace. For English
puritans this was not only a theoretical problem but an
experiential dilemma.
This dilemma was heightened by certain elements of
thought within the mid-seventeenth century context. As
53 See chapter 1, pp.5 ff.
54 H. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, p.513.
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it was explained in the Introduction, the mid-
seventeenth century context in which Baxter and Owen
wrote was shaped by influences not experienced by
earlier Elizabethan and Jacobean puritans.	 Among the
more	 notable	 forces	 shaping the	 context	 were
Arminianism and Antinomianism. Baxter and Owen wanted
to avoid both; they saw these as extremes. Thus when
Baxter and Owen referred to questions of preparation
(ie. the role of the law, the process involved before
justifying faith was exercised or the obtainment of
assurance) they were either trying to avoid, on one
hand, an Arminian modification of election, and
predestination and, on the other hand, an Antinomian
exaltation. When this aim is appreciated, their views
on preparation become quite clear. Yet, it can also be
shown that because of their differing views on the
covenant of grace, the way in which they avoided the
extremes of either Arminianism or Antinomianism led
them to dissimilar understandings of preparation.
Furthermore, when in this section Baxter and Owen are
compared and contrasted not only with each other but
with John Bunyan, offered here as an example of the
multiple expressions of mid-seventeenth century puritan
theology, the evidence suggests that middle and later
seventeenth century preparationism per se cannot be
uniformly classified.
Richard Baxter acknowledged that in the ordo salutis
men and women when effectually called were passive. A
person was convicted and made "sensible ,/ by the Spirit.
Yet once the will was made new the person had to cleave
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willingly to God. 55 There had to be an "affectionate
accepting". 56 After this a sinner delivered himself up
to Christ. In this process it was accepted that men
and women were required to perform some preparatory
actions.	 Baxter, however, never made these actions
conditions of the covenant. The only condition, as
observed in chapter 4, was faith. Men and women were
required to come and hear sermons, to open their minds
to argument, and to be willing to consider the gospel.
In his Treatise of Conversion Baxter explained what he
meant:
But then, there are some actions of the
unconverted, that are in order to their
conversion, and these God accepteth not,
so as to their persons, as of one
reconciled to him in Christ, nor as he
accepteth the works of his people, not
so as to be engaged by promise for their
reward. But yet he so far accepteth
them, that they are ordinarily the way
in which he will be found ; and in which
he will give them greater things. They
are means of his appointing for the
conversion of their souls, which he,ilath
not appointed them to use in vain. '
Baxter's	 view	 on	 preparation related 	 to his
understanding of grace. In 1658 he wrote,
Though you cannot be converted without
the special Grace of God, yet you must
know that God giveth this Grace in the
use of his holy means which he hath
appointed to that end; and common grace
may enable you to forbear your gross
sinning (as to thp, outward act) and to
use those means.
It must recalled that he argued that the covenant of
55 Baxter, Saints Rest, pp.178-82.
56 Baxter, Saints Rest, p.193.
57 Baxter, g Treatise of Conversion, Ore ed. Vol 7, p.175
58 Baxter, Call to the Unconverted, Preface
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grace was a universal covenant. 59
	
All humanity was
offered "common grace".	 Common grace did not convert
and regenerate, it only led to the work of "special
grace":
	
the grace which brought about true conversion
and regeneration. Even special grace had two parts:
first special renewing grace which was unconditional
and prior to justification, and then the special grace
of sanctification. a Men and women were not prepared
initially by the law's bruising but by common grace.
Baxter argued this way because of his view of the
covenant: the law was appropriated into the gospel
administration, it did not stand in isolation	 from
grace. E This had everything to do with Christ as the
new law-giver; the law came under Christ's covenant
control and so the law was conditionally suspended. It
was discharged in that men and women were no longer
under its condemnation provided they had faith in
Christ. 62 To be sure, the law softened hearts and
provoked a "sensibility" to the evil of sin and the
soul's misery; still, Baxter wrote in The Saints
Everlasting Rest that this was accomplished by the law
in coordination with the gospel. 63 But it was
supremely the work of the Holy Spirit; thus while the
59 See above chapter 3.3, p.193.
60 Baxter details this in Catholick Theologie /.iii. p.55 again in haid End to
Doctrinal Controversies, p.177. Elsewhere he called common grace 'sufficient objective grace'
and special grace 'internal grace"; see Confession, Preface sig (a).
61 Baxter, Catholick Theologie I.ii, p.35.
62 Baxter, hphorisses of Justification, p.92
63 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest, Ore ed. Vol 22, p.182
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law disturbed and provoked the need for repentance,
this repentance only occurred as a result of the Spirit
having brought about the first act of special faith:
"like a seed which exciteth the first act before a
habit, though not ordinarillibefore some preparations. "64
So when Baxter considered which came first, repentance
or faith, he suggested:
When God moveth the soul to believe or
repent, we must conceive that in the
instant antecedent to the act, the soul
receiveth some impress or impulse from
the divine essence by &Mich it is
disposed or moved to act.
Baxter also explained that preparation by common
grace was only to prepare the way for special grace.
Furthermore, such preparation need not always have
occurred: there were exceptional cases of people
brought to faith suddenly. In 1675 Baxter, seeing
himself as a reconciler between Calvinist and Arminian,
went so far as to suggest that,
The object of Gods will, to give special
grace, which shall effectually cause men
to repent and believe, is ordinarily a
fore-seen disposed sinner prepared by
his common grace; but sometimes an
unprepared sinner, whom, of his free
will, he will suddenly convert, as it
pleaseth him freely to distri,pte his
benefits (all being unworthy).
One last consideration: Baxter never thought that
the will was entirely passive to this preparation by
64 
Baxter, Catholick Theologie II, p.46
65	
Baxter, Catholick Theologie I.iii, p.26 and I.ii, p.84 Baxter, Christian
Directory, (1673), Ore ed., Vol 2, p.182.
66 Baxter, Catholick Theologie, II.,p.13. Baxter wrote similarly in Rn End to
Doctrinal Controversies, p.320, but insisted that, it is not to be taken for his ordinary
way.°
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common grace. 67 He stressed the free and personal
response of both the understanding and the will. "Hell
would not be so full, if people were but willing to
know their case, and to hear and think of it."69
Because	 of	 this	 assumption Baxter	 issued	 his
exhortations to sinners. 	 He told them to repent and
receive the gospel promises.° Men and women were
encouraged by Baxter to try and see if they were true
believers. "Unless you take it for an indifferent
thing, whether you	 live for ever in Heaven or Hell;
its best for you to put the question close to your
consciences betimes." 70 maintained, however, that
it was not wholly a case of mere willingness by which
one received faith to believe; rather it was complying
with common preparing grace. The individual was urged
not to harden his heart, not to ignore means or help,
and not to resist the promptings of the Spirit.
Refuse not Christ, and he will not
refuse you: And when he is willing, if
you be but willing, truly willing to be
saved from sin and misery, and to have
Christ, Grace, and Glory in the use of
the means which God hath appointed you,
neither Earth 
n
nor Hell can hinder your
salvation ...
Evidence of Baxter's voluntarism is evident as he
explained how, by means of common grace, one was
67 Baxter, Treatise on Conversion, Orme ed., Vol 7, p.23
68 Baxter, Call to the Unconverted, pp.22-23; see also Baxter, Christian Directory,
Orme ed., Vol 2, pp.5-88.
69 Baxter, Call to the Unconverted, pp. 63-64
70 Baxter, The Life of Faith As It Is (1660) p.31. This sermon was earlier preached
before Charles II on Hebrews 11.1.
71 n L	 PBaxter, wmpassionate Counsel, p.79
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willingly to exercise a desire for special grace.
And also I entreat you, that you will
upon your knees beseech the Lord that he
will open your eyes to understand the
truth, and turn your hearts to the Love
of God, and beg of him all that saving
grace that you have so long neglected,
and follow it on from py to day, till
your hearts be changed. "
Baxter, then, accepted a preparation for faith. It
is to be noted, however, that this preparation was a
work of grace, begun by common grace and continued by
special grace. Common grace employed the use of the
law, but the law was never divorced from the wider
context of the covenant of grace because Christ was the
new law-giver.	 Baxter's preparation	 displayed a
voluntaristic emphasis, but in comparison 	 to the
earlier	 preparationism of	 Perkins, for	 example,
Baxter's was sharply different. 73 Principally his
preparation was through common grace given to all in a
universally extended covenant of grace.
John Bunyan, as an example of late puritan theology
which was slightly different than either Baxter or
Owen's, expressed an understanding of preparation in a
slightly distinctive way. In Some Gospel Truths Opened
(1656), Bunyan. urged upon his readers a
self-examination by means of the Word of God to see if
"thou hast as yet any beginnings of desiring after
religion".	 Bunyan did not explain clearly how these
"beginnings" were brought about, whether by one's own
72 Baxter, Call to the Unconverted, Preface.
73
See Perkins, Golden Chain XXXVI, p.228-229 in	 Breward, Perkins; and The
Foundation of Christian Religion Gathered into Six Principles, 	 The fourth principle
expounded, p. 156 in Breward, Perkins.
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efforts or by grace. What he encouraged was a looking
to the law or commandments of God so as to appreciate
the enormity of personal sin. Bunyan referred to the
work of the Holy Spirit in this process, but even here
he suggested it was up to the individual to "beg of God
to convince thee by his Holy Spirit, not only of sins
against the Law, but also of that damning sin, the sin
of unbelief.," M
Two years later Bunyan wrote A Few Sighs From Hell
(1658) and again urged his readers to plead for grace.
He inferred that before actual conversion there must be
a voluntary acknowledgement not only of one's
sinfulness but of one's need for grace. He seems to
have suggested that one should wait for grace. While
Bunyan did not refer to this as a state of preparation,
neither did he suggest this waiting or pleading period
was anything other than prior to justification.75
Still clearer was Bunyan's account of Christian in
The Pilgrim's Progress (1678). Christian meets
Evangelist while under a siege of conviction: implying
the initial work of the law.	 Equally important,
Christian is informed that there must be a willingness
to close with Christ or else all is lost. 	 A bit
later, Christian is	 entertained at the	 home of
Interpreter.	 Interpreter shows Christian a number of
truths: one in particular is a picture of a man
74 
Bunyan, Sole Gospel Troths Opened, Offor ed., Volume 2, p.136.
75 Bunyan, 4 Feu Sighs From Hell, Offor ed., Volume:3, p.701
76 Bunyan, The Pilgrim's Progress (1678) Spire Books (Old Tappan, New Jersey:
Fleming N. Revell, 1975), p.14.
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sweeping out a room. Interpreter explains that if the
room is swept only with a broom (the law) than the dust
(original sin) is never removed. 	 Only when the water
of the gospel is sprinkled is the dust removed. 77 Did
Bunyan have in mind a preparation, involving bruising
and waiting? Admittedly Interpreter shows Christian
the vision of a fire burning against a wall despite the
cold water poured upon it. 	 Interpreter explains that
this is to show Christian the enduring work of grace in
a person's life; but in the context it is hard to tell
whether Christian is to understand this as an
explanation of his own state, as one prior to true
faith and regeneration, or as a lesson in general.
What is clear is that only when Christian comes at last
to the cross does his burden of sin roll away, and he
is told of pardon, clothed with new garments and given
the Roll with the seal on it.
It is arguable, therefore, that Bunyan suggested a
type of preparation. There was a primary and
efficacious work of the law, yet never sufficient apart
from the work of the Spirit of Christ. 	 Bunyan's
paradigms, Christian and Helpful suggest a gradual
process rather than a sudden seizure.
	 What is most
important for a study of voluntarism was Bunyan's
77 Bunyan, PilgriB i s Progress, p.31.
78 Bunyan, Pilgri p 's Progress, p.33. See Richard Greaves, 'John Bunyan and Covenant
thought in the Seventeenth Century', CH, 36, 1967, pp.154 ff. Greaves is quite correct in
arguing that Bunyan saw the Law as a restatement of the covenant of works; yet one could not
come to Christ through an obedience to the Law, for it was only a tutor to Christ.
79
Bunyan, Pilgries Progress, p.39-40.
80 Bunyan, Pilgrias Progress, pp.76 ff.
281
insistence upon a willingness. It was not merely
knowledge or conviction, there had to be a choosing of
Christ and his benefits.
Looking at some of John Bunyan's work makes it all
the more interesting to examine John Owen, for Bunyan
and Owen knew each other and appreciated each other's
work.81
 Yet, whereas Bunyan's preparation was explicit,
Owen went in a dissimilar direction. According to Owen
it was impossible for men and women 	 to prepare
themselves for justification. In his Greater Catechism
(1645) he answered the question, "What do we ourselves
perform in this work of our conversion ?"
A. Nothing at all, being merely wrought
upon, by the free grace and Spirit of
God, when in
	 ourselves we have no
ability go any thing that is spiritually .
good...
Owen's anthropology and doctrine of sin explained
his rejection of preparation: "we being dead by nature
in trespasses and sins, have no power to prepare
ourselves for the receiving of God's grace; nor in the
least measure tqbelieve, and turn ourselves unt+im." 8'3
Owen never denied that ordinarily there were, what he
called, "internal Spiritual Effects", which preceded
81 It is quite possible that Owen proved instrumental in the publication of the
first part of The Pilgrim's Progress. Owen introduced his own publisher, Nathaniel Ponder, to
Bunyan. (Roger Sharrock, John Banyan. Papermac (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1968), p.69.)
According to Peter loon, Owen called upon Thomas Barlow, then Bishop of Lincoln, to help
release Bunyan from his internment in Bedford Prison; Barlow was unable to assist. Owen is
reported to have claimed before the King, 'Could I possess the tinker's abilities for
preaching, please your majesty, I would gladly relinquish all my learning." (Peter loon,
God's Statesman, pp. 161-62.).
82 Owen, The Greater Catechism, p.486.
83 Owen, h Display of hrsinianiss, p.126.
282
regeneration: illumination, convictionland reformation."
In this respect Owen retained the necessity of these
steps in the ordo salutis. Owen accepted the use of the
law to	 bring	 unregenerate	 men and	 women	 to
justification, even in a preparatory fashion. "Let no
man think to understand the gospel, who knoweth nothing
of the law." 85 Owen followed Calvin's understanding of
the use of the law: it was not meant to establish a
righteousness but to lay "open unto us the utter
disability of our nature", to charge "the wrath and
curse of God, due to sin, upon the conscience", and to
bring "the whole soul under bondage to sin, death,
Satan, and hell, so making us long and seek for a
Saviour." 86 Owen frequently insisted that even the
elect fell	 under the
	 full force of	 the law's
condemnation until they were brought to faith. 87
Nevertheless, the conviction which came from the law
was principally the work of the Spirit. Owen never
separated the law from the Spirit; so even the law was
subordinate to the merciful and gracious working of the
Holy Spirit. Owen went even further. Repentance (true
evangelical repentance) came through the law but
fundamentally it was due to "Gospel Grace". 88 In this
way he implied that repentance and faith were not
84 
Owen, Holy Spirit, p.193.
85 Owen, Doctrine of Justification (1677), Goold ed., V, p.98.
86 Owen, Greater Catechist, p.476 and also Hebrews, vol. 1, p.66.
87 Owen, Of Catania, p.179.
88 Owen, Hebrews, vol. 3., p.18.
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sharply distinct because, "Repentance is either legal,
servile, and terrifying, from the spirit of bondage; or
evangelical, filial, and comforting, from the Spirit of
free grace and liberty, which only is available." "
In this way he explained that preachers needed to be
careful when using the law:
It is their [preachers] duty to plead
with men about their sins, to lay load
on particular sins, but always remember,
that it is done with that which is the
proper end of law and gospel: that is,
that they make use of sin they speak
against, to the discovery of the state
and condition wherein the sinner is;
otherwise, haply they may work men to
formality and hypocrisy, but with little
of the true end of preaching the gospel
will be brought about.	 It will not
avail to beat
	
a man off from his
drunkenness, into a sober formality.	 A
skillful master of assemblies lays 111,
axe at the root, drives at the heart.
According to Owen, merely having illumination,
conviction and reformation was not enough. In fact,
Owen went so far as to suggest that while there are
certain "previous and preparatory works, or workings in
and upon the souls of men, that are antecedent and
dispositive unto it", nevertheless, "regeneration doth
not consist in them, nor can it be deduced out of
them." 91
Owen, like	 Bunyan and	 Baxter, insisted on	 a
willingness. 92 Owen, however, more clearly than Baxter
and Bunyan, argued that this willingness was not
89 Owen, Greater Catechiso, pp.487-88.
90 Owen, Of the Mortification of Sin in Believers (1656), Goold ed., VI, pp. 38-39.
91 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.191.
92 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.198. See also Doctrine of Justification, pp.100-01.
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synonymous with preparation or even the result of
common grace, but was the fruit of the Spirit's work
and the consequence of God's grace in the effectual
call.	 This had particular implications for the
will's role in conversion.
Owen maintained that in conversion the will was
initially passive. There was no co-operating action
"to our turning". It was "not, I say, the cause of the
work, but the subject wherein it is wrought, 'having
only a passive capability for the receiving of that
94supernatural being, which is introduced by grace."
Owen was emphatic, "that in the order of nature, the
Acting of Grace in the will in our conversion is
antecedent unto its own acting." 	 Still, Owen never
minimised the importance of the will in the stages
prior to justification. His voluntarism was evident.
In his exegesis of Hebrews 6.1 he wrote,
It is our turning unto God; our turning
from him being the bent and inclination
of our Wills and Affections unto sin.
The change of the Will, or taking away
the will of sinning is the principal
part of repentance. It is with respect
unto our wills that we are said to be
dead in sin, and alienated from the life
of God. And by this change of the will,
do we become dead unto sin. Rom 6.2 that
is, whatever remainder of lust or
corruption there may be in us 46 yet the
will of sinning is taken away.
Owen similarly never denied the importance
	 of
external	 means as	 aids	 in leading	 sinners to
93 Gwen, Holy Spirit, p.105.
14 Owen, A Display of Arwinianiss, p.134.
95 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.272.
96 Owen, Hebrews, vol. 3., p.13.
285
justification.
	 It was necessary to demonstrate ff a
diligent attention of mind to the means of grace to
understand and receive the things revealed and declared
97as the mind and will of God." 	 It was through these
means
	
that
	
God	 ordinarily saved	 sinners.	 98
Nevertheless, even on this Owen wished to qualify:
In the most diligent use of outward
means, men are not able of themselves to
attain unto regeneration, or complete
conversion to God, without an especial,
effectual, internal work of the 41oly
Spirit of grace on the whole soul.
If we look then at Baxter and Owen (with a contrast
in Bunyan) it is evident that some of the themes of
earlier	 preparationism	 continued	 into	 the
mid-seventeenth century.	 They both recognised the
experiential truth that a long process was involved.
Second, they accepted the use of the law as
	 a
preparatory means; but Baxter did not go as far as did
Owen and Bunyan. Finally, both Baxter and Owen
acknowledged the importance of the appointed means by
which God ordinarily prepared sinners. Owen, however,
was hesitant to place a confidence either in common
grace or in human willingness apart from the powerful
dynamic of the Spirit's regenerating work.
5.5 The irresistibility of God's call 
It has been argued so far in this chapter that
justification encompassed the meeting of the divine
97 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.193.
98 
Owen, Holy Spirit, p.193.
99 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.193.
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initiative and the human response. The nexus of these
two was an encounter shaped by the election of the
saints yet also the involvement of a preparatory use of
the law.	 It is important to ask now whether these
doctrinal assertions were	 consistent with puritan
experience. In short, was it merely inevitable that
the elect came to faith?	 How much did the human
response matter to the justification of the saints? It
is asserted in this section that the question of
irresistibility warrants investigation in order to
ascertain the vitality of voluntarism in justification.
Puritan preachers saw that many in their congregation
did not respond to the gospel, or if a few did only a
handful seemed to progress in the Christian life. 100
For the puritan pastor, the question was inescapable:
are only a few to be saved? To be sure, the doctrine
of reprobation was accepted. Nevertheless, this theory
presented existential	 tensions. Not only 	 was it
difficult to discern the
more often than not prior
saints experienced lives
elect from the reprobate, but
to their conversion even the
of sin and alienation from
God. As men and women looked back at their experience
many saw how they fought against God and lived in sin
and rebellion: witness Nehemiah Wallington's paroxysms
of guilt and remorse and Bunyan's testimony in Grace
Abounding to the Chief of Sinners (1666). 101	 Even
those like Baxter, who were not clear as to the
100 Baxter, A Christian Directory (1673), Orme ed., Vol. 2, pp.91-93, expressed his
frustration and alarm.
101	
For Nehemiah Wallington see Seaver, Hallingtan's Hand. This theme runs
throughout the whole of Seaver's presentation.
102
103
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particular moment when they first believed, could
easily see how much they had resisted God's movements
of grace. 102 Theimplication was practical: obviously
even the elect resist God's call to an extent; did
this, then, imply the necessity of human agency or a
weakness in divine grace ? A number of answers were
given.
John	 Owen argued	 that the
	 call of	 God was
irresistible. He maintained this position because he
saw the specific moment of justifying faith as proof of
an antecedent decree of God (hidden to the believer but
known to God). Because God's will and purpose in his
decree of election was immutable and infallible, the
faith of the elect was sure and infallible. Commenting
on Romans 11.29 Owen wrote, "The gifts and calling of
God', are said to be, 'without repentance': the gifts
of his effectual calling (Iv d..a au.) shall never be
repented of. They are from him, with whom there is no
change." 103	 Against the moderate Arminian, John
Goodwin, who suggested that election and reprobation
were not determined solely by God's decree but upon the
subsequent faithfulness of the individual, Owen claimed
that before actual faith God first moved with grace and
mercy. 104 Inhis treatise on the Holy Spirit Owen
insisted that the Spirit's work in the effectual call,
"is always infallible, victorious, irresistible or
always efficacious." 	 He went on to argue, "Wherefore
Baxter, Reliquiae I. pp.5-7.
Owen, Saints Perseverance, p.122.
104
	
	
('Owen, Saints Perseverance, p.122. For John Goodwin see Dia, vol 221145.
288
in or towards whomsoever the Holy Spirit puts forth his
power, or acts of his grace for their regeneration, it
removes all obstacles, overcomes all oppositions, and
infallibly produceth the effect intended." 105
Nevertheless, Owen acknowledged that individuals
indeed resisted the outward call of God. The external
means of grace - preaching, the reading of Scripture,
acts of obedience, exhortations, etc. - were resisted
by the human will and understanding. Still, the inner
movement of grace and the Holy Spirit were invincible.
In his first publication (1643) Owen wrote:
The operation of grace is resisted by no
hard heart, because it mollifies the
heart itself. It doth not so much take
away a power of resisting, as gives a
will of obeying, whereby the poweful
impotency of resistance is removed. 1"
Later in 1654 and again in 1674 Owen admitted that
there was resistance to God's call by the elect but
their resistance and reluctance were conquered by the
inner power of the Holy Spirit which created a
complying will where there was once a pugnacious will.t°7
44-7-
Baxter suggested that in a general sense the call of
God could be resisted by the human will, even though
the elect would not resist this forever. Unlike Owen,
however, Baxter did not base his argument on the
immutability of God's eternal decrees. He stressed
that the question of irresistibility was irrelevant
105 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.270.
106 Owen, A Display of Arninianisn, p.134.
107 
Owen,Saints Perseverance, pP.174-175; see also Holy Spirit, p.271
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because God's decree in eternity could only meet with
human resistance by those who exist actually in time.
This was a difficult philosophical and metaphysical
argument. What he meant was that election had more to
do with God's knowledge of a certain event rather than
the decree of the event.
Baxter contended that it was conversion which was
irresistible. On one occasion he wrote, "but eventually
the Grace of the Spirit in conversion is insuperable:
for God will overcome the resistance of his elect." 108
Asked whether this conversion was infallible Baxter
responded that it was, but only to the extent that it
related to God's knowledge of the event, not in
relation to God's will, purpose or resolution; this
differed from Owen's view as detailed above. Baxter
claimed that divine determination was an ambiguous
term: again, how could God predetermine an individual
to believe when the person did not exist from eternity
but in time? 109 Nevertheless, even the inevitable
certainty	 of the	 elect's faith	 never precluded
resistance.	 In Catholick Theologie (1675) Baxter
offered a detailed explanation of the resistance which
the elect gave:
Mans sinful soul resisteth God's
gracious operations, all these ways. 1.
It is passively become undisposed to
reception: And thus he is said to have a
hard heart of stone, and a seared
conscience, and to be dead and past
feeling, Eph 4.18,19 and 2.1,2. 2. It
doth not do what it can do morally to
receive grace, that is, it doth not
108 Baxter, Letter to Samuel Whittell, March 9,1654, Baxter MS Treatises 7, item
270, p.321.
109 See above pp.254-55.
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conari or suscitate	 it self to be
willing of it. 3. Yea, it doth
positively resist by action, and is
unwilling of God's gracious operations:
And this is twofold, 1. By willing the
contrary, and prosecuting carnal
interest, over-loving the pleasures of
the flesh, and so turning away from the
motions of grace, 2. And therefore by an
enmity to that grace and work, which
would convert Nm, and take him off his
chosen Idols.
It was this resistance, what Baxter frequently
called unwillingness, which he strove to overcome in
his role as a preacher and writer: "I beseech thee, I
charge thee, to hear and obey the call of God, and
resolvedly to turn, that thou may live." Hi Baxter
stressed the urgent need for grace in order to repent
and respond to God's call. Baxter referred to the
debility of the human will with respect to the call of
God. As he explained, only by "excitation,
illumination and right Disposition" is one turned.
Nevertheless, Baxter noted in 1691,
But as to the said right Disposition, or
moral power, no one can truly repent and
believe without that grace which must so
dispose him: common grace must dispose
him to a common fait12, and special grace
to a saving faith.
Did both really differ so much? 	 Certainly they
arrived	 at	 their	 conclusions	 from	 different
assumptions.
	 Both held to a high doctrine of grace.
Equally, they agreed that the elect were predestined to
saving faith.	 Baxter and Owen appreciated, however,
110 Baxter, Catholick Theologie, p.21.
111 Baxter, Call to the Unconverted, Preface
112 Baxter, An End to Doctrinal Controversies, p.177 also Baxter, Catholict:Theologif,,
p.13.
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the necessity of human response. Yes, they both
argued, there was a resistance of sorts: it was common
experience among the converted to recall and regret the
ways in which they resisted the saving overtures of
mercy. But this experiential awareness was actually
part of the paradox: ultimately the elect would be
saved and come to faith; their resistance would change
into compliance.	 Owen linked this inevitability with
his Christology: by the death of Christ the elect were
brought to saving faith. On the whole, Baxter also
thought that there was a certain infallibility: how he
arrived at this conclusion was not so much due to the
decree of God in predestination as with the nature of
grace. Was this a great difference of opinion?
Fundamentally it was not, yet the way in which they
arrived at their answers reflects, once again, their
disparate views on the covenant and faith. What is
striking, however, is that they both recognized the
paramount importance of willingness: the reprobate were
unwilling to repent, the faithful were ultimately
willing.
Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with the interaction
of the divine initiative and the human response. It is
possible to isolate these two in a doctrinal analysis,
but this defies the reality of puritan theology and
experience. The divine initiative and the human
response were not mutually exclusive: there was an
almost inscrutable meeting of the two. Baxter and Owen
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at times wrote about the two in such a way as to
suggest that one could be examined apart from the
other, but their ultimate intention was to explain to
their readers how they could make sense of their
Christian experience. The mid-seventeenth century
puritan looked intently at the ordo salutis to see if
his experience of grace made sense. For the lack of a
better expression, there was a sanctified self-
suspicion: they were instructed by Baxter and Owen to
rest not so much upon their own activity (essential yet
frequently failing) but on Christ and the covenant
promises. Baxter and Owen addressed the believers'
concerns in such a way as to safeguard (they believed)
the extremes of both Arminianism and Antinomianism.
What has emerged in this chapter is how they both
argued that the divine initiative was neither minimized
nor thwarted by the human response. Equally, both
underscored the importance of a willing response: the
intellect was crucial, but the will was vital. On this
assumption, what Baxter and Owen had to write about the
practical issues of Christian living and the ultimate
hope of assurance involved a voluntarism. 	 How this
voluntarism was exercised practically is the issue
examined next.
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Chapter Six
VOLUNTARISM IN PRACTICE: A WILLINGNESS IN DUTIES 
Introduction 
The driving force of puritan spirituality involved
an important "willingness". This meant an active self-
involvement on the part of those following Jesus
Christ, moved and influenced by grace and the Holy
Spirit. The importance of voluntarism becomes all the
more apparent in this chapter when the role of the will
in the Christian life is investigated. For as stated
in thc chapter 1, puritan divinity was practical
1divinity.
	
There was a subjective or experiential
element within puritan theology. This element was a
counter-point to the objective realm of doctrinal
truth. Peter Lake, in Moderate Puritans and the
Elizabethan Church, has put it well.
Puritan	 practical	 divinity	 centred
around the exploitation of the gap, the
anxiety-filled rift, that separated
those two levels. This was done by a
subtle shift of perspective from the
objective basis provided by the doctrine
of predestination to the situation of
the individual believer confronted by
the knowledge that some men were elect
and others reprobate and yet denied an
answer to the key question of his own
status relative to those two groups. The
preacher	 thereupon	 confronted	 the
believer with a description of the
objective characteristics of a godly or
elect person. But in the final analysis
the individual's position depended on
his own view of himself, on his own
choice of whether fully to internalis,9
and appropriate those qualities or not.'
1 See above, p.69.
2 Lake, Moderate Puritans, p.156.
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It is to this internalisation or appropriation of
the puritan godly self that this chapter turns. We
will examine how Baxter and Owen viewed practical
problems of the Christian life in a voluntaristic way.
This can be seen in the way in which Baxter and Owen
explained how God's grace related to the duties which
the godly were expected to perform. Accordingly, this
chapter will begin (6.1) with a study of the
relationship between grace and duty. Four issues will
be involved here: first, it will be necessary to
consider (6.1.1) how Baxter and Owen viewed duties as
dependent upon the influence of the Spirit; second,
(6.1.2), how they argued that grace was improved as a
person performed evangelical duties; third, (6.1.3),
how duties involved the use of means; and, finally,
(6.1.4), why, according to Baxter and Owen, duties were
subordinate to a trust in Christ's merits. The chapter
will then examine, (6.2), the fundamental duty of
fighting sin and growing in holiness, for here the
essential nature of voluntarism in practice can be
seen. This will involve in (6.2.1) studying how Baxter
and Owen	 explained the reality and	 problems of
indwelling sin.	 The chapter will conclude in (6.2.2)
_
with their teaching on the duty of mortification. It
will be shown that mortification was seen as a duty
dependent upon grace and the Holy Spirit; but it also
necessitated a deliberate willingness.	 Thus in this
chapter Baxter and Owen's voluntarism in practice will
be presented.	 The doctrinal framework delineated in
[	 the previous four chapters has to be understood as the
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practical implications are examined in this chapter.
6.1 Grace complemented by duty 
In 1643 John Owen wrote, "holiness, whereof faith is
the root, and obedience the body, is that whereunto,
and not for which, we are elected." 3 The pursuit of
holiness was a prominent aspect of puritan practical
theology. The seriousness of the "godly" of both the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can be explained as
a result of an interpretation of the Bible which
stressed the necessity of obedience, godliness and
faithfulness. This emphasis was in no way opposed to
the doctrine of justification. Holiness was not
meritorious on its own; still, it was appropriately
necessary.	 Richard Baxter was not vitriolic when he
asked in 1650,
Where is the man that is serious in his
Christianity? Methinks men do everywhere
make but a trifle of their eternal
state. They look after it but a little
upon the by; they do not make it the
task and business of their lives. 7
Owen agreed: the task and business of the saints were
to evidence, "the other internal changes of the Mind,
Will and Affections to be real and sincere. "5
Baxter and Owen	 followed the axiom of earlier
Reformers: sanctification was the goal of election and
3	
Owen, Display of Rrminianist, p.66.
4	
Baxter, Saints Rest, Ore ed., Vol 22, p.451.
5	
Owen, Hebrews, Vol. 3, p.13.
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God's intention and purpose in the daily provision of
grace to his people. Sanctifying grace implied duty:
for such the saints were intended.	 Calvin insisted
that, "Christ cannot be known apart from the
sanctification of his Spirit. It follows that faith can
in no wise be separated from a devout disposition."
Commenting upon Romans 8.13 Calvin made the following
distinction:
Let believers, therefore, learn to
embrace Him, not only for justification,
but also for sanctification, as He has
been given to us for both these
purposes, that they may not rend H4m
asunder by their own mutilated faith.
Calvin maintained that repentance was a life-long
process, involving mortification and vivification.
Mortification was based in the death and burial of
Christ, in which the believer denied himself and
repented daily for his sins. 	 Vivification came by the
risen and triumphant Christ and his Holy Spirit which
created the new nature within the believer. 	 The
process of mortification and vivification was lengthy,t.,
but one to which God was actively committed:
through continual and sometimes even
slow advances God wipes out in his elect
the corruptions of the flesh, cleanses
them of guilt, consecrates them to
himself as temples renewing all their
minds to true purity that they may
practice repentance throughout their
lives and know t4t this warfare will
end only at death.
It was not that the saints were sinless or arrived at
6	
Calvin, Instit. III.ii.8; OS, IV, p.18: fides a pio affectu nullo modo esse
distrahendam. See also Con. on 1 Peter 1.15, p.245.
7 Calvin, Con. on Romans 8.13, p.167.
8 Calvin, Instit. III.iii.8.
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perfection; it was a life—long and often disturbed
progression. Nevertheless, sin had lost its dominion.
Through the merits of Christ's righteousness, death on
the cross, resurrection from the dead and his Spirit,
God worked in his people a new life. 9
 Always it was
God who initiated sanctification.	 Still, believers
were responsible for coordinate action, they were to
live in a manner which corresponded to their calling:
we are adopted on the ground that He
should in turn have us as His obedient
children. Although obedience does not
make us his children, since the gift of
adoption	 is	 gratuitous,	 yet
distinguishes children from foreigners."
When Calvin described the life of a Christian man he
insisted that his life must manifest a "harmony and
agreement between God's righteousness and their
obedience, and thus to confirm the adoption that they
have received as sons." 12 Holiness was to be the bond
of the Christian's union with God because God could
only associate with what was clean. Only Christ's death
cleansed sinners and enabled them to be with the holy. 2
9 See Calvin, Co,,. on Romans 6.4, p.I23.
10 See Calvin, Coss. on 1 Thessalonians 5.23, p.280.
11 Calvin, COIL on 1 Peter 1.14, p.244. Later in chapter 7 reference will be made
to the issue of sanctification and assurance. At this point, however, note Calvin's
suggestion that holy living 'distinguishes" children from foreigners. Who is it that
perceives this distinguishing? Consider what Calvin wrote when commenting on 2 Peter 1.10 (a
classicas locus for the practical syllogism): "purity of life is rightly regarded as the
illustration and evidence of election, whereby the faithful not only show to others that they
are the sons of God, but also confirm themselves in this faith, but in such a way that they
place their sure foundations elsewhere.", p.334. Here Calvin accepted some degree of
self-evidence, but the qualifier was, 'their sure foundations elsewhere". The sure foundation
was Christ's accomplished work on the cross and his continuous intercession.
12
Calvin, Instit. III.vi.l. See also Coos. on I Thess 4.3, pp. 358-59 and Coss. on
Psalm 1.1,2 (Calvin Translation Society, Anderson edition, 1845), p.3.
13
Calvin,
	 on Hebrews 12.14, p.195.
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Calvin called this not a doctrine of the tongue but of
the heart. Every part of the saints' being must be
involved in the call to holiness. 14
For we have been adopted as sons by the
Lord with this one condition: that our
life express Christ, the bond of our
adoption. Accordingly, unless we give
and devote ourselves to righteousness,
we not only revolt from our Creator with
wicked perfidy 15but also abjure our
Savior himself.
Much of	 what Calvin wrote about the grace of
sanctification and duties was echoed by William
Perkins. In 1557 Perkins insisted that the "beginnings
of grace are counterfeit unless they increase.., namely
that they grow up and increase as a grain of mustard
seed to a great tree and bear fruit answerably." 16
Perkins also explained that sanctification involved
mortification and vivification. Mortification was the
first part of sanctification "whereby the power of sin
is	 abated	 and	 crucified	 in	 the	 faithful".
Vivification was the second part "whereby an inherent
holiness being begun is still augmented and enlarged". 17
Perkins argued that holiness was begun by God and
continued by him; but man was obliged to live a life
appropriate to God's grace. M.M. Knappen, in his
edition of the diaries of two Elizabethan puritan
divines, Richard Rogers and Samuel Ward, has suggested
14 Calvin, Instit. III.vi .4; CR, XXX, p.504; Non enim linguae est doctrina, sed
vitae; nec intellectu memoriaque duntaxat apprehenditur, ut reliquae disciplinae, sed tum
recipitur denum ubi animam totam possidet, sedemque et receptaculum invenit in intimo cordis
affectu.
15 Calvin, Instit. III.vi .3.
16 Perkins, A Grain of Mustard Seed in Breward, Perkins, pp.404-05
17 Perkins, A Golden Chain in Breward, Perkins, pp.234-35.
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that it was this ethical element which was the most
striking part of puritan practice. He defined this as
the strong pursuit of "godliness" through God-appointed
means and duties. Richard Rogers recorded in his diary
on November 29, 1587:
And this is mine harty desire that I may
make godliness, I meane one part or
other of it, to be my delight through my
whole life, as this month hath been a
good beginning thereof, which in this
time hath been no hard yoke to me,
though at some times heretofore an
estate most difficult to enter into. And
this carefull observinge and watchinge
over my heart in particulars I doe farre
better like 10of and goe forward in thenheretofore.
Similarly Samuel Ward decried his laziness in his
pursuit of godliness, specifically having failed in
his duties: failure to prepare for Chapel, drowsiness
in Sunday worship, inattentiveness to the sermon,
weakness in prayer, failing to repeat the day's sermon
at home, excessive eating and as negligence towards the
poor. 19
It	 is	 important,	 nonetheless, to	 make four
important general observations about duties. First,
the life of holiness and sanctification was seen by
these puritans as a work of grace initiated by the
Spirit. Richard Sibbes stressed that "Grace conquers us
first, and we by it conquer all things else... „. 20
Puritan practice accepted a coordination between grace
18 Knappen, Two Puritan Diaries,p.65. Richard Rogers (1550-1616), was a lecturer at
Wethersfield, Essex. Published in 1592 an important work entitled, Seven Treatises. Samuel
Ward (1577-1640) was one time 'lecturer" at Haverhill, Suffolk and later at Ipswich.
19 Knappen, Two Puritan Diaries, p.108.
20 Sibbes, Braised Reede, p.300.
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and duties and built upon this foundation. Secondly,
the works of holiness were not seen as meritorious
apart from the merit, person and ministry of Jesus
Christ. Any stress on duty was not meant to be at the
exclusion of Christ's work and a faith in him. Years
later, but consistent nevertheless, William Allen, a
close associate of Baxter, argued that duty was not
opposed to justification by faith; works of evangelical
obedience were inferior and subordinate to Christ: "So
long as the stress which is laid on duty, terminates in
Christ, in God's will and appointments in the new
covenant, and is regulated by his word and promise,
there is no danger of our over charging Duty."
Third, faith was presupposed in the specific duties.
Duties apart from faith resulted in hypocrisy, faith
apart from duties was insincerity. Finally, it was
understood that the righteousness of sanctification was
not merely imputed but also inherent. In short, grace
was improved as it was used by the believer in holy
works of evangelical obedience. To be sure, sin and
failure caused an existential tension for the saints,
hence the oft-repeated themes of warfare, conflict, and
struggle. Still, it was assumed that godliness would
be evidenced in particular actions, duties and works.
To quote Richard Sibbes again, "The whole conversation
of a Christian is nothing else but knowledge digested
into will, affection and practice." 22 It was not just
21	 •	 •
Witham Allen, A Discoorse...Two Covenants, (1673), Appendix, p.212 but
misnumbered 312.
22 Sibbes, Braised Reede, p.265.
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in particular duties but, as Thomas Goodwin, who was a
close friend and colleague of Owen, wrote in 1641, in a
"universal extent and latitude". 23
The four general points introduced here need to be
noted before examining Baxter and Owen. The Christian
had been rescued by God for eternal life. In this life
the Christian's life had to manifest holiness and for
this holiness God provided sanctifying grace. As the
next four subsections on Baxter and Owen's thought
detail, while sanctification was seen as a work of
grace, nevertheless certain duties were understood as
coordinate corollaries.
6.1.1 Duties always dependent upon grace 
Baxter and Owen argued that a believer's holiness,
however weak and faltering, was due to God's grace
through the Spirit.
	 Owen stressed that holiness only
occurred by the work of God's Spirit.
	 He referred
specifically to Spirit-created 'habits'. A habit was,
A vertue„ a	 power, a principle of
Spiritual Life and Grace, wrought,
created, infused into our Souls, and
in-laid in all the Faculties of them,
constantly abiding, and unchangeably
residing in them, which is antecedent
unto, and the next cause„of all Acts of
true Holiness whatever.
In an earlier work he had insisted that the 'habit
of grace' was infused in the believer and not merely
23 Thomas Goodwin, The Tryall of a Christians 6rowth, (1641, another ed.,1643),
p.78.
24 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.416; also see Owen, Of Companion, p.200.
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acquired by the frequency of holy acts. "The root is
made good, and then the fruit." 25 Habits of grace were
the direct consequence of the sanctifying work of the
Spirit. Owen was concerned to explain the centrality
of the Spirit in sanctification. His chief aim was to
be pastoral and practical. 26 Holiness was the result
of the triune God's operations, but it was the special
work of the Spirit.
There
	
is	 not	 any Spiritual
	 or
Saving—Good from first to last
communicated unto us, or that we are
from and by the Grace of God made
Partakers of, but it is revealed to us
and bestowed on us by the Holy Ghost.
He who hath not an immediate and
especial Work of the Spirit of God upon
him and towards him, did never receive
any especial Love, Grace or Mercy from
God. For how should he so do? Whatever
God works in us,. and upon us he doth it
by his Spirit.
It was the Spirit's work to create the necessary
willingness in believers to do the works and duties of
holy living. The drive in Owen's argument must be
appreciated:
There is therefore necessary such a work
of the Holy Spirit upon our Wills, as
may cure and take away the Depravation
of them before described, freeing us
from the state of Spiritual Death,
causing us to live unto God, determining
them in and unto the Acts of Faith and
Obedience. And this he doth, whilst, and
as he makes us new creatures, quickens
us who are dead in Trespasses and sins,
25 
Owen, Saints Perseverance, p.97.
26 Geoffrey Nuttall has written: 'Neither Owen nor any of his fellow authors is
concerned to deny or to controvert the classic expressions of the doctrine. Their concern is
rather to draw out its implications for faith and practice. What is new, and what justifies
Owen in his claim to be among the pioneers, is the place given in Puritan exposition to
experience, and its acceptance as a primary authority...Their interest is primarily not
dogmatic, at least not in any theoretic sense, it is experimental.' The Holy Spirit in
Puritan Faith and Experience, p.7.
27 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.11; see also Gwen, Holy Spirit, pp.82,164 and 165.
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gives us a new Heart, and puts a new
Spirit within us, writes his Law in our
Hearts, that we may do the Mind of God,
and walk in his Wayes; worketh in us to
will and to do, making them who were
unwilling and obstinate, to become
willing and,mobedient and that freely and
of choice.
Accordingly, claimed Owen, through infused spiritual
habits believers were prompted into corresponding acts
of holiness. They were not merely persuaded to
holiness: God actually worked in them to will and to
do. n To be sure, Owen never denied that Christians
needed a fresh, daily, supply of actual grace, but his
point was that holiness was always the consequence of
antecedent work by the Spirit. n
Baxter also
	 highlighted the work of the Spirit. In
Christian Directory he presented a doctrine of the
Spirit similar to Owen's.
The same Holy	 Spirit assisteth the
sanctified, in the exercise of this
grace,	 to the increase	 of it, by
blessing and concurring with the means
appointed by him to that	 end; and
helpeth them to use those means, perform
their duties, conquer temptations,
oppositions, and difficulties, and so
conf4meth and preserveth them to the
end. "
Baxter described the Spirit's role in the Christian
life as, "the Spring to all your spiritual motions; as
the wind to your sails: you can do nothing without
28 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.284.
29 Owen, Holy Spirit, pp.335, 411,517 and 520.
30 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.465.
31 Baxter, Christian Directory, Orme ed., vol 2, p.191.
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it. " "
Interestingly, however, whereas Owen stressed quite
clearly the antecedent efficacy of the Spirit in the
performance of duties - of course, never denying the
agency of human activity - Baxter hesitated to go so
far. Instead he preferred to see an inextricable
interconnection between the work of the Spirit in the
duty and the means of that duty. "There is an
admirable, unsearchable concurrence of the Spirit, and
his appointed means, and the will of man in the
procreation of the new creature, and in all exercises
of grace...".	 Nevertheless, he went on to say,
The more to blame those foolish
atheists, that think God or the Spirit
is not the cause, if they can but find
that reason and means are in the effect.
Your reason, and conscience, and means
would fall short of the effe4, if the
Spirit put not life into all. al
On the whole, it was not that this difference between
Baxter and Owen was due to a major doctrinal
disagreement; rather it was a matter of emphasis.
Baxter stressed	 the importance and
	 necessity of
personal obedience in the Christian life. Owen,
equally concerned to urge a life of holiness, referred
to the promise of the Spirit's efficacious aid. Baxter
was concerned to counter presumption, Owen to counter
moralism.
32 Baxter, Christian Directory, p.197.
33 Baxter, Christian Directory, P.193.
34 Baxter, Christian Directory, One ed., vol 2, p.198.
35 See chapter 1, p.S9 for the implications of moralism as an issue in seventeenth
century puritan theology.
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Three reasons explain this difference of emphasis,
for Baxter did not minimize the importance of the Holy
Spirit. First, as mentioned in chapter 1 of this
thesis Baxter, was concerned with certain Antinomian
influences, hence he emphasized the necessity of active
participation in the use of means. 36 Second, Baxter
also questioned whether habits of grace necessitated
coordinating holy duties or acts. "And we hold that yet
the habits of Grace do not necessitate this or that
particular act of obedience or Love, but it is too
possible	 to	 sin	 by	 omission	 Or	 commission
notwithstanding these habits." 37 Owen never denied
sins of omission or commission; still, "an habitual
Reserve for any thing that is sinfull or Morally evil,
is eternally inconsistent	 with this Principle of
Holiness."	 Third, Baxter made the controversial
claim that evangelical works of obedience were a
coordinate, albeit	 subordinate, condition of 	 the
covenant of grace.	 In a section of his Aphorismes of
Justification (1649) he presented an exposition of
James 2.20-26.	 Baxter denied that James was merely
describing a "working faith", that is a faith which
produced congruent works.
	 He argued that this was to
misinterpret James' intention.
For when the Apostle saith, that Faith
did gpYoug abroD Koanrale tOlov„ work in
and with his works, It clearly aimeth at
such a working in, and with, as maketh
36 See above pp.56-57 and p.62.
37 Baxter, Catholick Theologie, pt. II, p.BI.
38 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.426.
39 See Baxter, gphcrispes, pp.235-36.
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them conjungt
	 in	 the work	 of
justifying...'
This was not moralism per se, rather Baxter maintained,
"the continuance and accomplishment of Justification is
not without the joynt procurement of obedience."
Baxter put it this way in The Life of Faith:
A Dead opinionative belief, may stand
with a worldly fleshly life; but a
working faith will make you strive, and
make the things of God your businesse:
and the labour and industry of your
lives will shew, whether ,myou soundly
believe the things unseen.
Despite this difference Baxter and Owen agreed on
one point: there had to be a demonstrable and active
growth in holiness. The Spirit prompted growth and
advancement. Sluggishness and laziness were signs of
trouble. How should the believer fight these problems?
Mid-seventeenth century puritans referred to the use of
God-appointed duties; duties were where one could find
the means of grace, and grace was furthered as grace
was employed.
6.1.2 Grace improved as duties were performed 
Both Baxter and Owen argued that there must be a
forward movement in the Christian life. Grace was
given for this purpose; the Spirit was bestowed in
order to initiate and move men and women into further
growth in	 the way of grace	 and sanctification.
Nevertheless, the believer's personal endeavours must
40 Baxter, Aphorises, p.157.
41	
Baxter, Ophorismes of Jastification, Thesis 76, p. 302; also see Baxter,
Justification, p.113 and Baxter, No or Never, p.131.
42 Baxter, The life of Faith (1660), p.34.
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also occur.
	 Diligence was expected, activity was
assumed. What is important to note is the way in which
Baxter
	 and	 Owen	 explained this	 necessity and
assumption.
	
Commenting upon Hebrews 3.14, John Owen
wrote:
It is true our Persistency in Christ,
doth not as to the Issue and Event
depend absolutely on our own diligence.
The unalterableness of our union with
Christ on the account of the
faithfulness of the Covenant of Grace,
is that which doth and shall eventually
secure it. But yet our own diligent
endeavour is such an indispensable means
for that end, as that without it, it
will not be brought about. For it is
necessary to the continuance of our
subsistency in Christ, both necessitate
praecepti, as that which God hath
Commanded us to make use of for that
End; and necessitate medii, as it is in
the Order and Relation of Spiritual
things one to another, ordained of God
to effect it. For our persistence in our
Subsistence in Christ, is the emergency
and effecr„ of our acting Grace unto that
purpose.
Holy duty was prescribed because within the covenant
of grace God had appointed duties and works which were
coordinate and suitable. By suitable Baxter and Owen
meant: a man prayed because through the covenant he was
a child of God; he listened and studied the word of God
because it was words for him; he fought with sin
because sin was contrary to the character of God and
the new character given to him by God.
The duties to which divines like Baxter and Owen
frequently referred were numerous. Yet the chief duty
of the Christian life was to watch and work upon one's
heart. Within puritan ,rhetoric there was a strong call
43	 Owen, Hebrews, Volume 2, p.149.
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for self-suspicion.	 Baxter urged his readers in
Saints Everlasting Rest,
Let most of your daily work be upon your
hearts: be still suspicious of them;
understand their moral wickedness and
deceitfulness, and trust them not too
far. Practice that great duty of daily
watching: pray earnestly that you be not
led into temptation: Fear the beginnings
and appearances of sin. BewAre lest
conscience lose its tenderness."
Owen was equally insistent. "This doth he who hath
communion with Christ: he watcheth diligently over his
own heart, that nothing creep into its affections, to
give it any peace or establishment	 before God, but
Christ 4nly." 45 This primary duty of 'watching' or
'crucifying' was never meant to be done in a spirit of
fear. Believers were in the covenant of grace; there
was to be a fear, but a filial fear which was the
result of love and faith. John Bunyan wrote in A Few
Sighs From Hell (1658), "and yet Christ hath justified
thee freely by his grace, thou will serve him in
holiness and righteousness all the days of thy life,
yet not in a legal spirit, or in a covenant of works;
but mine obedience, say thou, I will endeavour to have
46it free and cheerful, out of love to my Lord Jesus."
Commenting upon Hebrews 3.12-14, John Owen explained,
Fear is necessary in continual Exercise.
Not a fear of Distrust or Diffidence, of
anxious Scrupulosity, but of Care Duty
and Diligence. Continually to fear
Dangers in all things, brings an useless
perplexing Scrupulosity, where 	 mens
Principle of duty is only an harassed
44 Baxter, Saints Everlasting Rest, Dedication, One ed., vol 22, p.13.
45
Owen, Of Cossanion, Banner of Truth reprint of Boold edition, Vol. 2, p. 148;
cf. pp. 149-50.
46 Bunyan, A Fes Sighs Fros Hell, Offor ed., Vol.	 p.724.
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convinced conscience, and the Rule of it
is the Doctrines and Traditions of men.
But where the Principle of it is the
Spirit of Grace, with all this fear
there is Liberty; and where the Rule of
it is the Word	 there is Safety Peace47and Stability.
In this daily watching and self-examination the
basis was always faith in Christ, his work on the cross
as the atoning and ransoming sacrifice and his Spirit.
As the saints watched themselves it was always within
the realm of the Covenant. The Father's mercy, love,
grace and justice were to be considered. The Son's
cross, intercession, care for sinners, and purity were
to be prized. 48 Only in this context could the summons
to particular duties - prayer, reading the Bible,
listening to sermons, study, corporate fellowship,
family instruction and devotion, redeeming the time,
purifying one's thoughts, curbing the passions and
considering the life to come - be considered.° One's
security in Christ was not on the merit of these
duties, but these duties were absolutely appropriate.
As Baxter put it in 1669, "He that is resolved to bring
us to Glory, is as much resolved to bring us to it by
perseverance in Holiness and diligent obedience; for he
never decreeth one without the other; and he will never
save us by any other way." 5°
47 Owen, Hebrems, Vol. 2, p.116.
48 Owen, Holy Spirit, pp.401-05.
49 Owen, Of Cormanion, p.272; Owen, Hebrems, Vol. 1, pp.156-60; Baxter, Saints Rest,
Orme ed., vol 22, p.6; Baxter, Last Mork of a Believer, To the Reader.
50	
Baxter, Directions for Weak Christians (1669) which was the second part of
Directions for Meek Distespered Christians to Grow op to a Confirmed State of Grace (1669)
p.90.
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The argument in this present section so far can be
summarised as follows. Both Baxter and Owen wished to
avoid the excesses of Antinomianism and the problems of
moralism. Accordingly, both maintained that grace was
found and improved as grace was employed in the ways
and duties which God's Word suggested. The issue was
heightened by the pressures which many Calvinists of
the period felt from Antinomianism. Divines like
Baxter, and even Owen, tried to show how they could
stress the role of grace while never doing so at the
expense of personal holiness and diligence. These
divines criticised what they saw as the dangerous
implications of Antinomian doctrine and so attempted to
show how grace and duty went hand in hand.
John Owen declared, "the due Assertion of Grace
never was nor never can be an obstruction unto any Duty
of Obedience." 51 another occasion he wrote, "The
doctrine of grace may be turned into wantonness; the
principle cannot." 52 Owen was concerned to demonstrate
that his high view of grace did not minimise the use of
the means of grace.
	
In	 Saints Perseverance he
stressed that effectual grace preserved the saints
precisely in the use of these means. 2	 Fundamental to
Baxter and Owen's explanation was the idea that grace
was in no way opposed to duty. Owen wrote,
Our Duty and God's Grace are no where
opposed in the matter of sanctification,
yea the one doth absolutely suppose the
other. Neither can we perform our Duty
31 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.420.
2 Owen, Of Commion, p.31.
S3 Owen, Saints Perseverance, pp.172-73.
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herein without the Grace of God; nor
doth God give us this Grace unto any
other End but that we may rightly
perform our Duty. 54
According to Baxter and Owen grace was free and
undeserved; it defined the new covenant. By grace
believers entered into the covenant and their faith in
Christ was supported and preserved by grace and the
Holy Spirit. Yet this grace was found ordinarily in
the ways of obedience and in a willingness to follow
God's commands. Writing on the fight with sin, for
example, Owen wrote, "The more men exercise their grace
in duties of obedience, the more it is strengthened and
increased...". E
	
He wrote	 in 1674	 a further
consideration:
For although there is no Grace, nor
Degree of Grace or Holiness in
Believers, but what is wrought in them
by the Spirit of God; yet ordinarily and
regularly the Increase and Growth of
Grace, and their thriving in Holiness
and Righteousness, depend upon the use
and Improvement of Grace received, in a
diligent Attendance unto all those
Duties of Obedience eich are required
of us 2 Pet 1.5,6,7.
By its very nature grace prompted and initiated an
active life of obedience. In 1669 Baxter asked,
And why have we this life of Grace but
to use it, and to live by it? Why came
we into the Vineyard, but to work? And
why came we into the Army of Christ but
to fight? Why came we into the race but
to run for the prize? or why turned we
into the right way, but to travel into
54 Owen, Holy Spirit p.336.
55 Owen, Indwelling Sin, Sold ed., VI, p.170.
56 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.167. His emphasis.
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Four years later Baxter wrote, "Habits are for use:
grace is given you, not only that you may have it, but
also that you may use it."
Thus, as presented here, the life of faith, begun by
faith, was meant to continue by grace through duties.
Grace and duty were not mutually exclusive concepts.
It was claimed by preachers that God had not left his
people ignorant about these duties and how they were to
be performed. In very practical ways the saints were
instructed that grace improved as grace was employed
particularly in the use of appointed means.
6.1.3 Duties often involved means 
Means were ordinances or prescriptions in which and
by which grace was given and used in the Christian
life. Means were ordinarily instrumental causes,
deriving value only as a consequence of their divine
prescription. Prayer, attendance upon the Word, holy
fellowship,	 fasting,	 meditation	 and	 certainly
preaching: these were the important means. " Most
mid-seventeenth century puritans understood the use of
means in this way. Means were given by God and even
prescribed by God in the covenant of grace. They were,
in a way, covenant-aids.	 In themselves they were
insignificant, although appropriate 	 to a life of
57 Baxter, Meek Christians, p.90.
58 Baxter, Christian Directory, p.169.
59 See Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terns, 'media',
op.187-88.
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fellowship with God. Used in a spirit of active faith,
obedience and love, means facilitated growth in grace.
They were not, however, to be exalted above faith; in a
Fast Sermon before Parliament on 22 October, 1644,
Richard Vines stressed how easily one could fall into
the trap of over confidence in means, "To have means in
our hands, and not use them, is secure unbeleefe, to
use them and trust in them is proud unbeleefe...".
Yet, while faith was trust, as William Bridge wrote in
1671, dependence upon God very much involved the use of
means:
and so we are to do what we can,
although not what we should in the
matter of our salvation; because by our
endeavour, and using the means we shew
our	 dependence upon	 God,	 and our
obedience	 to Aim, because	 he hath
commanded it... "
Baxter described the use of appointed means in the
following way.
He can never expect to obtain the end,
that will not be persuaded to use the
means. Of	 your selves you	 can do
nothing. God giveth his help, by the
means which he 64lath appointed and fitted
to your help.
He went on in the same work to list the means he
considered important: the Word of God, public worship,
private prayer, confession of sin (even at times to
another), familiar company with other devout
Christians, a serious meditation on the life to come,
60 
Richard Vines, The posture of David's Spirit when he was in a doubtful
condition', in Robin Jeffs, ed., The English Revolution. I. Fast Sersons to Parliasent
(London: Cornmarket Press Ltd., 1970), Volume 13, p.182.
61	 •
William Bridge, The Freeness of Grace and Love of God to Believers, (1671), p.64.
For Bridge see DNB, vol 6, p.315 and Calm Revised, p.74.
62 Baxter, Christian Directory, p.48.
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and a prudent and faithful guide or counsellor for
one's soul. Elsewhere Baxter referred to the
efficacy of good books, a sound catechism, and a sound
ministry. 64 Withthese things in mind Baxter exhorted•
his readers to an active life with these means, for
this was the normative Christian life.
Neglect not those means which the Spirit
-hath appointed you to use, for the
receiving of its help, and which he
useth in all his holy operations - If
you will meet with him, attend him in
his own way, and expect him not in
by-ways where he useth not to go. Pray
and meditate, and hear, and read, and do
your best, and expect his blessing.
Though your ploughing and sowing will
not give you a plentiful harvest without
the sun, and rain, and the blessing of
God, yet these will not do neither,
unless you plough and sow. God hath not
appointed a course of means in nature or
morality in vain, nor w1 he use to
meet you in any other way."
Similarly, Owen wrote in 1657,
The grace exhibited by Christ in his
ordinances is refreshing, strengthening,
comforting, and full of sweetness to the
souls of the saints. Woe to such,full
souls as loathe these honey-combs.
Nevertheless, in urging the use of grace and means
in an active life of obedience, Owen and Baxter
recognised that duties were imperfect and frequently
hindered by sin. In chapter 7 the relationship between
the issues of indwelling sin, perseverance and
assurance will be examined; suffice it to say here that
the struggle with sin disturbed the godly's duties.
63 Baxter, Christian Directory, p.48-51.
64 Baxter, Cat holick Theologfe, P .1 50-52; P .99 ; P.II3.
65 Baxter, Catholici Theologie, p.197.
66 Owen, Of Callanioo, p.44.
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Laziness in duty, neglect of means and sins of
omission: such were the manifestations of sin in
believers. Puritan pastors responded with exhortation
and encouragement.	 On the whole, asked Owen, the
occasions of temptation notwithstanding, did believers
see growth,
	 increase and	 progress?	 Was their
motivation for duty out of love and not merely fear,
guilt or conscience?
	
Were they growing in conformity
to Christ?
	 pleaded in 1662,
Art thou in a declined lapsed state ?
decayed in grace ? Hast thou lost thy
first desires and love ? do thy first
works, and do them with thy might.
Delay not, but remember from whence thou
art fallen, and what thou hast lost by
it, and into how sad a case thy folly
and negligence hath brought thee...
Return while thou hast day, lest the
night surprise thee: Loyter and delay no
more; thou hast lost it already: thou
art far behind hand.	 Betir thee
therefore with all thy might.
Later in 1669 Baxter explained the character of the
Christian, "He is very desirous to be assured that he
is sincere; but he is more desirous to be so. And he
knoweth that even assurance is got more by the exercise
and increase of Grace than by bare enquiry whether we
have it already...". 69
The answer to the practical problem of weakness in
duty and obedience began with at least a willingness to
pick up what the Bible prescribed and preachers
exhorted. But this only went so far; duties were in
themselves neutral, it was supremely the efficacy of
67 Owen, Holy Spirit, pp.443-44.
68 Baxter, How or Never, pp.39-40, cf. pp. 53-58, 149, 152-54.
69 Baxter, Character of a Confirmed Christian (1669), p.82.
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Christ and the aid of the Spirit which enabled the
believer to live obediently. Duty had to be seen in
this light, for duties were always subordinate to
Christ.
6.1.4 Duties always subordinate to Christ 
This point can easily be missed, yet it was crucial
to the argument of most mid-seventeenth century
puritans in their attempt to avoid the problems of
Antinomianism, on one hand, and a moralism, on the
other. Christ and his righteousness, his sufficiency,
his love and mercy: these formed the mainspring for the
puritan life of duty. Faith issued forth works, but,
because the works were imperfect or presumption came so
easily, the works themselves forced one into a greater
position of dependent faith.
Owen argued that holiness came through the immediate
work of the Holy Spirit and the habitual principle of
grace. M Yet the Spirit and grace were only given to
the elect because and as a result of the death of
Christ. M
	In this way, Owen suggested the duties of
holiness	 were always, ultimately, 	 subordinate to
Christ. The believer must know this, meditate on this
and live by this. "Nothing is Duty, nothing is
Obedience in Believers, but what is Grace from Christ
communicated unto them." 72
As noted earlier in chapter 3, Baxter did not agree
70 
Owen, Holy Spirit, 338.
71
Owen, Sales Electoral Saagais Jesa, p.121.
72 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.457.
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with Owen that Christ died only for
	 the elect;
nevertheless, he too insisted that one's faith in
Christ	 was the
	
basis of	 holiness.	 Note the
exhortation, with encouragement, that he issued in his
preface to Benjamin Baxter's, Non Conformity (1670):
and how much the Life and Death of
Christ were intended and fitted, to
mortifie our earthly Minds and
Affections, and to bring us to a holy
contempt of the pleasures, and profits,
and honours of the world; and that it is
the office of our Faith, to be our
victory over the World; and all this, in
the imitation and strength of him, who
hath heartened us to the war, with this
Encouragement, Be ofn good cheer, I have
overcome the world.
For Baxter Christ was the covenant inaugurator and
he was the fountain of all spiritual graces. Duties,
therefore, must be based upon a faith and love towards
the triune God. Still, as has been noted, faith must
be active, and willingly
balance existed, a balance
believer abided in Christ.
balance in his second
Everlasting Rest.
so. A fine and delicate
maintained as long as the
Baxter explained this
publication,	 The	 Saints
In a word, you must both use and trust
duty in subordination to Christ, but
neither use them nor trust them [sic] in
co-ordination with him. So that this
derogates nothing from Christ: for he
hath done, and will do all his work
perfectly, and enable his people to do
theirs: yet he is not properly said to
do it himself; he believes not, repents
not, etc., but worketh these in them:
that is, enableth and exciteth them to
do it. No man must look for more from
73 Baxter, To the Reader. It is worth noting that Benjamin Baxter, no relation,
dedicated this book to Mrs. Brace Allen, wife of William Allen, author of A Discourse of the
Nature, Ends, and Difference of the Two Covenants (1673) for which Richard Baxter wrote a
Preface.
74 Baxter, Meak Christian, p.11.
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duty than God hath lai4 upon it; and so
much we may and must. "
Apart from a true and lively faith duties could lead
to a life of improper zeal with a pretentious
self-righteousness or even, at the other extreme,
excessive guilt. A heartfelt trust and faith in Christ
were the safeguards of puritan activity.
	
John Bunyan
wrote in 1656,
if thy obedience do not flow from this
faith, which is the faith of God's
elect, as I have proved at large, thy
obedience, thy zeal, thy self-denial,
thy holiness, righteousness; yea, all
that thou canst do, is but sin in the
sight of the great God of heaven and
earth. Heb 11.6; Ro 14.23; For all true
sanctification comes through the name of
the Lord Jesus Christ, by the ope.;ation
of the Spirit of God. 1 Cor 6.11.
The duties of the Christian life were to possess a
distinct character.	 Ideally, gone was pretence, cold
heartedness and pride; instead there was warmth and
pure love.	 Duties were to flow out of the inner
spiritual grace and habit and they were to be grounded
and rooted in one's love for Christ.
	 "Think it not
enough to delight in duties", wrote Baxter, "if you
delight not in God.	 Judge not of your duties by the
bulk and number, but by the sweetness."77
The only way a believer could have this 'sweetness'
was through a lively faith. Faith, however, suggested
an active delighting in God, closing with him daily;
and thus a voluntarism can be detected. It was not that
75 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest 	 Ore ed., vol 22, p.34; see also Baxter,
Catholick Theologie, p.186.
76 Bunyan, Sone Sospel Truths Opened, Offor, Volume 2, p.168.
%
77 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest, Orme ed., vol 22, p.13.
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the will acted alone or even primarily, but that a
willingness had to exist and concur with the operations
of the other faculties. This voluntarism, or a
willingness, can be seen in the exhortation to use the
means of meditation or spiritual reflection.
Both Owen and Baxter frequently referred to the
necessity of considering or meditating upon God in all
his fullness. If the saint would only remind himself
of God's character, mercy, love and power then duties
would flow naturally and suitably. He must, however,
be willing to do this. 	 The saints were exhorted,
therefore, to 'eye' God. Owen declared, "Would
believers exercise themselves therein, they would find
it a matter of no small spiritual improvement in their
walking with God." 78 Owen went on to explain,
Our love unto God is a love of duty, the
love of a child. His love descends upon
us in bounty and fruitfulness; our love
ascends unto him in duty and
thankfulness... It is indeed made up of
these four things: 1. Rest; 2. Delight;
3. Reverence; 4. Obedience. By these do
we hol4 Communion with the Father in his
love. "
Duty in the Christian life, then, arose out of love;
anything else and the duty was suspicious. For this
reason the man or woman of God watched his or her heart
in order to guard the duty. Likewise, however, they
watched their duty to discern their hearts. "For we may
abound in outward Duties", wrote Owen, "and yet our
Hearts be very much alienated from the Life of God." 8°
78 Owen, Of Cossanion, p.23.
79 Owen, Of Camp ion, pp.28-29.
80 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.464.
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It was too easy for the Christian life to become a life
of externals. To be sure the external duties were
crucial and essential, but it was the inner spiritual
reality and vitality which was the sine qua non of the
life of obedience and action. We must not, however,
make too sharp a distinction between these two. They
were mutually dependent: grace came in order that duty
might exist which would in turn prove and further God's
work of grace. Nevertheless, if it was true and from a
heart of faith, duty was always subordinate to Christ.
In this section, (6.1), then, it has been shown that
Baxter and Owen called for a willingness in the
practical issues of the Christian life. The doctrinal
basis for this was that presented in chapters 3 and 4:
the sovereignty of God did not nullify the importance
of human secondary agency. The practical implication
of this can be seen in the inter-relationship between
grace and duty; there was a complementary inter-
relationship. Yet, always the experienced reality for
Baxter and Owen's readers was one which saw their
failure to use means, their coldness and their tendency
towards pride.	 This reality necessitated a life-long
fight with sin: the fight now considered.
6.2 The struggle with sin 
In	 Bunyan's	 Pilgrim's Progress
	
Prudence	 asks
Christian about his experience of faith, and
particularly whether any elements of his old life
presently bother him. Christian admits,
Yes, but	 greatly against
	
my will;
especially my	 inward
	
and	 carnal
cogitations,	 with which
	
all	 my
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country-men, as well as my self, were
delighted. But now all those things are
my grief; and might I choose mine own
things, I would choose never to think of
those things more; but when I would be
doing of that which is 	 that which
is worst is with me.
Christian	 reflects	 what	 was	 axiomatic	 for
mid-seventeenth century puritans: the believer still
struggled with sin and corruption. Frequently the
apostle's dilemma in Romans 7.15-24 was the paradigm
for puritan experience. Sin was real and disturbing
despite the best intentions of the saints to have it
otherwise.	 Yet while the reality of this continued
sinfulness	 Was	 readily accepted, it	 was	 more
importantly incumbent on the individual to fight this
problem of sin. Accordingly, what this section will
show is another aspect of voluntarism in practice. In
the struggle with indwelling sin Baxter and Owen
suggested an active and self-engaging response.
	 The
believer was expected and encouraged to choose
willingly the right way - the way of Christ - by the
use of God's aids, means and encouragements. Through
this choice one particularly fought with temptations,
mortified the flesh and pressed on upwards in the life
of godliness. Here, then, was manifested one of the
more complex aspects of puritan piety and practice.
The godly self was involved in a battle with a
dimension of itself. 	 Grace was superior and primary,
but there was a fundamental expectation of the self's
participation.
	 This was never easy, and always a
life-long process.	 What is noteworthy is the great
81 Bunyan, The Pilgris's Progress, Spire Books edition, p.49, emphasis mine.
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stress which was placed upon the role and agency of the
will.
The human will principally engaged in the struggle
with sin; to be sure, the Christian's appetites,
reason, imagination and heart were involved against
temptation and the pull of the "flesh". Still,
responsibility was given to the will to counter the
influence of sin: the will was the principal moral
faculty. The will was indeed aided by a corrected
understanding and affections, guided by the Spirit's
influence, instructed by the Word and facilitated by
the appropriate internal and external means. The fight
with sin, however, was not won solely by a passive
persuasion of Christ's victory over sin and death;
there had to be an active choice: yield to sin or
choose to accept God's way of renovation.
	 More was
involved here than a right understanding. Baxter
wrote, "The crossness of thy will to the will of God,
is the sum of all the impiety and evil of the soul; and
the subjection and conformity of thy will to his, is
the heart of the new creature, and of thy rectitude and
sanctification." 82 The nature of voluntarism, for
which this thesis has been arguing, was therefore,
clearly demonstrated in the struggle with sin. Without
any doubt, however, this voluntarism was subordinate to
the elect's dependence upon grace. and- the . gospel
promises. Owen and Baxter rejected any implication of
a self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, as this section
considers the reality of the struggle with sin and the
82 -Baxter, Catholick Iheologie t p.57.
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duty of mortification, it will be evident that this
struggle involved chiefly the human will. As Baxter
put it in Now or Never,
This is your trial: your warfare, is the
resisting of deceit, and of all that
would tempt you to consent to the means
of your own destruction: consent not,
and you conquer: conquer, and you are
crowned. The combat is all about youx,
wills; yield, angyou have lost theiiay.
6.2.1 The reality of the struggle 
The saints hardly needed to walk long in the way of
the Christian life before they discovered within
themselves an inward proclivity towards disobedience,
sloth, coldness and negligence in duties.
Concupiscence was a recognised dilemma for every
Christian; it was a reality which none could deny
without falling into great peril: a peril which both
Baxter and Owen considered to be Antinomianism. What
made the issue of the struggle with sin important to
puritan practice was the way in which this reality
framed puritan self-awareness and consequent activity.
At the centre of the saint's life was a crucial
conflict. Curiously, however, this conflict, while
difficult and problematic, was actually a sign of
spiritual life and vibrancy. Puritan pastors,
therefore, detailed this conflict not to impose a
morbid introspection but to encourage their flock
further in a .life of actual freedom and integrity.
Spiritual health actually prescribed conflict, and a
83 Baxter, Nom or Never (1662), PP.47-413.
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conflict within one's self. Oven wrote in 1668, "The
man that understands the evil of his own heart, how
vile it is, is the only useful, fruitful, and solidly
believing and obedient person." 84
There was no denying that sin still remained within
the justified and regenerated people of God. Question
78 of the Westminster Larger Catechism (1648) asked,
"Where does the imperfection of sanctification in
believers come from ?"
A. The imperfection of sanctification
in believers arises from the remnants of
sin abiding in every part of them, and
the perpetual lustings of the flesh
against the Spirit; by which they are
often foiled with temptations, and fall
into many sins, are hindered in all
their spiritual services, and their best
works are imprfect and defiled in the
sight of God."
This was no theoretical issue, it was a fundamental
experiential problem; and so puritan pastors preached,
taught, counselled and wrote about the nature of
indwelling sin. What was it that caused this problem
within the godly? How could a saint act in such a
manner when he or she was a new person in Christ?
John Owen's most explicit answer came in 1668 in his
work, The Nature, Power, Deceit and Prevalency of
Indwelling Sin. Based on his exposition of Romans 7.15
ff, Owen explained that within even the godly there
remained a "principle", or law, of sin. It was this
law which-led to coordinate acts of the "flesh". Owen
explained that this was the law (v6Aaa) .to which Paul
refers in Romans 7.21.
84 Oven, lidmelliag Sia, p.201.
85 T.H. Torrance, The School of Faith, p.200.
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And for this reason doth the apostle
here call indwelling sin a law. It is a
powerful and effectual indwelling
principle, inclining and pressing unto
actions agreftable and suitable unto its
own nature.
Owen's view was that in the saints the law of sin
did not have dominion, for there dwelt within them the
opposing law of holiness, the habit of grace.
Nevertheless, while the law of sin had lost its
dominion it still had a power, albeit weakened, which
could prompt and affect.
	
effects of this law of
sin could not be underestimated:
This law of sin dwells in us, that is,
it adheres as a depraved principle unto
our minds in darkness and vanity; unto
our affections in sensuality; unto our
wills in a loathing of and aversion
from, that which is good; and by some,
more, or all, of these, is continually
putting itself upon us, in inclinations,
motions, or suggestions to evil, hhen we
would be most gladly quit of it.
It was the fool, suggested Owen, who ignored this power
or law of sin. It was from this all invading power
that "Eruptions into great, open, conscience-wasting,
scandalous sins" came.	 Appropriately it was important
to "Inquire then how it is with your souls."89
Baxter and Owen considered	 that the extent of
indwelling sin was total or universal. Baxter
explained that the seat of sin "is not this or that
faculty that is the full and proper subject of sin, but
86 
Owen, Indwelling Sin, p.158.
87 Owen, Indwelling Sin, pp.163-64.
88 Owen, Indwelling Sin, p.167.
89 
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the man: the fullness of sin being made up of the vice
of both faculties, understanding and will, conjunct."
Owen maintained that "It is not straitened in a corner
of the soul; it is spread over the whole, all the
faculties, affections, and the passions of it." 91	In a
work on the mortification of sin Owen, referring to
Romans 6.19, identified the law of sin as synonymous
with the body (aapK4). Owen suggested, "the body here
is the same with maxaLos avepcomos, and Aga TrIS
1
ocAaprLas, the 'old man' and the 'body of sin', Rom 6.6
or it may synecdochically express the whole person
considered as corrupted, and the seat of lusts, and
distempered affections."92
What Baxter and Owen wrote about the will and
indwelling sin is relevant 	 to a study of their
voluntarism.	 In Christian Directory Baxter never
denied sin's effect upon the understanding, yet sin's
prominent impact was upon the will, for the voluntary
nature of sin was central to the believer's dilemma.
The saints actually complied, willingly, with the
influences of sin. They knew what was right, for the
Word told them this, but still the will chose; and from
this radical debility of the will the intellect was
often drawn away from the truth and the affections led
astray. It was true, argued Baxter, that sin
frequently began with the sensitive appetites, but sin
was not sin "till it be positively or privately,
90 Baxter, Catholick Iheologie, p.235.
91
Owen, Saints Perseverance, p.105.
92 Owen, Nortification, pp.741.
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immediately or mediately voluntary." The will was the
first principle of men's actions s quod exercitum'.93
Owen agreed.	 Sin drew off the mind from duty and
entangled the affections; but sin's deceit did not
conceive until the will consented. "Now the conception
of sin, in order unto its perpetration, can be nothing
but the consent of the	 there is nothing in the
soul itself that remains to give check to it, when once
the will hath given its consent." 94	There were times
when the will fully and absolutely complied with the
mind's deliberations. At other times sin occurred even
with a secret "renitency and volition of the contrary".
The example of Peter's denial of Jesus, reasoned Owen,
involved his will; yet there was still a secret and
Opposing volition, a principle of love. It was this
which made indwelling sin all the more a struggle. 95
Indwelling sin, then, was seen by these puritans not
as a residue sadly present within believers, but as an
active dynamic: opposed by the Spirit, but still
influential. As Owen put it:
It is always in continual work... So
that sin	 is always	 acting, always
conceiving, always seducing and
tempting... There is not a day but sin
foils, or is foiled; prevails or is
prevailed on; and it will be so whilst
we live in this world. Ju
The effects of the dynamic of remaining indwelling
sin were numerous and dire.
	 Baxter detailed the
93 Baxter, Catholick Theologie pp.235-41.
94 Owen, IndmeIling Sin, p.251.
95 Owen, Indmeiling Sin, pp.251-60.
96 Owen, Mortification, p.11.
328
effects of sin committed by "God's own children". The
saints actually sin against their relationship with
their Father, "which is more heinous than if a stranger
did it". Additionally, indwelling sin resulted in the
saints sinning against Christ, against the operations
of the Spirit, against their pardon and justification
and, in short, against the covenant of grace. 97 Owen
described the effect of indwelling sin among believers
as both actual sins and in "habitual declensions". By
actual sins he suggested the specific moments of
negligence in duty, when the deceitfulness of sin
conceived progressively actual acts of wrong-doing.
Individuals
	 like Noah,	 Lot, Hezekiah	 and David
experienced this problem. 98 Believers found within
themselves "surprisals" or eruptions" into actual
sins, sins which in one sense were involuntary but
which in fact pointed to the will's involvement in this
struggle. 99
Clearly the reality of such a problem had the
potential to disturb and confound the faithful.
However normative the struggle was, it raised the
question, why did God allow this indwelling sin to
remain? The common answer was that remaining sin was
not victorious. God allowed its presence to reveal how
utterly dependent men and women are upon Him. Richard
Sibbes explained,	 "we carry about us a
	 double
principle, Grace and Nature.
	 The end of it is
97 Baxter, Catholick Theologii pp.249-50. 4
98 Owen, Indwelling Sin, pp.279-B1.
99 Owen, Indwelling Sin, p.192.
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especially to preserve us from those two dangerous
Rockes our Natures are prone to dash upon, Securitie
and Pride, and to force us to pitch our rest on
Iustification,	 not	 sanctification,	 which besides
imperfection hath some soyle. " 100 	Years later Thomas
Goodwin in Tryall of a Christian's Growth offered his
answer. Indwelling sin remained so that "God might
thereby the more set forth and cleare unto us the truth
of it to all our hearts." Also, "it serves exceedingly
to illustrate the grace of perseverance, and the power
of God therein; for unto the power of God is our
perseverance wholly attributed." Thirdly, "it confuses
the devil." Finally, explained Goodwin, the saints
themselves were shown the necessity of humility and
self-denial.
	
101 Owen, in Indwelling Sin, maintained
that remaining sin showed the faithful two things,
themselves and God's grace. Believers saw themselves
and the original enmity they had towards God and they
saw their "vileness".	 As a consequence of this the
need for humility was evident.	 Moreover the saints
were led to appreciate the love and mercy of God. They
discovered that God delighted to be with the broken and
contrite in heart, and, insisted Owen, this made
believers less critical and harsh towards others. 102
Baxter offered comfort to believers who were depressed
due to their sinful laziness: "This is your infirmity,
100 Sines, Bruised Reede, pp.55-56.
101 Goodwin, Tryall of a Christian's Growth (another edition, 1643), Introduction,
pp. 33-39.
102 
Owen, indwelling Sin, PP.196-202.
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and a sin to be lamented, but not a mark of death and
gracelessness." He went on to suggest:
but bless God that you are offended with
it, and would fain be delivered. This
was Paul's evidence, Rom 7.24. You will
have flesh, and flesh will plead for its
interest, and will be striving against
the Spirit; but bless God that you have
also the Spirit to strive against the
flesh. Be thankful that you have life
to feel your sickness, though you
languish under it, and cannot work as
healthful men; and that you are in the
way to Heaven, though ym go not so fast
as you should and want."'
The issue was: however serious and dangerous the
reality of the struggle with sin, God had not abandoned
his people to an unresolvable conflict. There was
hope. True, there was a law of sin - all pervading and
utterly deceitful - which caused even the greatest men
and women to fall. Nevertheless, believers were
redeemed people of God; they belonged to Him; they were
his work of regeneration; they were recipients of his
grace and Spirit; these truths were the basis for
continuing in the life-long struggle. The rule of sin
had been dethroned in the life of the saint. The
usurper might still be active within the realm but the
true King had gained his rightful throne. 104
Sibbes claimed, "yet Gods children never sinne with
full will, because there is a contrary Law of the
minde, whereby the dominion of sinne is broken, which
always hath some secret working against the Law of
sin." 105 In 1657 Baxter claimed "But it is not every
103 Baxter, How or Never, p.151.
104 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.484 for this illustration.
105 Sines, Bruised Reede, p.186.
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act of a gross sinne that makes or proves a man to be
unjustified." 106 In Reliquiae he wrote,
Therefore whenever a justified Person
sinneth, the Temptation at that time
prevaileth against the Spirit, and the
Love of God! not to the Extinction of
the Love of God, nor to the Destruction
of the Habit, nor the setting up of the
contrary Habit in predominacy; as
setting up the habitual Love of any Sin
above the habitual Love of God! The
inclination of the Soul is still most to
God: And he esteemeth him most, and
preferreth him in the adherence of his
will, in the main bent and course of
Heart and Life; only he is overcome, and
so far abateth the actual Love and
obedience to God, as to commit this
particular Act of	 n, and remit or omit
that Act of Love. "1
The paradox was the hope. To feel a sense of
struggle with sin, and the world, was not cause for
despair, it was promising. It was only through the
Spirit and the work of grace that one was sensitive to
the struggle; unregenerate sinners were not bothered.
For the godly, who often felt this struggle acutely,
the promise was that God's grace, the crucified and yet
risen work of Jesus and the operation of the Spirit,
would create within the people of God a dominant will
towards God, a heart of love, and a right understanding
so as to bring them through the struggle. This did not
minimize the seriousness of the believers' sins; their
culpability was still real.	 Owen expressed it this
way:
But, upon the Introduction of the New
Principle of Grace and Holiness in our
Sanctification, this Habit of sin is
weakened, impaired, and so disenabled,
as that it cannot nor shall encline unto
106	 Baxter, Richard Baxter's Account of his Present Thoughts Concerning the
Controversies about the Perseverance of the Saints (1657), p.13.
107 Baxter, Religaiae, pp. 7-8.
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sin with that constancy and Prevalency
as formerly, nor press unto it
ordinarily with the same urgency and
violence. Hence in the Scripture it is
said to be dethroned by Grace, so as
that it shall not reign or Lord over us,
by hurrying us into the pursu sint of its
uncontrollable inclinations...
The argument of this subsection so far has been that
the problem of sin was real for the faithful: both
ontologically (the indwelling habit) and morally (they
chose that which was wrong and broke God's standards).
Sin would never disappear in their lives, but there was
hope: God would not abandon them to this powerful
sinfulness. By the Spirit and grace, through means and
duties the saints were offered a hope.
Precisely because of this hope and promise there was
a responsibility. The godly were expected to follow in
the way of grace through the duties of grace. The
principle duty relating to the struggle with sin was
mortification. Their wills, understandings and
affections were repaired for a reason: they were to
wage war on the enemy within, the enticements from the
world without and choose a life of love towards their
Redeemer.
6.2.2 Mortification 
Puritan pastors insisted that mortification, as part
of sanctification, was associated with justification.
In their view, the peace received in the gospel
surrounded, supported and continued mortification. For
mortification, as most seventeenth century puritans
108 Owen, Holy Spirit ? p.429.
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knew it, was part of election and sanctification. The
Westminster Larger Catechism taught that dying to sin
only could occur through the infusion of "saving
graces", "seeds of repentance unto life" and the
"righteousness of Christ") M Mortification was simply
a gospel duty, that is, only within the gospel did one
find the grace and means for this duty. Mortification
was never aided by the law alone. "The whole Effect of
the Application of the Law in its power unto indwelling
sin, is but to irritate, provoke, and increase its
guilt." 110 The way to fight sin was to live closer to
God. The more one contemplated his attributes, his
mercy and his presence the greater the victory over
temptations to sin. "Satan can never come in so ill a
time with his temptations, and have so little hope to
speed, as when the soul is contemplating the attributes
of God, or taken up in prayer with him, or any way
111
apprehensive of his presence." 	 What was needed
was, "true evangelical mortification" argued Owen. Too
many fell into the extreme of either a legal "rigid
frame of Spirit" or else lived with "pretenses of
liberty, grace, and I know not what." 112
The individual's life in Christ began because of an
overflowing grace, and only continued because of this
grace. Solely by this grace could one begin to
mortify, or put to death, indwelling sin: not that this
109	 Questions 75,76 and 77. Torrance, The School of Faith, pp. 199-200.
110 Owen, Holy Spirit, p.486.
Baxter, Divine Life, Orme ed., vol 13, p.260.
112 Owen, Mortification, p.14.
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was	 easy in this life.
	
Complete victory over
indwelling sin was not possible. Owen wrote that
indwelling sin was, "an enmity that hath this from its
nature, that it is incapable of cure or reconciliation.
Destroyed it may be, it shall be, but cured it cannot
be." 113 Baxter's The Right Method for a Settled Peace
of Conscience (1653), displayed his pastoral concern
for the weak and fearful who found the struggle with
sin and the duty of mortification hard. Sins,
weaknesses, doubts and struggles did indeed disturb
God's people.	 Yet, this made it all the	 more
imperative to mortify the flesh and its attraction to
the world. The solution, however, began by appreciating
God's grace in the gospel of his Son. 	 Provided that
one believed and then sincerely and willingly longed
for Christ and the Spirit, one's growth in holiness was
assured.	 Perfection was not the condition, rather
sincerity and a willingness.'" 	 But Baxter also
explained that, "A sanctified man cannot grieve or weep
for sin when he will, or so much as he will." 115 Even
if tears and sorrow were plentiful, as he warned his
fellow preachers, "It is easier to chide at sin, then
to overcome it". MG
113	 Owen,Indmelling Sin, p.177. See Owen, Mortification, p.25.	 See also Baxter,
The Crucifying of the World by the Cross of Christ (1658), ed. by John Baillie (London: James
Nisbet and Co., 1861), p.151. All subsequent references to 	 Crucifying of the World taken
from this edition.
114 See Baxter, Crucifying of the World, p.118.
115 Baxter, Right Method, Orme ed., vol 9, p.283.
116 Baxter, The Reforsed Pastor (1656) first edition, p.16.
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Mortification, therefore, was the issue. "The
vigour, and power, and comfort, of our spiritual life,
depends on the mortification of the deeds of the
n7flesh."	 Mortification involved the killing of
specific sins to be sure; yet, more importantly,
mortification approached every aspect of sin's
influence. It was not merely the outward act but the
inner "lust" which had to be killed; and the
application was universal, not just in one part of life
but in the whole of the man. Baxter and Owen were not
the only ones to	 express this.
	 Thomas Goodwin
insisted, "If thou hast prevailed against the outward
act, rest not, but get the. rising of the lust
mortified, and that rowling of it in thy fancies; get
thy heart deadened towards it also: and rest not there,
but get to hate it, and the thought of it." 118
This duty, however, had to be based upon the work
of redemption and regeneration which God had
accomplished. Mortification, in short, was principally
based on God's work in the believer. "Neither are we
so much to speak of it here", wrote Thomas Goodwin, "as
it is a duty to be done by us, (though it be so) but as
it is a work of God upon us, which he takes care to go
through	 with, and perfect in all those who are
U9faithful."	 John Owen insisted that mortification
"is a work that requires so many concurrent actings in
it as no self-endeavour can reach unto, and is of that
Id•••
Owen, Mortification, p.9.
Goodwin, Tryall, Introduction, pp.41-42; cf. Owen, Mortification, pp.41-42.
Goodwin, Trya1I, p.84.
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kind, that an Almighty energy is necessary for its
accomplishment." 120 The source of this "Almighty
energy", explained Owen, was the Spirit. It was the
Spirit which Owen also called the "principal efficient
cause" of mortification. 121 Referring to Romans 8.13
Owen suggested,
All other ways of mortification are
vain, all helps leave us helpless, it
must	 be	 done	 by	 the	 Spirit...
Mortification from a self-strength,
carried on by ways of self-invention,
unto the end of a self-righteousness, is
the soul and substanc.A of all false
religion in the world. 1"
Yet as mortification was established by the work of
God in the covenant of grace it also was a necessary
duty for those incorporated into the Covenant. Owen
wrote in Holy Spirit: "the Work and Duty of
Mortification consists in a constant taking part with
Grace, in its Principal, Actings and Fruits, against
the Principle Acts and Fruits of Sin." 123	 As
presented
	
in chapter 4,	 Baxter stressed sincere
obedience to the point of calling it an "evangelical
righteousness",	 subordinate	 to	 Christ's	 but
essential. 124	Mortification was an element of this
sincere obedience and, thus, a subordinate part of the
120 Owen, Mortification, p.18.
121 See Owen, Mortification, pp.19-20 for details of the Spirit's work.
122 Owen, Mortification, p.7.
123 Owen, Holy Spirit p.477. cf. Owen, Mortification, p.6, where Owen insists that
this duty is only for believers, 'ye to whoa 'there is no condemnation' (Romans 8.1) ye that
are 'not in the flesh, but in the Spirit' ver 5. who are 'quickened by the Spirit of Christ'
ver 10,11." See also pp.33-38.
124 Chapter 4, pp.228-29.
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covenant condition. Owen, as mentioned in chapter 3,
denied Baxter's emphasis on condition. Nevertheless,
he suggested that mortification, while not an immediate
cause of one's life in Christ, was not only a causa
sine qua non "but as the thing that hath an effectual
influence thereinto." in
It is	 here that	 a correlation	 between God's
initiative and human co-agency can be detected. Owen,
for example, explained that even though the Spirit was
the principal efficient cause believers had to remember
that the Spirit did his work in and through them.
The Holy Ghost works in us, and upon us,
as we are fit to be wrought in, and
upon; that is, so as to preserve our own
liberty and free obedience. He works
upon our understandings, wills,
consciences and affections, agreeably to
their own natures; he works in us, and
with us, not against us, or without us;
so that his assistance is an
encouragement, as to the facilitating of
the work, and no occaEkon of neglect, as
to the work itself.
Furthermore, a degree of voluntarism in practice is
evident in this context. Baxter insisted that the will,
like understanding and the affections, was renovated
and healed so as to choose the appointed means to fight
sin. The saints had to choose to use these means in
the duty of mortification; they had to engage willingly
in fasting, acts of humiliation and especially prayer
with meditation. They had to choose to deny themselves
and live crucified to the world and the world as
crucified to them.	 Note the interconnection between
125 Owen, 'fortification, p.22.
126 Owen, 'fortification, p. 20. Owen drew upon the following passages of Scripture:
Phil 2.13; Is 26.12; 2 Thess 1.11; Col 2.12; Rom 8.26; Zech 12.10.
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the provision of the Spirit, meditating upon Christ and
the duty of mortification in Baxter's admonition.
To live after the flesh, is by loving
the world, and enjoying it as our
felicity: and to mortifie the deeds of
it by the Spirit, is by withdrawing this
fuel and food that doth maintain them,
and by crucifying and killing the world
as to such ends. Our work is to put on
the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no
provision for the flesh tR, fulfill the
lusts thereof, Rom 13.14. "1
Thomas Goodwin, however, offered this caveat: the
willingness had to be rooted in faith and the means of
God. "It is certaine", he explained, "that unless our
thoughts work upon the.means, as well as the means work
upon us, and so do mingle themselves with those means;
that unless faith and Christ's death be mingled in the
heart, it purgeth not... ". 128
Nevertheless, the important aspect here was the
will's vital role in mortification. Indwelling sin, to
be sure, necessitated the activity of the whole of man
and not merely any one faculty. Still, exhortation to
mortification appealed to the mind in order to prompt
the will. Baxter stated,
There is more Power in all of you than
you use, or then you are well aware of.
It wanteth but awakening to bring it
into act. Do you find in your
Repentings, that the change is more in
your Wills then in your Power? and in
the awakening of your Will and Reason
into act, thm in the addition of meer
abilities?
n••••••'
127 Baxter, The Crucifying of the Norld, pp.78-79.
12g Goodwin, Tryall, p.95.
129 Baxter, Nom or Never, p.52.
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The godly men and women of mid-seventeenth century
puritan gatherings were exhorted to pray and seek for a
willingness to obey, "an inclinable heart" as Baxter
put it. 130 When they discovered their weaknesses and
sins the solution was found in Christ. Moreover, while
the believer was free from the need for a legal
righteousness, he or she must find Christ in the way of
evangelical obedience,	 "and so have	 a personal,
evangelical righteousness, 	 or never be	 saved by
Christ's righteousness; therefore, say not it is not
duty, but Christ; for it is Christ in a way of duty."
Mortification was the spiritual duty of all; all must
fight and resist indwelling sin and the allurement of
the world. 01
Voluntarism is seen more clearly when it was asked
why believers found obedience so difficult. 	 Baxter
suggested that it was due to the will. 	 In 1653 he
wrote,
Understand what I told you before, that
as the beginning of grace is in your
understanding, so the heart and life of
it is in your will; and the affections
and passionate part are but the fruits
and branches. If therefore your grace
be weak, it is chiefly in an
unwillingness to yip,1d to Christ, and
his Word and Spirit."'
Five years later Baxter referred to dying to sin and
the influence of the world as a "moral death".
Significantly he claimed, "a Moral death is principally
in the Will it self, and nothing is more voluntary, and
130 Baxter, Right Method, p.134.
13 1 Baxter, Saint's Rest, pp.43-44.
132 Baxter, Right Method, p.134.
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so it is the principal vertue or vice: To be dead in
sin and to God is the summe of all Evil: And to be dead
to sin and the world, in Christ, is the summe of Moral
Good.
	
03
"
Owen explained that believers had problems with
mortification because they failed to look to Christ for
"succour" and help in resisting temptation. 134 "Yea,
but let me add, that never any soul did, or shall
perish by the power of any lust, sin or corruption, who
could raise his soul by faith to an expectation of
relief from Jesus Christ." 25 In his work on the
nature of temptation Owen claimed that it was
negligence in duty and worship, failure to appreciate
the nature of the temptation itself, and supremely a
heartless appreciation for the love and mercy of God
which contributed to the saints' problem. 136 They were
to choose to engage in the fight.
Assuredly, men and women lacked the strength on
their own to resist temptation and battle sin. 137
Nevertheless, Owen, like Baxter, urged the godly to
"watch and pray".	 They were to keep their hearts
28tender to the love of God.
A universal carefulness, and diligence,
exercising itself in, and by all ways
and means, prescribed by God, over our
132 Baxter, The Crucifying of the Narld, pp.102-03.
134 Owen, Hebrews, Vol. 1, p.294.
135 Owen, Nortification, p.82. Owen referred to Isaiah 55.1-3 and Rev 3.18.
136 Owen, Tesptation, Goold ed., VI, pp. 121 and 140-41.
137 Owen, Tesptation, pp.92 and 124; cf. Owen, Hebrews, Vol. 1, p.293.
136 Owen, Telptation, Pp.133-37.
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hearts and ways, the baits and methods
of Satan, the occasions and advantages
of sin in the world, that we be not
entangled, is that which in thiSnyord
(eg. Mt.26.41) is pressed upon us.
This section has sought to show that within the
Christian life, as Baxter and Owen saw it, the call to
mortification implied a voluntarism in practice. It
was certainly a gospel duty and could only be true if
it was done in Christ and through the Spirit. Never
would the saints be completely victorious until they
were raised in Christ. Nevertheless, what counted was
their willingness, or to put it another way, "the
prevailing bent of their will". 140 The saints were
exhorted on the basis of Scripture, to choose the way
of Christ's holiness. 	 This choice involved their
wills.	 Mortification was hardly a passive persuasion
of the mind, it was an activity of faith.
Conclusion 
As Baxter and Owen defined it, the life of faith was
shaped by grace. God's grace supported and protected
his people. The very nature of this grace, however,
involved duties.
	
In no way were	 these duties
meritorious on their own; they were subordinate to
Christ's righteousness. Practically, duties involved
the use of gospel means: prayer, the sacraments, the
Scriptures and attentiveness to sermons. The call to
139 Owen, imitation, pp.100-01.
140 Baxter, Crucifying of the Norld, p.153.
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duties was profoundly associated with both the nature
of grace and the continued reality of indwelling sin:
grace, a gift from God, was given to produce the fruit
of sanctification; real life, however, showed the
faithful that their biggest problem was "within". The
puritan self-identity was a complex mix of a radical
dependency upon grace and an outward summons (that is,
through preachers and writers) and inward nudges (that
is, by means of guilt as well as joy) to an active
life.
	 Willingness was	 central to the practical
dimension of mid-seventeenth century puritan life.
To appreciate the nature of this life of faith it
must be remembered that the doctrines of a sovereign
will and a human will (relatively free to choose
according to its nature) were the underpinnings of the
practical theology expressed by Baxter and Owen. Human
willingness was subordinate to God's grace and covenant
mercy.	 This subordination, however,	 in no way
minimized the necessity of the human response. 	 Such
was the paradox of the doctrinal framework of Baxter
and Owen's voluntarism. Experientially, voluntarism
was problematic. The problem was the tendency for this
voluntarism to fall not only into the trap of an
external legalism, but more significantly into
self-reliance. For the doubtful and weak, or for that
matter any person who knew the problems of his own
sincerity	 and willingness,	 despair could	 arise;
assurance was needed along	 with the promise
	
of
perseverance. The doctrine of perseverance, then, was
both	 a check	 to the	 voluntarism	 suggested in
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mortification and a prelude to the whole question of
assurance. It is to the doctrines of perseverance and
assurance that we now turn in the final chapter.
344
Chapter Seven
VOLUNTARISM IN PRACTICE: 
A WILLINGNESS IN PERSEVERANCE AND ASSURANCE 
Introduction 
Because mortification presented the reality of sin
and human proclivity towards negligence and
disobedience it was necessary for puritan pastors to
raise the question and promise of perseverance and
assurance.	 In this final chapter this vital hope is
considered. As in the previous chapter, here too the
experiential aspect of	 the puritan life and the
theology of the	 will intersect. Perseverance and
assurance were, of course, not isolated issues; they
were associated with numerous other doctrines. The
task of this chapter is to examine the issue of
perseverance and assurance and see if the type of
voluntarism considered throughout this thesis
influenced the way in which mid-seventeenth century
puritans gained solace in the Christian life.
To	 do so	 it is necessary	 to appreciate the
historical development of the doctrines within
Calvinism. As it was argued in t4ie chapter 1.3, Calvin
understood faith and assurance to be inextricably
related. Nevertheless, he recognized that believers
wrestled with doubt and insecurity: their sinfulness
affected their security. In his opinion a believer was
sure of perseverance and assurance because of the
merits of Christ. It was argued, however, that Calvin
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did not entirely dismiss self-reflection; he advised
the faithful to look inward and see if the fruit of
their union with Christ was evident. The issue for
Calvin, however, was ultimately that one's faith in
Christ, witnessed by the Spirit, was the basis for hope
and security. Later Calvinists, particularly William
Perkins, went further than Calvin: he appreciated that
a person often waited a long time before the assurance
of the objective truth of God's grace and pardon in
Christ was subjectively appropriated; stated simply,
Perkins claimed that faith and the assurance of faith
were not as closely linked in one's experience as
Calvin had argued. Accordingly, Perkins advocated the
practical syllogism: but he considered this practical
syllogism only as a complementary exercise to the
superior work of the Spirit.
The argument put forward in chapter 1 was that there
was	 a doctrinal development from	 Calvin to the
Westminster Assembly.
	
Yet it was also argued that
there was a closer affinity between Calvin and later
Calvinists than R.T. Kendall has assumed. True,
compared to Calvin later Calvinists were more willing
to employ the language of covenant theology; were more
inclined to consider a preparation for faith; and were
more	 accepting	 of	 the	 practical	 syllogism.
Nevertheless, as Baxter and Owen are considered in this
chapter it	 will be suggested	 that, despite the
differences between Baxter and Owen, they developed
arguments and applications	 about perseverance and
assurance which were	 not altogether removed from
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Calvin's. Their immediate historical context (notably
influenced by Arminianism and Antinomianism) meant that
there were differences between Calvin and them. Still,
when their views on perseverance and assurance are
examined a voluntarism in practice is seen; and this
voluntarism bore striking similarities not only to
Calvin's but to Augustine's voluntarism: the importance
of "willingness".
The chapter begins (7.1) with an examination of the
general	 issues	 involved	 in	 the	 question	 of
perseverance. This will be valuable in the study of
Owen's stress on the immutability of perseverance as a
consequence of election (7.1.1) and Baxter's concern to
counter what he saw as Antinomian presumption and so
argued that perseverance was a subordinate part of the
covenant condition (7.1.2).	 Yet, more needs to be
considered here: specifically the question of
assurance. For both Baxter and Owen recognized that an
appeal to either the immutability of election or to the
covenant
	
condition	 would	 only	 cause	 further
complications. Thus in the final section,(7.2), their
views on assurance are presented. There it will be
argued that an inherent logic connected the question of
perseverance and the hope of assurance: the challenge
to perseverance which came from indwelling sin was
mollified by the evidence that the Spirit was producing
(gradually) testifying fruit of sanctification.
Voluntarism, or the necessity of a "willingness", was
central to Baxter and Owen's answer to this fundamental
problem of perseverance and assurance for the saints.
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Thus,
	 in these	 two	 inter-related struggles
perseverance and assurance -- voluntarism is shown to
have been the mainspring of the believer's daily
experience. Only when the doctrinal presuppositions
outlined in the earlier chapters are borne in mind will
Baxter and Owen's practical divinity make sense: for
the goal of their	 doctrinal writing was to aid
believers in the life of faith.
7.1 Perseverance 
Would the saints continue in their faith and life of
obedience, or could they fall out of grace? These
apparently were practical issues confronting puritan
preachers, for they were frequent topics in sermons and
in printed works. Curiously, however, M.M. Knappen,
Two Elizabethan Puritan Diaries, has minimized the
existential dilemma which the doctrine of election
raised for the godly.	 Few puritans, claims Knappen,
lived with too great a doubt. 1 On the other hand,
Paul Seaver's study of Nehemiah Wallington seems more
credible. Wallington struggled with assurance. He
looked inward and saw his failures in the light of the
gospel's standards; and while he knew the hope of
pardon, the quest for assurance was frequently with
trial and vicissitudes. Seaver has written, "In fact,
one suspects that it was the introspection demanded by
the examined life that made the struggle for assurance,
rather than the debates over controverted doctrine, the
1 Knappen, Two Elizabethan Puritan Diaries, p. 22.
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central concern of a generation of the godly." 2	 It
could be argued that the question of assurance raises
one of the paradoxes of puritan piety. Often the
saints lived with the hope of perseverance even if they
were not personally assured. This was not illogical.
One could live in faith and hope of persevering grace
and yet not have absolute certainty that one would
personally endure the deceitfulness of sin. The hope
was still there, the promises of Scripture remained
evident, but total assurance, however much desired,
could actually lead to laxity. The evidence presented
in this chapter from the writings of Baxter and Owen
suggests that doubt was an issue not only related to
the implications of a doctrine of election but to
particular pastoral problems. It was argued by
Baxter and Owen that there was a correlation between
election, perseverance and assurance. They approached
perseverance within a specific context: God was
sovereign in election; he called his own according to
his purpose; those whom he effectually called he gave
the necessary grace in order that they would repent and
believe; and by his covenant faithfulness his people
persevered in their love and holiness. Still, there
was controversy: how important was a person's self-
involvement and willingness?
Before considering Baxter and Owen's answers to this
question it	 is helpful to	 consider further the
theological context in which they wrote. 	 Dewey
Wallace, in Puritans and Predestination, has presented
2 Seaver, Wallington's World, p.19.
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a picture of puritan theology at odds with both
Arminian and other moderate positions over the issue of
perseverance. While in the early years of the English
Reformation it was generally accepted that the saints
did not fall completely away from grace, by the time of
the Articles of Religion (1562) there was a tendency
some English	 Protestants	 to qualify	 their
3confidence.	 Consequently puritans like John Downame
became increasingly distressed with the weakening of
this certainty. 4 At first some non—puritans joined in
support of Downame; Wallace refers to Jewel, Sandys,
Cooper and Woolton. The conflict of opinion came in
the seventeenth century in the controversy surrounding
Richard Montagu, a conformist from Essex made bishop of
Chichester in 1628.	 Montagu was accused of denying,
among other things, an unconditional election and the
_	 5perseverance of the elect.	 Nicholas Tyacke has
pointed out that Montagu's A New Gag for an Old Goose
(1624) was a "veritable bombshell" Montagu's
opinions drew sharp criticism from a large number of
prominent puritans who thought Montagu personified the
7Arminian threat.	 There developed a sharp conflict in
3 
Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, p.52. It is worth noting that the XXXIX
Articles have no section explicitly concerned with perseverance or assurance. Article XVII,
'Of Predestination and election' contains one of the few implicit suggestions: 'and at length
by Gods mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity.' (et demum ex Dei misericordia pertingunt
ad sempiternam foelicatem); see Schaff, Creeds, p.497.
4 See Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, p.212, note 149 for a detailed list of
other works which considered this issue of perseverance.
5 Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, p.84.
6
Tyacke, anti-CaIvinists, p.75.
7 Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, PP.85-es.
for
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the House of Commons led by John Pym. 13 The
significance of the Montagu case is that it reveals the
sharp divergence of opinion within seventeenth century
English
	 Protestantism	 over	 perseverance.	 The
explanation for this lies partly in the growing
influence of Arminian theology as a reaction against
rigid Calvinism as evidence by the opinions of Henry
Hammond, Herbert Thorndike and Thomas Pierce, all of
whom rejected the Synod of Dort's explanation of
election and perseverance. 9 The Synod of Dort had
argued that despite indwelling sin, God was faithful,
"who having conferred grace, mercifully confirms and
powerfully preserves them therein, even to the end". 10
God was actively committed to his people; it was not a
question "in consequence of their own merits
	
or
strength, but of God's free mercy, that they do not
fall away from faith or grace...".
	 by the mid—
seventeenth century there was a sharp division within
English protestantism regarding perseverance. On one
level it involved the nature of predestination; and on
the other level, precisely because of predestination,
the difference of opinion involved human choice and
Tyacke, nti-Calvinists, p.75.
9 Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, p.126. This theory was earlier presented by
Nicholas Tyacke, 'Puritanism, Arminianism and Counter-Revolution' in The Origins of the
English Civil Mar, ed. by Conrad Russell (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.119-43.
10 Synod of Dort, V.iii.	 This English translation is provided by Schaff, Creeds,
p.593.	 The Latin in the original is as follows: 'Sed fidelis est Deus, qui ipsos in gratia
semel collata misericorditer confirmat, et in eadem usque ad fines potenter conservat.'
Schaff, Creeds, p.571.
11 Synod of Dort, V.viii, Schaff, Creeds, p.594. 'Ita non suis meritis, aut viribus,
sed ex gratuita Dei misericordia id obtinent, ut nec totaliter fide et gratia excidant, nec
finaliter in lapsibus maneant aut pereant.' Schaff, Creeds, p.572.
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activity.
It is important to appreciate this historical
context: by the time Baxter and Owen entered the scene
perseverance was a controversial topic, and the lines
were already drawn.	 If the ideas of the time were
presented as a spectrum of opinion, at one end would be
those Arminians, like 	 Montagu, who insisted that
justification was	 based on an	 individual's free
compliance with the conditions of the covenant. This
same group insisted that	 perseverance was not a
guarantee but was itself a condition. Nearer to the
centre would be "sectarian Arminians" (to use Dewey
Wallace's expression) like John Goodwin, who were often
sympathetic to puritan ecclesiology but disagreed with
Calvinist teaching on perseverance. 	 Goodwin argued
among other things that it was possible for the saints
to fall out of grace.	 He never sought to minimize,
however, the work of grace and mercy. 	 He was quick
to point out, nevertheless, that many professors did
fall away; thus, any notion of the impossibility of the
saints' apostasy was wrong. It may be improbable for
the saints to fall away, but it was possible. Close to
the centre of the spectrum were those like Baxter, who,
while often coming near to views like Goodwin's, held
to a non-Arminian position. Baxter suggested that the
elect would persevere: not because the death of Christ
procured this guarantee absolutely, but because the
elect would fulfil this condition. Much of Baxter's
explanation	 depended	 upon	 his understanding
	 of
12 Wallace,Paritans and Predestination, pp. 130-131.
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condition. A Beyond that, just on the other side of
the centre, would be those who agreed with Owen. Owen
recognised that the saints had seasons of sin and even
backsliding, but	 they would	 ultimately persevere
because they were elect and predestined. As their
predestination was infallible and immutable so too was
their perseverance. The death of Christ could not be in
vain. Further on the other side, composing the other
extreme of the spectrum, would be the views of
Antinomian sects, who likewise denied the possibility
of apostasy because of the eternal decrees of God and
the ihtemhal v .:Irk of the Spirit.
This was the spectrum of the debate on perseverance.
In the first section of this chapter, however, while
recognising the Arminian and Antinomian poles, we want
to examine more closely Baxter and Owen's agreements
and differences. Two issues are worth consideration.
First, (7.1.1), Owen's insistence upon the immutability
of perseverance because of election; and secondly,
(7.1.2), Baxter's understanding of perseverance as a
condition. In these subsections attention to the role
of the human will and the importance of a willingness
deserves attention.
7.1.1	 Owen's view of perseverance: the immutable
consequence of election 
Owen's important work on perseverance is entitled,
The Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance Explained and
13 See chapter 3.3.1, pp.18415 for his definition of conditio.
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Confirmed (1654). It was dedicated to Oliver Cromwell
and written in response to John Goodwin's, imoxuTpwaLs
3
anoxuTputo-Ews, or Redemption Redeemed (1651).	 John
Goodwin (1594-1665), one time rector of East Rainham,
Norfolk and later of St. Stephens, Coleman Street in
London, was an advocate of "gathered" churches of
believers and thus can be classified as a puritan
according to the definition presented in chapter 1.2.
On the other hand, Goodwin was opposed to Oliver
Cromwell's National Church. He attracted severe
criticism in response to his views on the atonement and
God's decree of election: he was singular in that he
accepted puritan views on the church yet agreed with
Arminian	 interpretations
	 of	 election	 and
predestination.	 Owen accused Goodwin of attacking
God's absolute and unconditional promises to preserve
his own people. Owen insisted that because of God's
character his work in salvation was infallible and
certain.
The main foundation of that which we
plead for, is, the eternal purpose of
God, which his own nature requireth to
be	 absolutely	 immutable	 and
irreversible. The eternal act of the
will of God designing some to salvation
by Christ, infallibly to be obtained,
"for the praise of the glory of his
grace", is the bottom of the whole..."
In Owen's view, perseverance was predicated upon
election and predestination in Christ; and it was based
in the covenant with Christ through the work of the
Holy Spirit. The following illustrates the main points
of his position:
14 Owen, Perseverance, Goold ed., II, p.22, Preface to the Reader. All subsequent
references taken from this edition.
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[the basis for perseverance is] an
everlasting covenant that shall not be
broken, and hath therein given them
innumerable promises that he will
continue to be their God for ever, and
preserve them to be, and in being, his
people: to this end, because the
principle of grace, and living to him,
as in them inherent, is a thing in its
own nature changeable and liable to
failing, he doth, according to his
promise, and for the accomplishment of
his purpose, daily make out to them, by
his Holy Spirit, from the great treasury
and storehouse thereof, the Lord Jesus
Christ, helps and supplies, increasing
of faith, love and holiness, recovering
them with all might according to his
glorious power, unto all patience and
long-suffering with joyfulness, so
preserving them by his power through
faith unto salvation.
The complexity of Owen's argument demands clearer
exposition. This can be done through detailed
attention to three aspects of controversy between Owen
and John Goodwin: first, their differing views on
apostasy; second, their understanding of the nature of
God's will for his people; and finally, their
disagreement over the issue of perseverance as a
covenant condition.
First, their attitudes towards apostasy: Goodwin
argued that both Scripture and experience suggest the
reality of apostasy - believers did fall away; Owen
never denied that some professors did apostatize, but
were they, asked Owen, truly faithful and of the elect?
Owen maintained that while the saints at times yielded
to indwelling sin and even had seasons of backsliding,
nevertheless, they would persevere to the end. How was
this?	 Perseverance was rooted in the work of grace.
15 Owen, Perseverance, pp.22-23.
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The	 sin of	 believers	 was	 not like	 that	 of
non-believers. 16 A believer was one who had received
the converting work of God, which included an infused
habit of grace. Accordingly, this work of God had to
produce infallibly a new creation consistent with
itself. God would not abandon his work of regeneration
and sanctification. Sin would not triumph. Believers
belonged to Christ and were children of the Father;
though they sinned, and were accountable for this sin,
they never ceased to be his children. 17	 "Until he
hath taken away his Spirit and grace, although they are
rebellious children, yet they arelhis children still." 18
But surely, asked Goodwin, Owen's view led to
presumption and licentiousness? "It is... a promising
unto men, and that with height of assurance, under what
looseness or vile practices soever, exemption and
freedom from punishment...". 19 Owen countered that
perseverance was the opposite of licentiousness. 20 The
doctrine of perseverance actually promoted diligence
and obedience. Referring to 2 Tim 2.19 (But God's firm
foundation stands, bearing this seal; "The Lord knows
who are his...".) Owen argued:
This	 then,	 beyond	 all	 colourable
exception, is the intendment of the
apostle	 in	 the	 words
	 under
consideration; though many professors
fall away,	 yet you that	 are true
-....	
16 Owen, Perseverance, pp.85-86.
17 Owen, Perseverance, pp.97-98.
Owen, Perseverance, p.98.
Quoted in Owen, Perseverance, p.99.
4 Owen, Perseverance, pp. 101-102; cf. pp.261-262.
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believers, be	 not shaken	 in	 your
confidence, for God hath laid the
foundation of all your preservation in
his eternal purposes, whereby you are
designed to life and salvation, and by
the fruits whereof you are discriminated
from the best of them, that fall away;
only continue in the use of means, let
every one of ye depart from iniquity,
and keep up to that universal holiness,
whereunt41 also ye are appointed and
chosen.
The point which Owen tried to make was that, whereas
Goodwin suggested the possibility of
	 the saints'
apostasy, to Owen the doctrine of perseverance
maintained its impossibility due to the infallibility
of election, Christ's death for the elect • and the
sovereignty of the Spirit.	 Owen accused Goodwin of
suggesting that perseverance was predicated upon the
rational capability of man to maintain his own
standing. 22 According to Owen this view of mankind was
wrong, it failed to take seriously the effects of
indwelling sin.	 The saints could decay in grace, and
that was why they needed daily fresh supplies of
continuing grace.	 But if perseverance was dependent
upon the aptitude and fortitude of the individual then,
In a word, that men are able to plant in
themselves inclinations and dispositions
to refrain all manner of sin destructive
to the safety of their souls, fuller of
energy, vigour, life, strength, power,
than those that are in them, to avoid
things apparently tending to the
destruction of their natural lives, is
an assertion as full of energy,
strength, and vigour, life and poison,
for the destruction and eversion of the
21 Owen, Perseverance, p.182.
22 Owen, Perseverance, p.108.
Perseverance, pp.112-13, 119.23 Owen,
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grace of GAd in Christ, as any can be
invented.
The second aspect of the controversy between Owen
and Goodwin had to do with the nature of God's will.
As explained in chapter 3, Owen accepted the relative
free agency of secondary agents: in this way the
doctrine of perseverance never nullified human acts of
disobedience, neither	 were	 the means	 of	 grace
insignificant. 25 Fundamentally, however, the saints
persevered because God willed it so. Owen appealed to
a number of Biblical texts, principally Malachi 3.6,
"For I the LORD do not change, therefore you, 0 Sons of
Jacob are not consumed.", and Romans 11.29, "For the
gifts and calling of God are irrevocable." In
contrast, Goodwin argued that, "the gifts and calling
of God may be said to be without repentance because let
men continue the same persons which they were, when the
donation or collation of any gift was first made by God
unto them...".	 Owen thought this was illogical: how
could it be that men were promised perseverance as
along as they remain faithful and obedient?	 Owen
insisted that it was in election and predestination
where the promise of perseverance could be found. 27
Despite the actual sins and weaknesses of God's people,
ultimately God's will for his own people would triumph
and the elect would never fall away irrevocably.
That	 which	 God	 affirms shall	 be
24 Owen, Perseverance, p.113.
25 See chapter 3, pp.177-78 and 181-82.
26 Owen, Perseverance, p.123.
27 Owen, Perseverance, pp.150-51.
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certainly and infallibly fulfilled upon
the account of the immutability of his
own nature, and he encourageth men to
expect it, as certainly to be fulfilled,
as he	 is unchangeable; that	 shall
infallibly, notwithstanding all
oppositions and difficulties, be wrought
and perfected; now that such, and so
surely bottomed, is the continuance of
the love of God unto his saints, krid so
would he have them expect, etc...
Goodwin did not go so far. He accepted the
importance of predestination, but predestination had
more to do with a relation between possibility and
condition. Goodwin tended to favour "preapproves" or
"approbation" when discussing predestination. 	 In
other words, God foresaw those who would come to faith
and endure in faith and on the basis of this
foreknowledge willed the perseverance of the believer.
According to Goodwin perseverance was a condition.
Those who persevered were truly the elect; Goodwin had
no problem with this, but that the elect were ipso
facto guaranteed to persevere he would not maintain.
The third aspect of Owen and Goodwin's disagreement
related precisely to this question of perseverance as a
covenant condition. Owen claimed that Goodwin held to
the notion that the love of God was conditional upon
believing. Owen rejected this interpretation: to make
any action or quality of man antecedent to God's love
or grace was totally wrong and Pelagian. 30 Of course,
agreed Owen, men and women were to employ God's
appointed means but the means did not possess any
28 Owen, Perseverance, p.130-31.
29 Goodwin, Redemption Redeemed, p.219.
30 Owen, Perseverance, pp.155-56.
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conditional merit.	 Means were only suitable and
appropriate to the life of faith. 31	 Owen argued that
even in the covenant with Abraham (Gen 17.7) God
promised	 himself	 unconditionally;	 the	 people's
disobedience	 would	 not	 affect	 the	 covenant
irreversibly. 32	 If the	 covenant rested on the
performance of conditions then the covenant of grace
was nothing more than the covenant of works. 33
 God was
always the primary agent in the covenant of grace. 34
Even in the example of God's promises to the nation of
Israel, Owen claimed, what mattered was not the
condition of obedience expected from Israel but God's
gracious faithfulness to the elect of Israel.
Furthermore, even the gospel promises, despite the
appearances of qualifications and conditions, were
nevertheless absolute promises. "I say then, that even
the conditional promises of God, are absolutely made
good." n	 Obedience was not a condition	 for grace,
this was crucial to Owen's argument. He reminded the
reader that while there was an indissoluble union
between sin and punishment, the same was not true
between obedience and reward. 36 All gospel promises,
moreover, were made to redeemed sinners, and only in
31 Owen, Perseverance, p.172.
32 Owen, Perseverance, pp.205 ff.
33 Owen, Perseverance, pp.207-08.
34 Cf. Owen, Perseverance, p.270.
35
Owen, Perseverance, p.235; cf.pp. 228 and 233.
36 
Owen, Perseverance, p.229.
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Christ and through Christ were the benefits of Christ's
promises obtained. Here Owen's Christocentrism was
apparent.
Christ intercedes, that they may be
preserved by the power of his Father, in
and through the use of those means,
which he graciously affords them, and
the powerful presence of the Spirit of
God with them therein; and that, not on
any such absurd and foolish conditions,
that they may be so preserved by his
Father, provided they preserve
themselves, and continuous believers, on
condition	 tat	 they	 continue	 to
believe...
The promises of the gospel flowed out of one's union
with Christ. According to Owen, perseverance was not
dependent upon the faithfulness and obedience of the
saints, for this would be foolishly illogical. "Now
what one drop of consolation can a poor, drooping,
tempted soul, squeeze out of such promises, as depend
wholly or solely upon anything within themselves...?"313
Why would the saints need the promise of perseverance
if they were already persevering?
The counsel of his heart (as to the
fulfilling of it), doth not depend on
any thing in us; what sin thou art
overtaken withal, he will pardon; and
will effectually supply thee with his
Spirit, that thou shalt not fall into,
or continue in such sins, as would cut
off thy communion with him; and doth not
this mix with the forementioned promises
with faith, and so render it effectual
to the carrying on of the work ofnlove
and obedience, as was mentioned?
Owen's view of perseverance, then, may be summarized
in the following way.
	 The seemingly conditional
37 Owen, Perseverance, p.378.
38 Owen, Perseverance, pp.238-39; see also pp. 235-39.
39 Owen, Perseverance, p.405.
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promises demanding perseverance were actually absolute
promises. In Owen's opinion they were procured in and
by Christ for the believer. It was not, however, that
obedience was meaningless. The saints were commanded
to persevere, but the potentiality and capability were
found in one's union with Christ. Sin was never
minimised, but the promise of perseverance was that God
would enable the believer to triumph over the sin;
sin's challenge would be defeated. 	 God was committed
to victory within the elects' lives.
7.1.2 Baxter's view of perseverance: a covenant promise 
Close	 attention	 has	 been	 given	 to	 Owen's
disagreement with John Goodwin in order to see Owen's
insistence upon the
	 immutability of perseverance.
Their	 dispute also
	 helps	 to illumine	 Baxter's
understanding of perseverance.	 In some ways Baxter
came close to Goodwin's view; he too emphasised it as a
condition.	 Yet, Baxter also agreed with Owen: the
infallibility of election was anaspect of the saints'
hope. Baxter's view, therefore, not only shows his
independent thinking but it also demonstrates the
diversity of opinion on perseverance which existed
within mid-seventeenth century puritanism.
Interestingly,	 however, Baxter	 wrote that	 the
doctrine of perseverance should not be a central issue
for his contemporaries. 	 In	 Catholick Theologie
(1675), he stated that for the first one thousand years
of church history Christians never claimed a certainty
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of perseverance.	 In an earlier work on perseverance
Baxter wrote	 that the doctrine	 never played an
important role in the early churches or in the creeds
and confessions of the church.	 He suggested that
the issue became prominent because of the scholastic
concern to explain probability and possibility in
relationship to the will of God. 42 Baxter's argument
was that the issue of perseverance was relatively new,
and should not divide the church of his day.
Moreover, he maintained that knowledge of certain
perseverance was not absolutely necessary in order to
have peace of mind. He argued this solely on the basis
of experience. The early church had no doctrine of
perseverance and many seemed to have possessed a
certain hope.	 Likewise, Augustine, Luther and the
Arminians had no doctrine of assurance and, yet, they
were not robbed of assurance! 3	The doctrine of
perseverance, argued Baxter, presupposed that
Christians were assured that they believed sincerely
and would endure to the end in a life of faithful
obedience. As a pastor Baxter recognised that few were
assured of their own strength. If told to look at the
fruit of sanctification most people would find little
hope. "If a man be uncertain whether he be sanctified,
truly himself he must needs be uncertain whether he
40 Baxter, Catholick Theolagie, II, pp.93-103.
41	 Baxter, Richard Baxter's Account of his Present Thoughts concerning the
Controversies about the Perseverance of the Saints (1657), p.23.
42 See chapter 2, pp.87-89.
43 Baxter, Perseverance of the Saints, p.19.
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shall persevere in that grace which he knoweth not that
44he hath; yea and in common grace it self." 	 In the
final section of this chapter the question of assurance
will be examined, but for the moment we are concerned
with the promise of perseverance, and Baxter's
conviction that certainty of perseverance was elusive
in the common experience of God's people.
But too sad experience telleth us that
there be but few, exceeding few of the
godly among us that are certain of their
sincerity, Justification, or Salvation:
I have desired several Ministers that
converse much with experienced
Christians, and hear them open the state
of their souls, to tell me how they find
them in point of assurance? And divers
of them of largest acquaintance tell me
that they meet not with one that hath
it; but that they all profess some
doubting and uncertainty, and one that
they ask will say, I am sure.
Here Baxter had in mind the question of assurance; but
the issue was, many of these doubting Christians wanted
a hope of perseverance -- a hope of their final triumph
over sin and weakness. 46
But was it possible for the saints to fall away?
This was the central question. 	 To repeat, Arminians
suggested that it was possible, albeit remote.	 Owen,
on the other hand, said it was not possible. Baxter
took a middle position.	 He too insisted on making a
distinction between possibility and probability. 	 It
was possible for saints	 to fall away, but	 the
.,...---..."'''
44 Baxter, Perseverance of the Saints, p.20.
45 Baxter, Perseverance of the Saints, p.20.
46 Baxter, Perseverance of the Saints, p.21.
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probability was that they would not.°	 The possibility
existed because even redeemed humanity was weak and
prone to	 the effects of indwelling	 sin.	 This
possibility, however, did not challenge the sovereignty
of God's will. The possibility of apostasy was a
statement about the human condition, not about the
purposes of God. The warnings and exhortations in
Scripture existed	 because of the	 possibility of
apostasy not because of any probability.
	 In effect
they became effective aids or means to warn God's
people and to turn them away from danger. The danger
was very real and so concern was absolutely essential
but the probability was that the elect, because they
were predestined to faith and glory, would persevere. 48
Note Baxter's appeal to the covenant of grace and
especially to the influence of election:
As to the question therefore whether
Justification be lossable, and pardon
reversible, I answer, that the grant of
them in the Covenant is unalterable; But
mans will in itself is mutable, and if
he should cease believing by Apostasy,
and the condition fail, he would lose
his Right, and be unjustified and
unpardoned, without any change in God.
But that a man doth not so de facto is
to be aswibed to Election and Special
Grace... ."
Baxter stated that the reason why so many saints had
fears and doubts about their own perseverance was
because their knowledge of their perseverance was weak
and imperfect.	 The knowledge of the impossibility or
47 Baxter, Catholick Theologie II, p.93.
48 Baxter, Catholic Theology, II, p.96.
49 Baxter, Catholick Theologie, I.ii., p..
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non futura of their apostasy was faulty according to
Baxter. "If no grace be perfect in this life, then the
assurance	 of	 our	 sincerity,	 Justification	 and
Perseverance are not.perfect in this life...". 50 But
what about the evidence of so many individuals who,
either in Scripture or in many a congregation, started
off well in faith but then fell away from the faith?
Baxter instructed his readers not to look at the
apostates' experience, for their situation was not
similar to that of the godly.	 This line of argument
seemed to beg the issue, but to quote Baxter at length:
Why you know that God hath told you
expressly in his Word, that he that
repenteth and believeth shall be saved,
and that loving him, and loving one
another, and esteeming Christ and
eternal life above this world, are the
sure markes of Christ's Disciples. If
you find these in your own souls, what
need have you to doubt them because that
others have been deceived? God hath
made you more capable of knowing your
own hearts than others; and accordingly
hath made it your dugy to search your
own and not theirs...
As noted above, Baxter referred to the influence of
election and predestination, and in this way Baxter
moved from Goodwin's position. 52 Like Owen, Baxter
insisted that God was actively engaged in preserving
his elect. He went so far as to suggest that
perseverance promised that God brought about the actual
persevering faith of the elect to specific individuals.
50 
Baxter, Perseverance of the Saints,, p.31.
51
Baxter, Perseverance of the Saints, p.28.
52 
4.F.ess-r-atersaca.
	 ct-Lett p ,367.
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"To purpose believers to salvation, and not to purpose
faith and perseverance absolutely to any particular
persons, is to purpose salvation absolutely to none at
2
all...".	 While Baxter wrote this in 1650, in other
later works he insisted that the condition of abiding
faithfulness was still demanded.	 Baxter considered
that he was consistent with the thinking 	 of the
NWestminster Divines.	 The Westminster Confession
declared:
This perseverance of the saints depends,
not upon their own free will, but upon
the immutability of the decree of
election, flowing from the free and
unchangeable Love of God the Father;
upon the efficacy of the merit and
intercession of Jesus Christ; the
abiding of the Spirit and of the seed of
God within them; and the nature of the
covenant	 of grace: from	 all which
ariseth	 also	 the	 certainty	 and55infallibility thereof.
At first glance Baxter appears to have agreed with
Westminster theology; even that when the godly fell
into sin, and when God withdrew the immediacy of his
affection, still God would not abandon them forever.
Commenting upon John 16.32 he wrote,
Yet, note here, that it is but a
partial, temporary forsaking that Christ
permitteth; and not a total or final
forsaking or apostasy. Though he will
let them see that they are yet men, he
will not leave them to be but as other
men: nor will he quite cast them off, or
suffer them to perish...
	 The sincere
may manifest their infirmity; but the
hypocrites
	 will	 manifest
	 their
53 
Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest,
I 
.2-27 p.29.
-
54 Baxter, 'An unsavoury volume to Mr. Jo. Crandon's Anatomized or a Nosegay of the
choicest flowers in that Garden presented to Mr. Joseph Caryl' which is part IV in Apology,
pp.4B-49.
55 
Westminster Confession XVII.ii, Schaff, Creeds, pp.636-37.
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hypocrisy. 56
Nevertheless, Baxter differed from Owen and from the
Westminster Confession over the issue of perseverance
as a condition.	 It is important to remember that
Baxter's	 understanding of a condition in no way
diminished the superiority of Christ's merit. 57 There
was no causality or merit to a condition. He argued
throughout most of his doctrinal writings that the
diligent and obedient life (ie. perseverance) was the
condition for the final rest of God's people. God had
pledged himself to his people in the covenant; through
faith in Christ the godly were justified but they must
possess their own inherent righteousness. True, Christ
accomplished this through fresh grace and through the
Spirit, but the saints had to work and strive. Here we
can see Baxter's middle position vis-a-vis Goodwin and
Owen.
Though this perseverance be certain to
true believers; yet it is made a
condition of their salvation, yea, of
their continued life and faithfulness,
and	 the	 continuance	 of	 their
justification, though not their first
justification itself. But eternally
blessed be that hand of love, which hath
drawn the free promise, and subscribed
and sealed to that which ascertains us,
both	 of the	 grace	 which is	 the
condition, and th o kingdom	 on that
condition offered.
According to Baxter this condition was a helpful
means: it prompted attentiveness and a dependency upon
grace.	 He explained to Joseph Caryl in 1654, "I still
56 Baxter, The Divine Life, Orme ed., vol 13, pp.287-88.
57
See chapter 3.3.1 - 3.3.2.
58 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest, Orme ed., vol 22. p.196.
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affirm that God will preserve us from turning
unbelievers, notwithstanding the conditionality of this
promise, yea by the means of this conditionality to
excite us to vigilancy and care for perseverance."59
What was Baxter's point and why did he make it?
Chiefly, he tried to resist the implications of
Antinomian teaching on justification - at least as he
understood their teaching. Rather than suggest that
someone was justified before the actual moment of
faith, or that at the death of Christ every sin of the
elect was atoned, Baxter wished to comfort doubting
believers by pointing to the sure promise of
perseverance: God will see that his people will endure
in obedience, notwithstanding occasional failings, to
receive the final heavenly rest. Equally, he was
concerned with pretension or laziness which could have
arisen if a person failed to see the important demand
for obedience to "evangelical" duties. The godly had
to exercise a holy life, this was a gospel duty. To be
sure, Christ enabled them to fulfil this condition - it
was not up to their willingness and efforts alone - but
they had to strive and press on to the goal of that
heavenly rest.
Give not over watching till Satan give
over tempting, and watching advantages
against you. The promise is still but
on condition, that you persevere and
abide in Christ, and continue rooted and
steadfast in the faith, and overcome and
be faithful to the death.. If you havF0
begun resolvedly, proceed resolvedly.
59 Baxter, Apology, Part IV, p.51. For Caryl see DMIJ, vol 9, p.253.
60 Baxter, Weak Christians, p.90.
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Baxter and Owen's understanding of perseverance
reveals that in this area voluntarism was held in
check. Perseverance was not dependent supremely upon
one's willingness to strive. Baxter and Owen argued
that if perseverance was dependent upon the will of
man, then (as Baxter put it) "it were cold comfort to
those that know what man's will is." 61	 To be sure,
voluntarist implications were evident as Baxter and
Owen encouraged believers to walk faithfully and
mortify the flesh, but when it came to the promise of
perseverance God's	 will and purpose	 were judged
superior. Where voluntarism was more influential in
the Christian life was with the question of assurance,
an issue associated with perseverance but which also
stood in contradistinction. For the search for
assurance raised the question whether a person looked
to the gospel promises alone or into one's self to see
if there was a sincere appropriation of those promises,
evidence of renewal and a changed life. It is to the
question of assurance - which involved grace and duty,
mortification and perseverance, but still distinct -
which we now turn.
7.2 The Hope of the Saints: Assurance 
The voluntarism of mid-seventeenth century puritans
like Baxter and Owen, as it related to assurance, was a
refined and modified one in comparison to earlier
61 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest, pp.29-30.
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puritan teaching. It is arguable that this second
generation puritan theology tried to correct some of
the implications of puritan teaching inherited from
Perkins and Ames. There was not a return to Calvin's
teaching per se, rather there was an attempt towards an
equipoise, albeit fragile: election in Christ was the
source of assurance, but also there was a necessary
introspective task requiring a "willingness".
Voluntarism, therefore, was not the basis for enjoying
assurance, but it was nevertheless a subservient aspect
of experiencing the comfort established by Christ.
Mid-seventeenth century English puritans appreciated
that many believers experienced doubts and fears.
Sinclair B. Ferguson has quite correctly written,
For it was not simply the doctrinal
system that gave rise to the need to
discuss assurance, but the analytical
and applicatory preaching on the nature
of Christian experience. The pulpit was
the creator of anxious hearts, and
therefore the pulpit hagl to bring them
comfort and assurance.
According to John Asty, a young Owen, apparently
lacking assurance, visited Edmund Calamy's church, St.
Mary's, Aldermanbury. Calamy was elsewhere that Sunday
morning, but an unknown preacher preached on Matthew
8.26 in such a way that Owen's struggles with assurance
ended.
	
Bunyan's testimony, as he recorded it in
Grace Abounding is another illustration of a fairly
62 Ferguson, John Omen, pp.99-100. Emphasis his.
63 Asty, Collection of the Sermons of ... John Omen, p.v. See also loon, God's
Statesman, pp. 12-13 and Ferguson, John Owen, p.2. For Calamy, the elder, see NM., vol 8,
pp.227-30.
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common experience.	 Doubting was a frequent problem.
Richard Baxter described a number of periods in his own
Christian life. During one period he found comfort in
Ezekiel Culverwell's, Treatise of Faith.° Reflecting
on another period of doubt he explained that such a
dark period of doubt and despair was because,
could not	 distinctly trace	 the
workings of the Spirit upon my heart in
that method	 which Mr. Bolton,	 Mr.
Hooker, Mr. Rogers, and other divines
describe! Nor knew the time of my
conversion, being wrought on by the
forementioned degrees. But since then I
understood that the soul is in too dark
and passionate a plight at first, to be
able to keep an exact account of the
order of its own operations; and the
preparatory grace being sometimes longer
and sometimes shorter, and the first
degree of special grace being usually
very small, it is not possible that one
of very many should be able to give any
true account of the just time when
special grace began, and advanfied him
above the state of preparation.
In An End to Doctrinal Controversies Baxter insisted
that a struggle with assurance was the prevailing
experience of many. 67 Still, puritan pastors never
glorified doubting, in fact they worked hard to comfort
the doubting and the fearful among their flock.
It is precisely this pastoral emphasis, however,
which suggests that most mid—seventeenth century
puritans tended to separate faith from assurance. The
64 Bunyan, Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners (1666). For other examples see
William Bridge, The Freeness of Grace (1671), p.75; Giles Firmin, The Real Christian (1670),
To the Reader, sig B 3v; See Cohen, God's Caress, p.110, who over emphasises the value of
doubt when he writes, 'doubt spurs the desire for assurance, which encourages deeds that
increase faith, but assurance edges into presumption and inspires doubt.'
65
Baxter, Religuiae I.i.5 p.5.
66
Baxter, Reliquiae, I.i.6 p.6.
67 Baxter, An End to Doctrinal Controversies, pp.235-36.
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Westminster Confession of Faith declared, "This
infallible assurance doth not so belong to the essence
of faith, but that a true believer may wait long, and
conflict with many difficulties before he be partaker
ofit...".	 Baxter went even further than the
Westminster Divines,
Therefore	 justifying
	
Faith is	 not
assurance that we are justified;
otherwise all should have assurance that
have Faith; and justifying Faith, in
order of Nature, goeth before
Justification, but Assurance that we are
justified, followeth it; we cannot be
assured that we are justified
n
 but by
being assured that we believe.
It was possible to possess justifying faith and yet
still have to wait a long time and endure a season of
struggle before coming to personal assurance. The
Independent minister, and member of the Westminster
Assembly, Thomas Goodwin explained, "That one who truly
fears God, and is obedient to him, may be in a
condition of darknesse, and have no light; and he may
walk many days and years in that condition." 70
The common explanation for this distinction between
faith and assurance was inclined to stress experiential
influences. Few writers referred to the inscrutable
implications of election as the cause for fearful
doubting.	 Instead, as Richard Sibbes earlier in the
century	 had suggested, doubt of assurance occurred
when believers allowed	 "feeling" to eclipse true
68 Westminster Confession XVIII.iii. Schaff, Creeds, pp.638-39.
69 Baxter, An End to Doctrinal Controversies, p.280.
70 Goodwin, Childe of Light Walking in darknesse in Certaine Select Cases Resolved,
(another edition, 1647), p.4; cf. Goodwin, Christ Set Forth (1642), p.195; and Westminster
Larger Catechism, 8.81 in Torrance, School of Faith, p.201.
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knowledge of God's love. "Againe, one main ground is,
False reasoning, and error in our discourse, as that we
have no grace when we feele none: feeling is not
alwaies a fit rule to judge our states by; that God
hath rejected us, because we are crossed in outward
things, when as this issues from Gods wisdome and
love." 71 Similarly, while Thomas Goodwin thought that
the saints' doubts derived chiefly from "something that
is between God and them", more often than not weak
believers doubted because they were afraid to see that
Christ died for them personally. n Baxter, of course,
frequently challenged those who urged Christians to
think of Christ dying in substitution for them
personally; instead he called doubters to look at the
universally available covenant of grace. 73 Doubters
had problems because they questioned the sincerity of
their faith, but while their faith might be weak and
vacillate God's covenant promises stood true.
Justifying faith carried with it no assurance about
one's own sincerity but about the hope of the covenant,
that Gods Promises and all his words are
true, and that he will perform them; and
that Christ is the Saviour of the World,
and that the love of God is our End and
Happiness, and that all this is offered
to us in Christ, even pardon and Life,
as well as others; which offer Faith
accepteth truly; but the believer is oft
uncertain of the sincerity of his own
71	 •
Sibbes, The Soales Conflict with it selfe..., (1635, 4th edition, 1651) p.22.
72 Goodwin, Childe of Light published in Certaine Select Cases Resolved (1645,
another edition 1647), p.5; See also Goodwin, Christ Set Forth (1642), p.195.
73 See chapter 3.3.
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74belief, and so of Salvation.
There were other explanations. Giles Firmin argued
that some of the implications contained in certain
"preparationist writings" led to spiritual depression:
specifically, stressing too much the work of the law.
He criticised particularly Thomas Hooker, Thomas
Shepherd, Daniel Rogers, William Perkins and John
75Rogers. Not surprisingly John Saltmarsh, one of the
prominent Antinomian writers of the period, suggested
that many were affected by some preachers too strenuous
in their preaching of the law. "There is nothing but
the taking in of the Law, and Accusings, Or
condemnations of it, which can trouble the Peace and
Quiet of any soul...". M
What was generally agreed was that the faithful
would in time procure some degree of assurance. Their
doubts and fears would not deter them from a life of
hope. In fact, the hope of assurance was never hidden,
for the basis of assurance was Jesus Christ himself, as
revealed in the gospel and testified to by the Spirit.
This certainty is not a bare conjectural
and probable persuasion, grounded upon a
fallible hope; but an infallible
assurance of faith, founded upon the
divine truth of the promises of
salvation, the inward evidence of those
graces unto which these promises are
made, the testimony of the Spirit of
adoption witnessing with our spirits
74 Baxter, Catholick Theologie I.ii, p.88.
75 Firmin, The Real Christian (1670), To the Reader, sig B 3v. For Firmin see DIM,
vol 19, p.45. For Hooker see DNB, vol 27, p.295; for Shephard, DNB, vol 52, p.50; for Daniel
Rogers, DNB, vol 49, p.117; and for John Rogers, DNB, vol 49, p.129.
76 Saltmarsh, Free 6race: or, the Flemings of Christs Blood	 freely to Sinners
(1646, 10th edition, 1700), p.41.
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that we are children of God: which
Spirit is the earnest of our
inheritance, whereby wc, are sealed to
the day of redemption.
The hope of assurance required no "new revelation" nor
inordinate exercise of faith, but was found in the
wonders of the new covenant and available to every
believer, though it might take long to emerge. The
gospel was first and foremost a message of grace and
mercy, assurance could be based on nothing else.
Assurance, promised William Bridge, came "in a way of
free grace and love too." 78
The hope of assurance was, of course, associated
with God's predestinating purpose and with election;
yet assurance was not promised by puritan pastors in
strict predestinarian language. Always the hope was
expressed with a dominant Christocentrism. "0 what a
comfort is it to a poor Christian", wrote Baxter, "that
in his greatest infirmities, and deepest sense of
unworthiness, he hath the beloved of the Father to take
his prayers and present them to God, and to plead his
cause more effectually than he can do his own."
	
79
Baxter appealed to Christ's glorious and sufficient
work on the cross and his status as resurrected Lord
and High Priest, all of which established the
infallible assurance within the covenant of grace. 80
In a work which he intended to be most pastoral and
practical he wrote,
77 
Westminster Confession XVIII.ii, Schaff, Creeds, p.638.
78 
Bridge, The Freeness of Grace and Love of God to Believers, p.81.
79 
Baxter, Treatise of Conversion, Orme ed., vol 7, p.207.
80 
Baxter, Catholick Theologie LH, p.90.
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Yea, he is engaged by Covenant to
Receive us; when we gave up ourselves to
him, he also became ours; and we did it
on this	 condition, that he	 should
receive and save us: And it was the
condition of his own undertaking: He
drew the covenant himself, and tendered
it first to us, and assumed cmhis own
conditions, as he imposed ours. °'
As	 could be	 expected, Owen's	 Christocentrism
	
concentrated on the atonement: in 	 the infallible
atonement	 of	 Christ	 for	 elect	 sinners Christ
established assurance for those for whom he died.
the	 main	 foundation	 of	 all	 the
confidence and assurance whereof in this
life, we	 may be	 partakers, (which
amounts to joy unspeakable, and full of
glory)	 ariseth	 from	 this	 strict
connexion of the oblation and
intercession of Jesus Christ, that by
the one he hath procured all good things
for us, and by the other he will procure
them to be actually bestowed; whereby he
doth never leave our sinnes but follows
them into every court, until they be
fully pardoned, and clearly expiated,
Heb 9.26. he will never leave us until
he hath saved, to the utter Epst, them
that come unto God by him...
But what of the practical syllogism or the reflex
act? Did mid-seventeenth century puritans like Baxter
and Owen advocate this step in order to find assurance?
Introspection was never rejected: "it is the duty of
every one to give all diligence to make his calling and
election sure...", claimed the Westminster Confession
of Faith.	 The	 Larger Catechism (Q.80) clearly
referred to the Spirit enabling believers "to discern
81 
Baxter, The Last Mork of a Believer... prepared for the funeral of Mary...
Ranier... at the death of her daughter, before her death, reprinted (1682), p.43; see also
pp.39-56. For Baxter's treatment of covenant and covenant conditions see chapter 3.3.1.
82
Owen, Salus Electoral', p.34; cf. Thomas Goodwin, Christ Set Forth, p.193.
83 
Westminster Confession XVIII iii, in Schaff, Creedsop.638-39.
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in themselves those graces to which the promises of
life are made...". 94 Baxter suggested that assurance
required one to discover the sincerity of one's faith,
"For his assurance is the conclusion of this argument,
[Whosoever	 sincerely believeth	 and	 repenteth is
justified: But I sincerely believe and repent;
therefore I am justified] And the weakness of the
apprehension of either of the premises is even in the
conclusion, which always followeth partem debiliorem."85
Puritans like Baxter and Owen recognized, like Calvin,
that the fruit of one's sanctification could aid the
believer along the way to assurance. Indeed certain
preachers, as we have seen, encouraged the saints to
look for particular qualities within themselves. Here
is detected evidence of a voluntarism, for the saints
were encouraged to choose a way of life which would
manifest certain qualities. If a person was willing to
choose the means and gospel-aids, then he or she would
be on the way to assurance. 86
	
Even Owen suggested
that individuals should examine the choices of their
lives: has there been an abiding choice of Christ, a
choice away from temptation to sin, and a choice to
love the person of Christ? V Baxter went further and
exhorted the godly to see a strict correlation between
duty and assurance, and they should choose to act
84 Torrance, School of Faith, p.201.
85 Baxter, Catbolick Theologie I.ii. p.89.
86 Baxter, HON or Never, pp.40-41.
87
Owen, Discourse II, 7 February, 1672, in John Asty, A Conplete Collection of the
Sersons of the Reverend and Learned John Omen D.D. (1721), pp.541-42.
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88accordingly.	 "And they that have a great degree of
grace, and also keep it in lively exercise, do seldom
doubt of it." n	 Earlier he had written, "Assurance
and peace are Christ's great encourgements to
faithfulness and obedience: and, therefore, though our
obedience do not merit them, yet they usually rise and
fall with our diligence in duty."
Yet this observation cannot be pushed too far
because at the same time there was a scepticism about
the practical syllogism: it was fallible because it
expected	 the	 individual	 to	 have	 an accurate
self-awareness, and this could lead either to further
fear or presumption. 	 If the saints were to examine
themselves for external or internal signs of
sanctification then they must do so only with the
greatest caution. Thomas Goodwin wrote,
Thus whensoever we would go down into
our owne hearts, and take a view of our
graces, let us be sure first to look
wholly out of our selves unto Christ, as
our justification, and to close with him
immediately; and this as if we had no
present, or by-pas grace, to evidence
our being in him.
John Owen was even more sceptical. He preferred to
stress the testimony of the Spirit of adoption. "Yea,
in the very graces themselves of faith and uprightness
of heart, there is such a seal and stamp, impressing
88 
For Baxter (and Owen) on the relationship between grace and duty see chapter
6.1.2.
89 Baxter, The Character of a Sound Confirmed Christian, as also of a peak
Christian: hnd of a seeming Christian, the second part of Directions for peak Distempered
Christians (1669), pp.66-67.
90 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest (1650), p.514.
91 Goodwin, Christ Set Forth, To the Reader, Sig A3.
379
the image of God upon the soul, as without any reflex
act,	 or	 actual	 contemplation of	 those	 graces
themselves...". 92
Baxter's principal exhortation was that the faithful
be willing to accept the covenant of grace; in their
willingness was the procurement of assurance. Baxter
maintained that as long as one was willing to accept
the offered Christ then this was evidence of justifying
faith. "For his willingness is his very consent or
Acceptance; and that Consent is true Faith: Christ
expecteth no more to make up the match." 93 It was not
a perfect, sinless, willingness which was required but
sincerity or, "which way goes the prevailing bent or
choyce of your will...".
Thus, this reflex act was received with hesitancy
and considerable qualification. At times Baxter seemed
to suggest that discovering one's sincerity was the way
to assurance, but he urged that sincere faith was only
brought about by a predisposing act of grace.
the final word was an acknowledgment of God's work in
the believer's life.	 96	 He	 declared that the
syllogism's conclusion was only a "fruit of faith".
"This is a rational conclusion helped by Grace, whereof
the major only is de fide (He that believeth is
92 
Owen, Perseverance, pp.83.
93 
Baxter, Rphorisses of Justification, p.278.
94 
Baxter, Aphorises of Justification, p.279.
95 
He states this explicitly in The Saints Everlasting Rest p.490.
96 
Baxter, Divine Life, Urine ed. vol 13, II., p.245.
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justified] but not the minor II believe]. Therefore we
usually call it a Fruit of Faith." 97 One was assured,
therefore, not by exalting one's own act of faith or
sanctification but by recognising the love and mercy of
God which enabled one's act of faith. Whatever
assurance came from the practical syllogism it was
qualified by a greater emphasis upon the person of the
Savior and the work of the Spirit. 	 "It is by the
Spirit", explained Baxter, "that all Christians must
come to their assurance...". 98 Owen suggested that
while the work of the Holy Spirit might take a long
time there could never be any full assurance without
the Spirit's work, a work in which, "when our spirits
are pleading their right and title, he comes in and
bears witness on our side...".
By examining puritan writers like Baxter and Owen a
fundamental conclusion may be reached: the practical
syllogism was not dismissed outright, but
Christocentrism and pneumatology were far more central
in explaining assurance. It was mentioned above that
Bunyan's Grace Abounding illustrates mid-seventeenth
century puritan struggles with doubt. Bunyan was not
fully	 at peace	 until he	 recognised	 the alien
righteousness of Christ imputed to him:
this Sentence fell upon my soul, thy
Righteousness is in Heaven: And
methought withal, I saw with the Eyes of
my	 Soul,	 Jesus	 Christ	 at	 God's
Right-hand;	 there, I	 say, was	 my
97 Baxter, An End to Doctrinal Controversies, p.239.
98 Baxter, Cathalick Theologie I.ii, p.91; cf. Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest,
p.493.
99 Owen, Of Cosmunion, p.241; cf. Hebrews, Vol.2, p.147.
'381
Righteousness; so that wherever I was,
or whatever I was doing, God could not
say of me, He wants my Righteousness,
for that was just before him. I also
saw moreover, that it was not my good
Frame of Heart that made my
Righteousness better, nor yet my bad
Frame that made my Righteousness worse;
for my Righteousness was Jesus Christ
himself, the same YeMerday, today, and
forever Heb. 13.8.
What is seen in the issue of assurance, then, is a
qualified voluntarism. The will had a role to play in
experiencing assurance, for assurance did not come
through a passive persuasion of faith. Mid-seventeenth
century puritans, as represented chiefly by Baxter and
Owen, cautiously advocated introspection to see the
handiwork of the Spirit and God's grace. In this sense
they continued the distinction between faith and
assurance. But for them this distinction had more to
do with particular experiential issues: it was just a
fact that many of the godly had a difficulty in
appropriating the confidence which both Scripture and
the preacher promised.	 To save the godly from
destructive anxiety Baxter and Owen appealed to the
person of Christ. In him targ" the saints'	 hope and
assurance. Owen pointed to the death of Christ; Baxter
to the universal covenant. Both stressed the
comforting work of the Holy Spirit. The voluntarism -
that is the will's choosing - was always subordinate to
the work of grace. The state of the renewed will, as
Baxter and Owen explained it, has to be remembered when
100 Bunyan, Grace Abounding #229, p.117. See Richard Sreaves, 'John Bunyan and
Covenant Thought in the Seventeenth-Century,' CU 36 (1967), p.163. He argues that Bunyan
accepted the need for a 'personal, experiential awareness of being under the covenant of
grace ...'. This is true, but 6reaves seems to have passed over the emphasis which Bunyan
gave to Christ's imputed righteousness even in the quote he offers from Lam and Grace.
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reading of the will's activity in assurance. In
general many of the doctrinal implications of Perkins
et al were continued after 1649; so R.T. Kendall's
argument	 cannot
	 be	 dismissed	 outright.	 101
Nevertheless, when mid-seventeenth century puritan
understanding of the will is examined -- as it related
to the covenant, the use of means and the relation
between grace and duty -- it is clear that particularly
Owen, and even Baxter to an extent, qualified and
modified earlier teachings on the nature of assurance.
Conclusion 
In this chapter on perseverance and assurance a
number of conclusions have been reached. With regard
to Baxter and Owen's views on perseverance, it was
argued that their opinions reflected points along a
spectrum of mid-seventeenth century thought. Owen was
one whose understanding of election led him to stress
the immutable	 certainty that God's	 people would
persevere.	 He was not	 ignoring the reality of
indwelling sin; rather, sin notwithstanding, the saints
would endure because of God's commitment to them.
Owen's Christology also shaped his interpretation of
the saints' duty to persevere: the promises and hopes
were found in Christ. Baxter's consideration of
perseverance shows how subtle were the shades of
thought along the spectrum in the mid-seventeenth
101 See chapter 1, pp.4 ff.
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century: he neither fully agreed with the Arminians nor
entirely concurred with Owen. Still, for Baxter the
guarantee of perseverance was not so much with a
person's performance of duties as with 	 the sure
promises of God in the covenant of grace.
For Baxter and Owen assurance, therefore, involved
supremely a sure confidence in the grace of God
extended in the covenant and the indwelling Spirit.
Yet, both reveal a tendency among mid-seventeenth
centuty puritans to make a clearer distinction between
faith and assurance than, say, Calvin. Provided that
one appreciates that Calvin recognized the experiential
problems of believers, then Baxter and Owen's view on
assurance was not altogether a fundamental departure
from Calvin.	 On the other hand, it is clear that
Baxter and	 Owen tacitly advocated	 the practical
syllogism; yet the evidence would suggest that they
placed only slight confidence in the exercise.
Instead, greater stress was placed upon the work of the
Spirit. What is manifestly obvious from the material
considered in this chapter is that for both Baxter and
Owen assurance was more than result of a passive
persuasion of the mind. Voluntarism was involved.
This voluntarism suggests, in the final analysis, a
piety which demanded a willingness. To be sure, this
chapter also showed that such a willingness was
controlled, subordinate to, and moderated by the truths
(as Baxter and Owen conceived them) of Christology,
predestination	 and	 pneumatology.	 Still,	 the
prominence, but not dominance, of the will's choosing
384
to respond to the divine initiative was a key element
of the day to day living of the saint, and a salient
aspect of his hope.
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CONCLUSION 
This	 thesis	 has	 studied	 the	 importance	 of
voluntarism within	 mid-seventeenth century puritan
theology and practice. It has been argued that
voluntarism should be defined as the prominence, but
not dominance, of the human will in response to the
divine initiative in the divine/human encounter.
Richard Baxter and John Owen have been taken to
illustrate mid-seventeenth century puritanism. Because
of their prominence within mid-seventeenth century
puritanism and the significance of their publications
it was argued that they were valid representatives of
the period. Nevertheless, it was also shown that they
reflected the diversity of opinion within seventeenth
century Calvinism.
To introduce the question of "Calvinism", however,
only begs further questions concerning voluntarism.
Specifically, in what sense was there a theological
continuity from Calvin to Baxter and Owen with regard
to the doctrine of the human will? 	 Additionally,
"Calvinism" is hard to define.	 Should Calvinism be
equated with the theology of Perkins and Ames, and how
did their views on human willingness relate to
Calvin's? Is there any specific evidence to suggest
that later Calvinists were modifying or correcting
Calvin's theology of the human will? Lastly, due to
the infrequent references to Calvin's writings in the
works of Baxter and Owen, it remains difficult to
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confine a study of mid-seventeenth . century puritan
voluntarism to a comparison and contrast with the
voluntarism of John Calvin. This thesis has argued
that there were notable similarities between Calvin's
voluntarism and Baxter and Owen's: thus suggesting a
significant degree of continuity. Yet, this continuity
should not be limited to the issue of Calvin versus the
Calvinists.
Appropriately, the thesis looked to earlier
antecedents for Baxter and Owen's voluntarism. It was
shown that Augustine was the principal influence not
only upon Baxter and Owen, but upon a tradition in
which Luther and Calvin both stood. Attention was
given to Augustine's theories on divine sovereignty and
human freedom. While important modifications were made
to Augustine's theology, principally due to a revived
Aristotelianism during the middle ages, there was a
tradition which understood freedom in a particular way.
Freedom of the will was relative: the will chose
relative to its nature. As affected by sin the will
chose according to its sinful nature; in this sense it
chose to sin freely. There was no external necessity
or constraint upon men and women to sin. While the
will was free in this relative sense, only by grace
could a sinful will be healed and corrected. How grace
and human nature interacted, however, was shown to have
been explained in varying ways: this was the issue with
which medieval ' theologians like Aquinas, Duns Scotus,
Ockham and Bradwardine were concerned. In reaction to
the conclusions reached by the via moderna of Ockham
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and Biel, Luther built on the work of Bradwardine and
led	 the	 subsequent	 Reformers	 into	 a	 revived
Augustinianism.	 It	 was suggested, however, that
Luther's anthropology was less optimistic than
Calvin's; and Calvin, while very much an Augustinian,
was also less willing to dismiss certain Scholastic
metaphysical conclusions. These antecedents and the
Augustinian tradition shaped the context in which
Baxter and Owen wrote.
This thesis has also argued that Baxter and Owen
were influenced	 by covenant theology.
	
Covenant
theology was a	 central aspect of mid-seventeenth
century puritan
	
theology and practice. 	 It was
stressed, however, that covenant theology was not a
"system" of theology. It was a way of explaining the
divine initiative.	 This explanation was never free
from paradox:
	 both divine sovereignty and human
secondary agency were defended. Yet in this context it
was noted that Baxter and Owen differed. Baxter was
far more willing to accept a universal and conditional
covenant. Owen claimed that the covenant was absolute,
for by the death of Christ the elect were infallibly
predestined. It was argued, therefore, that attention
must be given to Christology when reading seventeenth
century covenant theology. Baxter viewed Christ as the
covenant law satisfier: by his merits and death a new
covenant was established into which all were invited
provided that they met the condition of faith. Owen,
on the other hand, gave far more emphasis to Christ's
atonement: namely that Christ died in substitution for
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the elect only and by his death they were infallibly
brought into the covenant.	 Neither Baxter nor Owen
were willing to go to the extremes of either
Arminianism or Antinomianism; in this respect their
interpretations of the covenant of grace were, on one
level,	 similar.	 Yet	 due	 to their	 different
understandings of the merits and righteousness of
Christ, and conditionality and contingencies, they
arrived at divergent views of the covenant of grace.
Despite this difference both stressed the
importance of a "willingness". Their voluntarism meant
that faith was more than a passive persuasion of the
mind. Faith involved the whole of man's faculties:
intellect, will and affections. In the exercise of the
will both Baxter and Owen pressed upon their readers
the necessity of human choice. This willingness was
not an exaltation of the human will, yet it was with a
recognition that grace and the Holy Spirit renovated
the will because choice was fundamental to the image of
God in men and women. Baxter and Owen both spoke of
the "suitability" of human choice in response to the
gospel: Nevertheless, there was a paradox here and it
cannot be resolved: there was no way the human will
could choose to respond to the gospel apart from the
sovereign work of God, but a choice had to occur.
Justification, therefore, according to Baxter and
Owen, involved voluntarism. What must be remembered is
that voluntarism did not minimize the sovereignty of
God in justification. While Baxter and Owen differed
in their understanding of predestination and election,
389
they both claimed that justification was a sovereign
work of God in a person's life, through the merits of
Christ and the influence of the Spirit. Only a
renovated will responded to the call of the preacher to
repent and believe. Baxter and Owen did not entirely
dismiss preparation for faith: but they were reluctant
to go any further than to suggest that there was a
preparation, through means which God ordained, which
brought a person to faith. Through this process the
will was changed and redirected. The main cause,
however, was not the work of the law as much as it was
the work of the Spirit.
On this basis the Christian life, according to
Baxter and Owen,	 involved a mysterious dialectic
between	 divine	 sovereignty	 and human	 response.
Christians were not to ignore duty, for in the
performance of duty they grew in grace. It was not so
much a case of works meriting further grace as it was
obedience appropriate to the believer's new creation in
Christ. The inverse of the life of duty was the
profound self-awareness of indwelling sin and failure.
The greatest challenge in the Christian life was a
watchfulness of the self. Essential to this self-
awareness was willingness. Were the saints willing to
use the means of grace? Were they willing to fight
indwelling sin? Never could they rely on the
steadfastness of their willingness, for it was the
person of Christ in whom they gained solace and
strength; but their willingness mattered.
"..'
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While Christians lived in this
	 world, claimed
Baxter and Owen,	 they struggled with doubts and
questions. Perseverance and assurance were hopes
which, while associated with voluntarism, ultimately
depended upon God's gracious and sovereign mercy.
Baxter and Owen did not fully reject the practical
syllogism, but they gave	 greater emphasis to	 a
confidence in the Spirit's work and the tenor of the
covenant	 of grace.	 Such	 were the	 doctrinal
underpinnings and the practical issues of mid-
seventeenth century voluntarism, as seen in Richard
Baxter and John Owen.
The contribution which this study makes to the
knowledge of puritan theology and practice lies
principally in the definition of voluntarism offered.
Puritan theology, while shaped by Scholastic rhetoric
and methodology, was still a theology which attempted
to explain human experience.	 The experiential aspect
of	 the puritan	 faith	 implies that	 the modern
interpreter	 must	 be	 prepared to	 see	 numerous
contradictions and paradoxes. It is tempting to want
to resolve these tensions, either because of a
presupposition which assumes that puritan theology was
a highly systematic form of thought, exemplified in the
work of Perry Miller, or from a concern, as symbolized
by R.T. Kendall, to relate puritan theology to earlier
expressions (eg. Calvin). It was argued in this thesis
that voluntarism, as seen in Baxter and Owen, illumines
qt(daIisicA4-ift-a
the cOntrad4-e-t4ens ., paradoxes and even contradictions
within mid-seventeenth century puritanism. This study
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explored the theological dimension which Peter Lake and
Paul Seaver have charted in practical piety.
Voluntarism, as explained in this thesis, was at the
centre of puritan piety: not because it was a theory
which was superimposed upon predestinarian theology,
but because at the heart of practical Christian living
it was recognized that part of what it meant to be a
moral human being involved choice. This thesis can
bring us further along in an understanding of the
dynamics of puritan theology and practice as we
appreciate how this human aspect related to divine
activity.
...	 .... '
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APPENDIX 
The Controversy Surrounding Baxter's
Aphorismes of Justification (1649)
The following details the controversy which developed
as a result of Richard Baxter's first publication,
Aphorismes of Justification (1649), second edition
published at the Hague (1653). It was a work quite
provocative and involved some of the, more notable mid-
seventeenth century figures. Presented below is a list
of those individuals from whom Baxter received
significant reaction. It is arranged chronologically
and also records Baxter's response where relevant.
1.John Warren
Calamy Revised, p.511
2.John Owen
3.Richard Vines
DNB, vol 53, p.369
an undated response in
Baxter Treatises MS 61, vol
14, item 321. London: Dr.
Williams's Library.
	
Warren
also	 wrote
	
letters	 to
Baxter,	 one	 especially
worth	 noting	 is	 dated
August 27, 1649.
	
Baxter
responded to Warren on at
least	 two	 occasions:
September	 11,	 1649
	
and
November, 7, 1649.	 Later,
Warren	 wrote	 further
animadversions.
Owen responded to Baxter's
criticism in the Appendix
to Aphorismes in	 Of the
Death of Christ...	 (1650).
Baxter responded to Owen in
Rich: Baxter's Confession
of his Faith (1655); Owen
responded again to Baxter
in	 Vindicae	 Evangelicae
(1655). See Baxter's later
comments	 about	 Owen	 in
Religuiae	 Baxterianae
1.163, p.111.
One of the two to whom
Baxter	 dedicated
Aphorismes. Of particular
interest see his letters to
Baxter: July 1, 1650 and
July 3,
	 1651.	 Baxter,
Correspondence MS 59, vol
5.15, 5.17, 18
	 and 5.19
London:
	 Dr.	 Williams's
Library. Baxter	 responded
in	 particularly	 the
following letters: July 24,
1650 and June	 16, 1651.
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Baxter Correspondence,	 MS
59	 vol	 5.24	 and 5.20.
London:	 Dr.	 Williams's
Library
4.George Lawson
DNB, vol 32, p.289
5.John Wallis
DNB, vol 59, p.141
6.William Eyre
Calamy Revised, p.187
7.Thomas Blake
DNB, vol 5, p.179
See Baxter's comments in
Reliquiae
	 1.156,	 p.107.
Also see "Dialogue between
Baxter and Lawson", Baxter
Treatises MS 61 Vol 1.9;
Baxter's review of his
controversy with Lawson in
Baxter Treatises MS 59, vol
7.274	 and his letter to
Lawson,
	
dated August	 5,
1651 which is also in vol
7.
Epistle from John Wallis,
dated June 28, 1652. But
see Reliquiae I S156, p.107
where Baxter states	 that
he, "broke it off in the
middle because he	 little
differed from me."
Criticised Baxter in
Vindicae	 Justificationis
Gratuitae (1653). John Owen
wrote the Preface.	 Eyre
had responed to a sermon
preached by Benjamin
Woodbridge, later published
as Justification by Faith
(1653).	 Baxter	 praised
Woodbridge's sermon in	 a
response to Eyre in Rich.
Baxter's	 Apology	 (1654).
Baxter later furthered his
response to	 Eyre in	 Of
Justification	 (1658).
Benjamin Woodbridge
responded to Eyre in The
Method of Grace (1656).
Wrote against Baxter in
Vindicae Foederis (1653) to
which Baxter responded in
his Apology (1654).	 Later
Blake	 published	 Covenant
Sealed (1655) in which he
responded	 to	 Baxter's
Apology.	 Interestingly,
this work by Blake has a
commendation by	 Richard
Vines and
	 a preface	 by
Christopher Cartwright in
which reference is clearly
made to Baxter's Apology.
9.Anthony Burgess
DNB, vol 7, p.308
10.John Crandon
8.George Kendall
DNB, vol 30, p.405
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Critical reference was made
to Baxter	 in The Pagan
Preacher Silenced, or an
answer to a Treatise of Mr.
John Goodwin, entitled The
Pagans Debt and Dowry. By
Obadiah	 Howe,	 with	 a
verdict	 on	 the	 case
depending	 between	 Mr.
Goodwin	 and Mr.	 Howe
(1653).	 Baxter responded
to this	 in his	 Apology
(1654).
Baxter dedicated Aphorismes
to	 Burgess	 and	 Vines.
Burgess
	
published	 veiled
criticism
	
in	 The	 True
Doctrine of	 Justification
Asserted (1654). Baxter
also received letters from
Burgess which Baxter later
published
	 in	 Of
Justification (1658).	 See
also	 Reliquiae
	 I	 S156,
p.107.
Wrote Mr. Baxter's
Aphorisms Exorcized (1654).
Baxter responded to this in
his Apology (1654).
Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the
Seventeenth Century, I, p.188.
11.John Eedes
DNB, vol 17, p.141
Challenged Baxter
in The Orthodox Doctrine
(1654).	 This work	 dealt
with	 the debate	 between
Baxter and William Eyre.
12.A Mr. Fisher, Mr. Hagger
and a Mr. Keye Referred to by Baxter in
his Apology, Part IV, but
dismissed by Baxter.
13.John Tombes
DNB, vol 57, p.2
14.John Warner
DNB, vol 59, p.394
15.Giles Firmin
DNB, vol 19, p.45
Published Latin
animadversions and letters,
which	 were published	 by
Baxter	 in	 his	 Of
Justification (1658).
Diatriba Fidel
Justificantis	 (1657),
published in Baxter's
	 Of
Justification (1658).
Meditations upon Mr.
Baxter's Review (1672)
16.Thomas Tully
DNB, vol 57, p.310
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Justificatio Paulina (1674)
and Letter to Mr. Richard
Baxter (1675) both of which
received	 response	 in
Baxter's	 Treatise	 on
Righteousness (1676).
17.Christopher Cartwright In Reliquiae I S156, p.107,
DNB, vol 9, p.220
	 Baxter	 stated	 that	 he
received criticism from
Cartwright in the latter's
defense of the King against
the Marquess of Worcester.
There is some problem with
this.	 There is a work
entitled	 Certamen
Religiosium: or, a
Conference (1649). This is
an account between the King
and an number of divines.
The DNB, vol 3, p.450
states that actually this
was written by one Thomas
Bayly. Thomason, Catalogue
of	 the	 Pamphlets...
(London: British Museum,
1908), concurs. There is a
1651 edition of this work
which has a Preface written
by	 C.C.	 [Christopher
Cartwright].	 This Preface
says that indeed Bayly was
the author	 of the	 1649
Certamen.	 Cartwright was
not interested whether the
conference took place	 or
not. His problem was with
the lack of an answer ct
what he saw as a one-sided
presentation
	 (ie.	 Roman
Catholic) to the King. He
claimed that Part II of
this book was his response.
This may be what Baxter had
in	 mind	 in	 Reliquiae.
Cartwright	 later	 wrote,
Exceptions	 against	 a
Writing	 of Mr.	 Baxter's
(1675) which Baxter
included in his Treatise of
Righteousness (1676).
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